JUDGMENT C.S.P. Singh, J. - The petitioners challenge the order of appointment of the Receiver of their Mills as also the order dated 21-9-1972 (Annexure `16' to the petition) by which the District Magistrate, Moradabad extended the period of appointment for a further period of one year with effect from 26-9-1972 as also an order dated 4-111972 passed by the same Officer (Annerure `20' to the petition) dismissing the objections filed by the petitioners against the appointment of the aforesaid Receiver. 2. The facts leading to the present petition may now be shortly stater. Messrs Kundan Sugar Mills own a factory in Amroha in the district of Moradabad. This factory has been leased out to Kundan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. and Seth Pooran Chand Agarwal is the Managing Director of the lessee company. A Receiver of the Factory was appointed by the District Magistrate, Moradabad for recovery of an amount of Rs. 82,41,071.78 which had fallen in arrears towards cane price, cane purchase tax and provident fund. The aforesaid appointment purported to have been made by virtue of powers conferred under Section 146(1) (i)/182-A (1) (a) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. The order aforesaid was to remain effective till 31-10-1970. Writ Petition No. 3663 of 1969 was filed in this Court for quashing this order but was dismissed. Thereafter, Special Appeal No. 186 of 1970 was filed, but during the pendency of the appeal, the Collector, Moradabad superseded the order of 8th October 1969 and passed fresh orders for appointment of Receiver. As a result, the Special Appeal became infructuous and thereafter writ petition No. 1243 of 1971 was filed for quashing the order of appointment of Receiver dated 25th September, 1970. Subsequently, the tenure of Receiver was extended to 26-9-72 and this order too was challenged by the petitioners in the aforesaid writ petition. This writ petition was dismissed on 19th May, 1972. The Court, however directed that in as much as the order appointing a Receiver had been made without affording the petitioner an opportunity to show cause against the proposed order, it should be permitted to file objections before the Collector challenging the appointment of the Receiver. The petitioner thereafter filed objections against the order of appointment of the Receiver. The Court, however directed that in as much as the order appointing a Receiver had been made without affording the petitioner an opportunity to show cause against the proposed order, it should be permitted to file objections before the Collector challenging the appointment of the Receiver. The petitioner thereafter filed objections against the order of appointment of the Receiver. Before the objections were disposed of, the District Magistrate, Moradabad passed one of the impugned orders dated 20-9-1972 by which the tenure of the Receiver was extended till 25-9-1973. Subsequently, after hearing the parties, he dismissed the, objection on 4-11-1972. 3. Counsel for the petitioners has urged that a Receiver has been functioning in respect of Mills since the year 1969 and that during this period the liabilities instead being wiped out, have increased to a colossal extent, and this being so, the order extending the appointment of the Receiver is unjustified and patently erroneous. There was considerable controversy between the parties as to the exact amount of arrears due at the present moment. Competing figures were given showing the extent of liability as due now. It is not necessary to decide the exact amount of liability qua Government dues. Still outstanding against the company, as it is not denied by the respondents that arrears running into several lacs of rupees still remained due in respect of cane price, cane purchase tax and provident fund dues. In the counter-affidavit of Shri Ram Newas Tewari, who is the Receiver of the Mills, the liability as on 30-6-1972 have been set out in Annexure `CA-4'. The arrears in respect of sugarcane price and purchase tax are as under :--- Sugar cane price and commission etc. Rs. 32,75,921.69 Interest accrued thereon Rs. 11,12,603.75 Purchase tax Rs. 60,08,818.78 4. The liability under these two heads alone works out to Rs. 1,03,97,344.22. Counsel for the petitioners has urged that the increase in this liability has been on account of the mis-management by the Receiver and there is no chance for clearing off these arrears. On the contrary, it has been strongly urged on behalf of the respondents that the Receiver has been able to put the Mills in better financial shape, and that there are fair prospects of the liability being wiped out in the near future. 5. The processes to which resort can be had to by the Collector are set out under Secs. 5. The processes to which resort can be had to by the Collector are set out under Secs. 146(1) (i) and 182-A (1) (a) of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1910 which read as under :- "146. (I) An arrear of revenue may be recovered by one or more of the following processes:- (a) by serving a writ of demand or a citation to appear on any of the defaulters; (b) by arrest and detention of his person; (c) by attachment and sale of his movable property; (d) by attachment of the specific area, share, patti, or mahal in respect of which the arrear is due; (e) by transfer of such share or patti to a solvent co-sharer in the mahal; (f) by annulment of the settlement of such patti or of the whole mahal; (g) by sale of such specific area of patti of the whole mahal; (h) by attachment and sale of other immovable property of the defaulter; and (i) by appointing a receiver of any property, movable or immovable, of the defaulter. "182-A(1), Notwithstanding anything in this Act, when an arrear of revenue is due, the Collector may, in addition to or instead of any of the processes here in before specified, by order :- (a) appoint, for such period as he may deem fit, a Receiver of any movable or immovable property of the defaulter;" 6. It will be noticed that the Collector can have resort to as many as seven modes of recovery of the arrears in question. 