Judgement ASTHANA, J. :- The basic question, common to all these cases referred to a Full Bench, is whether the relationship between the parties was that of pure master and servant unregulated or uncontrolled by any statutory provision and the servant was not entitled to the relief of injunction or declaration of nullity of removal from service and his remedy lay in a suit for damages for breach of contract. Second Appeal No. 2973-of 1971 2. The first case referred is Second Appeal No. 2973 of 1971 which arises out of a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant-appellants from interfering with the plaintiff-respondent in the discharge of his duty as Principal including functioning as such for all intent and purposes of the Vaish Degree College, Shamli, District Muzaffarnagar, later on known as Vyparik Varg Degree College, Shamli, hereinafter referred to as Vaish College. 3. Admittedly Sri Laxmi Narain, the plaintiff-respondent, was the permanent Principal of the Vaish College. He was appointed as such on 17-5-1964. His appointment was duly approved by the Vice Chancellor of Agra University to which the college was then affiliated. The plaintiff-respondent joined his post with effect from 1-7-1964. By a notice dated 24-10-1966 issued by the Management the plaintiff was directed not to discharge the functions and duties of the Principal of the College and not to obstruct the functioning of Sri K.K. Kaushik as acting Principal. By a resolution dated 27-10-1966 Sri K.K. Kaushik was appointed as the Principal, the Management having held that the plaintiff had abandoned the post. On 28-10-1966 the plaintiff instituted the suit for permanent injunction. While the suit was pending the Kanpur and Agra Meerut Universities Act 1965 (U.P. Act Kin of 1965), hereinafter called the Meerut Act, was enforced with effect from 21-11-1966 and the Vaish College, Shamli, stood affiliated to the Meerut University under the said Act. On 12-3-1967 the Management passed a formal resolution terminating the service's of the plaintiff but later on clarified it by a resolution dated 29-3-1967 terminating the Services of the plaintiff as Principal with effect from 24-10-1966, as from that date according to the Management the plaintiff had absented himself from duty. The plaintiff got the plaint amended adding pleas questioning the legality and validity of the action taken by the Management subsequent to the filing of the suit. The plaintiff got the plaint amended adding pleas questioning the legality and validity of the action taken by the Management subsequent to the filing of the suit. Inter alia, the plaintiff alleged that the termination of his services as confirmed Principal being in violation of the provisions of the Meerut Act and the statutes, was void and in any case the Management not having obtained the approval of the Vice-Chancellor of the Meerut University as required by the Meerut Act, the termination of the services of the plaintiff never took effect. The contesting defendants, inter alia, set up a plea that the terms and conditions of the service of the plaintiff as Principal were governed by an agreement between him and the Management and were not governed by the provisions of the Act or Statutes of the Agra University or of the Meerut University and the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief of injunction which was barred to him under the Specific Relief Act. It is not necessary to detail out all the other factual allegations of the parties averred in the pleadings as the same are not necessary for the purpose of disposing of this reference. 4. The trial Court took the view that as the plaintiff had not been appointed under any written agreement of contract as envisaged by the Statute of the Agra University, he was not entitled to the benefit of the Act and the Statutes and the fact that the resolution terminating the services of the plaintiff was not sent up for approval of the Vice Chancellor was therefore, of no avail. On this main finding the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 5. The lower appellate Court while affirming the finding that the plaintiff was not appointed under any written agreement of contract as required by the Statutes field that that would not disentitle the plaintiff to claim the benefits of the Act and the Statutes of Agra University as in the absence of the written contract the appointment of the plaintiff as Principal was not rendered invalid and as the services of the plaintiff, were terminated by the Management without obtaining the approval of the Vice Chancellor of the Meerut University, the order of termination was illegal and void, Then relying upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Meerut College v. Dr. Puri, 1969 All LJ 621 and of the Supreme Court in Prabhakar Ram Krishna Jodh v. A.L. Pande, (1965) 2 SCR 713 the learned Judges held that the Statutes framed under the Agra University Act created legal rights in favour of the teachers of the affiliated colleges which could be enforced against the Management of an affiliated college and that the case of the plaintiff fell within the third exception laid down by the Supreme Court in S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra, AIR 1964 SC 1680 affirming the principle that the courts are invested with the power to declare invalid the act of a statutory body, if by doing the act the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute. The appeal was allowed and the plaintiff's suit was decreed for a perpetual injunction restraining the contesting defendants from interfering in his functioning and discharging the duties as Principal of the Vaish College till his services were validly terminated in accordance with the provisions of Meerut Act and the statute made thereunder. 6. When the Second Appeal filed by the contesting defendants was heard by our brother K.N. Srivastava, before him on behalf of the appellants reliance was placed on Executive Committee of State Warehousing Corporation v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, AIR 1970 SC 1244 and Indian Airlines Corpn. v. Sukhdeo Rai, AIR 1971 SC 1828 in support of the contention that the Division Bench decision of this Court, in 1969 All LJ 621 which supported the view taken by the Court below was no longer good law. Brother Srivastava doubted whether the plaintiff was entitled to the relief of injunction as prayed for and after framing the question "Can the Civil Court grant the relief of injunction in view of the fact and circumstances of the present case ?", directed that the case be referred to a Full Bench. Special Appeal No. 516 of 1971 7. The second reference before the Full Bench has come up in Special Appeal No. 516 of 1971. the Board of Management of Dayanand Brijendra Swarup college, Dehradun v. Suresh Charidra Varma arising out of original writ No. 4035 of 1968. The Division Bench while admitting the Special Appeal passed an order directing the appeal to be heard by a Full Bench. 8. the Board of Management of Dayanand Brijendra Swarup college, Dehradun v. Suresh Charidra Varma arising out of original writ No. 4035 of 1968. The Division Bench while admitting the Special Appeal passed an order directing the appeal to be heard by a Full Bench. 8. Suresh Chandra Varma, the petitioner, was a Geography teacher in Dayanand Brijendra Swarup Degree College, Dehradun, hereinafter referred to as Dayanand College. He entered in service as a probationer in 1963 and was confirmed in that post in 1966. On 7-6-1967 the petitioner was suspended and was served with certain charges. The petitioner submitted an explanation. Meanwhile the petitioner was found to have committed some other misconduct and a consolidated charge sheet dated, 31-10-1967 was served upon him. The petitioner submitted his reply on 15-11-1967. The Management Committee of the Dayanand College appointed a Sub Committee which submitted its report on 16-6-1968. On the basis of the said report the Committee of Management passed a resolution terminating the services of the petitioner. This resolution was approved by the Vice-Chancellor and finally an order terminating the services of the petitioner was passed on 21-8-1968. 9. The petitioner questioned the validity and legality of the termination of his service on the main ground that the Committee of Management of the College contravened Statute 30 of Chapter XVIII of the Agra University Statutes applicable to the Meerut University to which the college was affiliated. The learned Single Judge who heard the petitioner on merits relying on 1969 All LJ 621 (supra) repelled the contention of the respondents that the resolution passed by the Committee of Management even if wrongful and illegal, could not be questioned in a writ petition as the relationship between the petitioner and the college was governed by a contract of service and the remedy of the petitioner lay in damages for breach of contract. The learned Judge holding that the petitioner was not afforded adequate and reasonable opportunity as required by Statute 30, allowed the writ petition and quashed the resolution of the Committee of Management dated 16-6-1968 and the order dated 21-8-1968 terminating the service of the petitioner. On appeal by the Committee of Management, the Special Appeal Bench directed the special appeal to be referred to a Full Bench in view of the doubt as to the correctness of the Division Bench decision in Dr. Puri's case. On appeal by the Committee of Management, the Special Appeal Bench directed the special appeal to be referred to a Full Bench in view of the doubt as to the correctness of the Division Bench decision in Dr. Puri's case. Writ Petition No. 858 of 1970 10. The third case referred is writ petition No. 858 of 1970 Ahmad Husain v. Aligarh Muslim University. The petitioner is a Head Clerk employed in the office of the Registrar of the Aligarh Muslim University. He was appointed as Assistant Registrar on probation. His probation was extended from time to time. By its resolution dated 13-2-1970 the Executive Council of the University decided not to confirm the petitioner in the post of Assistant Registrar and directed him to be reverted to his substantive post of Head Clerk. The petitioner challenged the legality and validity of this resolution of the Executive Council on the ground that the resolution was in. breach of the relevant Regulations framed by the Executive Council of the University in exercise of its powers under Section 31 of the Aliagrh Muslim University Act. On behalf of the respondent University it was contended that the reversion of the petitioner to his substantive cost was not in breach of any Regulation and in the alternative it was contended that the Regulations framed by the Executive Council of the University in exercise of its powers under Section 31 of the Aligarh Muslim University Act" have no statutory force and assuming the same were violated, it would not entitle the petitioner to a relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Brother G.C. Mathur, who heard the petition, referred the following question to the Full Bench :- "Whether a writ petition is maintainable by an employee of an University which is a statutory body on the ground that his services have been terminated or he had been reduced in rank in violation of the provisions of the Regulations framed by the University ?" Writ Petition No. 68 of 1971 11. The fourth case listed before us is writ petition No. 68 of 1971 Ramesh Chandra Bhudwar v. Vive Chancellor, Meerut University. The fourth case listed before us is writ petition No. 68 of 1971 Ramesh Chandra Bhudwar v. Vive Chancellor, Meerut University. Sri L.M. Pant, learned counsel for the petitioner stated that this case has been listed before the Full Bench only formally to enable him to address legal arguments if necessary, as in this case also similar questions which arise in the cases referred are involved. Sri Pant and Sri Bhatnagar appearing for opposite party specifically stated that the parties do not desire the Full Bench to consider the case with a view to express their opinion on the question involved. It is, therefore, not necessary to state the facts and the points arising in the fourth case. 12. From the above narration of the salient facts of the three cases referred, it is clear that the relationship between the contesting parties is that of master and servant. Involved in each case is a relief in some form or shape of reinstatement of the servant in his post of employment on the ground that the termination of his employment by the master was null and void. It is well settled that a contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced. A declaration by a Court that the termination has no effect and the servant still continues in service and directing that he be reinstated ordinarily cannot be made as that will amount to enforcing a contract of personal service. This principle of law was accepted by the Supreme Court in Dr. S. Dutta v. University of Delhi, AIR 1958 SC 1050 . In the same case the Supreme Court noticed a decision of the Privy Council in the case of High Commr. for India v. I.M. Lall, AIR 1948 PC 121 wherein the Judicial Committee accepted the principle that where a suit of the servant is founded on the claim that his dismissal by the master was void and of no effect as certain mandatory provisions of the law had not been complied, a declaration that the purported dismissal was void and inoperative and he remained in service will not amount to enforcing a contract of personal service. A declaration of a statutory invalidity of an act of the master is a thing entirely different from enforcing a contract of personal service. The principle of law that emerges from the decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. A declaration of a statutory invalidity of an act of the master is a thing entirely different from enforcing a contract of personal service. The principle of law that emerges from the decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. S. Dutt's case is that since the law prohibits the specific performance of a contract of personal service any wrongful termination of the service of the employee by his employer would not entitle the employee to a declaration that his status remained unaffected, be still continued in service and he be reinstated to his post of employment. But where the employee bases his claim on the breach of some statutory provision which governed and regulated the conditions of his service he will be entitled to a declaration that his status remains unaffected, he still continues in service and he be reinstated as in doing so the Court of law does not enforce a contract of personal service but the Court declares that the act of removal from service was statutorily invalid. 