P. Choudhuri and T.N. Phukan, for Plaintiff-Appellant; S.K. Ghose, J.P. Bhattacharjee and S.N. Medhi, for Defendants-Respondents. Judgement BAHARUL ISLAM, J. :- This appeal is by the plaintiff and is directed against the judgement and decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, Upper Assam Districts at Jorhat in Title Suit No. 32 of 1959. The plaintiffs suit was for declaration of her right, title and interest in the suit land and for khas possession and mesne profits. 2. The case of the plaintiff is that the suit land measuring 81 B. 7 Lechas was the self-acquired property of her father Manuram, Manuram had a brother named Bhabadeb. They had been separated, Manuram came to the suit land situated in village Kaibartaeaon, while Bhabadeb continued to live in the paternal village Kenduguri, Manuram had his wife. Chandra Prova, and two daughters-Golapi and the plaintiff. Manuram went on pilgrimage and died there. Thereafter Manurams widow, Chandra Prova, and daughter, Golapi also died. Thus the plaintiff became the only heiress of Manuram. At the time of Manurams death the plaintiff was a child of about 4/5 years. So Bhabadeb came to the suit land from Kenduguri and d to look after the plaintiff and the properties left by Manuram. In course of time Bhabadeb gave the plaintiff in marriage and used to possess her land on her behalf. After some time Bhabadeb also died leaving three sons - Lakhinath, Jiba Kanta and Deba Dutta. Subsequently Lakhinath died leaving his widow. Bhadreswari (defendant No. 1) and a daughters son. Atul Barua (Defendant No. 10), Jiba Kanta also died leaving his widow Golapi (defendant No. 7) and a son. Tirtha Nath (defendant No. 9) Deba Dutta died leaving his widow Bhubaneswari (defendant No. 8). The plaintiffs case is as stated above, that after Bhabadebs death the suit land used to be managed and looked after by Lakhinath till his death. During his lifetime Lakhinath used to give her share of the produce of the land. But after his death, defendant No. 1 refused to give her (plaintiff) any share of the produce and set up her own title to the suit land. Plaintiff then filed mutation case No. 17 of 1957-58 on 16-4-58. Defendant No. 1 filed an objection to the plaintiffs application for mutation. whereupon the revenue officer rejected her application for mutation. But after his death, defendant No. 1 refused to give her (plaintiff) any share of the produce and set up her own title to the suit land. Plaintiff then filed mutation case No. 17 of 1957-58 on 16-4-58. Defendant No. 1 filed an objection to the plaintiffs application for mutation. whereupon the revenue officer rejected her application for mutation. The plaintiff then on enquiry came to know that Lakhinath had got his name mutated in respect of the suit land fraudulently. In Mutation Case No. 417 of 1898-99 by right of inheritance. She further learnt that Lakhinath, during his lifetime, had transferred the kha schedule land to defendants No. 2 to 6 without the plaintiffs knowledge. She has therefore, filed the instant suit for the reliefs mentioned above. 3. Defendant No. 9 has filed a written statement. His pleas, inter alia. We that the suit is barred by limitation, that it is barred under Section 154 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation (hereinafter called the Regulation) that the periodic patta No. 133 of village Kaibartagaon had been settled with Lakhinath in 20 years settlement that Manuram had no title in respect of the suit land and that Lakhinath never recognised the plaintiff as the owner of the suit land. It was further pleaded that Lakhinath bequeathed all his movable and immovable properties by a will to him (defendant No. 9 on January 19, 1935, and Letters of Administration thereof were granted to defendant No. 9 by the District Delegate on 17th June, 1940. It is further contended that at the time of the will and Letters of Administration, defendant No. 9 was a minor and the property used to be managed by defendant No. 1 on his behalf on the strength of the Letter of Administration. He, therefore, contends that the plaintiff has no title to periodic patta No. 133. It is further pleaded that Lakhinath made a gift of the land of Periodic Pattas Nos. 132 and 199 to Chandra Prova, Mudai and defendant No. 5. He, therefore, pleads that the plaintiff has no title to the Kha schedule land. He claims compensation of Rs. 1,000/- under Section 35(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Defendants Nos. 1, 7 and 8 filed a joint written statement and defendants Nos. 132 and 199 to Chandra Prova, Mudai and defendant No. 5. He, therefore, pleads that the plaintiff has no title to the Kha schedule land. He claims compensation of Rs. 1,000/- under Section 35(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Defendants Nos. 1, 7 and 8 filed a joint written statement and defendants Nos. 3 to 6 and 10 filed another written statement Defendant No. 5, Kalai died during the pendency of the suit and his heirs have been substituted as defendant 5 series. Defendants 5(e) and 5(f) are minors represented by their guardian ad litem. The guardian ad litem has also filed A written statement on behalf of the two minor defendants. These written statements are in the line and in support of the written statement filed by defendant No. 9. 