7. Now the power enjoyed by the Collector in making the recovery is a statutory power, and although the statutory does not specifically lay down the manner or method in which the power has to be exercised, courts have read into such statutory powers certain implied limitations; one of them being that the power must be used honestly, bonafide and reasonably; and the second that it must be exercised for the purpose for which it is conferred. In re : Mayor and Co. of Westminster and London and North Western Railway Company', 1905 A.C. 426 the House of Lords while considering the limitation of the power enjoyed by sanitary authorities observed on page 430 as under :- "There can be no question as to the law applicable to the case. In re : Mayor and Co. of Westminster and London and North Western Railway Company', 1905 A.C. 426 the House of Lords while considering the limitation of the power enjoyed by sanitary authorities observed on page 430 as under :- "There can be no question as to the law applicable to the case. It is well settled that a public body invested with statutory powers such as those conferred upon the corporation must take care not to exceed or abuse its powers. It must keep within the limits of the authority committed to it. It must act in good faith. And it must it reasonably. The last proposition is involved in the second, if not in the first." 8. In the King v. Roberts, 1924 A. C. (2) K. B. D. 695, a question arose as to whether metropolitan borough council, which was entrusted with the power of managing the borough and to employ servant necessary for such administration could pay wages, which were unreasonable. Bankes, L. J. held that even though Section 62 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855 did not specifically set any limit to the salary which could be paid by the council, such a restriction was implicit. He observed on page 708 as under :- "I cannot come to the conclusion that the Legislature, in giving the commissioners of Sewers in 1848 authority to pay wages without any qualification whatever, or in giving a borough council in 1855 authority to pay such wages as they though fit, intended to confer upon either body authority to expend public moneys in paying unreasonable wages or to create any distinction between the wages lawfully payable to their employees by one class of public authority and by another...." Scrutton, L. J. considering this question held on p. 719 as under :- "While I sympathise with this view, I think it goes too far as a rule of conduct. Good faith is not in my view sufficient by itself; some of the most honest people are the most unreasonable; and some excesses may be sincerely believed in, but yet quite beyond the limits of reasonableness. Good faith is not in my view sufficient by itself; some of the most honest people are the most unreasonable; and some excesses may be sincerely believed in, but yet quite beyond the limits of reasonableness. I think there must be a limit to justifiable payments, which depends on their relation to work done and its market value, as well as to good faith in the person authorising the payment; and a system which pays unskilled labour of a low grade higher wages than are being earned in the market by organised skilled labour may easily pass the bounds of reasonableness, though the system is adopted in good faith...." This case was taken on appeal to the House of Lords and the House of Lords took the view that the discretion conferred upon the council by the Statute must be exercised reasonably and that fixing by the council of an arbitrary sum for wages without regard to existing labour conditions was not an exercise of that discretion. See Roberts v. Hopwood, 1925 A. C. 578. Although these principles were enunciated qua statutory corporations, but they are now firmly established as respects Government bodies too by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1964 S. C.. wherein it was observed on p. 81 as under :- "If this were put aside, the second ground of attack on the orders may be viewed from two related aspects of ultra vires pure and simple, and secondly as an infruction of the rule that every power vested in a public body or authority has to be used honestly, bonafide and reasonably, though the two often slide into each other. 9. Let us now examine the limitation on the power of the Collector to resort to the modes of recoveries set out under the U. P. Land Revenue Act. In the first places as the power conferred on the Collector is for the purposes of effecting the recovery of an arrear of land revenue, this power can be exercised only for such a purpose and for no other, and secondly the power has to be exercised reasonably so as to achieve the object and purpose for which the power has been conferred viz. realisation of the arrear in question. realisation of the arrear in question. `Reasonableness' in the context of the section connotes adoption of one or the other modes of recovery which in the circumstances can reasonably be expected to result in the collection of the arrear. If in the circumstances of a particular case, it is clear that the adoption or continuance of one particular mode of recovery cannot possibly result in clearing of the arrears, the power would in such circumstances be an unreasonable exercise of powers or one based on extraneous considerations or exercised for a purpose other than one for which it is conferred. Although a wide berth has to be given to authorities exercising powers of collecting revenues, yet in as much as they act in exercise of powers conferred by statutes, these principles do not stand completely obliterated in their case too. To illustrate the point. let us assume that there is an arrear of land revenue which carries interest and the Collector decides to realise the arrear by lease of a holding. If in a particular case, the lease money that is received is not even sufficient to meet the interest that accrues on the arrears due, it would be clearly a case of an invalid exercise of power on the part of the Collector to