D. A. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) [ The Honble Court after narrating the facts of the case further observed: ] ( 2 ) AT the outset it is necessary to lay down with precision and accuracy the approach of the Court while dealing with the offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 Prior to its amendment in the year 1964 Parliament provided different sentences for the first offence second offence and those who committed third and subsequent offences. By the Amending Act 49 of 1964 sec. 16 which is a punishing section which had recognised different sentences to be awarded for the first offence second offence or subsequent offences has been substantially amended. The material portion of section 16 as amended in 1964 by Amending Act 49 of 1964 reads as under :"16 (1) If any person (a) whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf imports into India or manufactures for sale or stores sells or distributes any article of food: (i)which is adulterated or misbranded or the sale of which is prohibited by the Food (Health) Authority in the interest of public health; xxx xxx xxx he shall in addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under the provisions of sec. 6 be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to six years and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees. " Provided that- (i)if the offence is under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) and is with respect to an article of food which is adulterated under sub-clause (1) of clause (i) of sec. 2 or misbranded under sub-clause (k) of clause (ix) of that section; or (ii) if the offence is under sub clause (ii) of clause (a) the Court may for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months or of fine of less than one thousand rupees or of both imprisonment for a term of less than six months and fine of less than one thousand rupees. "the necessity and purpose of amendment has been clearly set out in the objects and reasons accompanying the amending bill. "the necessity and purpose of amendment has been clearly set out in the objects and reasons accompanying the amending bill. Relevant portion reads as under :" It is also considered that the penal provisions of the Act are inadequate and that they should be made more deterrent in order to have an effective check on the evil of adulteration. "now if the Parliament had to step in to take away the discretion which trial Court always enjoys in deciding adequate quantum of punishment keeping in view the facts of each case effect will have to be given to the legislative intendment as manifest in the amendment of sec. 16. If prior to the amendment of sec. 16 in the year 1969 the Parliament had recognised the necessity of providing different sentences though for the same offence committed for the first time and then repeated and subsequently by amendment of sec. 16 did away with this difference it would give a clue to the intention of the Parliament as manifest in the penal provision contained in sec. 16 after its amendment in 1964. When the legislature provided different punishments for the same offence committed for the first time or for the second time or for the third time relevant principle behind it is to punish effectively contumacious conduct of the accused in that sentence awarded for the first offence had not deterred him from pursuing the same criminal activity. Ordinarily there ought to be no difference in the sentence to be awarded to a man who adulterates an article of food for the first time or for the second time or for the third time because degree of harm is the same from the societys point of view. To illustrate if water is added to milk it is of no consequence whether it was added by the accused for the first time when unfortunately it was detected or for the second time when unfortunately it was again detected or for the third time except this that sentence for the first offence has not acted as a check on the criminal or anti-social activity of the accused concerned. It is only the measure of contumacious conduct of the accused which can indicate a principle for providing for more deterrent punishment for second and subsequent offences. It is only the measure of contumacious conduct of the accused which can indicate a principle for providing for more deterrent punishment for second and subsequent offences. But once that scheme of the section is deliberately and intentionally amended it must be for a purpose. It must not have been undertaken as an exercise in mere futility. Act was on the statute book from 1954 and the amendment was undertaken in 1964. In between the Central Council of Health reviewed the working of the Act and then recommended inter alia that the penal provisions of the Act should be made more deterrent. If with this material the Parliament stepped in and amended the penal provisions contained in sec. 16 simultaneously doing away with different punishments for the first offence second offence and subsequent offences Courts dealing with offences under the Act must take notice of the amendment keeping in view the purpose and object for which amendment is made and give effect to it. In fact punishment provided in sec. 16 prior to its amendment in 1964 failed to act as deterrent not because punishment was very light but because the Courts while deciding the cases under the penal provision failed to take note of the pernicious effect of the adulterated food on the society at large. Unfortunate though it is it is true that the Judges and Magistrates dealing with the cases under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act by and large failed to take note of the object and purpose for which the Act was enacted namely to eradicate wide spread pernicious and degenerating effect of adulteration of articles of food and treated offences under it lightly forgetting that the activity of a trader dealing in adulterated articles of food affect a wide segment of society in two ways in that the activity becomes menace to the public health and it is undertaken by a man for private profit. Two important aspects of the offences committed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act are that the one who commits it does it for personal profit and gain and therefore it is done in an insidious manner at the cost of the public health of the society causing