Judgement SEN, J. :- These are three applications under Article 226, of the Constitution of India, directed, inter alia; against Assam Government Notification No. TAD/R/215/72 dated 6th December 1972 terminating the membership of the petitioners who were nominated members of the Mikir Hills District Council. The notification reads as under: "The 6th December, 1972. No. TAD/R/215/72 - In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-paragraph (6-A) of para. 2 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution read with sub-rule (3) of Rule 6 of the Assam Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951, the Governor of Assam is pleased to order that the following Members of the Mikir Hills District Council who were nominated as Members vide this Departments Notification No. TAD/R/49/71 dated the 19th March 1971 shall cease to be Members of the said District Council with immediate effect. 1. Shri Satveswar Daolagupu 2. Shri Pitor Tubit 3. Shri Fulsing Lalung 4. Shri K. Rengma." Satyeswar Daolagupu is petitioner in Civil Rule No. 876 of 1972. Pitor Tubit is petitioner in Civil Rule 882 of 1972 and Khuembe Rengma is petitioner in Civil Rule No. 883 of 1972. Pulsing Lalung was petitioner in Civil Rule No. 881 of 1972, which has been disposed of by this Court by a separate order. 2. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 6 of the Assam Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951 provides - "The nominated members shall be appointed by the Governor, and a member so appointed shall hold Office during the pleasure of the Governor." The applications also challenge another notification No. TAD/R215/72 dated 6th December, 1972 nominating respondents Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 as members District Council in places of the petitioners and Fulsing Lalung, and a notice dated 10-11-1972 issued by the Chairman. Mikir Hills District Council fixing 12th December 1972 for holding election of the Chief Executive Member of the Council. 3. Since the points of law urged in Civil Rule Nos. 876. 882 and 883 of 1972 are all common, we propose to dispose of all these three applications by this one common judgement. 4. This notification at Annexure VI in Civil Rules No. 876 of 1972, terminating the tenure of the four nominated members, is being challenged on several grounds. Since the points of law urged in Civil Rule Nos. 876. 882 and 883 of 1972 are all common, we propose to dispose of all these three applications by this one common judgement. 4. This notification at Annexure VI in Civil Rules No. 876 of 1972, terminating the tenure of the four nominated members, is being challenged on several grounds. The first ground taken is that the aforesaid notification before issue was never placed before the Governor of Assam and that it was passed at the instance of respondent No. 4 Chatra Singh Teron, Minister for Tribal Affairs Department Government of Assam, Shillong, without laving the matter before the Governor. Under sub-paragraph (6-A) of Paragraph 2 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution (here- in-after called the Schedule) a nominated member of the District Council holds office at the pleasure of the Governor. It has been urged that such pleasure is to be exercised by the Governor himself and cannot be delegated by him to any other person or be exercised by any one also on his behalf. Further, the power to remove a nominated member under sub-para. (6-A) of paragraph 2 vests not in the State Government, but in the Governor in his discretion and, accordingly. If the matter is not submitted to the Governor for his order, such order will not be a valid one. 5. We shall, therefore, first examine whether the power of the Governor under sub-paragraph (6-A) of paragraph 2 of the Schedule is to be exercised in his discretion or has to be exercised by him, as a constitutional head of the State of Assam, acting with the aid and, advice of his council of ministers. 6. Mr. N.M. Lahiri, the learned Advocate General for Meghalaya, has very strenuously submitted that in so far as the Schedule is concerned, the Governor is not to exercise his functions specified therein as the constitutional head of the State, but must exercise the same in his discretion. He submits that the entice object and scheme of the Schedule is to provide for the administration of the autonomous districts and autonomous regions within the State of Assam by District Councils and Regional Councils, and that it has conferred a right of self-government on these districts, without interference from or subordination to the State Government of Assam. He submits that the entice object and scheme of the Schedule is to provide for the administration of the autonomous districts and autonomous regions within the State of Assam by District Councils and Regional Councils, and that it has conferred a right of self-government on these districts, without interference from or subordination to the State Government of Assam. This object will be completely defeated if the Governor is to exercise his functions under the Schedule as the constitutional head of the State of Assam. The autonomy will then be eroded almost to a vanishing point and the provisions of the Schedule will become more or less a dead letter of law. Mr. Lahiri has submitted that under paragraph 3 of the Schedule, the District Councils and the Regional Councils have been empowered by the Constitution to make laws with respect to certain matters, which otherwise would have been within the legislative competence of the State Legislature. He then invites our attention to Article 162 of the Constitution of India, which provides : "162. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws : Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof". 7. Mr. Lahiri submits that from Article 162, it would be quite clear that the executive powers of a State are conterminous with the legislative powers of the State Legislature and since the matters specified in paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule are within the legislative competence of the Regional Councils or District Councils, as the case may be, the Assam State legislature is impliedly barred from making laws on those matters. Therefore, the executive power of the State of Assam cannot extend to those matters. Mr. Lahiri further submits that under paragraph 2(6) of the Schedule, certain matters including matters relating to or connected with elections or nominations to District Councils have also been left under the rule-making power, first of the Governor and then of the District or Regional Council, as the case may be. Mr. Lahiri further submits that under paragraph 2(6) of the Schedule, certain matters including matters relating to or connected with elections or nominations to District Councils have also been left under the rule-making power, first of the Governor and then of the District or Regional Council, as the case may be. In view of paragraph 11 of the Schedule, which provides that rules made by a District or Regional Council shall upon publication In the official Gazette have the force of law, these rules made under para 2(7) are also to be held as laws, within, the legislative competence of the District or Regional Council and the power of the State Legislature is impliedly excluded with regard to these matters as well. Consequently, the executive power of the State cannot extend to these matters also. In other words, the executive power of the State of Assam does not extend to the autonomous districts of Assam with regard to the matters specified in paragraphs 3(1), 2(6) and (1) of the Schedule and, therefore, the Governor in discharging his functions under the Schedule with regard to the autonomous districts or regions of Assam cannot act with the aid and advice of his council of ministers, but must act in his discretion. 8. We have considered the above submission with great care, but we feel that we cannot accept the same, for reasons stated hereafter. No doubt, under paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule, the Regional Council or the District Council, as the case may be, has been vested with the competence to make laws with regard to matters specified therein. In other words, paragraph 3(1) is something like a legislative list for the District and Regional Councils and enumerates the subjects on which these councils are competent to make laws. But, from this, it does not follow that the State Legislature is debarred from making laws on those matters, as regards any autonomous area within the State of Assam. The legislative powers of the State Legislature under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution are not taken away by paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule, with regard to the matters specified therein; if that were the intendment of the Constitution makers, the word exclusive would have been used in paragraph-3 (1), as in Article 246(1) and (3) of the Constitution. The legislative powers of the State Legislature under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution are not taken away by paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule, with regard to the matters specified therein; if that were the intendment of the Constitution makers, the word exclusive would have been used in paragraph-3 (1), as in Article 246(1) and (3) of the Constitution. We therefore can only conclude that the legislative list in paragraph 3(1) is in the nature of a list, concurrent with Lists II and III in the Seventh Schedule, although, under paragraph 12 of the Schedule, the cowers of the District or Regional Council to make laws with respect to the aforesaid matters have been saved to the extent, that any law of a State Legislature on the same matter will not apply, unless the District or Regional Council has given a direction to that effect it may be pertinent in this connection to note that under paragraph 12(1)(b), the Governor may, by a public notification, direct that any Act of Parliament regarding any matter not specified in clause (a) of that sub-paragraph will not apply to an autonomous district or region. That certainly cannot mean that since the application of a Parliamentary statute may be barred, in certain circumstances, to an autonomous district or region, the executive power of the Union does not extend thereto. In my opinion and as submitted by Dr. Medhi, the learned Advocate General Assam, the State legislatures competence under Articles 245 and 246(3) of the Constitution to make laws with regard to matters specified in paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule has not been affected or abrogated; only the application of such laws has been made dependant upon a direction by the District Council pr the Regional Council, as the case may be, in order to save the operative force of the laws made by the District Council under paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule. So far as the rule-making power under paragraph 2(6) and (7) of the Schedule is concerned, even that saving clause, as, for paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule, is absent. So far as the rule-making power under paragraph 2(6) and (7) of the Schedule is concerned, even that saving clause, as, for paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule, is absent. We do not, therefore, find any justification for the submission that the executive power of the State of Assam does not extend to the autonomous districts or regions or at any rate does not extend with regard to matters specified in paragraphs 2(6) and (7) and 3(1) on the ground that the State Legislature has no competence to on those matters. 