ORDER K.N. Srivastava, J. - This is an execution second appeal arising out of the following facts. 2. Smt. Bhagwati Devi obtained a decree for prohibitory injunction against the judgment debtors in suit No. 251 of 1954 restraining the judgment debtors from interfering with her possession over the house in dispute. The judgment debtors disobeyed the decree and interfered with the possession of Smt. Bhagwati Devi with the result that she made an application for execution, as provided Under Order XXI, Rule 32 Code of Civil Procedure. During the pendency of this execution application, she sold the house in question to Smt. Shanti Devi. Smt. Shanti Devi made an application in the execution proceedings for being substituted in place of Smt. Bhagwati Devi. This application was allowed. 3. The execution application was contested by the judgment debtors on various grounds and inter alia, it was pleaded that it was barred by time, that Smt. Shanti Devi being not a decree holder and the decree in suit No. 251 of 1954 having not-been transferred to her she had no right to execute the same and that the decree being a decree for prohibitory injunction could not be executed because of the bar Under Order XXI, Rule 32(5) Code of Civil Procedure. 4. I shall take up the last question first. It is true that Order XXI, Rule 32(5) CPC appeals to mandatory injunctions and under this rule a prohibitory decree cannot be execute. But, this does not mean that such a decree cannot be executed under the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32(1) Code of Civil Procedure. It the instant case by a decree of a competent court the judgment debtors were prohibited from interfering with the possession of Smt. Bhagwati Devi, the decree holder, over the house in question. Now as it has been complained by their own act the judgment debtors have made it impossible for the obedience of the decree. Tile question would, therefore; arise as to wither the judgment debtor could be permitted to tike advantage of their own unlawful act and say that the decree cannot be executed even under the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 32(1) Code of Civil Procedure. 5. Tile question would, therefore; arise as to wither the judgment debtor could be permitted to tike advantage of their own unlawful act and say that the decree cannot be executed even under the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 32(1) Code of Civil Procedure. 5. The argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellant was that in such a case the decree holder should file a fresh suit to get the prohibitory decree converted into a mandatory decree for the illegal act of he judgment debtors for which they were prohibited by a competent court and the decree holder be directed to take recourse to other litigation with nil fault of the decree holder. My reply to this question would be in the negative. 6. The same question cams up for decision before a Division Bench of this Court in Nawab Singh v. Mithu Lal 1935 ALJ 416. The following observation was made by the Bench in this case: If this were not the interpretation then the result would be that where there is an injunction restraining a Defendant from demolishing a house and he deliberately disobeys the injunction and demolishes the house no compensation can be awarded to the decree-holder in execution because the judgment debtor will be able to say that he has not demolished the house a second time after the attachment. In our opinion where the, judgment debtor has, by his own act, made it impossible]for, himself to obey the decree he cannot escape from the liability to pay compensation which will be enforced after the attachment has subsisted for three months. If, however, it be impossible to award the decree-holder any compensation, then the only remedy which must be adopted would be to detain him in civil prison. 7. In this reported case, a prohibitory decree had been passed which was executed by both the court below Under Order XXI, Rule 32 Code of Civil Procedure. On appeal by the judgment debtor, with the, above observations the appeal was dismissed. 8. There is yet another Division Bear on decision of this Court, Angad v. Madho Rao 1938 ALJ 558. In this reported case, a prohibitory decree had been passed which was executed by both the court below Under Order XXI, Rule 32 Code of Civil Procedure. On appeal by the judgment debtor, with the, above observations the appeal was dismissed. 8. There is yet another Division Bear on decision of this Court, Angad v. Madho Rao 1938 ALJ 558. All that is held in this case was that the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 32(5) CPC did not apply to a prohibitory decree and that the proceedings in the case could be treated as proceedings in a suit u/s 47(2); CPC and the execution application as mended could be treated as a plaint in the payment of the necessary court-fee. 9. It appears that the earlier Division Bench case was not brought and the notice of the Division Bench deciding Angad's case. All that was held in the latter Division Bench case was that Order XXI, Rule 32(5) CPC did not apply in prohibitory decree. It was nowhere laid down in the latter case that such a decree could not be executed even Under Order XXI, Rule 32(1) Code of Civil Procedure. On the other band in Nawab Singh's case this point was in issue as to whether such a decree could be executed Under Order XXI, Rule 32(1) CPC and the reply of the Bench was in the affirmative. In this view of the matter, the view taken by the lower appellate court appears to be correct. 10. The next question which has been pressed in this appeal is as to whether Smt. Shanti Devi could execute this decree. There is no doubt that Smt. Shanti Devi is not a transferee or an assignee of the decree. What she claims is that the decree passed in the, earlier suit related to the house and when the house itself was transferred to her all rights title of the transferor existing on the date of the transfer in that house should pass to the transferee add, therefore, in this view of the matter, Smt. Shanti Devi was entitled to execute the decree. 11. In a Supreme Court case Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. 11. In a Supreme Court case Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. AIR 1955 SC 376 , the following observation was made: There are two questions to be considered before the section may be applied, namely, (1) whether the Code otherwise provides and (2) whether the Respondent company can be said to be persons claiming under the decree-holder. As regards (1) it is said that Order 21, Rule 16 specifically provides for application for execution by a transferee of decree and therefore, a transferee of decree cannot apply u/s 146 and must bring himself within Order 21, Rule 16. This is really begging the question. Either the Respondent company are transferees of the decree by an assignment in writing or by operation of law, in which case they fall within Order 21, Rule 16, or they are not such transferees in which event they may avail themselves of the provisions of Section 146 if the other condition is fulfilled. There is nothing in Order 21, Rule 16 which expressly or by necessary Implication, precludes a person who claims to be entitled to the benefit pi a decree under the decree-holder but does not answer the description of being the transferee of that decree by assignment in writing or by operation of law, from making an application which the person from whom he claims could have made. It is mid what then is meant by the words "save as otherwise provided by this Code"? The answer is that those words are not meaningless but have effect in some cases. Take by way of an illustration, the second proviso to Order 21, Rule 16 which provides that where a decree for payment of money against two or more persons has been transferred to one of them it shall not be executed against the others. 12. The house was admittedly transferred to Smt. Shanti Devi. She made an application for being substituted in place of the decree holder. 12. The house was admittedly transferred to Smt. Shanti Devi. She made an application for being substituted in place of the decree holder. That application was allowed the prohibitory decree passed against the judgment debtors related to this very house and certainly in equity and justice the transferee would be entitled to avail of that decree and such a transferee cannot and should not be forced to take recourse to another series of litigation, particularly when it is conceded by the learned Counsel that when Smt. Shanti Devi made an application for being substituted in place of the decree holder, no objection was raised by the judgment debtors then and the court substituted Smt. Shanti Devi in place of Smt. Bhagwati Devi. In this view of the matter, I do not agree with the argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that Smt. Shanti Devi was not entitled to execute this decree. 13. In the result, the appeal fails. It is hereby dismissed with costs. The stay order is discharged.