5. The learned Subordinate Judge framed the following material issues : "(1) .... .... .... .... (2) Whether the suit land is the self acquired property of Late Manuram or late Lakhinath ? Whether the plaintiff has got any right, title and interest thereon by right of inheritance ? (3) Whether late Lakhinath made a bequeath of the suit land of Sch. A to the defendant Probhat Barkataki ? If so, whether late Lakhinath had any right title and interest thereon to make a valid bequeath in favour of said Probhat Barkataki ? (4) Whether defendant Probhat Barkataki has been enjoying the suit land of Schedule A by right of bequeath at first through defendant Musstt. Bhadreswari during his minority and then by himself to the exclusion of the plaintiff ? (5) Whether late Lakhinath transferred land of schedule B by way of sale and gift ? If so. whether such sale or gift confers any valid title on the transferees ? (6) .... .... .... .... .... .... (7) Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? (8) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs claimed ? (9) To what other reliefs, the parties are entitled ? (10) Whether the suit is barred under Section 154 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation ? (11) Whether the plaintiff can claim the suit land in view of the will and letters of Administration ?" 6. (8) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs claimed ? (9) To what other reliefs, the parties are entitled ? (10) Whether the suit is barred under Section 154 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation ? (11) Whether the plaintiff can claim the suit land in view of the will and letters of Administration ?" 6. After trial the learned trial Court has found that the suit is barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act of 1908; that late Manuram was the owner of the suit property as was evidenced by the Jamabandi (Ext 3) and the oral evidence of P. Ws Kamaleswar, Ratneswar and the plaintiff. He has also found that Lakhinath bequeathed the A schedule land to defendant No. 9 by a registered will as per Ext. C and that Letters of Administration of the will were granted by the District Delegate vide Ext. E dated 17th August 1940. He has also found that the plaintiff has failed to prove that she was enjoying the usufruct of the suit land on payment thereof by Lakhinath. He has also found that Lakhinath gifted the B schedule land to defendant No. 5 and Dhonai as per Exhibits 6 and 7 and the latter had acquired valid title thereto. 7. The facts that the land originally belonged to Manuram, that Lakhinath bequeathed the A schedule land to defendant No. 9 and gifted the B schedule land to defendant No. 5 and Dhonai, that Ext. C was a registered will and that Ext. E were the letters of Administration, have been admitted. 8. During the pendency of the appeal In this Court, respondent No. 3, Bapuram, 5 (a) Musst Kali Keot, and 6, Dhanai died, no substitution was made and as such the suit abated as against them. Shri S.K. Ghose, learned Advocate-General, Nagaland, appearing on behalf of the respondents, submits that the appeal has abated in toto. 9. Shri P. Choudhuri, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant, submits that the trial Court erred in holding that the suit was barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act of 1908 (hereinafter called the Act.), which Act is admittedly applicable to the present case. 9. Shri P. Choudhuri, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant, submits that the trial Court erred in holding that the suit was barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act of 1908 (hereinafter called the Act.), which Act is admittedly applicable to the present case. He submits that Section 10 of the Act applies to the instant case and as such the plaintiffs case is not barred by limitation at all Alternatively, he submits that the plaintiffs suit having been based on title, Manurams title to the suit land having been admitted. Article 144 of the Act applies, and as there was a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and Lakhinath the defendants had acquired no adverse possession against the plaintiff, and the suit was not barred under Article 144 at the Act. 10. Section 10 of the Act provides that "no suit against a person in whom property has been vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representative