9. Mr. Lahiri has in the connection, invited our attention to paragraph 2 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, which reads as follows :- "Subject to the provisions of this Schedule, the executive power of a State extends to the Scheduled Areas therein." Mr. Lahiri submits that the absence of such a provision in the Sixth Schedule would clearly indicate that the executive power of the State of Assam was not intended to extend to the Autonomous Districts and Regions. We, however, cannot subscribe to this view, as the provisions of the Sixth Schedule have to be construed on a plain reading thereof and in the context of the scheme and object of that Schedule. We also find that in paragraph 3 of the Fifth Schedule, there is a provision under which the executive power of Union extends to giving directions to a State as to the administration of the scheduled areas therein. The fathers of the Constitution most probably thought that since under paragraph 3 of the Fifth Schedule, the executive power of the Union has been extended to the giving of directions to a State as to the administration of the scheduled areas therein, a provision, in clear terms, saving the executive power of the State with regard to the scheduled areas therein should be incorporated and that is possibly why para, 2 was required to be inserted in the Fifth Schedule. In the Sixth Schedule, there is no provision whereby the executive newer of the Union has been extended to the administration of the autonomous districts specified in Part I of the Table appended thereto, and there was thus no need to have a paragraph, on the same lines as in paragraph 2 of the Fifth Schedule. 10. In the Sixth Schedule, there is no provision whereby the executive newer of the Union has been extended to the administration of the autonomous districts specified in Part I of the Table appended thereto, and there was thus no need to have a paragraph, on the same lines as in paragraph 2 of the Fifth Schedule. 10. A careful analysis of the Schedule will also show that the State Government has been entrusted with a specific and sometimes a dominant role to discharge with regard to the autonomous districts and regions and that it was not the intention of the fathers of the Constitution to place these Autonomous Districts beyond the executive authority of the State. For example, under paragraph 13 of the Schedule the estimated receipts and expenditure pertaining to an autonomous district which are to be credited to, or to be made from the Consolidated Fund of the State of Assam shall be first placed before the District Council for discussion and then after such discussion be shown separately in the annual financial statement of the State to be laid before the Legislature of the State. Again, under paragraph 14(2), the report of the Commission on the administration of an autonomous district or region shall be laid before the State Legislature together with a memorandum regarding the action proposed to be taken thereon by the Government of Assam. Any action by the Government of Assam, as contemplated under paragraph 14(2) would have, been repugnant and unconstitutional, if the executive authority of the State did not extend to these districts and regions. The provisions Pf paragraph 2(6) of the Schedule which read as under : "The Governor may, with the consent of any District Council, entrust either Conditionally or unconditionally to that Council or to its officers functions in relation to agriculture, animal husbandry, community projects co-operative societies, social welfare, village planning or any other matter to which the executive power of the State extends." may also be noted. It is quite clear from this sub-paragraph that executive power of the State of Assam extends to agriculture, animal husbandry, community projects, co-operative societies, social welfare, village planning, some of which are also within the legislative list in paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule. It is quite clear from this sub-paragraph that executive power of the State of Assam extends to agriculture, animal husbandry, community projects, co-operative societies, social welfare, village planning, some of which are also within the legislative list in paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule. Indeed, a plain reading of paragraph 6(2) would indicate that the executive power of the State of Assam extends to the autonomous districts and regions to the same extent as to other plains districts of Assam, subject to the autonomy granted to such districts under the Schedule, enabling the district councils to exercise any of the executive powers as may be necessary for the purposes of administration of the district under paragraph 2(4) of the Schedule. The Governor may also place one of his Ministers specially in charge of the welfare of the autonomous districts and autonomous regions in the State under paragraph 14(3). Under paragraph 15(1), if the Governor is satisfied that an act or resolution of a District or Regional Council is likely to endanger the safety of India, or is likely to be prejudicial to public order, he may annul or suspend such act or resolution and take such steps as he may