JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is an appeal by Khachera Mal alias Khachera against his conviction of offences punishable under sections 302 and 307, I.P.C. for committing the murder of Bidha and for the assault on Bhonta, Sint. Ramdei, Smt. Triveni and Kundan. He has been sentenced to death under section 302; I.P.C. and tenyears' R. I. tinder section 307, I.P.C. There is also the usual reference for confirmation of the sentence of death. 2. The present occurrence took place on the 13th of April, 1972, at about 8 P. M.'at the house of Bhonta (P.W. 1) in Goverdhan Town of district Mathura. The appellant was married to Bhonta's daughter, Smt. Nango (P.W. 11), about three years before the occurrence. She lived with her husband for some time, but he did not properly maintain her, did not provide her with food, clothing and maltreated her. The appellant is a resident of village Hodal in district Gurgaon (Haryana). Bhonta went to Hodal a few days before the Holi and on the intervention of the Panches was in a position to bring his daughter to his place. The Panches had suggested that they would come to Bhonta's house on the Amawasya day to take back the girl, but they did not arrive and Sint. Nango continued to live with her father. This annoyed the appellant. 3. The prosecution case is that Khachera appellant came to Bhonta's house on 13-4-1972 at about 8 P. M, and at once put the question what had been decided about his wife. Before Bhonta could give any reply the appellant took out a knife and assaulted him. Bhonta caught hold of the knife as a result of which he got injuries on his fingers. The appellant then gave another knife blow k on the abdomen. On the alarm raised by Bhonta his nephew Kundan (P.W. 12), 's daughter Smt. Ramdei (P.W. 4) and his wife Sint. Triveni arrived. The appellant first of all gave a knife blow on the abdomen of Kundan and then attacked Smt. Triveni and Ramdei causing injuries to them. In the mean- time, Bidha, younger brother of Bhonta, arrived and tried to catch hold of the appellant, who was trying to run away. Khachera appellant then assaulted idha as well causing injuries on his chest. Bidha immediately fell down and uccumbed to the injuries. Srnt. In the mean- time, Bidha, younger brother of Bhonta, arrived and tried to catch hold of the appellant, who was trying to run away. Khachera appellant then assaulted idha as well causing injuries on his chest. Bidha immediately fell down and uccumbed to the injuries. Srnt. Nango daughter of Bhonta and the wife of the appellant was also there. On hearing the alarm Sure (P.W. 2) and Dohare also arrived and saw the appellant running- away with the knife his hands. Bhonta then left for Police Station Goverdhan along with the injured and the dead body of Bidha and lodged the first information report (Ext. Ka-1), which was registered at 8.20 P. M., the Police Station is one furlong to the north of the house of Bhonta. A. S. I. Shri Niwas Misra (P.\V. 3) first of all held an inquest on the dead body and prepared the inquest report (Fxt. Ka-3) and sent it to the mortuary for post mortem examination. Thereafter, the Station Officer, S. I. Jai Karan Singh (P.W. 14), along with A. S. I. Shri Niwas Misra left for the spot for the investigation of the crime. He prepared the site plan (Ext. Ka-18) and took blood- stained and ordinary earth in his possession. The Station Officer then went out in search of the appellant. He was told that the appellant had left towards Deeg Adda in search of some conveyance. He proceeded in that direction along with Rajendra Singh (P.W. 8) and Choti and on reaching the barrier on the road leading to Barsana he noticed one man hiding in a pit. On being challenged that person tried to run away but was apprehended after being given some beating. That person was the appellant. The knife (Ext. 2) having blood-stains on the blade and also the handle was found in the right hand pocket of the appellant's trousers. The Sub-Inspector took the knife in his possession and sealed it in a packet and also prepared its recovery memo (Ext. Ka-16). The appellant was then wearing a blood-stained shirt (Ext. 1), which was also taken into possession and its recovery memo (Ext. Ka-17) was prepared. Thereafter, both the Sub-Inspectors returned to Police Station at 8 P. M. at night. 4. Ka-16). The appellant was then wearing a blood-stained shirt (Ext. 1), which was also taken into possession and its recovery memo (Ext. Ka-17) was prepared. Thereafter, both the Sub-Inspectors returned to Police Station at 8 P. M. at night. 4. The two kinds of earth, the knife, and the shirt of the appellant and the clothes taken poseession of and found on the dead body were sent to the Chemical Examiner and thereafter to the Serologist for analysis and report. These articles were found to be stained with human blood. The Serologist, however, was not able to hold the blood grouping test. 5. The post mortem examination on the dead body of Bidha was performed by Dr. N. C. Chaturvedi on 14-4- L972 at 3-30 A. M. He found the following ante mortem injuries on the dead body : "1. Abrasion }"Xi" on the back of the right elbow. 2. Incised wound 1i" X i" X muscle deep on the front of the left side chest li" below the left nipple. 3. punctured wound li" X i" X cavity deep on the front of the left side chest 3i" below the upper margin of the manubrina sternat and 3" away from the left nipple. 