or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands property, or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds shall be barred by any length of time". This section applies when some property vests in trust for some specific purpose. When the plaintiff pleads a case of trust and proves it, then he can follow the properties in the hands of the trustees or his assigns or legal representatives and for that purpose he can bring a suit at any time. In the instant case it is not the case of the plaintiff in the plaint that any trust was created. On the contrary, the definite case of the plaintiff in the plaint has been that on the death of Manuram, the plaintiff became the owner of the property, which vested in her, possessed and after him, Lakhinath, possessed and managed the property on her behalf. In the plaint the plaintiff has stated : "Being the sole heir to the self acquired land of Manuram, the land in suit, the plaintiff Khetekeswari only has right, title over it ............ when Manuram died and as there was none to look after his widowed wife and the two minor daughters, he (Bhabadeb) shifted to Napamua with his family and lived in the house of Manuram and looked after the suit property of Manuram. when Manuram died and as there was none to look after his widowed wife and the two minor daughters, he (Bhabadeb) shifted to Napamua with his family and lived in the house of Manuram and looked after the suit property of Manuram. At the time of the death of Manuram the plaintiff would be aged about 4 or 5 years. Bhaba Deo himself shifted to the suit land and brought up the plaintiff and gave her away in marriage. Till the time of her marriage, the plaintiff used to enjoy the right and possession of the suit land by her own right. Even after the plaintiff was given away in marriage, Bhaba Deo managed the suit land and died few days thereafter............ After the death of Bhabadeo, late Lakhi Nath and after the death of Lakhi Nath his wife defendant No. 1 used to manage the suit land as usual on behalf of the plaintiff and besides payment of Government revenue year by year used to deliver 450/500 puras of paddy every year to the plaintiff.........." The plaintiffs case, therefore, is not that the suit land vested either in Bhabadeb or Lakhinath or defendant No. 1, but that it is vested in her, Bhabadeb, after him. Lakhinath, was her guardian and possessed the land on her behalf; and as such, she claims. Lakhinaths possession was her constructive possession. In our opinion, therefore, Section 10 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the facts of the present case. 11. The alternative submission of the appellant is that this case is governed by Article 144 of the Limitation Act, and as, he submits, there was fiduciary relationship between Lakhinath and the plaintiff. Lakhinath or his successors could not have adverse possession in respect of the suit land and in support of his contention he relies on a number of case laws. Admittedly till marriage the plaintiff was a minor and Lakhinath was her guardian and the latter was in possession of the suit land on behalf of the plaintiff. His possession, therefore, was the constructive possession of the plaintiff, and no plea of adverse possession could be set up against the plaintiff so long as Lakhinath continued to be the guardian of the minor plaintiff; that is to say, till the fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and Lakhinath continued. His possession, therefore, was the constructive possession of the plaintiff, and no plea of adverse possession could be set up against the plaintiff so long as Lakhinath continued to be the guardian of the minor plaintiff; that is to say, till the fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and Lakhinath continued. In the case of Hutehegowda v. Chennigegowda, AIR 1953 Mys 49, it has been held : "When the property is in the possession of a close relative, particularly when the owner is a minor and has no other male member to look after him, it must be presumed that the possession la not adverse". In the Law of Limitation and Prescription by U.N. Mitra, it has been stated : ".........With reference to the property of a female living with her relation he is deemed to be manager on her behalf until he openly asserts a hostile title to hold on his own behalf. Possession of husband or brother or mother is prima facie not adverse. It is not open to a person who takes charge of a minor and protects him to plead that as regards his properties he has adverse possession. The law is clear that a person who is either an actual legal guardian or who takes upon himself the guardianship of a minor cannot be heard to say that his possession must be taken to be adverse to the minor. So long as he acts as guardian or as agent, the law regards him as bailiff or trustee for the minor and would