consider necessary (including the suspension of the Council and the assumption to himself of all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Council) to prevent the commission or continuance of such act. or the giving of effect to such resolution and under paragraph 15(2) any such order made by the Governor shall be laid before the Legislature of the State, which would have the power to revoke or approve such order. Paragraph 16(2) of the Schedule provides that the Governor may, in certain contingencies, assume the functions of any District Council, subject to his laying before the State Legislature his reasons for such order, which would cease to operate unless approved by the State Legislature within 30 days of its first sitting after issue of that order. Paragraph 16(2) of the Schedule provides that the Governor may, in certain contingencies, assume the functions of any District Council, subject to his laying before the State Legislature his reasons for such order, which would cease to operate unless approved by the State Legislature within 30 days of its first sitting after issue of that order. Paragraph 20-A that was inserted by the Assam Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act, 1969 is also very pertinent Clause (1)(a) of this para provides : "(1) In this Schedule, - (a) Governor, in relation to Meghalaya, means the Governor of Assam acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers for Meghalaya, except in so far as he is by or under this Schedule required to exercise his functions "in his discretion or to exercise his powers under sub-paragraph (4) of Paragraph 12-A." This would also show that the Governor tinder the Sixth Schedule is required to act on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers, except in so far as he may be expressly or by necessary implication required to exercise his functions in his discretion. The scheme of the Sixth Schedule therefore shows that the State Legislature has a sort of overall superintendence over the District Councils and that the executive authority of the State extends to the autonomous districts and regions. Consequently, the Governor must exercise his functions under the Sixth Schedule, as respects these areas, with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers, unless he is expressly or by necessary implication required to act in his discretion. We fail to find any such implied discretionary power of the Governor, in the Schedule, as contended by Mr. Lahiri with regard to the exercise of his functions in relation to autonomous districts or regions, except possibly in the making of his recommendation under para 14 (2). Paragraph 9(2), of course, provides expressly for exercise of the Governors discretion thereunder. 11. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion, that, as submitted by the learned Advocate General. Assam, the autonomous districts and regions of the State of Assam are within the executive authority of the Government of Assam, and as such, the Governor, except in those matters where he is to act in his discretion, must act with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. 12. Mr. Assam, the autonomous districts and regions of the State of Assam are within the executive authority of the Government of Assam, and as such, the Governor, except in those matters where he is to act in his discretion, must act with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. 12. Mr. Lahiri has, drawn our attention to the distinction between the executive powers of the State and the executive powers of the Governor. The Supreme Court has, no doubt, held in Jayantilal Amratlal v. F.N. Rana, AIR 1964 SC 648 that there are functions which are vested in the Union and which are exercisable by the President on behalf of the Union and again there are functions and powers with which he is by the express provisions of the Constitution as President vested. And the same is the position with regard to the Governor of a State. However, the distinction made by the Supreme Court between the executive functions of the State and the executive functions of the Governor cannot lead to the conclusion that the Governor is not a constitutional head Of the State. Article 163(1) provides for a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, save in matters where he is required to act in his discretion. We are, therefore, of the opinion that whether the functions exercised by the Governor are the functions of the State or are the functions of the Governor, they have equally to be exercised with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except in so far as he is by or under the Constitution required to exercise them In his discretion. Mr. Lahiri submits very rightly that the discretionary powers of the Governor are not expressly provided in the Constitution in all cases. For example, there are at least two provisions of the Constitution, which by necessary implication require the Governor to exercise his powers in his discretion. These are the second proviso to Art.200 and Article 356 of the Constitution. If the Council of Ministers sponsors a Bill which in the Governors opinion requires to be reserved under the above proviso, then it would be his duty to reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President irrespective of any advice from the Council of Ministers, for otherwise Art.200 would be a dead letter. If the Council of Ministers sponsors a Bill which in the Governors opinion requires to be reserved under the above proviso, then it would be his duty to reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President irrespective of any advice from the Council of Ministers, for otherwise Art.200 would be a dead letter. Again, the language of Article 356 shows that the Governor can make a report about the failure of the constitutional machinery in his State contrary to the advice of his Council of Ministers. In our opinion, the Governor may be required, in appropriate circumstances to use his discretion in the appointment of the Chief Minister, dissolution of the Legislature, right to advice warn and suggest and withhold the assent from a Bill. Almost all other functions are to be performed by the Governor with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. 