4. Punctured wound i"Xi" muscle deep on the upper and outer part of the left thigh." On internal examination he found a lacerated wound i"Xi" on the upper part of the right side of the pericardium whole thickness and a lacerated wound }" X i" whole thickness on the upper part right side heart. Both the chambers of the heart were empty. Cavity of thorax contained about two pints of blood on both sides with a lacerated wound 1" X 1" on the left side chestwall x cavity deep between 3rd and 4th rib, I" from left side of sternum. The stomach contained semi solid food material. Small intestines were empty and large intestines contained focal matter. 6. In the opinion of the doctor, death was due to shock and haemorrhage due to the above injuries. Dr. Chaturvedi also expressed the opinion that external injuries nos. 2 and 3 were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and that injuries 2 to 4 were caused by a knife and injury No. 1 could be caused by friction. The injuries of Kundan, Smt. Triveni, Suit. Ramdei and Bhonta were examined by Dr. Dr. Chaturvedi also expressed the opinion that external injuries nos. 2 and 3 were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and that injuries 2 to 4 were caused by a knife and injury No. 1 could be caused by friction. The injuries of Kundan, Smt. Triveni, Suit. Ramdei and Bhonta were examined by Dr. S. C. Sharma (P.W. 5) on 13-4-1972 between 11.15 P.M. and 12 midnight. He found the following injuries on their person : Kundan "1 Stab wound 2"X "X "X abdominal cavity deep on front of abdomen. Omentum coming out in the wound." This injury was kept- under observation which was caused by some sharp edged weapon and was fresh having been inflicted within six hours. Smt. Triveni 1. Stab wound 2"X "X3" direction obliquely downwards with surgical emphysema in left axillary line in lower costal region." The injury was kept under observation. It was caused by sharp edged weapon and was fresh, caused within six hours. Smt. Ramdei 1. Incised wound 1"X ?"X " on lower part of left breast. 2. Incised wound "X "X " on front and base of left thumb. These injuries were simple, caused by sharp edged pointed object and were fresh and caused within six hours. Bhonta "1. Incised wound 1,"X ?"X ' on right ring finger in palmer aspect. 2. Incised wound '"X ?" " on right little finger on palmer aspect. 3. Incised wound J" X "X i" on left lower abdomen. 4. Abrasion 3"X linear on lower right side chest and upper abdomen." All the injuries were simple caused by some sharp edged pointed object and were fresh caused within six hours. Dr. Sharma expressed the opinion that the injuries of Smt. Triveni and Kundan were dangerous to life and could be caused by the knife (Ext. 2). 7. The injuries of Khachera appellant were examined by Dr. Deoraj Pahuja (D. W. 1) on 14-4-1972 at 10 A. M. He found the following injuries on his person : "1 Contused wound 1.5 cm X 2.cm X scalp deep 9.5 cm up and towards right from the upper lobule of left ear on the left side of head bone. 2. Contused wound 4 cm X 4. cm X muscle deep in front of the left thumb." Both the injuries were simple and caused by some blunt weapon. 2. Contused wound 4 cm X 4. cm X muscle deep in front of the left thumb." Both the injuries were simple and caused by some blunt weapon. The doctor was of opinion that these injuries could have been caused at midnight between 13th and 14th April, 1972 and that the injuries on the thumb could be caused by the handle of the knife while the head injury by a blunt weapon like a lathi. After completing the investigation S. I. Jai Karan Singh submitted the chargesheet against the appellant. 8. Khachera appellant pleaded not guilty reserving his statement for the Sessions Court. Before the Sessions Judge Khachera stated that he was married to Smt. Nango, that she did not do any work nor prepared bread and for that reason he some time threatened her, that during his absence and the absence of his parents Smt. Nango fled away to the house of her Phuplia, that on 12-4-1972 Deoki Nandan Pujari came to him to Hodal at 7 P. M. saying that he was sent by Smt. Nango and Bid ha, that four persons of Agra had come and Bhonta wanted to remarry (Dhareja ceremony) his daughter, Smt. Nango, to the Agra man and that Snit. Nango and Bidha had called him. At that time there was no arrangement for going to Goverdhan and, therefore, he reached Goverdhan the next day at 12 or 1 P. Al. Deoki Nandan stopped in his temple at Giri Jaji, while the appellant proceeded to his Sasural where he found the neighbours, the Agra people, Bhonta and his relations having assembled there. Smt. Nango told the appellant that she did not wish to go to Agra. Bhonta also made a similar utterence. Sint. Nango also said that if she were to go to any place she would go to the house of Khachera. Such talks took place for some time when the Panchayat came to an end and it was decided that the decision shall be taken in the evening. The Panchayat was again convened at 7.30 or 8 P. M. which was attended by the Agra people and also by Bhonta and one or two strangers, they were sitting towards the thatch while the appellant and Bidha on the other side. During the talks abuses were exchanged and the Agra men assaulted him with a knife. The Panchayat was again convened at 7.30 or 8 P. M. which was attended by the Agra people and also by Bhonta and one or two strangers, they were sitting towards the thatch while the appellant and Bidha on the other side. During the talks abuses were exchanged and the Agra men assaulted him with a knife. The appellant says that Bidha checked the knife blow but it hit him, that while running he caught hold of the knife, as a result of which his thumb was cut, and that after snatching the knife he welded it but could not say who was injured. The night was dark and in the struggle the lantern was extinguish- ed. The appellant says that he used the knife, because he was being taken inside for being given a beating and it was then that he received the Dada injury on his head. The appellant further says that he proceeded to the Police Station but the Sub-Inspector did not take down his report and that his wrist watch and a sum of Rs. 36 and odd were taken away by the police. Except for Dr. Pahuja no one was examined in defence. 