not allow him to set UP adverse possession ......... The presumption is that such possession is on behalf of the infant ......... and it continues so even after the ward attains majority until something has been done to alter the character of that possession…………." In our respectful opinion the above is the correct view of the law. But it cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that at no point of time the plea of adverse possession can be set up by the guardian or his successors against the minor even after minor attains majority, and the guardian ceases to be one. In our opinion adverse possession may be set up by the guardian after the relationship of guardian and ward ceases. In our opinion adverse possession may be set up by the guardian after the relationship of guardian and ward ceases. When the plaintiff in the instant case was married away, the relationship of guardian and ward between her and Lakhinath ceased and as such, although Lakhinath could not set up any hostile title so long as he continued as guardian, he might do so after he ceased to be the guardian. But in order to succeed, he or his successor must prove some overt act of dispossession of the plaintiff from the suit land. 12. The plaintiff in her deposition on 3-8-1962 stated her age to be 71 years. So she was born in 1891 and she became major in 1909. Her son, P.W. 4, was born in 1908. So the plaintiff must have been married before 1908. Lakhinath executed the registered will (Ext. C) on 19th January, 1935, and this will was probated and letters of Administration granted by the District Delegate on 17th June, 1940. The first act of ouster of Lakhinath was on 19-1-1933 when the will was executed and the ouster was complete when the District Delegate granted the letters of Administration on 17-6-1940. 13. The appellant submits that Lakhinath was possessing the property on behalf of the plaintiff till before she filed the suit and was paying, her usufruct of the land. The evidence of P.W. 4, Badhanath Sarma, son of the plaintiff, is that his uncle died in 1936, that Lakhinath used to cultivate the land, and after him, his wife. Bhadreswari, used to possess it, and they used to pay the plaintiff cart loads of paddy every year. P.W. 4 was serving in a tea garden during the relevant time. He admits that he did not visit the land, P.W. 5. Bihua Borah, is the alleged cart-man. His evidence is that he used to carry 8 to 10 cart loads of paddy from the house of Lakhinath. He deposes that his house is at Bhatia gaon. The house of Lakhinath is about 8 or 10 miles from his house, which is at a distance of one mile from the plaintiffs house. Witness Ratneswar Pathak deposes that he saw "loaded paddy on carts and on enquiry. Lakhinath told me that the cart loads of paddy were being sent to Manurams daughter out of the crops grown on her fathers lands". Witness Ratneswar Pathak deposes that he saw "loaded paddy on carts and on enquiry. Lakhinath told me that the cart loads of paddy were being sent to Manurams daughter out of the crops grown on her fathers lands". The evidence of the three above mentioned witnesses in this regard is mere make believe evidence and inspires no confidence. The plaintiff has failed to prove under what arrangement or agreement Lakhinath or defendant No. 1 cultivated the land of Schedule A under the plaintiff. She is out of the land and its physical possession for about 60 years. She was expected to five cogent evidence to prove the arrangement and/or payment of crops as alleged, but she has failed to do so. The learned trial Court in our opinion rightly rejected the evidence in this regard of the plaintiffs side and held that the plaintiff has failed to prove that Lakhinath or his widow had at any time possessed the land under the plaintiff under any agreement and that any paddy was paid to her. 14. In the circumstances we hold that the plaintiff has failed to prove that Lakhinath or his widow Bhadreswari was possessing the land on behalf of the plaintiff and was paving her any usufruct. That being the position we are clearly of the opinion that the possession of the defendants clearly became adverse with effect from 17-6-1940 on which date the letters of Administration were granted ill favour of Bhadreswari and the suit, having been filed on 29-9-1959 it was clearly barred by limitation under Article 144 and the defendants, who are admittedly in possession of the land, have acquired title by adverse possession and the plaintiffs suit is liable to be dismissed. 15. In view of our finding that the plaintiffs suit is barred by limitation, we need not decide on the preliminary point raised by the respondents. 16. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed, but in the facts and circumstances of the case we leave the parties to bear their own costs. D.M. SEN, J. :- I agree. Appeal dismissed.