S. GUNDAPPA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition is directed against an order made by the learned District judge at Turnkur in Misc. (VOA) Appea. 1 No,. 45/ 1972. By that orderder, the learned District Judge set aside the grant made in favour of the petitioner, under the provisions of the Mysore Village Offices Abolition Act (Act), and remitted the matter to the Assistant Commissioner, Tumkur, to re-examine the cases of the parties. ( 2 ) THE petitioners were grantees o certain lands, formerly belonging to a 'talvari' inam. This grant was made pursuant to, the Act by the assistant Commissioner on 28-4-1971. The first respondent herein, who was the appellant before the learned District Judge, was not a party to the said proceeding. When the master stood concluded thus, on 20-6-1972 the first respondent herein appealed to the learned District Judge pursuant to the provisions of S. 3 (2) of the Act. The learned District Judge set aside the grant as aforesaid. Hence, this petition. ( 3 ) IT is relevant to note that the appeal having been filed nearly fourteen months after the date of tile regrant in. favour of the petitioners, a question would arise whether such. an appeal could have been entertained by the learned District Juudge, who, there cannot be much doubt, is a persona designate, far the purposes of that Act. Presumably, thinking that learned District Judge was competent to condone such delay, the first respondent, the appellant before him, made an application under S. 5 of the limitation Act The learned District Judge condoned the delay and made an order as aforementioned. ( 4 ) THE first contention on behalf of the petitioners is that even granting that such an appeal would be competent, pursuant to the provisions of S. 3 oi the Act, it ought to have been filed within ninety days of the decision of the Assistant Commissioner. There is no provision in the Act enabling a District Judge to exercise his discretion regarding condonation of delay, pursuant to S. 5 of the Limitation Act. In other words, the rovisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to aji appeal under S. 3 of, tha act, It is further contended that the first respondent herein would not ftrlftl the requirements of any 'person aggrieved by such decision occurring in S. 3 (2) of the Act. In other words, the rovisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to aji appeal under S. 3 of, tha act, It is further contended that the first respondent herein would not ftrlftl the requirements of any 'person aggrieved by such decision occurring in S. 3 (2) of the Act. Lastly, it was contended that the learned District Judge was in error in thinking that the provisions of Rule 3 would apply to the case, as in realtty it was Rule 5 of the Rules that would apply to the case. ( 5 ) IT is unnecessary to examine all the contentions for the purpose of disposal of the present petition, as I am of the view that the provisions of the Limitation Act, especially S. 5 thereof would not be attracted in regard to appeals preferred under S. 3 (2) of the Act. ( 6 ) THE provisions of Section 3 (2) of the Act read thus : " Any person aggrieved by such decision may file an appeal to the District Judge oi the District within ninety days of such decision and the decision, of the District Judge on such appeal shall be final. '' it is clear from the above provision that the reference is not to a 'district court' but to a 'district Judge'. In such a situation the District Judge acts as a persona designate, for purposes of the Act. This would mean that when he functions lor purposes of this Act he would not be sitting as a court Once this position is reached, it would be clear from the very provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, that they are not attracted to a proceeding before such 'persona designata. '. There is no other provision in the act which makes the provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to a proceeding under S. 3 of that Act. I have observed in connection with another matter disposed of yesterday, that this, provision is likely to work great hardship and indeed lead to a mis carriage of justice in certain conceivable situations. To quote an instance, it is possible for a party to exceed this period of limitation even while taking a certified copy of the order proposed to be appealed against. That cannot. also be excluded even on general principles. To quote an instance, it is possible for a party to exceed this period of limitation even while taking a certified copy of the order proposed to be appealed against. That cannot. also be excluded even on general principles. It is to be hoped that the provision will be suitably amended, providing for the removal of such anomalies. ( 7 ) THE result is. that the learned District Judge was not competent to entertain tha appeal filed, as it was after the expiry at the ninety days period of limitation prescribed under Sec,3 (2) of the Act. The petition, therefore, has to succeed and is allowed. The order made by the learned district Judge, Tumkur, in Misc. (VOA) Appeal No. 45/1972, therefore, has to be set aside. It is ordered accordingly. No costs. --- *** --- .