13. The problem with which we are faced in the cases before us is whether the employees concerned have founded their claim on the basis of the net of termination of their service by their respective employer in breach of some statutory provision and they can ask the Court to make a declaration of a statutory invalidity. In the first two cases referred, that is of the Principal of the Vaish College and the teacher of Dayanand College a claim has been made that the termination of their respective services by the Management of the colleges concerned was in violation of the provisions of the Acts and the statutes applicable to the University to which the colleges were affiliated. On the relevant dales when the termination orders were passed by the management of the respective colleges they stood affiliated to the Meerut University. In the case of 1969 All EJ 612 a Division Bench of this Court finding" that the termination of the service of Dr. Puri was in derogation of the relevant Statutes declared the resolution and the order terminating the service of the petitioner as illegal. In the case of 1969 All EJ 612 a Division Bench of this Court finding" that the termination of the service of Dr. Puri was in derogation of the relevant Statutes declared the resolution and the order terminating the service of the petitioner as illegal. The Division Bench repelled the contention of the Management of the college that no declaration could be given as a servant cannot be forced on a master and there can be no specific performance of a contract relating to personal service with the following observations : "It has been contended that a servant cannot be forced on a master and that there can be no specific performance of a contract relating to personal service. In our opinion this principle does not apply in the present case because we have already said that the matter is not purely contractual and in terminating the services of Dr. Puri, the management of the Meerut College has breached statutory provisions." 14. It is not disputed by Sri S.N. Kacker appearing for the Management of the Vaish College and Sri Jagdish Swarup appearing for the Management of the Dayanand College that the provisions of the Act and the Statutes which applied to the Meerut College in the case of Dr. Puri governed the conditions of affiliation of the respective colleges also whom they represent and the Division Bench decision in Dr. Puri's case would have been conclusive against them bad it been good law. The learned counsel for the Management of the colleges submitted that in view of the declaration of law made by the Supreme Court subsequent to the decision in Dr. Puri's case the decision of the Division Bench in that case will be deemed to have been overruled and no longer good law. In this connection a reference was made to Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corpn. Lucknow v. Chandra Kirao Tyagi, AIR 1970 SC 1244 ; Indian Airlines Corpn. v. Sukhdeo Rai, AIR 1971 SC 1828 ; Bank of Baroda Ltd. v. Jewan Lal Mehrotra, (1970) 2 Lab LJ 54 and Vidya Ram Misra v. The Managing Committee Shri Jai Narain College, AIR 1972 SC 1450 . Lucknow v. Chandra Kirao Tyagi, AIR 1970 SC 1244 ; Indian Airlines Corpn. v. Sukhdeo Rai, AIR 1971 SC 1828 ; Bank of Baroda Ltd. v. Jewan Lal Mehrotra, (1970) 2 Lab LJ 54 and Vidya Ram Misra v. The Managing Committee Shri Jai Narain College, AIR 1972 SC 1450 . The argument was that the relationship between the teacher and the Management of the colleges, a private body, being purely contractual, assuming that the termination of service of the teacher by the Management was wrongful, the teacher was not entitled to declaration and reinstatement in his post of employment and his remedy lay in an action for damages for breach of contract. The arguments so raised involves consideration of the following propositions : 1. Whether the service of a teacher including the Principal of the affiliated colleges in question is purely contractual unregulated and uncontrolled by any provision having the force of law ? 2. Whether the Management of the two colleges concerned acted as a statutory body or statutory functionary when it took action to terminate the service of the teacher ? and 3. Whether the Committee of Management of the affiliated colleges when found to be bound to follow a procedure prescribed by law or bound to comply with some statutory requirement before the termination of the service could be effective, any termination of service of a teacher by it in violation of such statutory requirements will entitle the teacher to an injunction or a declaration of statutory invalidity of the action taken ? 15. It would be appropriate at this stage to examine the relevant Acts and Statutes which govern the affiliation of the colleens in the Meerut University. The Kanpur and Meerut Universities Act 1965 (U.P. Act XIII of 1965), came into force with effect from 21-11-1966. By Sub-Section (3) of S. 4 of the Meerut Act all the colleges situate within the area of the Meerut University which at the commencement of the Meerut Act were affiliated to the Agra University and under the Agra University Act 1926 (hereinafter referred to as the Agra Act) from such date as the State Government may by notification in the Gazette appoint in this behalf would be deemed to be affiliated to the Meerut University. It is the common case of the parties that the Vaish College and Dayanand College are situate in the area of the Meerut University under the Meerut Act and before the commencement of the Meerut Act they were affiliated to the Agra University under the Agra Act and that the requisite notification was issued by the State Government under Sub-Section (3) of S. 4 of the Meerut Act and they became affiliated to the Meerut University. Though the Meerut Act envisaged by its Section 31 that the first statutes shall be made by the State Government but it appears that no such statutes were made when the Meerut Act commenced. The Meerut Act by its Sec. 50(1)(aa) enacts that the State Government may for the purposes of removing any difficulty in relation to the enforcement of the Act by order published, in the Gazette direct that all or any of the Statutes or Ordinances made under the Agra University Act, 1926 shall, with such adaptations and modifications, whether by way of addition, amendment or omission, as it may deem to be necessary or expedient, apply in relation to the University for so long as the First Statutes in respect of the same subject-matter are not made under Sub-Section (1) of S. 31. The State Government issued a notification dated November 18, 1966, by publication in the U.P. Government Extraordinary Gazette dated November 21, 1966, in exercise of its powers under clause (aa) of Sub-Section (1) of S. 50 of the Meerut Act directing that the Statutes and Ordinances of the Agra University as amended upto date shall apply to the Meerut University for so long as the First Statutes in respect of the same subject-matter were not made under Sub-Section (1) of S. 31. Inter alia by the said notification the statutes relating to affiliation and recognition of colleges contained in Chapter XVIII of the Agra University Hand Book 1965-66 were applied. 16. It is further the common case of the parties that at the relevant time when the impugned action was taken by the Management of the respective colleges Statutes contained in Chapter XVIII of the Agra University relating to affiliation and recognition of colleges applied. 16. It is further the common case of the parties that at the relevant time when the impugned action was taken by the Management of the respective colleges Statutes contained in Chapter XVIII of the Agra University relating to affiliation and recognition of colleges applied. It is further the common case of the parties that when Sri Laxmi Narain was appointed the Principal of the Vaish College and Sri Suresh Chandra was appointed teacher in the Dayanand College, those colleges stood affiliated to the Agra University and the provisions of the Agra Act and the Statutes framed thereunder were applicable. 17. Section 25-C of the Agra Act by its Sub-Section (1) enacts that every teacher in an affiliated college shall be appointed under a written contract which will contain such terms and conditions as may be laid down by the Statutes. Sub-Section (2) enacts that every decision by the Management of an affiliated college to dismiss or remove from service a teacher shall be reported forthwith to the Vice Chancellor and subject to provisions to be made by the Statutes shall not take effect until it has been approved by the Vice Chancellor. "Teacher" as defined in Sub-Section (2) (f) in the Agra Act means a teacher of the University or teacher of an affiliated college and includes a Principal. It is not disputed that the provisions of Section 25-C of the Agra Act also applied in the case of a Principal of an affiliated college of Agra University. In the Meerut Act also there are parallel provisions as contained in Section 25-C of the Agra Act. Sub-Section (1) of S. 28 of the Meerut Act enacts that every teacher in an affiliated college shall be appointed under a written contract which shall contain such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. Sub-Section (3) enacts that every decision by the Management of an affiliated college to dismiss or remove from service a teacher, shall be reported forthwith to the Vice Chancellor and, subject to the provisions contained in the Statutes shall not take effect unless it has been approved by the Vice Chancellor. Sub-Section (3) enacts that every decision by the Management of an affiliated college to dismiss or remove from service a teacher, shall be reported forthwith to the Vice Chancellor and, subject to the provisions contained in the Statutes shall not take effect unless it has been approved by the Vice Chancellor. Here at this stage it is proper to note that in 1964 when Sri Laxmi Narain was appointed permanent Principal of the Vaish College and his appointment was approved by the Vice Chancellor of the Agra University as found by the Courts below, no written contract as contemplated by Sub-Section (1) of S. 25-C of the Agra Act was executed but before us the learned counsel for the parties proceeded on the basis that his appointment was in order as if he was appointed under a written contract. It is, further important to note that the Vice Chancellor of Meerut University has not yet approved the decision taken by the Management of the Vaish College terminating the services of Sri Laxmi Narain as Principal. In the case of Sri Suresh Chandra, the Geography teacher of Dayanand College who duly executed a written contract, the Vice Chancellor of Meerut University had approved the decision of the Management of the college terminating his services. 18. Reverting to the relevant Statutes relating to affiliation and recognition of colleges contained in Chapter XVIII of the Agra University Statutes which admittedly applied in the two cases out of three before us, it will be found that conditions of service of teachers of affiliated colleges are contained in Statutes starting from Statute 28 and ending with Statute 42. Statute 29-A provides that the Principals and all other members of staff of the colleges shall be appointed on a definite written contract of service which shall embody the specified points mentioned therein and shall be in the form appended at the end of the Chapter. Eight points are enumerated. Statute 29-A provides that the Principals and all other members of staff of the colleges shall be appointed on a definite written contract of service which shall embody the specified points mentioned therein and shall be in the form appended at the end of the Chapter. Eight points are enumerated. Clause 4 deals with the grounds on which services can be terminated and mentioned : (a) Wilful neglect of duty; (b) Misconduct including disobedience of the orders of the Principal; (c) Breach of any of the terms of contract; (d) Physical or mental unfitness; (e) Incompetence, provided that the pleas of incompetence shall not be used against a teacher after two years of confirmation; and (f) Abolition of the post with the prior approval of the Vice Chancellor, and says that they shall be the only grounds on which services can be terminated. Clause 5 provides for three months' notice en either side for terminating the contract or in lieu of such notice the payment of three months' salary except when termination of service takes place under Sub-Clause (a), (b) or (c) of clause 4. It would be noticed that the points which are required to be embodied in the written contract as mentioned in Statute 29-A do not mention the procedure to be adopted for terminating the services of the teacher on the grounds enumerated in clause 4. Such a provision is made by Statute 30, the material portions of which may now be quoted :- 30. "Every decision by the Management of an affiliated college, other than a college maintained by Government, to dismiss or remove from service a teacher shall be subject to the provisions of this Statute. (1) No order dismissing or removing from service a teacher shall be passed unless charge has been framed against the teacher and communicated to him/her with a statement of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action, and he/she has been given adequate opportunity :- (i) of submitting a written statement of his/her defence; (ii) of being heard in person, if he/she so chooses; and (ii) of calling and examining such witnesses in his/her defence as he/she may wish; provided that the Committee of officer authorised by the Managing Committee to conduct the enquiry may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, refuses to call any witness. (2) The Committee of Management may al any time, not