JUDGMENT C. P. Sinha, J. This application under section 561 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (herein after referred to as the Code) has been filed by the five members of the second party in the Court below for quashing of the Magistrate's order dated 9.9.1970 and the proceeding drawn on that basis in case no. 55 (M) of 1970. 2. As it appears, on 6.8.1970 a petition was filed before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Buxar by Mostt. Jhunia alleging that Sarjoo Thakur and four others (present petitioners) were after her life and property and were always threatening to kill or assault her seriously. She further stated that on 4.8.1970 they had actually made assault on her for which she had lodged necessary sanha at the police station. She further mentioned that in 1967 also similar troubles had been started at their hands for which there was a proceeding under section 107 of the Code which was eventually compromised on 2.6.1967 when they had undertaken not to create trouble in future. On these allegation she requested the Sub-divisional Magistrate to take action against them under section 107 of the Code. 3. The Sub-divisional Magistrate under his order dated 6.8.1970 referred that petition of Mostt. Jhunia to the local police for enquiry and report by 6.9.1970. The police after holding enquiry into the matter sent report dated 24.8.1970 recommending action under section 107 of the Code against both the sides to prevent breach of the peace. When the police report was not received till 7.9.1970 the magistrate reminded the police about it and ordered the matter to be put up on 6.10.1970. In the meanwhile police report was received and put up before the magistrate on 9.9.1970 when he passed the following order: “Perused the report of the E.O. Draw proceeding D/s 107 Cr.P.C. against both the parties. To date fixed. There is no merit in the protest petition to be considered now. Let that be heard along with the show cause.” This order is said to have been passed by Mr. B. N. Sharma on that date. 4. The above protest petition, as referred to in the Magistrate's order, was filed on behalf of Hridayanand Thakur (present petitioner no. 2) where he alleged that he had learnt about the submission of a false report by the police in collusion to put the petitioner to harassment. B. N. Sharma on that date. 4. The above protest petition, as referred to in the Magistrate's order, was filed on behalf of Hridayanand Thakur (present petitioner no. 2) where he alleged that he had learnt about the submission of a false report by the police in collusion to put the petitioner to harassment. He also denied therein about there being any apprehension of the breach of the peace and further averred that the police report would show that there is no evidence in village to support the incident and they did not enjoin for a proceeding under section 107 for serving one's selfish end. In the end, he prayed that the police report should be rejected and matter be dropped without taking further action. 5. In pursuance of the above 107 order of the Magistrate, notices were sent to these petitioners where it was said that on that police report he was satisfied that they were ready to creates breath of the peace and disturb the public tranquility or to do certain wrongful act which may probably cause breach of peace between the two aides within his local jurisdiction, and, accordingly, he drew proceeding under section 107 against them directing them to appear before him to show cause why they should not be made to execute bond for a specified sum and period. A copy of this notice as served on these petitioners has been made Annexure 2' to the present application. 6. Mr. Binod Kumar Roy appearing for the petitioners has assailed the legality of the impugned order and the notice on the grounds: (i) The petition of Mostt. Jhunia was sent to police for enquiry and report by the regular Sub-divisional Magistrate who had also passed the subsequent order dated 7.9.1970 putting off matter to 6.10.1970 in the absence of that enquiry report, but on 9.9.1970 the impugned order for drawing up the proceeding was passed by the Second Officer Mr. B.N. Sharma and not by the regular Sub-divisional Magistrate. (ii) In the impugned order 9.9.1970 learned Magistrate should have given his reasons in brief on which he was satisfied to draw this proceeding; (iii) In the notice sent to his clients the substance of the information received by the Magistrate must have found place to satisfy the mandatory requirement of section 112 of the Code. 7. (ii) In the impugned order 9.9.1970 learned Magistrate should have given his reasons in brief on which he was satisfied to draw this proceeding; (iii) In the notice sent to his clients the substance of the information received by the Magistrate must have found place to satisfy the mandatory requirement of section 112 of the Code. 7. So far as the first ground is concerned, as the record of the case shows, that order dated 9.9.1970 of Mr. Sharma was in his rapacity as acting for the Sub-divisional Magistrate. This inference is confirmed by the fact that he passed this order on receipt of the police report in the same case of the court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate. There is nothing to show that Mr. Sharma had made this order in a capacity which was district from that of his