9. The defence version given before the Sessions Judge is clearly incorrect. Smt. Nango (P.W. 11) was examined by the prosecution and has not supported the appellant. In case she wanted to go back to her husband and did not wish to be remarried to the Agra man she would not have made allegations against Khachera. Kundan (P.W. 12) is the son of Bidha, deceased. He also gave evidence against the appellant. This was not probable had Bidha been supporting the appellant. It is also difficult to accept that the blow inflicted on the appellant hit Bidha. The injury found on the left thumb of the appellant is a contused wound not likely to be caused by the blade of the knife. The defence theory was given at a late stage. Keeping all these circumstances in mind no reliance can be placed upon the defence version. However, the burden of proof lies upon the prosecution to establish its case before the appellant can be convicted of any offence. 10. The eye-witnesses examined by the prosecution are: Bhonta (P.W. 1), Sint. Ramdei (P.W. 4), Smt. Nango (P.W. 11), Kundan (P.W. 12) and Sure (P.W. 2). However, the burden of proof lies upon the prosecution to establish its case before the appellant can be convicted of any offence. 10. The eye-witnesses examined by the prosecution are: Bhonta (P.W. 1), Sint. Ramdei (P.W. 4), Smt. Nango (P.W. 11), Kundan (P.W. 12) and Sure (P.W. 2). The first four were present throughout and have narrated all the events as to how injuries were caused to the various persons including Bidha, deceased. They are all relations of deceased. Bhonta and Bidha (deceased) are brothers, Kundan is the son of Bidha, while Sint. Ramdei and Sint. Nango are daughters of Bhonta. They can be called interested witnesses, but their presence at the spot at the time of the occurrence cannot be doubted. Out of these four witnesses, three viz. Bhonta, Smt. Ramdei and Kundan had received injuries. Therefore, their presence can in no case be doubted. Sint. Nango, daughter of Bhonta, was admittedly at the house of her father and is likely to be present when the present assault was committed. 11. We have been taken through the deposition of these witnesses and find that they have made a straight forward statement. There exists no material contradiction in their evidence. The discrepancies that exist are as to the sequence in which the injuries were caused and the duration of the entire occurrence. Such mistakes can easily be committed by witnesses on the lapse of time. No undue significance can be attached to these discrepancies. 12. The appellant has suggested that he received two injuries at the spot in the present occurrence. The prosecution case, on the other hand, is that he could be apprehended with difficulty after being given some beating. The defence version as to how the appellant got the injuries is not true. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in accepting the prosecution case that the appellant was injured during his arrest. The non-examination of the neighbours could not also be given any importance. It is likely that Sure arrived late and did not see the assault and most of them in night have turned up after the departure of the appellant. 13. The testimony of the eye-witnesses stands corroborated by the factors; firstly, the bush-shirt which the appellant was wearing having been found to be stained with human blood and the knife (Ext. It is likely that Sure arrived late and did not see the assault and most of them in night have turned up after the departure of the appellant. 13. The testimony of the eye-witnesses stands corroborated by the factors; firstly, the bush-shirt which the appellant was wearing having been found to be stained with human blood and the knife (Ext. 2) found with the appellant being stained with human blood and its handle having got detached from the blade. The appellant has furnished no explanation for wearing a blood-stained bush-shirt and for being in possession of a blood-stained knife. There is also no explanation as to how the handle got detached from the blade. Evidently, it had been used shortly before the recovery which fits in with the versions given by the eye-witnesses. Bleeding from the two contused wounds is not likely to have stained, the bush- shirt to the extent it was noticed. Even if no weight is attached to the blood- stained bush-shirt, the recovery of the blood-stained knife from the possession of the appellant is a good and strong corroborative evidence. The learned Sessions judge has not believed Sure (P.W. 2) on account of a contradiction in his evidence. In his statement before the investigating Officer he stated that he had heard the commotion at the temple. In such a case he was not likely to arrive at the spot before the departure of the appellant. The safe thing shall be to discard his testimony. On a consideration of the total evidence on record and the circumstances of the case we are in agreement with the findings recorded by the learned Sessions judge and are satisfied that the prosecution case has been established beyond doubt, viz. that he was the appellant who had assaulted and caused vital injuries to Bidha and also caused injuries found on the person of Kundan, Smt. Triveni. Smt. Ramdei and Bhonta. 