exceeding two months from the date of the receipt of the teacher's explanation in respect of the charge or charge ? communicated to him/her, at a meeting' convened under its rules pass a resolution dismissing or removing from service a teacher for any one or more of the following grounds :- (i) Wilful neglect of duty; (ii) Misconduct, including disobedience to the order of the Principal in the case of the teachers; (iii) Breach of any of the terms of contract; or (iv) Incompetence, provided that the plea of incompetence shall not be used against a teacher after two years of confirmation. (3) The teacher may at any time within 15 days after the passing of such a resolution which shall contain the grounds of dismissal removal, as the case may be, and which shall be communicated to him/her forthwith, apply to have the decision of the committee of Management reviewed by it at a subsequent meeting, and the Committee shall on receipt of such an application be summoned to a second meeting within one month of the receipt of such an application. At such a meeting the teacher may submit an additional statement of his/her case and shall, if he/she so desires, be allowed to appear before the Committee in person to state his/her case and to answer any question that may be put to him/her by any member present at the meeting. If the teacher does not apply to have the resolution of the Committee reviewed, or if the resolution is confirmed by the Committee at subsequent meeting by a two-thirds majority of the members present, further notice of dismissal or removal from service need not be given to the teacher but he/she shall be given a copy of the resolution passed at such a meeting. (4) The Committee of Management may, instead of dismissing or removing from service the teacher, pass a resolution inflicting a lesser punishment by reducing the pay of the Teacher for specified period or by stopping increments of his/her salary for a specified period and/or may deprive the teacher of his/her pay during the period, if any, of his/her suspension. (4) The Committee of Management may, instead of dismissing or removing from service the teacher, pass a resolution inflicting a lesser punishment by reducing the pay of the Teacher for specified period or by stopping increments of his/her salary for a specified period and/or may deprive the teacher of his/her pay during the period, if any, of his/her suspension. The teacher in such a case also shall be entitled to apply to have the resolution of the Committee reviewed as provided above, and if he/she is not satisfied with the decision of the Committee, he/she may appeal to the Vice Chancellor for reconsideration of his/her case and the decision of the Vice Chancellor shall be final. The resolution of the Committee punishing the teacher shall operate only when and to the extent approved by the Vice Chancellor. X X X X (10) Every decision of the Management about the dismissal or removal from service of a teacher shall be reported forthwith, along with a complete report and all connected papers, to the Vice Chancellor who shall consider whether the provisions of the above Statutes have been complied with. If he is satisfied that the provisions of the Statute have not been complied with or that the grounds on which the teacher has been dismissed or removed from service are not adequate, he will disapprove of the decision of the Managing Committee. The decision of the Vice Chancellor shall be communicated to the Management within six weeks of the receipt of the proposal for compliance. If, however, the Vice Chancellor feels that any particular point needs clarification, he may call upon the Committee of the Management and the teacher concerned to give the necessary clarification before giving his decision. The decision of the Managing Committee will operate only if and when approved by the Vice Chancellor." 19. If, however, the Vice Chancellor feels that any particular point needs clarification, he may call upon the Committee of the Management and the teacher concerned to give the necessary clarification before giving his decision. The decision of the Managing Committee will operate only if and when approved by the Vice Chancellor." 19. Sri S.N. Kacker and Sri Jagdish Swarup on behalf of the Management of the respective colleges submitted that Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C of the Agra Act and the parallel provision contained in Sub-Section (3) of Section 28 of the Meerut Act and the Statute 30 of Chapter XVIII of Statutes of Agra University by themselves do not have the force of law so as to regulate the relationship between the management and the teacher and do not confer upon the teacher any enforceable legal right until and unless they are incorporated in the terms of written contract between the teacher and the Management as envisaged by Sub-Section (1) of Section 25-C of the Agra Act or Sub-Section (1) of Section 28 of the Meerut Act. It was their submission that those provisions being a part of the written contract any breach thereof by the Management would amount merely to a breach of contract and not to the breach of any statutory duty imposed by law. To put in different words breach of the said provisions by the Management will not amount to a breach of law making the action 'null and void' entitling a teacher to a declaration or injunction. Reliance was placed mainly on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of AIR 1972 SC 1450 in support of the submission that the provisions of Statute 30 and Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C of the Agra Act or the parallel provisions of Meerut Act have proprio vigore no force of law, the relationship between the parties being purely contractual and the Management of the college not being a statutory body, the case of the teacher did not fall in any of the exceptions laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of AIR 1964 SC 1680 . 20. 20. Sri Shanti Bhushan appearing for Laxmi Narain, Principal of Vaish College and Sri Raja Ram Agarwal, appearing for Suresh Chandra, the teacher of Dayanand College, contended in reply that in accordance with the law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of (1965) 2 SCR 713 despite the teacher of the affiliated college of the Meerut University having been appointed under a written contract the previsions of Statute 30 and of Sub-Section (3) of S. 25-C of the Agra Act or Sub-Section (3) of Section 28 of the Meerut Act will have the force of law and the relationship between the parties cannot be said to be purely contractual, the conditions of service being governed and regulated by law and the teacher would be entitled to a declaration or injunction as the Management constituted by the University Acts and the Statutes made thereunder functioning as a Statutory body in terminating the services of the Principal or the teacher violated those provisions thus the teacher's claim being based on breach of the Statute, the order of termination was liable to be declared null and void and the case squarely fell within the third exception formulated by the Supreme Court in S.R. Tewari's case. 21. Sri Shanti Bhushan advanced a further argument on behalf of Laxmi Narain, Principal of Vaish College, based on Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C of the Agra Act and the parallel provisions contained in Sub-Section (3) of Section 28 of the Meerut Act. He contended that the rule enacted in the said provisions was not a condition of service but a limitation imposed on the power of Management binding on it, therefore, the Vice Chancellor not having approved of the action taken by the Management, the termination never became effective, at any rate is not yet effective and the Principal was entitled to an injunction or a declaration to that effect. Sri Kacker for the Management refuted this contention, without prejudice to his main argument mentioned above and submitted that even without the approval of the Vice Chancellor the termination of the service by the Management factually brought to an end the relationship of master and servant between the parties and at worst it will be a wrongful act on the part of the Management and not a breach of law as the failure on the part of the Management to perform its duty to send for approval its resolution of termination to the Vice Chancellor would not give any enforceable right to the Principal and will only result in disaffiliation of the college at the discretion of the University. Learned counsel said that mere absence of approval by the Vice Chancellor will not make the actual termination of service non est as there was a de facto end of the relationship of master and servant when the Management passed the resolution terminating the service of the Principal and since then he was excluded from his office and did not do any work for the college as Principal. Two cases were cited in this connection -S.N. Awasthi v. President, K.A. Degree College, 1971 AD LJ 1105 : (1972 Lab 1C 272) and Francis v. Municipal Councillors,, (1962) 3 All ER 633. 22. In Awasthi's case, 1971 All LJ 1105 : (1972 Lab 1C 272) the High Court considered the effect of clause (d) of the First Statute 6.06 of the Kanpur University. It reads as follows :- "The Management may, before or at the end of the period of probation (including the extended period, if any), terminate the services of a teacher of the College if his work or conduct is not considered satisfactory. Provided that prior permission of the Vice Chancellor shall be necessary." The probationary service of Awasthi, a teacher in the K.A. Degree College affiliated to Kanpur University were terminated by the Management of the College without obtaining the prior permission of the Vice Chancellor of the Kanpur University. It was held that the resolution of the Managing Committee in effect terminated the services of the teacher and the termination being without prior permission of the Vice Chancellor the resolution made in contravention of the Statutes 6.06 (d) was invalid. It was held that the resolution of the Managing Committee in effect terminated the services of the teacher and the termination being without prior permission of the Vice Chancellor the resolution made in contravention of the Statutes 6.06 (d) was invalid. It was submitted by Sri Kacker that though the prior permission of the Vice Chancellor was necessary under the Statute yet it was held that the resolution of the Management effectively terminated the services. It is difficult to appreciate how the decision, in Awasthi's case supports the proposition, as the High Court struck down the resolution holding it invalid. In fact the observations in paragraph 7 of the reported judgement at page 1109 relied upon by Sri Kacker were made to repel an argument on behalf of the Management that there was automatic cessation of the services of the teacher as his probation which was for two years was never extended and the so-called resolution was of no consequence. 23. In the case of (1962) 3 All ER 633 the Privy Council considered Section 16(5) of an Ordinance empowering the President of the Municipal Council to remove persons from office appointed on a commencing salary of dollars 200 a month subject to the approval of the councillors. There is nothing in the decision of the Privy Council in the case cited which may be of any assistance to Sri Kacker as the decision turned on the finding that Francis was not removed from service by the President was entitled to damages as his services were actually put to an end by the councillor who were the employers by confirming the decision of the Establishment Committee who terminated the service of Francis. Sri Kacker attempted to draw assistance from the decision of the Privy Council in Francis's case on the ground that though termination of service was not in accordance with the law yet the termination was held effective as the Councillors who were the employers by confirming the decision of establishment Committee, a body not authorised to terminate the service, put an end to the relationship of master and servant. The submission was that the Management of the Vaish College being the employer passed a resolution terminating the service of the employee and no matter the requirement of the law was that the termination should receive the approval of the Vice Chancellor, it would still be effective and if found wrongful would only entitle the Principal to claim damages. 24. Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C of the Agra Act and the parallel provision in Sub-Section (3) of Section 28 of the Meerut Act lay down that a decision by the Management of an affiliated college to dismiss or remove from service a teacher shall not take effect until it has been approved by the Vice Chancellor. In the cases cited by Sri Kacker the Courts had no occasion to consider any such provision of law. That a decision would be subject to the approval of some person or authority is not the same thing as saying that a decision shall not take effect until it has been approved by some person or authority. It cannot be doubted, assuming the abovesaid provisions of the Agra Act and the Meerut Act have force of law and apply independent of the written contract, the dismissal or removal from service of a teacher by the Management of an affiliated college will not take effect until the happening of an event indicated in the said provisions, that is, the approval by the Vice Chancellor. The question whether these provisions by themselves do not regulate the terms and conditions of service of a teacher of affiliated college and acquire vitality, and force only when they become a part of service contract is yet to be determined. 25. It was also suggested by the learned counsel for the Management of the colleges that the relationship between the Management and its teachers being wholly contractual the teachers did not enjoy any status as being occupant of any public office or the holder of any office protected by any provision of law. This argument was refuted by the learned counsel appearing for the teachers on the submission that under the scheme of the University Acts and the Statutes the teachers and the Principals are holders of office of status as such, as the provisions of the law protect their office and give them security of tenure. 