13. In the Schedule, we find that so, far as the autonomous districts and regions are concerned, the Governor is required to act in his discretion expressly or by necessary implication only as respects paragraph 9(2) and perhaps paragraph 14(2). 14. Thus, even if we assume that the powers exercisable by the Governor under the sixth schedule with regard to the autonomous districts and regions are not in discharge of the executive functions of the State but of the executive functions of the Governor, such functions, subject to the exceptions stated above, must, in view of Article 163(1) of the Constitution, be exercised with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. 15. A question here arises for consideration. It is whether powers are conferred on a Governor in his personal capacity, without reference to his council, if the expression Governor is used in any Article or provision in the Constitution. In our opinion, if the Governor has to act in his personal capacity whenever in any Article of the Constitution, the expression Governor occurs. It will upset the whole constitutional structure envisaged at the time when the Constitution was passed and will make the Governor a kind of a dictator. To read every Article of the Constitution in which the expression Governor occurs as conferring powers upon the Governor in his personal capacity without reference to the Cabinet would be constitutionally incorrect. 16. It will upset the whole constitutional structure envisaged at the time when the Constitution was passed and will make the Governor a kind of a dictator. To read every Article of the Constitution in which the expression Governor occurs as conferring powers upon the Governor in his personal capacity without reference to the Cabinet would be constitutionally incorrect. 16. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the expression Governor occurring in any Article or provision of the Constitution will not necessarily confer powers upon the Governor in his personal capacity without reference to his council, unless the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to act in his own discretion, as provided in Article 163(1). For example, the Governor under Article 171(3)(e), may not nominate a member of the Legislative Council in his personal capacity, without the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. Governors have, under our Constitution, apart from a few exceptions, a constitutional position only and act only on the advice of his Council of Ministers. The position under the Schedule is no different, save in matters where the Governor is required to act in his own discretion, expressly or by necessary implication thereunder. Paragraph 2(6-A) of the Schedule, certainly does not empower the Governor to act in his personal capacity. 17. It has next been argued by Mr. Lahiri that the pleasure of the Governor under paragraph 2(6-A) can in no cast be delegated to some other person or exercised on his behalf by some other authority. 18. No doubt, it has been held in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 that the power to dismiss a public servant at pleasure is outside the scope of Art.154 of the Constitution and therefore cannot be delegated by the Governor to a subordinate officer and can be exercised by him only in a manner prescribed by the Constitution. Again in AIR 1964 SC 648 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held : "There is a vast array of other powers exercisable by the President - to mention only a few - appointment of Judges : Articles 124 and 217, appointment of Committees of Official Languages Act:Article 344, appointment of Commissions to investigate conditions of backward classes; Article 340, appointment of Special Officer for Scheduled Castes and Tribes:Article 338, exercise of his pleasure to terminate employment Article 310, declaration that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to give to a public servant sought to be dismissed an opportunity contemplated by Article 311(2) - these are executive Powers of the President and may not be delegated or entrusted to another body or officer because they do not fall within Article 258." 