lease out the property in question instead of reducing the liability by the sale of the holding. Similarly, where a Receiver of movable or immovable property is appointed, and if after the elapse of a reasonable time, it appears that there is no fair chance of the arrears being liquidated, it would amount to arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of powers by the Collector to continue the appointment of Receiver over the property in question. In the present case, as has been seen, a Receiver was appointed in respect of these Mills in the year 1969 and although nearly four years have elapsed, the Government arrears have not yet been cleared off. No clear findings have been given by the Collector as to whether there is any possibility of the arrears being paid off in case the receiver continues for sometime more. No clear findings have been given by the Collector as to whether there is any possibility of the arrears being paid off in case the receiver continues for sometime more. Considering the circumstances of this case, we are of the view that it was necessary for the Collector to have considered the question as to whether the Mill in question had the potentiality of turning out such profits as would enable the Receiver to clear off the dues for which the appointment in question was made. The Collector has not considered this aspect of the controversy. In the concluding portion of his order passed on 4-11-1972. although the Collector has expressed the view that the continuance of the Receiver is necessary for liquidating the Government dues, no reasons have been given for reaching such conclusion in spite of the fact that Government dues on the date of the passing of the order in question had increased and ran into over Rupees one crore. 10. Counsel for the petitioner has urged that considering the past workings of the various Receivers, it would be impossible for any Receiver to clear off the colossal dues which have accumulated during all these years. The question whether the Mill has the potentiality of turning over such profits as would be sufficient to clear off the dues in question within a reasonable time is a matter of evidence, and there is not enough material on the record to enable us to embark on such an enquiry and to come to a definite conclusion that this is so. This apart as in the first instance it is for the Collector to investigate this fact, we think it desirable that he should make such an enquiry. It has also been urged that the present Receiver has been mismanaging the Mills and as such too the particular mode of recovery adopted by the Collector Viz, by appointment of Receiver over the properties should be quashed. The fact that a particular Receiver has not been working satisfactorily may be a ground for the appointment of another in his place, but this fact by itself alone would not justify quashing the entire proceedings for the appointment of the Receiver. The fact that a particular Receiver has not been working satisfactorily may be a ground for the appointment of another in his place, but this fact by itself alone would not justify quashing the entire proceedings for the appointment of the Receiver. 11 It has also been urged that the term of the Receiver has been ex-tended without any opportunity being given to the petitioner to show cause against such an extension, and further that the order making the extension does not disclose any reasons whatsoever. Counsel for the respondents on the contrary has urged that it is not necessary in law to give any opportunity to the petitioner before making the extension order. It is not necessary to decide this controversy, as we feel that even if the order extending the tenure of the office of the Receiver can be said to be bad in law, the petitioner would not stand to gain in the long run, for if the order were to be quashed, the Collector can make a fresh appointment of another Receiver. Apart from this, we are also otherwise not inclined to interfere with the order in question on this ground alone, in as much as the term of the Receiver is about to expire, and in case the order extending his term is quashed now, the entire working of the Mills will he disturbed. 12. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the order passed by the Collector dated 4-11-1972 rejecting the objections of the petitioner has to be quashed. In as much as the working result of the present season too, must be by now available, it would be in the interest of justice, for the Collector to consider the working result of the present season too, before finally disposing of the objections. Counsel for the respondents has contended that we should not interfere with the order of the Collector as the order in question is appealable. It is highly contentious as to whether this is so. Counsel for the respondents has contended that we should not interfere with the order of the Collector as the order in question is appealable. It is highly contentious as to whether this is so. We are, however, of the view that even if such an alternative remedy exists, considering the nature of the controversy between the parties and the stakes involved in the dispute, and the fact that the principles on which the Collector has to decide an objection regarding the continuance of Receivers have not yet been laid down by this Court earlier, we are inclined to exercise our discretion in favour of the petitioner and not to throw out the petition on the ground of alternative remedy. 13. The petition is accordingly partly allowed. The order of the Collector dated 4-11-1972 is quashed, and the Collector is directed to decide the objections afresh in accordance with the observation made in this judgment after giving an opportunity to the petitioner to file fresh objections, if any, and to lead such evidence as they may desire. The Receiver or the State would also be entitled to file such pleadings or lead such evidence as they think desirable. The Collector is directed to decide the objections as expeditiously as possible before the start of the next crushing season of 1973.