26. This argument was refuted by the learned counsel appearing for the teachers on the submission that under the scheme of the University Acts and the Statutes the teachers and the Principals are holders of office of status as such, as the provisions of the law protect their office and give them security of tenure. 26. The important question then arises for consideration is whether such terms and conditions of service of the teacher of an affiliated college as find mention, in Statute 30 or Section 25-C (2) of Agra Act or Section 28(3) of the Meerut Act have proprio yigore force of law. For the teachers, as said above, it was contended that to the nature and character of their employment under the scheme of the Act and the Statute applicable the ratio of Jodh's case (1965) 2 SCR 713 decided by the Supreme Court fully applied while on behalf of the Management it was contended that the ratio of Vidyaram Misra's case, AIR 1972 SC 1450 applied. The learned counsel for the Management even went to the extent of submitting that the decision of the Supreme Court in Vidayaram Misra's case will be deemed to have overruled their earlier decision in Jodh's case, a proposition which is very difficult to accept. In Vidyaram Misra's case the learned Judges of the Supreme Court noticed their previous decision in Jodh's case and distinguished it but did not even remotely hint that Jodh's case was not correctly decided. It is not possible, therefore, to hold that the decision in Jodh's case stands overruled and the law declared therein is no longer good law and binding. Rather a perusal of the judgement of 'he Supreme Court in Vidyaram Misra's case clearly shows that the principle of law as formulated in Jodh's case was not disapproved but it was not found applicable to the facts in Vidyaram Misra's case as the scheme under the Lucknow University Act and the Statutes applicable to the Associate Colleges of Lucknow University was found to be different in comparison to the scheme under the University of Saugar Act and the Ordinances made thereunder. In Jodh's case it was held by the Supreme Court that Clause 8(vi)(a) of the College Code (Ordinance 20) framed by the University requiring the Governing Body of the College not to terminate the service of any teacher confirmed in the service of the college without following the procedure mentioned therein despite the fact that the teachers of the colleges were duly appointed on a written contract, conferred a legal right on the teachers of the affiliated colleges. The argument that the college Code merely regulated the legal relationship between the affiliated colleges and the University and it imposed only contractual terms and conditions of service was repelled. In Vidyaram Misra's case the Supreme Court found that on a plain reading of Statute 151 of Lucknow University it was manifest that all the terms and conditions of service of a teacher must be incorporated in the contract to be entered into between the college and the teacher concerned and did not say that the terms and conditions have any legal force without being embodied in an agreement, therefore, without the contract they had no vitality or conferred any legal right. The learned Judges emphasised more than once in the course of their judgement that Statutes did not specify any procedure for removal of a teacher independently of the contract and the terms and conditions mentioned in Statute 151 had no efficacy unless they were incorporated in a contract. Thus two principles of law emerge from the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jodh's case and Vidyaram Misra's case; (1) Where any provisions of an Act, Statute or Ordinance relating to the conditions of affiliation of colleges to, a University on their own force, that is. Thus two principles of law emerge from the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jodh's case and Vidyaram Misra's case; (1) Where any provisions of an Act, Statute or Ordinance relating to the conditions of affiliation of colleges to, a University on their own force, that is. proprio vigore are enforceable, no matter the teacher of the affiliated college is required to be appointed under a written contract he will have an enforceable right entitling him to declaration of statutory in validity of any action taken against him in violation of such provisions affecting his employment and; (2) Where the University Act, Statutes or Ordinances relating to affiliation of colleges to a University require certain specified terms and conditions to be incorporated in a written contract to be entered into between the Management of the affiliated college and its teacher at the time of appointment, and nothing else remains affecting the conditions of service which is not wholly governed by the contract, then anything done by the Management of the affiliated college adversely affecting the teacher in respect of his employment would amount only to a breach of contract actionable in damages. 27. The problem, therefore, in the cases before us reduces to this : Whether Sub-Section (1) of Section 25-C and the relevant Statutes contained in Chapter XVIII of the Statutes of Agra University relating to the terms and conditions of affiliation require the provisions of Statute 30 and the provisions of Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C of the Agra Act to be incorporated in the written contract ? Do they indicate that the same would not have any legal force unless a written contract containing such terms and conditions was executed ? That is to say, whether Statute 30 and Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C of the Agra Act have the same character as Clause 8(vi)(aa) of the College Code framed under the University of Saugar Act conferring an enforceable legal right on the teacher or are they merely in the nature of terms and conditions required to be incorporated in the written contract ? 28. 28. Before examining the above pro positions an argument raised on behalf c-the Management to the effect that the Statutes or Ordinances framed under the Meerut Act in regard to conditions for affiliation of colleges operate only in the field of relationship of the affiliated college with the University and any breach thereof by the Management of the affiliated college will only visit the affiliated college with the penalty of disaffiliation at the discretion of the University and will not give any right to a teacher which could be enforced before a Court of law though such breach by the affiliated college affects the teacher prejudicially, has to be considered. In Jodh's case the Supreme Court does not appear to have accepted the argument so widely as stated above. The learned Judges at p. 718 (1965) 2 SCR 713 observed :- "It is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that the "College Code" has been made by the University in exercise of its Statutory power conferred by Section 32 and under Section 6(6) of the Act. It is also conceded on behalf of the respondents that the College Code is not ultra vires of the powers of the University contained in Section 32 and Section 6(6) of the Act. In our opinion, the provisions of Ordinance 20, otherwise called the College Code, have the force of law. It confers legal right on the teachers of affiliated colleges and it is not the correct proposition to say that the College Code merely regulates the legal relationship between the affiliated colleges and the University alone. We do not agree with the High Court that the provisions of the College Code constitute power of management. On the contrary we are of the view that the provisions of College Code relating to the pay scale of teachers and their security of tenure properly fall within the statutory power of affiliation granted to the University under the Act. It is true that Clause 7 of the Ordinance provides that all teachers of affiliated colleges shall be appointed on a written contract in the form prescribed Sd. A, but that does not mean that teachers have merely a contractual remedy against the governing body of the college. It is true that Clause 7 of the Ordinance provides that all teachers of affiliated colleges shall be appointed on a written contract in the form prescribed Sd. A, but that does not mean that teachers have merely a contractual remedy against the governing body of the college. On the other hand, we are of opinion that the provisions of Clause 8 of the Ordinance relating to security of the tenure of teachers are part and parcel of the teacher's service conditions and, as we have already pointed out, the provisions of the College Code in this regard are validly made by the University in exercise of the statutory power and have, therefore, the force and effect of law. It follows, therefore, that the College Code creates legal rights in favour of teachers of affiliated colleges and the view taken by the High Court is erroneous." 29. From what is quoted above it is manifest that the Supreme Court took the view that as Ordinance 20 was made by the University in exercise of the statutory power laying down the terms and conditions of services of the teachers relating to their pay and scale and security of tenure properly fell within the statutory power of affiliation granted to the University under the Act and, therefore, they had the force and effect of law. The Supreme Court deliberately rejected the proposition that Ordinance 20 merely regulated the legal relationship between the affiliated colleges and the University alone. They further did not agree with the High Court that the provisions of Ordinance 20 constituted power of management. They also repelled the contention that as Clause 7 of the Ordinance provided that all teachers of affiliated colleges shall be appointed on a written contract in the form prescribed the teachers had merely a contractual remedy against the governing body of the college. 30. They also repelled the contention that as Clause 7 of the Ordinance provided that all teachers of affiliated colleges shall be appointed on a written contract in the form prescribed the teachers had merely a contractual remedy against the governing body of the college. 30. Then relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR 1970 SC 1244 and AIR 1971 SC 1828 it was argued by the learned counsel for the Management of the Colleges that though the statutes were framed under the Agra Act laying down the terms and conditions of relationship between the affiliated college and its teachers any order made in breach of such statutes would not amount to breach of any statutory obligation entitling the teacher to a declaration and at worst the resolution of termination passed by the Management of the college would only be a breach of contract making the management liable for damages. It is important to note that in the two cases, Warehousing Corporation, AIR 1970 SC 1244 and Indian Airlines, AIR 1971 SC 1828 the Supreme Court held that the relevant regulations framed by the Corporations, had no statutory force. Since Jodh's case was not noticed in these cases, it cannot be said that the declaration of law in Jodh's case is no longer good and binding. In the cases before us the teachers stand on a stronger footing. The Statutes under chapter XVIII of the Agra University Statutes which are applicable were not framed by the Meerut University. The Meerut Act by its Section 50(1)(aa) enforced it. In fact these Statutes were substituted for the First Statutes of the University which up to that time had not been framed. It is not disputed on behalf of the Management that the First Statutes will always be a part of the Act and enforceable as such. It is difficult then to agree with the contention that the Statutes under Chapter XVIII of the Agra University Statutes will not have the same force as the provisions of the Act. Statutes under Chapter XVIII. therefore, bear no resemblance to the regulations made by the Warehousing Corporation or the Indian Air Lines Corporation. 31. It is difficult then to agree with the contention that the Statutes under Chapter XVIII of the Agra University Statutes will not have the same force as the provisions of the Act. Statutes under Chapter XVIII. therefore, bear no resemblance to the regulations made by the Warehousing Corporation or the Indian Air Lines Corporation. 31. To surmount the above formidible difficulty Sri Kacker for the Management of the Vaish College went so far as to submit that the provisions of Section 50(1)(aa) of the Meerut Act were ultra vires as they suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power to the Executive. There is hardly any tenability in this contention. What was provided by cl. (aa) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 50 of the Meerut Act was that the State Government may, for the purposes of removing any difficulty in relation to enforcement of the Act direct that all or any of the Statutes or Ordinances made under the Agra University Act, 1926 shall with such adaptation and modifications whether by way of addition, amendment or omission as it may be deemed to be necessary or expedient, apply in relation to the University for so long as the First Statutes in respect of the same subject-matter are not made under Sub-Section (1) of Section 31.Sri Kacker submitted that it has been left to the sweet will and unguided discretion of the State Government to apply any Statute or Ordinance under the Agra Act with any kind of addition, amendment or omission as the State Government thought necessary or expedient and that amounted to excessive delegation of legislative power. Reference was made to Jalan Trading Co. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1967 SC 691, wherein the Supreme Court struck down Section 37 of Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 on the ground that it exceeded the permissible limit of delegation of legislative authority. It was found that the section authorised the Government to determine for itself what the purposes of the Act were and to make provisions for removal of doubts and difficulties which was the function of the Legislature and the power to remove the doubts and difficulty by altering the provisions of the Act would in substance amount to exercise of legislative function which could not be delegated to an Executive Authority. There is no analogy between the invalid Section 37 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 and clause (aa) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 50 of the Meerut Act. Here the difficulty is indicated by the Legislature itself, that is, non-framing of the First Statutes of the University. The State Government is not empowered to amend or modify the provisions of the Meerut Act, after forming an opinion what the purpose of the Act was and what difficulty was to be surmounted. Here the difficulty indicated is obvious The Meerut Act could not be worked out unless the First Statute had been framed along with it. That was the difficulty. The Statute and Ordinances under the Agra Act were already known and any of them were only left for mechanical application with the necessary adaptations and modifications. No doubt some choice was left with the State Government as to what addition, amendment or omission is to be resorted to for adapting the Statutes of Agra University but that would not amount to excessive delegation of legislative authority. See Re: The Delhi Laws Act, AIR 1951 SC 332 . The attack on the vires of clause (aa) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 50 thus fails. The Statutes of Chapter XVIII of the Agra University cannot therefore, he equated with the regulations made by the Warehousing Corporation or the Indian Airlines Corporation. 32. For the Management the argument that even if the Statutes under Chapter XVIII of Agra University be deemed to be part of the Meerut Act still they will operate only in the field of affiliation was again reiterated. Reference was made to two Supreme Court decisions (1) Km. Regina v. St. Alloysius High School, ATR 1971 SC 1920 and (2) Dr. Rampal Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan, (1970) 1 SCC 75 . In Km. Regina's case the Supreme Court found that part II. Rules relied upon by "Km. Reference was made to two Supreme Court decisions (1) Km. Regina v. St. Alloysius High School, ATR 1971 SC 1920 and (2) Dr. Rampal Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan, (1970) 1 SCC 75 . In Km. Regina's case the Supreme Court found that part II. Rules relied upon by "Km. Regina as binding on the respondent School have not been framed under Section 56 of the Madras Elementary Education Act, 1920 had no statutory force and then held that nothing in those rules conferred upon an aggrieved employee of a school any right enforceable at law in the event of the Management of an Elementary School refusing to comply with those rules 'which, inter alia, enjoined upon a school to abide by the directions given thereunder by the Education Officers of the Government named therein. The ratio of the decision in Km. Regina's case is, therefore, not attracted in the circumstances of the case before us. In the case of (1970) 1 SCC 75 the decision of the Supreme Court turned on the fact that mere appointment of some Professors and Principal in the Faculty of Medicine of the University ignoring the provisions of Ordinance 65 framed by the University laying down minimum qualifying experience in service could not render the appointments invalid as those appointments were validly made under the rules framed by the Governor under Article 309 of the Constitution and Dr. Rampal Chaturvedi had no right to approach the High Court by means of a petition for a writ of quo warranto. The ratio of this case also does not, therefore, help the Management of the colleges. 33. In both the above cases cited on behalf of the Management certain observations were made that the provisions on which the petitioners relied pertain to the sphere of recognition and affiliation but that circumstance was not made the basis of the decision. In Km. Regina's case, AIR 1971 SC 1920 the specific rule relied upon by the petitioner was not found to have any force of law on an examination of the entire scheme of the Madras Education Act. In Dr. Rampal Chaturvedi's case the Supreme Court did not examine the true nature of Ordinance 65 framed by the Rajasthan University, as it found the impugned appointments justified under the rules framed by the Governor under Article 309 of the Constitution, which bad an overriding effect. 34. In Dr. Rampal Chaturvedi's case the Supreme Court did not examine the true nature of Ordinance 65 framed by the Rajasthan University, as it found the impugned appointments justified under the rules framed by the Governor under Article 309 of the Constitution, which bad an overriding effect. 34. Reverting to the main argument, it was next contended on behalf of the Management of the colleges that even though the Statutes in Chapter XVIII of the Agra University Statutes may have derived their force from Section 50(1)(aa) of the Meerut Act yet they will not confer any enforceable right on the teacher or the Principal as Statute 29-A has the effect of making the conditions of service of teacher of affiliated colleges contractual. It was submitted that Section 25-C(1) of the Agra Act required a written contract which will contain such terms and conditions as may be laid down by the Statutes, so all those provisions in Chapter XVIII which answer to the definition of terms and conditions of service will form a part of the written contract. It was further emphasised that the duly imposed on the Management and the power of approval to be exercised by the Vice Chancellor under Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C of the Agra Act have been subjected to provisions to be made by the Statutes hence it is the Statutes which will prevail over the section and since the matter of approval by the Vice Chancellor also comprises one of the terms and conditions of service, it will also become a part of the contract. In other words, the submission was that no matter pertaining to terms and conditions of service of a teacher or Principal of an affiliated college is left to be governed and regulated by the provisions of the Act or the Statutes independently of the contract as every term and condition of service has to be reduced into a contract. 35. Sub-Section (1) of Section 25-C of the Agra Act says that every teacher in an affiliated college shall be appointed under a written contract which will contain such terms and conditions as may he laid down by the Statute. 35. Sub-Section (1) of Section 25-C of the Agra Act says that every teacher in an affiliated college shall be appointed under a written contract which will contain such terms and conditions as may he laid down by the Statute. The plain meaning of the language used is that whatever terms and conditions which the Statutes lay down for being embodied in the written contract will form the part of the written contract under which the teacher in an affiliated college would be appointed. The statutes have to be seen for finding out the terms and conditions that shall form part of the written contract. It is not possible to give the meaning to the language of Sub-Section (1) that whatever pertains to terms and conditions of service of a teacher in the Statutes shall form part of the written contract. It is only those terms and conditions of service which the Statutes requires to be embodied in the written contract that will form part of the contract. As already pointed out above, Statute 29-A of Chapter XVIII specifies the points pertaining to the condition of service of teachers of affiliated colleges for being reduced into a definite written contract of service and the model form of such written contract is also prescribed. Once a document pertaining to the permanent service is executed embodying the points specified under Statute 29-A it will answer the requirement of Sub-Section (1) of Section 25-C of he Agra Act. Eight points have been enumerated in Statute 29-A of Chapter XVIII. None of the eight points mentioned as terms or conditions of service cover the conditions found in Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C or Statute 30 of Chapter XVIII. Thus the Statute 29-A does not lay down that what is contained in Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C and Statute 30 must form part of the written contract. 36. None of the eight points mentioned as terms or conditions of service cover the conditions found in Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C or Statute 30 of Chapter XVIII. Thus the Statute 29-A does not lay down that what is contained in Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C and Statute 30 must form part of the written contract. 36. The form of agreement appended at the end of Chapter XVIII which is required to be followed for members of the staff other than the Principal in an affiliated college does not contain my clause in the nature of the provisions found in Statute 30 though there is a clause (11) to the effect that the decision of the college Management to dismiss the teacher shall not take effect unless it has been approved by the Vice Chancellor in accordance with the provisions of Section 25-C(2) of the Act. In the form of agreement with the Principals of the affiliated colleges appended at the end of Chapter XVIII, Clauses 11, 12 and 13 are relevant. They are reproduced for convenience of reference :- "11. That the services of the Principal shall not be terminated except by a resolution of the Managing Committee passed in a meeting of the Committee expressly called for the purpose and attended by at least two-thirds of the total membership and such resolution to be effective must be passed by two thirds majority of the members present. 12. That before such a resolution is passed, the Principal shall be acquainted in writing with the grounds on which it is proposed to remove him and he shall be given enough time (not less than 15 days) to submit his explanation which shall be duly considered by the Managing Committee before the decision of removal is taken. The Principal shall also have the right to be personally present at the meeting of the Managing Committee to explain his case but he shall withdraw from the meeting when the vote is taken. 13. That the resolution of the Managing Committee removing the Principal shall operate only when approved by the Vice-Chancellor". 37. Statute 30 says that every decision of the Management of an affiliated College to dismiss or remove from service a teacher shall be subject to the provision of that Statute. It is not disputed that Principal is included within the word 'teacher' in the said Statute. 37. Statute 30 says that every decision of the Management of an affiliated College to dismiss or remove from service a teacher shall be subject to the provision of that Statute. It is not disputed that Principal is included within the word 'teacher' in the said Statute. Worded as it is the Statute has an overriding effect. An order of dismissal or removal from service of a teacher by the Management of an affiliated college cannot be made unless the provisions of the said Statute have been complied with. The provisions contained in Statute 30 are not a part of the contract of a teacher. Neither Statute 29-A provides for it nor the appended model form. Non-compliance with the provisions of Statute 30 by the Management would not amount to a breach of contract as the provisions of the Statute 30 are not the terms and conditions of the written contract. The question is whether Clause (12) mentioned above in the form of agreement with the principals of colleges excludes the Principal from taking benefit of the provisions of Statute 30 in the matter of his removal from service. A comparison of Clause (12) with Statute 30 will show that while Clause (12) of the agreement does not give the principal the right of cross-examining witnesses if he so chooses and of calling and examining such witnesses in his defence as he may wish and the right of review and asking the Management to inflict 3 lesser punishment and so on, while Statute 30 confers all these benefits. If in the case of a Principal Statute 30 is held to be superimposed by clause (12) of the agreement, then the Managing Committee even without affording an opportunity to the Principal of cross-examining the witnesses and of culling and examining the witnesses in his defence, may terminate the services of the Principal after meeting the requirements of Clause (12) and the Principal will have no remedy. Thus, the Principal will have lesser protection than a teacher. For the same reason the mere inclusion of clauses in the agreement of the Principal and the teacher that the dismissal will not take effect till approved by the Vice Chancellor will not mean that the provisions of Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C of the Agra Act will lose their efficacy as a rule of law and become contractual. For the same reason the mere inclusion of clauses in the agreement of the Principal and the teacher that the dismissal will not take effect till approved by the Vice Chancellor will not mean that the provisions of Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C of the Agra Act will lose their efficacy as a rule of law and become contractual. To the phrase "subject to the provisions to be made by the Statute" occurring in Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C it is not possible to give the meaning that merely because Statute 29-A required a definite written agreement embodying specific points, the contract superimposes itself and Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C of the Agra Act no longer remains operative proprio vigore, The position that emerges out, therefore, is that despite the requirements of a teacher of an affiliated college being appointed under a written contract containing such terms and conditions as may be laid down by the Statutes the provisions of Sub-Section (2) of Section 25-C of the Agra Act and Statute 30 of Chapter XVIII continue to govern and regulate the terms and conditions of service of the teacher in the matter of termination of his services by the Management of the affiliated college and any breach of the provisions thereof will be a breach of law and not merely a breach of contract. The present cases, therefore, fall within the rule of law of Jodh's case and Vidyaram Misra's case will have no application, inasmuch as in the case of Lucknow University the relevant provisions of the Act and the Statutes did not leave out anything pertaining to terms and conditions of a teacher of an associated college which was not required to be reduced in the form of a contract. In the case of teachers of the associated college of Lucknow University as found by the Supreme Court the right of a teacher was purely a contractual right unprotected, unregulated and uncontrolled by any provision of law independent of the contract. 