14. The next question is of which offence can Khachera be convicted. that he was the appellant who had assaulted and caused vital injuries to Bidha and also caused injuries found on the person of Kundan, Smt. Triveni. Smt. Ramdei and Bhonta. 14. The next question is of which offence can Khachera be convicted. Has he committed the offence of murder punishable under section 302, I.P. C. or is liable to conviction only of the lesser offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under section 304, I.P.C. The learned Advocate for the appellant has strongly contended that Khachera appellant did not have the intention to cause the death of Bidlia nor did he have the intention to cause injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death. It is said that the appellant used his knife to enable him to avoid his arrest at the spot and that he was not inflicting injured on vital parts of the body and it was accidentally on account of Bidha turning to one side, that the blows meant to strike the non-vital parts fell on the chest, as a result of which Bidha was injuried on the chest, and succumbed to the injuries. Reliance was placed upon certain Supreme Court decisions and one Allahabad case to which we shall make reference shortly. For convenience of comparison the be stated as below : Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide, if the act by which the death is causing is done (a) With the intention of causing death: (b) With the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death: (c) With the knowledge that.... the act is likely to cause death. Subject to certain exceptions, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done (1) With the intention of causing death: (2) With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused: (3) With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. (4) With the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death. (4) With the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death. Where it is proved that the injury was caused with the intention of causing death, the offence is always murder punishable an-1c section 302, I.P.C. irrespective of the location and the nature of the injury. However, in majority of cases evidence is not forth- coming as to the intention of the offender and his intention or knowledge is to be inferred from the act done i.e. the nature of the injury caused. A person using a deadly weapon and inflicting injury on a vital part of the body can be deemed to have the intention to inflict a fatal injury having knowledge of the con- sequences of such act. It is in such cases that controversy is raised whether the contemplated intention or knowledge to bring the case within the four corners of the definition contained in section 300, I.P.C. exists or not. It is invariably not disputed that the offender can be deemed to have had the intention or knowledge that the act done, namely, bodily injury caused, is likely to cause death and the offence committed is one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In order that culpable homicide is murder as defined in section 300, I.P.C. the intention must be to inflict a bodily injury as is in his knowledge likely to cause death or the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The intention or knowledge of the offender is often deduced from the nature of the injury caused; however. Controversy is raised whether the injury caused is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 15. Similarly, where knowledge and not the intention is material culpable homicide is murder where the act done is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. The requisite knowledge is also invariably judged from the nature of the injury inflicted. 15. Similarly, where knowledge and not the intention is material culpable homicide is murder where the act done is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. The requisite knowledge is also invariably judged from the nature of the injury inflicted. Where the weapon of assault is not by itself of a dangerous type, the intention or knowledge cannot ordinarily be deemed to be the one contemplated by section 300, I.P.C. The third and fourth clauses of section 300, I.P.C. can be invoked when the deceased was beaten mercilessly or a deadly blow was given with an ordinary weapon. In the present case, however, the appellant had wielded a knife which is a deadly weapon and inflicted injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Unless special circumstances exist, the offence committed shall be murder as defined in section 300, I.P.C. 16. The ingredients of the third clause of section 300, I.P.C. are: (a) was there the intention of causing bodily injury. (b) The nature of the bodily injury inflicted. (c) Was the bodily injury inflicted sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death ; (d) Did the offender intend to inflict a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is the nature of the injury, considered objectively, which can determine whether the first three ingredients have or have not been fulfilled. Where bodily injury was caused with a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body it can, on the basis of the injury itself, be said that there was an intention of causing bodily injury, what the nature of the bodily injury was and also whether it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. However, the fourth ingredient, whether the offender intended to inflict such a bodily injury, is to be judged on a consideration of all the circumstances, the past