acting as the sub-divisional Magistrate. In fact, the subsequent order in this order-sheet in the case appear to be per pen of the regular Sub-divisional Magistrate himself. This also supports the above inference that order of Mr. Sharma was passed when he was dealing with the files of the Sub-divisional Magistrate which might have become necessary in the absence of the Sub-divisional Magistrate on that day. 8. The impugned order dated 9.9.1970 is no doubt not self expressive in that it does not show in so many words about the satisfaction of the Magistrate regarding the necessity of such an action on the report received by him from the Police. It, however, shows that the action so decided by the Magistrate was after his perusal of the report of the police which, as shown above, had been done by the Police after necessary enquiry held in the matter on the petition of the complainant Moatt. Jhunia which had been referred to them for such an enquiry and report. The lacuna in this behalf in this order could well be taken to have been rectified in the body of the notice which was sent and served on these petitioners. In that it was clearly said that the Magistrate had felt satisfied about the existence of apprehension of breach of the peace at their hands on the basis of the report of the police received by him, and feeling so satisfied he had drawn up the proceeding. In that it was clearly said that the Magistrate had felt satisfied about the existence of apprehension of breach of the peace at their hands on the basis of the report of the police received by him, and feeling so satisfied he had drawn up the proceeding. So, the mere absence of these things in the Magistrate's order dated 9.9.1970 cannot, I think, be sufficient to make the order illegal and without jurisdiction, as canvassed on behalf of the petitioners. 9. Coming to the point or absence of substance of information received by the Magistrate in the above notice, this also appears to be not material in view of the fact that after this police report had been submitted in the case, on behalf of petitioner no. 2 a protest petition of the above nature was filed in which he assailed the police report to be false and collusive and also refuted the allegations as made against them and also assailed the Magistrate's power to draw up such a proceeding with the request that the matter should be dropped and the applicant (opposite party no. 2) should be directed to seek her redress in proper court. The averments in the protest petition prove that they were aware of this police report as also its contents and had tried to meet it as also the allegations of the first party (opposite party no. 2) in her petition. I Evidently, therefore, there could be no question of their feeling prejudiced in their show cause due to the absence of the substance of the information received in the notices served on them which they might eventually have to file in the case. The incorporation of the substance of the information received by the Magistrate as required by section 112 of the Code was meant for their benefit to avoid their feeling handicapped in meeting the charges levelled against them for which the Magistrate felt inclined to take out such a proceeding against them. They were, however, not likely to feel so for that absence in the impugned order on the notices sent to them in pursuance thereof because their above protest petition clearly showed that they had knowledge of that police report with its contents, as also the allegations that Mostt. Jhunia had made against them in her petition to the Magistrate in that behalf. Jhunia had made against them in her petition to the Magistrate in that behalf. For these reasons I am unable to read any flaw in the proceeding on this account also Mr. Roy has referred to the observations given in paragraph 37 in the case of Madhu Limaye v. Sub-divisional Magistrate, Monghyr 1971 S.C. 2486. He has particularly relied upon the observation of their lordships in this case that though while incorporating the substance of the information received in the order it may not be necessary for the Magistrate to repeat the information bodily but it must give proper notice of what has moved the Magistrate to take the action, this order is the foundation of the jurisdiction and the word 'substance' means the essence of the most important parts of the information. With great respect I am inclined to think that this observation cannot come to the aid of the petitioners to have this proceeding quashed because the facts in the instant case are quite different in view of the aforesaid protest petition filed by one of these petitioners which clearly indicated that they had full, knowledge of the police report as also the allegations made against them which obviously avoided any prejudice to them in putting of their defence in this case in the show cause which they may think of filing. In fact, it may be that the plea taken by them in that show cause may not be different from the above protest petition and both may substantially be similar if not the same. 10. For the above reasons, I find no merit in this application which must therefore, fail. It is, accordingly, dismissed. Since the case has already become pretty old the Magistrate must see his way to take up its hearing without any further delay and conclude it as early as possible. Application dismissed.