19. In Sardari Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 1547 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court, after referring to the decisions cited above, observed - "The general consensus has been that executive functions of the nature entrusted by the articles, some of which have been mentioned before (Articles 124, 217, 344, 340, 338, 311(2)) and in particular those articles in which the President has to be satisfied himself about the existence of certain fact or state of affairs, cannot be delegated by him to anyone else." 20. However, as has been held by their Lordships in Moti Ram v. N.E. Frontier Railway. AIR 1964 SC 600 at p. 619, when referring to the observations of their Lordships in AIR 1961 SC 751 , cited above, - "In the context it would be clear that this latter observation is not intended to lay down that a law cannot be made under Article 309 or a Rule cannot be framed under the proviso to the said Article prescribing the procedure by which, and the authority by whom, the said pleasure can be exercised." Thus although their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the pleasure of the Governor cannot be delegated to a subordinate officer and be exercised by such a delegate, it can certainly be exercised according to any procedure laid down and by the authority prescribed in that behalf. Since the exercise of the pleasure of the Governor under paragraph 2(6-A) of the Schedule is one of his functions, which must be discharged with the aid and advice of his council of ministers and is not to be exercised by him in his discretion, surely, the Governor can under the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution, allocate the business of exercise of his such pleasure to any of his ministers. 21. We may also state here that it is nowhere required that such treasure can be exercised only after the Governor has been personally satisfied that it is to be so exercised. There is no requirement under the Constitution that the Governor has to be satisfied himself about the existence of certain fact or state of affairs, before he can exercise such pleasure under paragraph 2(6-A) of the Schedule. It is also not a matter within his discretionary power: and therefore, in exercising such pleasure he must act only with the aid and advice of his council of ministers. Accordingly, if the matter of nomination of a member to the District Council or cessation of his membership has been allocated by the Governor to any Minister under the Rules of Business, the Minister in charge can exercise such powers of the Governor under Article 166(3) of the Constitution. The Minister would not be exercising the Governors pleasure as a delegate, but the Governor, as the constitutional head of the State, would be exercising his pleasure through the Minister under the Rules of Business framed for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government. 22. We may at this stage refer to the Assam Rules of Executive Business. A perusal of Rules 21, 31(1) and 31(2) thereof will clearly show that the exercise of the Governors pleasure with regard to the tenure of a nominated member of the District Council is not a subject, which has to be submitted to the Governor before issuing orders. It may be dealt with by the Minister in charge of the department and in any case, by the Chief Minister of the State. It may be dealt with by the Minister in charge of the department and in any case, by the Chief Minister of the State. The Assam Rules of Executive Business do, not require submission of the papers relating to the exercise of the Governors pleasure with regard to the tenure of a nominated member of a District Council to the Governor; on the other hand, it is left within the competence of the minister in charge. Hence, such order cannot be invalid on the around that the matter was not submitted to the Governor. This was the view taken in a similar matter by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Sripal Jain, AIR 1963 SC 1323 , where it was held that if a matter was not required to be submitted to the Governor for his orders under the Rules of Business and could be dealt with by the Minister-in-charge or the Chief Minister, as the case may be, the orders of the latter would not be invalid on the around that the Governors personal orders had not been obtained. 23. We also do not find that in the exercise of the Governors pleasure with, regard to the termination of the tenure of a District Council member, the Governor has to apply his own mind and has to be personally satisfied as under Article 217(c) in the case of the President. It is also not a matter in which he has to act in his discretion. On the other hand, he has to exercise this pleasure on the aid and advice of his council of ministers. Therefore, this power may be exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed and by the minister specified in the Rules of Business, framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution. It is not thus necessary that the relevant flies must be placed before the Governor, prior to issue of the order. 24. As regards the alienation of Has imputed to respondent No. 4, we have his affidavit in complete denial thereof. In the absence of any undisputed facts regarding such bias, we cannot hold that the impugned orders are invalid on that ground. 24. As regards the alienation of Has imputed to respondent No. 4, we have his affidavit in complete denial thereof. In the absence of any undisputed facts regarding such bias, we cannot hold that the impugned orders are invalid on that ground. It will also appear that the impugned Notification fat Annexure VI of Civil Rule No. 876 of 1972) had been approved by the Chief Minister, in which case the bias, if any, of respondent No. 4, cannot affect the validity of that order. We also do not find any substance in the submission that principles of natural justice were violated, in that the petitioners had not been granted a hearing before the Governors pleasure was withdrawn. In our opinion, there is no requirement of a hearing of the person concerned, before his tenure of service can be terminated by withdrawal of the Governors pleasure. 25. In the result we hold that the Impugned Notifications do not suffer from any infirmity on any of the grounds urged by the petitioners. The applications therefore fail. There will however be no order as to costs. P.K. GOSWAMI, C.J. :- I agree. Application dismissed.