history, the conduct of the offender and the circumstances and manner in which the injury was caused. However, the fourth ingredient, whether the offender intended to inflict such a bodily injury, is to be judged on a consideration of all the circumstances, the past history, the conduct of the offender and the circumstances and manner in which the injury was caused. Generally speaking, one may say, as a safe rule that the intention is to be gathered 'from the nature of the injury caused ; but there can be circumstances to show that the intention of the offender was not to inflict a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and it was accidentally, in circumstances which the offender could not himself foresee, that a fatal injury was caused and death took place. For example, where in play or out of fun the offender places a pointed weapon like a knife on the chest of the deceased, himself using very nominal force, but another person without the knowledge of the offender, pushes the pointed end with considerable force and the weapon pierces the body and death is caused, it would be a clear case where there was no intention to inflict a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In fact, that would also be a case where there was no intention to cause an injury likely to cause death. One can, therefore, say that the intention with which the bodily injury was inflicted is ordinarily judged from the nature of the injury caused, but in the special circumstances of the case one can hold that there was no such intention of the offender. They are invariably cases where the death was caused accidentally without the offender having the intention contemplated by section 300, I.P.C. 17. A similar rule was laid down in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 465 which is one may say, the leading case on the subject. The material observations of their Lord- ships are as below: " To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under section 300 " thirdly." First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present: Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. The material observations of their Lord- ships are as below: " To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under section 300 " thirdly." First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present: Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and. Fourthly it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. 18. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the bur( en is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under section 300 "thirdly ". It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional." The portions marked in the margin are of importance and show that a vague plea to escape the punishment for the offence of murder is not sufficient; it must appear that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional. If it is evident that the fatal injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death was not inflicted accidentally or otherwise unintentionally the offence committed shall be of murder punishable under section 302, I.P.C. 19. Coming to the facts of the present case three knife injuries were found on the dead body of Bidha, one was incised wound on the front of the left side chest, the other was a punctured wound on the front of the left side chest and the third was a punctured wound on the upper and outer part of the left thigh. The incised wound and the second punctured wound were muscle deep while the first punctured wound had penetrated the chest. It shall thus be found that out of three knife injuries two were caused on the chest, a vital part of the body. Kundan and Smt. Triveni received one stab wound each on vital parts of the body, while Smt. Ramdei one incised wound on the lower part of the left breast and another incised wound on front and base of left thumb. One of these two incised wounds was on a vital part of the body. Out of the three incised wounds inflicted on Bhonta one only was on a vital part, viz., left lower, abdomen. Consequently, while wielding the knife Khachera appellant inflicted six -knife injuries on vital parts of the body. and only four on non-vital parts. If the intention of the appellant was , not to cause such injuries as were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, he would have taken precaution that injuries were inflicted on non- vital parts. and only four on non-vital parts. If the intention of the appellant was , not to cause such injuries as were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, he would have taken precaution that injuries were inflicted on non- vital parts. Where it is found that most of the injuries are on non-vital parts and only one or two are on vital parts, and at the same time it is found that the target of attack was moving about and changing position, then it can be urged not necessarily with success in each and every case, that the intention was to be judged from the totality of the injuries caused and as the vast majority of the injuries were caused on non-vital parts of the body, the intention of the offender be held to be not to cause injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and it was accidentally that blows aimed to hit the non-vital parts struck' a vital part and caused death. In the present case, -the majority of the injuries were caused on vital parts of the body and, therefore, it cannot be said that it was accidental that Bidha was struck on the chest, thus causing his death. The offence committed by Khachera is thus clearly one of murder punishable under section 302, I.P.C. 20. In the unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Riasat v. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 180 of 1968 decided on Jan., 13, 1969 : U.J. (S.C.) 9 (1969) Vol. page 37 the offender had no motive to cause death, he did not even try to strangulate the deceased. He had sat on the chest of the woman as result of which there was fracture of eight ribs some of which punctured the left lung and caused death. Wrestlers very often sit on the chest of the opponent and press him with force, so that he may surrender and be declared to have lost in the wrestling bout. Even otherwise, a person sitting on the chest and pressing with his knees dries not generally cause fracture of ribs and consequent death. From the conduct of the. offender in merely sitting on the chest and pressing with _a,e knees,. Even otherwise, a person sitting on the chest and pressing with his knees dries not generally cause fracture of ribs and consequent death. From the conduct of the. offender in merely sitting on the chest and pressing with _a,e knees,. without any further attempt to strangulate the woman, it could "not, be inferred that he had the intention to cause an injury sufficient ordinary course of nature to cause death. .'ts Supreme Court case is at ' .par with the inflicting of injuries on a non-vital part.- The difference is only this that the injury was caused on a vital part of the body but it was inflicted in circumstances which: could show that -;here was no intention to cause a fatal injury. In Harjinder Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1968 SC page 867, Laxman Kalu Nikalie v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 S.C. 1390 and Anda and others v. The State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC p. 148, the fatal injuries were caused on non-vital parts of the body, similarly, Shyam Lal alias Shyama v. State, 1971 A.L.J. page 439, can be distinguished on the ground that therein two out of three injuries caused with knife were inflicted on the thigh a non-vital part of the body, and only the last injury was inflicted on the abdomen when the victim had taken a sudden turn to attack the assailant. In view of these circumstances, it was held that the fatal injury on the abdomen had been caused accidentally. In the present case, however, most of the knife injuries inflicted were on vital parts of the body. Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC page 1874, is a case where the act done was to chloroform the deceased and could not be intended to cause an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 21. Two other cases Chamru Buchwa v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC page 652, and Mahanarain v. Emperor, AIR 1946 Alld. 19, were also brought to our notice, but they apply to Exception 4 of section 300, I.P.C. The nature of the injuries received by Bidha (d, ceased), Kundan, Smt. Triveni, Smt. Ramdei and Bhonta make it clear that the majority of the knife injuries were caused on vital parts of the body. 19, were also brought to our notice, but they apply to Exception 4 of section 300, I.P.C. The nature of the injuries received by Bidha (d, ceased), Kundan, Smt. Triveni, Smt. Ramdei and Bhonta make it clear that the majority of the knife injuries were caused on vital parts of the body. The appellant was evidently brandishing his knife on the above per- sons to hit any part of the body and most of the knife blows were aimed at vital parts of the body. It cannot, therefore, be said that the fatal blow was inflicted accidentally, without any intention to cause a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The same inference shall have to be drawn in respect of the injuries caused to Kundan and Smt. Triveni but not in respect of Smt. Ramdei and Bhonta. The stab wounds of Kundan and Smt. Triveni i were abdominal cavity and 3" deep respectively. The injuries though on vital parts of Smt. Ramdei and Bhonta were only " and " deep, respectively. The injuries of Kundan and Smt. Triveni were inflicted on vital parts and it was their good luck that the knife did not penetrate deep. The appellant therefore, deserves conviction under section 302, I.P.C. for the injuries caused to Kundan and Smt. Triveni. 22. The present is, however, a fit case in which the lesser sentence of imprisonment for life be awarded. The statement on oath of Bhonta makes it clear that the Panches had permitted him to take his daughter to his place temporarily. It may be that Bhonta had in mind to re-marry his daughter to some other person. In any case, the circumstances of the case make it clear that Khachera appellant committed the unlawful acts in anger on finding that his wife was not coming back to him. On the alleged mat-treatment by the husband there is no evidence of any independent person; only the relations have made the statement. When there exists strong possibility that Khachera committed the offences in anger on finding that his wife was not coming back to him, he need not be awarded the maximum penalty of death. 23. The appeal is hereby dismissed except 'that the sentence under section 302, I.P.C. is reduced to imprisonment for life. The conviction under sections 302 and 307, I.P.C. and the sentence under section 307 are maintained. 23. The appeal is hereby dismissed except 'that the sentence under section 302, I.P.C. is reduced to imprisonment for life. The conviction under sections 302 and 307, I.P.C. and the sentence under section 307 are maintained. Both the sentence,,es shall run concurrently. The appellant is in jail and shall serve out the sentence now awarded to him. The reference is rejected.