38. In the case of teachers of the associated college of Lucknow University as found by the Supreme Court the right of a teacher was purely a contractual right unprotected, unregulated and uncontrolled by any provision of law independent of the contract. 38. Having held above that the provisions of Statute 30 of Chapter XVIII and Sub-Section (2) of S. 25-C of the Agra Act control and regulate the service conditions of the teacher of the affiliated college independently of written contract, the answer to the question whether the relationship between a teacher and the Management of an affiliated college is that of pure master and servant, that is to say, wholly contractual will be obvious. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Jodh's case such provisions are made by the University in exercise of its powers of affiliation granted by law to the University and are made with the object of affording protection to the teachers of the affiliated college against any arbitrariness of the Management in the interest of efficiency in the field of education. When a college is admitted to, the privilege of affiliation or association with the University, its Management is bound by the conditions of affiliation imposed by the University under the Act incorporating such University and the Management cannot be heard to say with impunity that though it has not complied with the conditions thus imposed and at its sweet will has put an end to the service of the teacher, will pay damages to him if the termination is found to be wrongful. The law declared by the Supreme Court in Jodh's case clearly lays down that where the services of a teacher are terminated in the breach of the provisions of the Act or the Statutes of the University which proprio vigore can be enforced independent of the contract the teacher will have an enforceable right. In Vidyaram Misra's case it has been held that where the provisions of the Act or Statutes of the University themselves provide that all that pertains to the terms and conditions of service will be reduced into a written contract, then the only remedy of the teacher is by way of suit for damages as the termination of his service in the breach of the terms and conditions of his service would merely amount to breach of contract. To that extent the rule of law laid down by this Court in the case of Dr. Puri v. Meerut University is no longer good law as the Supreme Court has not recognised the doctrine whereby parties are required to enter compulsorily into a contract embodying the terms and conditions laid down by that law, then the relationship is not that of pure master and servant and any breach of the terms and conditions of service would amount to a breach of law. 39. The matter can be examined from another angle. It was argued by Sri Shanti Bhushan for the Principal of the Shamli College that the right flowing from Section 25-C(2) of the Agra Act and the parallel provisions of Section 28(3) of the Meerut Act in favour of the teacher is a legal right independent of the rights flowing from the written contract. He further submitted that the same is the position with regard to the rights conferred by Statute 30 of Chapter XVIII of the Agra University Statutes. Submission was that the teacher enjoys an immunity or a protection and no decision of the Managing Committee dismissing or removing him can be taken without complying with Statute 30 and it will be effective only when approved by the Vice Chancellor. The object, the fulfilment of which the said provisions manifest, is that the disruption of the relationship of employer and the employee between the Management and the teacher cannot take place without first fulfilling the duty imposed on the employer and further only when a third party that is, the Vice Chancellor assents to it. The act of assent or approval by the Vice Chancellor is not and cannot be part of the contract between the employer and the employee but it is a super-imposition by law outside the contract. There appears to be great tenability in this contention. The act of assent or approval by the Vice Chancellor is not and cannot be part of the contract between the employer and the employee but it is a super-imposition by law outside the contract. There appears to be great tenability in this contention. On behalf of the Management it was, however, submitted as pointed out above that dismissal or removal from service of a teacher by the Management of an affiliated college no doubt shall not take effect until it has been approved by the Vice Chancellor but this section makes it subject to the provisions to be made by the Statutes and since the Statutes prescribe for the terms and conditions of service to be embodied in a written contract, the act of the approval by the Vice Chancellor in order to give effect to the dismissal or removal of teacher becomes a part of the contract of service. It is difficult to agree with this submission. No statute can reduce the necessity of approval by the Vice Chancellor to a mere contract between the Management and the teacher as that would imply that the parties can contract themselves out of it and render the Act nugatory. Such a term in the contract will be illegal. 40. The phrase "subject to provisions to be made by the Statute" occurring in Section 25-C(2) will only mean that the manner of reporting of the decision by the Management of an affiliated college to dismiss or remove from service a teacher and the manner of approval by the Vice Chancellor is to be regulated and controlled by the Statute. Clause (10) of Statute 30 of Chapter XVIII lays down the manner and the procedure in this respect. It provides that the decision of the Management about dismissal or removal from service of a teacher shall be reported forthwith along with complete report and all connected papers to the Vice Chancellor who shall consider whether the provisions of the above Statute have been complied with. It is significant to note here that the Vice Chancellor is enjoined to consider whether the provisions of the Statute are complied with and not whether the terms of the written contract haw been complied with. It is significant to note here that the Vice Chancellor is enjoined to consider whether the provisions of the Statute are complied with and not whether the terms of the written contract haw been complied with. If, the Vice Chancellor is satisfied that toe provisions of the Statute have not been complied with and the grounds on which a teacher has been dismissed or removed from service are not adequate he will disapprove the decision of the Managing Committee. The decision of the Vice Chancellor shall be communicated to the Management within six weeks of the receipt of the proposal for compliance. If, however, the Vice Chancellor feels that any particular point needs clarification, he will call upon the Committee of the Management and the teacher concerned to give the necessary clarification before giving his decision. The decision of the Managing Committee will operate only if and when approved by the Vice Chancellor, Thus clause (10) of Statute 30 which as held above is not an essential part of the written contract contemplated by Statute 29(A), when it says that the resolution of the Committee punishing the teacher shall operate only when and to the extent approved by the Vice Chancellor reinforces what is provided by the Act. The Committee of Management and the Vice Chancellor have to act within the ambit of the said clause and this is what is meant by subjecting the taking of effect of the decision on the approval of the Vice Chancellor to die Statute and nothing more. 41. The provisions of Statute 30 appear to be basically founded on the well established principles of natural justice for affording adequate and reasonable opportunity to the teacher accused of misconduct. There appears to be force in the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the teachers that it could not have been the intention of the framers of the Act and the Statutes that any breach of the rules of natural justice as embodied in Statute 30 would be merely a breach of contract. This reinforces the conclusion that Statute 30 was not intended to be merely an essential ingredient of the terms and conditions of the contract. 42. This reinforces the conclusion that Statute 30 was not intended to be merely an essential ingredient of the terms and conditions of the contract. 42. To sum up this part of the case it K clear that Section 25-C(2) of the Agra Act, (parallel Section 28(3) of the Meerut Act) and the Statute 30 of Chapter XVIII or the Agra University Act are proprio vigore enforceable and any breach of any terms thereof will be breach of Statute and not a breach of contract. 43. The next important question that remains to be considered is the nature and status of the Committee of Management of the colleges concerned. Relying on AIR 1972 SC 1450 (supra) the learned counsel for the Colleges contended that the Committee of Management of the Colleges concerned is merely a private body and not a Statutory body. Paragraph 13 at page 1455 of the report AIR 1972 SC 1450 was referred. The Supreme Court observed :- "Besides, in order that the third exception to the general rule that no writ will lie to quash an order terminating a contract of service, albeit illegally, as stated in 1964-3 SCR 55 : ( AIR 1964 SC 1680 ) might apply, it is necessary that the order must he the order of a statutory body acting in breach of 8 mandatory obligation imposed by a Statute. The college or the Managing Committee in question, is not a statutory body and so the argument of Mr. Setalvad that the case in hand will fall under the third exception cannot be accepted. The contention counsel that this Court has subsilentio sanctioned the issue of a writ under Art. 226 to quash an under terminating services of a teacher passed by a college similarly situate in (1965) 2 SCR 713 and, therefore, the fact that the college or the managing committee was not a statutory body was no hindrance to the High Court appellant has no merit and this Court expressly stated in the judgement that no such contention was raised in the High Court and so it cannot be allowed to be raised in this Court." (Underlining is mine). 44. A reading of the above quoted extract would show that no question was raised in Vidyaram Misra's case AIR 1972 SC 1450 that the Managing Committee of S.N.J. College was a Statutory body. 44. A reading of the above quoted extract would show that no question was raised in Vidyaram Misra's case AIR 1972 SC 1450 that the Managing Committee of S.N.J. College was a Statutory body. An argument was advanced on the footing that though it was not a statutory body yet in Jodh's case that fact that the Managing Committee of the College being a non-statutory body was not considered as hindrance to the High Court issuing a writ, therefore, the Supreme Court would be deemed to have subsilentio sanctioned an issuance of a writ against a non-statutory body. This argument was repelled. Can it be said then that the observation of the Supreme Court "the college, or the Managing Committee in question is not a statutory body", in a declaration of law to the effect that the Managing Committee of the Colleges affiliated to all the Universities are non-statutory bodies ? No legal principle or doctrine can be evolved from the said observation of the Supreme Court. It is at best a declaration of fact that the Managing Committee of the S.N.J. College was not a statutory body. Since it is only a declaration of law which is binding on all courts under Art. 141 of the Constitution and not a declaration of fact, the learned counsel for the Management cannot press into service Art. 141 of the Constitution. The said observation also cannot be binding as a precedent inasmuch as the question was not raised before the Supreme Court that the Managing Committee of the S.N.J. College was a statutory body. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1972 SC 1450 (supra) does not hinder the examination of the question whether the Managing Committee of the colleges concerned in the case before us can be said to be a statutory body within the meaning of the third exception laid down by the Supreme Court in Sri Nath Tiwari's case AIR 1964 SC 1680 . 45. It is admitted that the Shamli College is owned by a Registered Society. Similarly the Dayanand College, Dehradun is owned by A Registered Society. The Governing Body of either of the two institutions certainly will not be a statutory body. 45. It is admitted that the Shamli College is owned by a Registered Society. Similarly the Dayanand College, Dehradun is owned by A Registered Society. The Governing Body of either of the two institutions certainly will not be a statutory body. It was urged that the Governing Body of each of the two colleges or any smaller body appointed by it under its registered rules to manage the college will also not be a statutory body as a statutory body is that body which is created by a Statute. For the teachers it was submitted that the Committee of Management of an affiliated college in its constitution, composition and functions is not a body of persons coming into existence under the rules of the Registered Society but is a body of persons having a separate composition and is constituted by the University Act and the Statutes. 46. Statute 14 of Chapter XVIII of the Agra University Statutes by its Cl.