ORDER K.N. Seth, J. - This appeal by the Defendants is directed against an appellate order remanding the case to the trial court for deciding it on merits after seating aside the order of abatement passed by the trial court. 2. The Plaintiffs Respondents filed a suit for mandatory injunction directing the Defendants to remove the disputed constructions raised by them on the Plaintiffs land. The Plaintiffs claimed to be the Bhumidhars of the disputed grove plat Nos. 504 and 516. It was asserted that the Defendants had no concern with these plots and that wrongfully raised constructions on it. The Defendants denied the title of the Plaintiffs and claimed that the constructions in dispute were old and had been on their own Sehan land. They, however, did not claim any title in respect of plot Nos. 504 and 516. 3. During the pendency of the suit the Defendants made an application that the village in question had come under consolidation proceedings and the suit should be abated u/s 5(2)(a) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Plaintiffs filed an objection asserting that plot Nos. 504 and 516 were near the Abadi and had been kept out of consolidation scheme which was evident from Form No. 23 issued to them. It was asserted that the consolidation proceedings had no bearing on the matter in dispute. The trial court accepted the plea raised by the Defendants and abated the suit. The appellate court reversed that decision and remanded the suit for trial according to law. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellants contended that the suit was liable to be abated u/s 5(2)(a) of the Ant as the primary question involved in the suit was whether the Plaintiffs were the Bhumidhars of the plots in question and the Plaintiffs could not get any relief unless their rights as Bhumidhars had been established. It was urged that the suit related to a declaration of right or interest of the Plaintiffs in the land lying in an area which had come under consolidation proceedings the suit had to be abated. On the other hand, the contention of the Respondents was that the suit was primarily for the relief of a mandatory injunction calling upon the Defendants to demolish the constructions illegally raised by them. On the other hand, the contention of the Respondents was that the suit was primarily for the relief of a mandatory injunction calling upon the Defendants to demolish the constructions illegally raised by them. The suit could not be abated as the consolidation authorities were not competent to grant the relief prayed for and such a suit was not covered by the provisions of Section 5(2)(a) of the Act. 5. The Act contemplates that upon the publication of a notification u/s 4(2) every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated". A suit could be abated if it was in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in an area brought under consolidation operations, or it was for declaration or adjudication of any other right, in regard to which the proceedings could or ought to be taken under the Act. It is obvious that if under the provisions of the Act no proceeding could be taken for the adjudication of a dispute or no relief could be obtained from the consolidation authorities, the suit or proceeding in respect thereof pending in a court could not be abated. In the present suit the Plaintiffs claimed to be the Bhumidhars of plot Nos. 504 and 516 which constituted their grove and sought the relief of mandatory injunction directing the Defendants to, remove their illegal constructions. It is true that before the suit could be decreed, the Plaintiffs had to establish their rights over the land in dispute, but mere declaration of their right over the land would neither decide the controversy nor afford any relief to the Plaintiffs. It is true that before the suit could be decreed, the Plaintiffs had to establish their rights over the land in dispute, but mere declaration of their right over the land would neither decide the controversy nor afford any relief to the Plaintiffs. There being no provision in the Act under which the Plaintiffs could proceed or the consolidation authorities could grant the relief of demolition of constructions, mere adjudication about the right of the Plaintiffs over the land in dispute could be of no avail to them and such a declaration would leave the real dispute between the parties unresolved. If the real dispute between the parties could not possibly be decided by the consolidation authorities and no relief could be granted to the Plaintiffs or if they are forced to file a suit after first obtaining a declaration of their rights over the land from the consolidation authorities, it would virtually amount to negation of their legal rights. I am not prepared to hold that in enacting Section 5(2)(a) the legislature intended such a situation to arise. 6. Learned Counsel for the Appellants sought reliance from certain observations made in the case of Dahdeo Singh v. Jagdish Singh 1971 AWR 451 wherein D.S. Mathur, J., remarked that after the amendment of Section 5 in 1966 a suit for the demolition of unauthorised constructions on agricultural land stood abated. In that case the suit had been instituted in 1963 at a time when the village was under consolidation operations. The notification u/s 52 of the Act was published in 1964. The real controversy in the case whether the suit could be abated under the amended provision of the Act after a notification had been made u/s 52 of the Act. The learned Judge held that after the publication of the notification u/s 52, the consolidation authorities became functus officio except for the purposes detailed in that section of the Act and the provisions of Section 5(2)(a) of the Act could not apply to a case where the notification u/s 52 of the Act had been published prior to the amendment of Section 5 in 1966 and the suit, therefore, did not abate. It is obvious that the observations sought to be relied upon by the Appellants are merely obiter. 7. It is obvious that the observations sought to be relied upon by the Appellants are merely obiter. 7. The scope of Section 5(2)(a) was considered in the case of Jagarnath Shukla v. Sita Ram Pande 1969 AWR 435 wherein it was held that the section provides for the abatement of suits not only for declaration of rights or interests in any land but also for suits in respect of declaration of rights or interests in any land. The form of relief was held to be immaterial ajjrd the mere fact that the consolidation authorities could not grant a relief in the form in which the civil court could did not affect the question. Earlier in the judgment the Bench observed: From the language of the amended Section 5 it is clear that, if a suit can be abated, then the consolidation authorities must have jurisdiction to go into the question involved. Conversely, if a matter can be gone into in consolidation proceedings then a it in respect of that matter must be abated u/s 5. 8. It naturally follows that if the consolidation authorities ire not competent to go into tm real controversy invoked in the suit, it cannot be abated. The form of relief may not be material but the consolidate authorities must be competent to grant the relief sought for by the Plaintiff and if no relief can be granted under that provisions of the Act, the suit cannot be abated. The test to be applied in determining the question whether a suit shall be abated or not is whether tin Plaintiff can get the real and effective relief from the consolidation authorities irrespective of the form in which the relief is granted. In a suit seeking mandatory injunction for demolition of constructions, the only effective relief would be to direct the removal of the constructions. Such a relief' would be beyond the competence of the consolidation authorities. There is no provision in the Act under which such in order can be conferred or given effect to. A suit of such a nature cannot be abated and mist be decided by the Court. Such a relief' would be beyond the competence of the consolidation authorities. There is no provision in the Act under which such in order can be conferred or given effect to. A suit of such a nature cannot be abated and mist be decided by the Court. In Gayadin v. Marjad Singh Civil Revision No. 70 of 1971 D/-25-10-1972) Kirty, J. also held that a suit for relief of a mandatory injunction requiring the Defendants to ire move the illegal constructions and to Restore the land to its original condition would not abate u/s 5 of the Act. 9. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs Appeal dismissed.