(c) lays down that a college applying for affiliation to the University in any faculty shall be required to satisfy the Vice Chancellor with regard to that it is suitably organised, is under proper Management and the constitution of the Managing Committee provides (1) for the Principal of the College to be an ex-officio member of the Managing Committee of the college; (2) for the representation of the teacher on the Managing Committee, one teacher who is to be bead of his Department to be chosen on the Managing Committee in order of seniority in the college by rotation for one academic season. Statute 7.03 of the First Statute of the Meerut University by its clause (d) requires the satisfaction of the Vice Chancellor as to the constitution of the Management of the proposed college to be so broad-based as to include members from different interested groups who can be relied upon to take an enlightened interest in the affairs of the college and it further provides for representation on the Management of (1) the Principal of the college, an ex-officio member (2) the senior most teacher (judged by length of service as a teacher in the college concerned) (3) two persons nominated by the Executive Council for a term of five years. Then by clauses (e), (f) and (g) placed certain limitations as to its membership and constitution. Then by clauses (e), (f) and (g) placed certain limitations as to its membership and constitution. For the purpose of the cases referred it is the Statute 14 of Chapter XVIII of the Agra University Statutes which applies vide Section 50(1)(aa) of the Meerut Act. 47. Under Section 5(ii) of the Meerut Act a power has been conferred on the University to admit to the privileges of affiliation under the prescribed conditions any college situate within the area of that University. Section 2(a) of the said Act defines an affiliated college as being an institution affiliated to the University in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Statutes of the University. In clause (i) of Section 2 of the Meerut Act the Management 'means' the Managing Committee or body charged with managing the affairs of an affiliated college. Chapter XVIII of the Agra University Statutes prescribes the conditions for admitting By college to the privileges of an affiliation to the University. One of the conditions prescribed in Chapter XVIII of the Statutes as mentioned in Statute 14, stated above, is that the College is suitably organised, is under proper management, and the constitution of the Managing Committee conforms to the provisions therein. Once the managing committee of an affiliated college is constituted and composed in accordance with the Statute 14, it becomes the 'Management' as defined in clause (i) of Section 2 of the Meerut Act. It is not disputed that the two colleges concerned are affiliated colleges of the Meerut University as defined under Section 2(a) of the Meerut Act. It is further not disputed that the Managing Committee of each of the two colleges is constituted and composed in Accordance with the Statutes. The Managing Committee of the colleges then becomes the 'Management' as defined under the Meerut Act. It is not possible to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the Management that the Managing Committee of the colleges is a body constituted under the rules of the Registered Society, which owns those colleges. Now a Managing Committee of an affiliated college is to be constituted as laid down by the Statutes relating to affiliation and its constitution and composition is not left to the free will of the members of the Registered Society. Now a Managing Committee of an affiliated college is to be constituted as laid down by the Statutes relating to affiliation and its constitution and composition is not left to the free will of the members of the Registered Society. It may be that the very personnel of the managing body constituted under the rules of the Registered Society even enblock become a part of the personnel of the Managing Committee of the affiliated college but the fact that along with them are introduced as members the Principal of the college and a representative of the teachers by rotation as enjoined by the Statute of affiliation, the Managing Committee so constituted could not be the same as the original committee constituted under the rules of the Registered Society. The Meerut Act and the Statutes introduce a foreign element into the Management consisting of persons who may not be the members of the Registered Society. Thus the Management of an affiliated college is a creation of the Meerut Act and the Statutes and performs such duties and functions as are imposed upon it by the Meerut Act and the Statutes. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument that the Management of an affiliated college is created by a non-statutory agency, that is, the Registered Society. Here is a case where under the scheme of the Meerut Act and the Statutes a certain proposition of the members constituting the Managing Committee of the College be in majority are left at the choice of the Registered Society and certain members constituting it though in minority, are imposed by the Statutes. The recognition of those members constituting the Managing Committee who are appointed at the choice of the Registered Society is itself sanctioned by the Statutes. The body as a whole with the Principal and the representative of teachers then becomes the 'Management' as defined under Section 2(i) of the Meerut Act. If it be held that the existing committee selected or elected by the Registered Society is constituted as the Managing Committee with the Principal as Ex-Officio and the representative of the teachers by rotation as additional member, even so the Meerut Act and Statutes adopt such a body as the Management. Thus in any view the 'Management' of the affiliated college will remain a creature of the Meerut Act and the Statutes. Thus in any view the 'Management' of the affiliated college will remain a creature of the Meerut Act and the Statutes. The power to appoint teachers of the affiliated colleges is conferred on the 'Management' in the manner prescribed by the Statutes, vide Section 26(1) of the Meerut Act. No other body of persons owning or administering the college except the 'Management' as defined under the Meerut Act can employ a teacher. The duty to appoint the teacher, therefore, is cast on the 'Management' by the Meerut Act. Thus the 'Management' acts as a statutory functionary when appointing a teacher of an affiliated college. It follows, therefore, that when the Management dismisses or removes a teacher it also acts under the authority of the Statutes as a Statutory functionary. It is the Management as defined under Section 2(i) of the Meerut Act who is the employer and not the Registered Society. Once the Committee of Management of an affiliated college is constituted as explained above, it no longer remains under the control or supervision of the Registered Society owning the College. The Vice Chancellor of the University exercises general control over the affairs of the affiliated college under Sub-Section (4) of Section 10 of the Meerut Act. Since the affairs of an affiliated college almost in all respects are supervised by the Committee of Management of the College, the Vice Chancellor of the University will have a controlling hand over it. Further by its Section 6 the Meerut Act empowers the State Government to cause an inspection and enquiry to be made of any affiliated college and compel the compliance of any direction given by it to the Management of the affiliated college. Thus under the scheme of the Meerut Act the Management of an affiliated college does not function as an autonomous independent body of private persons but is supervised and controlled by the State Government and the Vice Chancellor of the University. 48. It was then suggested on behalf of the Management that in so far as the teacher is concerned, his relationship with the Management remains contractual as the Meerut, Act lays down that every teacher of an affiliated college will be appointed under a written contract and without first entering into a contract the Management will not have any jurisdiction over the teacher. The submission was that the Management of a college even if said to be functioning under the Meerut Act and Statutes, will have no jurisdiction over a teacher unless a contract is entered into between the Management and the teacher and the Management being that of a private college entirely managed by private funds the mere fact of affiliation of the College to the University will not make it quasi-public authority amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Reliance was placed on Josheph Mundassary v. Manager St. Thomas College, Trichur AIR 1954 Trav Co. 199 wherein it has been held that a Management of Private College entirely managed by private funds would not be a quasi-public authority merely because of its affiliation to an University. Even if this be true, it will not help in solving the problem arising before us. In the case cited the learned Judges found that there was nothing in the Madras University Act, the Statutes, the Ordinances and the Regulations imposing any duty on the Management of an affiliated college in regard to the conditions and terms of service of its teachers and they held that a mere resolution of the Executive Council of the University approving of the report of inspection recommending that in case of dispute between the Management and its teacher, the rules applicable to Government servants would apply will not become the law of the University. The decision in the said case thus turned on the absence of any provision in the University Act, Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations regulating and controlling the relationship between the Management of an affiliated College and its teacher. This is not the case here. It has been demonstrated above that the Meerut Act and the Statute do regulate and control the relationship between the Management of affiliated college and its teachers imposing certain duties on the Management and the Vice Chancellor. This is not the case here. It has been demonstrated above that the Meerut Act and the Statute do regulate and control the relationship between the Management of affiliated college and its teachers imposing certain duties on the Management and the Vice Chancellor. Though the relationship between the teacher and the Management of an affiliated college originates from a contract but once such a relationship arises and that relationship in certain respects is controlled and regulated by the Meerut Act and the Statute and the duties are imposed on the Management by the Meerut Act and the Statute in regard to the relationship then in performing its duties,, the Management would be subject to the power of judicial review by the High Court. In "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" S.A. De Smith at page 391 (Second Edition) says :- "On the other hand a body invested by Statute with jurisdiction over persons who have entered into contractual relationship with it may be subject to certiorari and prohibition although the occasion for the exercise of its jurisdiction does not arise until the contractual relationship is formed." It has been shown above that the Meerut Act by its Section 28(3) and the Agra Act by its Section 25-C(2) impose a duty on the Management of an affiliated college and Statute 30 of Chapter XVIII also imposes a duty on the Management which wholly fall outside the scope of the written contract. The Management while performing those functions will be exercising a statutory jurisdiction on the teacher not as a private body though a part of its membership may have been elected or selected originally by the Registered Society, a private body, and when it acts in breach of the provisions of the Act and the Statutes in any matter in regard to a teacher falling outside the scope of the written contract, it would be amenable to the jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court appears to have approved of the above principle in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889 . At p. 1894 para (6) It observed : "It is true that the origin of Government service is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case. The Supreme Court appears to have approved of the above principle in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889 . At p. 1894 para (6) It observed : "It is true that the origin of Government service is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case. But once appointed to his post or office the Government servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by the consent of both the parties, but by Statute or Statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by the Government. In other words, the legal position of a Government servant is more of status than of contract. The hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship if rights arid duties imposed by public law and not by mere agreement of the parties." (Underlining mine). 49. In sum it can be stated that there may be bodies which are Statutory and which are Non-Statutory. Statutory Bodies may perform statutory functions and may perform non-statutory function. When Statutory Bodies perform statutory functions, their acts will be amenable to judicial review by the Court, When Statutory Bodies perform non-statutory functions their acts may not be amenable to judicial review by "the Court. When non-statutory bodies perform non-statutory functions, their acts will not be subject to judicial review by the Court but when they perform statutory functions there is no valid reason why it not be held that their actions will be amenable to judicial review by the Court inasmuch as non-statutory bodies when performing statutory functions will be nothing else than mere instrumentalities acting under the Statute which imposes duties upon it affecting the rights of third persons and parties. 50. The conclusion, therefore, is that the Management of an affiliated college of the Meerut University is a statutory body or a statutory functionary while discharging its functions under the Act and the Statutes within the meaning of the third exception formulated by the Supreme Court in S.R. Tewari's case AIR 1964 SC 1680 . 51. It has been demonstrated that the Management of an affiliated college of the Meerut University when appointing a teacher or when terminating his service functions as a statutory body, Section 25-C(2) of the Agra Act or the parallel Section 28(3) of the Meerut Act and Statute 30 of the Ch. 51. It has been demonstrated that the Management of an affiliated college of the Meerut University when appointing a teacher or when terminating his service functions as a statutory body, Section 25-C(2) of the Agra Act or the parallel Section 28(3) of the Meerut Act and Statute 30 of the Ch. XVIII of the Agra University Statutes are enforceable 'proprio vigore' and though the origin of service of a teacher or Principal is contractual but once appointed to his post he acquires a status as attached to that relationship are rights and duties imposed by the Meerut Act and the Statutes. 52. The discussion above is sufficient for formulating the answers to the three propositions framed in paragraph 14. (1) The service of a teacher including the principal of the affiliated colleges in question is not purely contractual and is regulated and controlled by the provisions of the Meerut Act and the Statutes. (2) The 'Management' of the two colleges concerned acts as a statutory body or statutory functionary when it takes action to terminate the service of a teacher. (3) The teacher will be entitled to an appropriate injunction and a declaration of statutory invalidity of the action taken against him in terminating his service by the Management in violation of any provision of the Meerut Act and Statutes. 53. In Second Appeal No. 2973 of 1972, Vaish College Shamli v. Sri Laxmi Narain, the plaintiff-respondent Laxmi Narain would be entitled to the relief claimed in the plaint on the facts and circumstances of the case. 54. In Special Appeal No, 516 of 1971, the Board of Management of Dayanand Brijendra Swarup Degree College v. Suresh Chandra Verma. the petitioner, respondent Suresh Chandra Verma will be entitled to the appropriate relief if the special Appeal Bench affirms the factual findings recorded by the learned Single Judge. Writ Petition No. 858 of 1970 55. Now the question referred in Writ Petition No. 858 of 1970 Ahmad Husain v. Aligarh University be considered. That question is whether a writ petition is maintainable by an employee of an University which is a Statutory Body on the ground that his services have been terminated or he has been reduced in rank in violation of the provisions of the regulations framed by the University ? 56. The question is couched in words general in nature. That question is whether a writ petition is maintainable by an employee of an University which is a Statutory Body on the ground that his services have been terminated or he has been reduced in rank in violation of the provisions of the regulations framed by the University ? 56. The question is couched in words general in nature. The question postulates that the University is a Statutory Body which it certainly is, It has been laid down by the Supreme Court in S.R. Tewari's case that when a Statutory Body acts in the breach of a statutory provision while terminating the; services of its employee its action is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The question therefore, reduces to whether the regulations of which the breach is complained of are in the nature of statutory regulations or provisions? If the answer is in the affirmative then the remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution will be available when the University terminates the services of its employee in the breach of such regulations. 57. Since a reference has been made in the case of Aligarh University, the nature and the character of the Regulations framed under the Aligarh University Act 1920 of which the breach is complained of by the petitioner have to be examined. The peti- tioner is a Head Clerk in the Aligarh Muslim University. He was promoted to the post of Assistant Registrar and was kept on probation for one year. The petitioner claimed that he successfully completed the period of probation and became confirmed in the post. The petitioner, however, was reverted to his substantive post of Head Clerk. The petitioner has questioned the validity of the resolution of the Executive Committee of the University in his petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. He questioned the validity of the order on the ground that he was a confirmed Assistant Registrar and the resolution refusing to confirm him in the post of Assistant Registrar and reverting him to the post of Head Clerk amounted to his removal from the post of Assistant Registrar and reduction in rank without affording him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause. The writ petition was heard by our brother G.C. Mathur. The writ petition was heard by our brother G.C. Mathur. An objection was raised by the learned counsel for the University that the petitioner's remedy, if any, lay by way of a suit for damages. Reliance was placed on behalf of the University on a decision of the Division Bench in the case of Mohd. Nafis Khan v. Aligarh University, Special Appeal No. 95 of 1972, decided on 21-4-1972 (All). Brother Mathur held that another Division Bench decision to which he was a party in V.P. Kapoor v. University of Roorkee, Special Appeal No. 540 of 1971, decided on 19-1-1972 (All) was in conflict with the former decision. He, therefore, directed the reference. 58. It appears from the petition that the petitioner was appointed as officiating Assistant Registrar by the Vice Chancellor on 23-1-1963. His substantive post at that time was that of a Head Clerk in the University. The action of the Vice Chancellor appointing the petitioner as an officiating Assistant Registrar was ratified by the Executive Council of the University. The petitioner was then appointed in temporary capacity as Assistant Registrar till such time as regular arrangement was made or till further order, which ever was earlier. Then by a resolution of the Executive Council of the University, held on 6-2-1965. the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Registrar of the University on probation of one year with effect from 7-2-1965 on the recommendation of a duly constituted selection committee. The petitioner claims that after he had completed the period of probation of one year, he should have been confirmed as Assistant Registrar of the University with effect from 7-2-1966 but the University neither confirmed the petitioner nor extended the period of probation and, therefore, the petitioner became confirmed in the eye of law as an Assistant Registrar of the University but the Registrar of the University by his letter dated 5-4-1966 informed the petitioner that the Executive Council of the University at its meeting held on 26-3-1966 has approved the extension of the petitioner's probationary appointment as an Assistant Registrar of the University by six months from 7-2-1966. One of the challenges raised by the petitioner in the writ petition was that he had already become confirmed and the Executive Council of the University had no jurisdiction to extend the probation retrospectively. One of the challenges raised by the petitioner in the writ petition was that he had already become confirmed and the Executive Council of the University had no jurisdiction to extend the probation retrospectively. The petitioner then further stated that even after the expiry of six months the so-called extended period came to an end on 6-8-1966 but the Executive Council of the University did not pass any order either extending the period of probation or confirming the petitioner on the post. Then it was said that the Executive Council on 9-2-1966 further extended the probation period by 3 months. This action of the Council was also challenged on the same ground as stated above. When this extended probation came to an end on 6-11-1966, even then the Executive Council neither extended the probation nor confirmed the petitioner. Yet by a resolution passed on 22-12-1967 the Executive Council again extended the period of probation of the petitioner upto 31-1-1968. This action was again questioned by the petitioner on the same ground stated above. When this extended probation came to an end, the Vice Chancellor by his order extended the probation till the date of the next meeting of the Executive Council which was held on 6-7-1968 at which no action was taken by the Executive Council either confirming the petitioner or extending the probation. It is allied that the Executive Council extended the petitioners' terms of appointment from 1-4-1968 and ultimately on 13-2-1970 refused to confirm the petitioner on the post of Assistant Registrar. The main attack of the petitioner seems to be that the resolution of the Executive Council dated 13-2-1970 amounted to termination of the petitioner's service as an Assistant Registrar of the University without affording him an opportunity to show cause. The petitioner appears to be complaining of breach of Regulation 3. A subsequent amendment of this Regulation was characterised as ultra vires and not applicable to his case. This is a question on which we are not called upon to express any opinion. The writ petition seems to be based on the petitioner's claim that he was a permanent Assistant Registrar and the resolution of the Executive Council of the University not confirming him amounted to termination of his service as Assistant Registrar and reduction in rank. This is a question on which we are not called upon to express any opinion. The writ petition seems to be based on the petitioner's claim that he was a permanent Assistant Registrar and the resolution of the Executive Council of the University not confirming him amounted to termination of his service as Assistant Registrar and reduction in rank. On this basis the petitioner sought an order, writ or direction for quashing of the resolution of the Executive Council dated 13-2-1970 and as well as for quashing of the various orders of the Vice Chancellor and the Executive Council of the University. 59. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the University the main averments were that while the petitioner worked as a probationer, his work was not found satisfactory he having been warned from time to time and that he never successfully completed the period of probation though it was extended repeatedly. 60. It is not disputed that the Aligarh Muslim University is constituted as a body corporate under the Aligarh Muslim University Act 1920 (hereinafter called as the Act) and thus is a statutory body. The Executive Council is an Authority of the University and derives its powers from the provisions of the Act, Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations framed thereunder. It is the settled law that the power of a Statutory body flows from its corporate character and it is limited by the Statute constituting it. The courts in appropriate cases have power to declare an action of a statutory body illegal and ultra vires if found acting in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by the Statute. It follows, therefore, if in terminating the services of the petitioner as Assistant Registrar and reverting him to his substantive post of Head Clerk the University or any of its Authority acted in the breach of any Statutory provision the petitioner would be entitled to the appropriate relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 61. In answering the question referred, the real nature and character of the Re-gulations framed by the Executive Council of the Aligarh University has to be determined. If the Regulations have statutory force then the answer would be that the writ petition will be maintainable. 62. 61. In answering the question referred, the real nature and character of the Re-gulations framed by the Executive Council of the Aligarh University has to be determined. If the Regulations have statutory force then the answer would be that the writ petition will be maintainable. 62. Section 31 of the Aligarh Muslim University Act empowers the Authorities of the University to make regulations, consistent with the Act, Statutes and the Ordinances providing for all matters which by Act, Statute or the Ordinances are to be prescribed by the Regulations and providing for all other matters concerning such Authorities or Committee appointed by them not provided for by the Act, Statute and Ordinances. As observed above, the Executive Council is an Authority of the University and it is the Executive Body of the University presided by the Vice Chancellor. The constitution and the terms of office of the members and the powers and duties of the Executive Council are as prescribed by the Statutes. Under Statute 16 the Executive Council has been conferred the power to appoint members of the administrative staff. The petitioner is a member of the administrative staff. He was appointed by the Executive Council on an administrative or ministerial post created by the University under Sub-Section (11-B) of S. 5 of the Act. There is no dispute that Chapter IX of the Regulations framed by the Executive Council of the University regulating the conditions of service of the Officers or servants of the University apply in the case of the petitioner. The petitioner was appointed on probation as Assistant Registrar. Regulation 3 of Chapter IX applied. One of the contentions of the petitioner is that since the probation could not be extended beyond two years, he became automatically confirmed in his post immediately on the expiry of two years as no order terminating the probation was passed prior to the expiry of two years. This is disputed by the learned counsel for the University, who contended that under Regulation 3 there is no automatic confirmation. On this question we express no opinion. The Executive Council being the appointing authority had under Regulation 10 of Ch. IX the power to dispense with his services as Assistant Registrar. This is disputed by the learned counsel for the University, who contended that under Regulation 3 there is no automatic confirmation. On this question we express no opinion. The Executive Council being the appointing authority had under Regulation 10 of Ch. IX the power to dispense with his services as Assistant Registrar. The argument for the petitioner was, assuming the petitioner was still on probation, if he was considered incompetent then he was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to explain his conduct and if his services were no longer needed then six months' notice was necessary stating that his services were no longer needed.