a very wide pernicious effect affecting a large number of unwary unsophisticated and gullible members of the society. This should not and cannot be easily lost sight of. This should not and cannot be easily lost sight of. The offences are very serious if not atrocious in their effect on those who have the misfortune of taking those adulterated articles of food. If A causes some hurt to B by and large it is a matter between A and B. But if a trader sells about a maund of adulterated article of food to about hundred persons he has in turn played with the Jives of hundred persons and that shows the gravity of the offence. Time without number it has been pointed out that one who adulterates an article of food is not only a menace to the public health but indulges in anti-social activity carried on in an insidious manner for personal gain by cheating people. That pernicious effect and the degree of harm cannot be gauged with accuracy and reasonable certainty. It is often said that a particular accused is a first offender under this Act. It is easy to understand this expression because out of the whole bulk of adulterated article of food he has sold a portion of it only to the Food Inspector and in respect of which he is prosecuted. To that extent he is a first offender though by the time the accused is tried the entire bulk is disposed of and he has committed number of offences before law takes notice of it. Another aspect of the matter is that one who adulterates an article of food while playing with the lives of people cheats each one of his purchasers. When an article of food which is adulterated is purchased ordinarily foreign substance is added to it or its ingredients and constituents do not conform to the standard prescribed for the same. The standards are prescribed for assuring purity and quality of the article of food. When one buys an adulterated article of food he pays for something which he never wanted to buy and in the process gets cheated. This is also an aspect of which the Court should take notice while deciding or appreciating the gravity of the offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. ( 3 ) ONE can look upon with equanimity some time compassion some time indulgence some time even sympathy in case of an individual who causes harm to another fellow may be out of lust vengeance or even personal revenge. ( 3 ) ONE can look upon with equanimity some time compassion some time indulgence some time even sympathy in case of an individual who causes harm to another fellow may be out of lust vengeance or even personal revenge. But this sophisticated fellow who carried on something in the name of trade may be a petty trader sells article of food which is adulterated does something for his personal gain remaining completely oblivious to the health and well being of every one who deals with him. ( 4 ) JUDICIAL decisions have time without number noted that the activity of a trader dealing in adulterated article of food is anti-social and is a menace to public health. Offences under the Act being anti-social crimes affecting the health and well being of our people the legislature having regard to the trend of Courts to impose in most cases only a sentence of fine or where a sentence of imprisonment was passed a light sentence was awarded even in cases where a severe sentence was called for a more drastic step was taken by it in prescribing a minimum sentence and a minimum fine to be imposed even for a first offence. (Vide Jagdish Prasad alias Jagdish Prasad Gupta v. The State of West Bengal A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2044 and Gurumukh Singh v. State of Punjab A. I. R. 1972 (S. C.) 824 ). Sale of an article of food which is adulterated is an antisocial activity deleterious to the health of those who would consume them as article of food the eradication of which is the principal aim of the Act and in particular sec. 16 thereof. The evil would appear to be more pernicious when it is realised that the article of food is more often purchased and consumed by the persons coming from un-affluent sections of the society who cannot afford to buy the articles prepared by more sophisticated processes. (vide Jai Narain v. The Municipal Corporation Delhi A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2607)Divan J. in Bhavnagar Municipality v. Navnitrai 12 G. L. R. 817 at p. 819 has observed that unless deterrent sentence is passed and those who deal in adulterated foodstuffs and try to pass off as respectable members of the society are sent to prison and made to realise that this type of crime does not pay society will suffer. It does not require any elaborate discussion to reach an obvious conclusion that those who adulterate articles of food or deal in adulterated articles of food are menace to the public health and are such anti-social elements who should be put down with the heaviest hand. These are not the cases in which there is any place for leniency which would be misplaced sympathy which would be underserved and indulgence which would be a premium on dishonesty of the cheat. In the course of discussion whenever attempt was made to point out that this Court should deal with sympathy these cases at the end of the argument it was frankly conceded that these are not the offences for which any sympathy can be shown. If there is any right in law which must be granted there is right of defence and it was open to the accused to defend. But they cannot have best of the both in that on the one hand they go on masquerading as petty trader playing have with the lives of people coming from un-affluent section of the society and on the other hand when their activities one detected and they are sought to be booked they try to invoke sympathy of the Court on the ground that they are underdogs of the society or belong to the class of have knots. In cases of this nature law must take its own course uninfluenced and uninhibited by the consequence of the outcome of a trial. The legislative intendment manifest by the amendment of the Act must be given full effect to. That must be the approach and as that approach is so sadly forgotten this Court decided to suo motu exercise revisional jurisdiction conferred upon it by sec. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code. ( 5 ) THERE was some argument about the purpose and object of the punishment. Should the punishment be deterrent ? Should it be the approach of the Court that the criminal act is after all an outcome of a warped mind or a diseased mind and therefore the treatment aspect should be developed and not punitive one. I am more than certain that this approach is absolutely inappropriate and untenable in respect of offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. I am more than certain that this approach is absolutely inappropriate and untenable in respect of offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Even law has provided that meas rea is not a necessary ingredient of the offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Minds consciously work out a strategem by which at the cost of unsuspecting public a man wants to thrive himself and in the process to play havoc with the lives of the individuals who deal with him. Such a man cannot but be dealt with under any theory of punishment other than deterrent punishment. Theory of deterrent punishment postulates not only that the one who indulges into such activity would by gravity of the sentence be deterred from indulging into it over again but those like minded in the society looking to the misfortune that befell one of their confederates would be deterred from resorting to the same anti-social activity. If that is to be the purpose of deterrent punishment I cannot conceive of any case better than the one under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. And this Court is not called upon to decide at this stage as to which theory of punishment the legislature has kept in view while prescribing punishment for the offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. There is a clear legislative exposition while amending sec. 16 in that the judiciary which ought always to be trusted for deciding the quantum of punishment in each individual case because no two individual cases are alike has been denuded or stripped of its powers and the legislature interposed itself by saying that such and such shall be the punishment irrespective of any facts of any individual given case. A vary lengthy discussion took place at the Bar while hearing these applications and the learned Advocates were invited to develop a proposition on this line namely whether where the legislature provides for a specific punishment leaving nothing to the discretion of the Court the Court has at all any further discretion to tinker with the punishment provided in law. A vary lengthy discussion took place at the Bar while hearing these applications and the learned Advocates were invited to develop a proposition on this line namely whether where the legislature provides for a specific punishment leaving nothing to the discretion of the Court the Court has at all any further discretion to tinker with the punishment provided in law. No case law nor proposition from the text books investing such power in the Court has been brought to the notice of this Court except attempting their utmost to show that the offender under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is also entitled to the benefits of the Probation of Offenders Act. That is neither here nor there. The question which looms large before the Court is whether the Court can avoid giving effect to the legislative intendment by referring to something which is thoroughly irrelevant and of no consequence. Looking to the scheme enacted in sec. 16 after the amendment unless adulteration is shown to be of the type as stated in the proviso and the case is therefore shown to have been covered by the proviso there is no discretion in the Court but to give minimum punishment and one cannot envisage any exceptional case and even if there be one the legislature does not recognise it. Either a man is convicted and given minimum punishment is acquitted. There is no halfway house. ( 6 ) LANGUAGE of sec. 16 since its amendment leaves no room for doubt that unless the offence is under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) and is with respect to an article of food which is deemed adulterated under sub-clause (1) of clause (i) of sec. 2 or if the offence is under sub clause (ii) of clause (a) the Court must award punishment as set out in the main body of the section which provides that punishment shall not be less than six months but may extend to six years and fine shall not be less than Rs. 1000. 00. 2 or if the offence is under sub clause (ii) of clause (a) the Court must award punishment as set out in the main body of the section which provides that punishment shall not be less than six months but may extend to six years and fine shall not be less than Rs. 1000. 00. Looking to the scheme of the section where adulteration is of the nature as would attract the proviso or the article of food was misbranded which again would attract the proviso the Court undoubtedly has discretion to award less than minimum punishment not as such but for the reasons which the Court must record in writing and which must be both adequate and special. ( 7 ) DEALING with the question of adequate and special reasons at this very stage it is necessary to observe that the reasons assigned in almost all the cases before this Court can neither be said to be adequate nor can they be said to be special. By and large reasons which have appealed to the learned Magistrate are (i) that offender was a first offender (ii) that he was a petty trader and not a manufacturer; and (iii) that he showed repentance by pleading guilty to the charge. Now the first reason namely that offender is a first offender could hardly be said to be adequate and special reason because the legislature itself has done away with any distinction between first offender second offender and third and subsequent offender. If the legislature ever wanted any treatment of special nature being accorded to the first offender it was not at all necessary for it to amend sec. 16 which prior to the amendment did recognise distinction between sentences for the first offence second offence etc. Once the legislature stepped in and did away with this difference between first offence and second offence the Court cannot for its own reasons bring. in something which the legislature rejected. Second ground which appears to have appealed to the learned Magistrate was that the offender in question was a petty trader. Even this does not appear to be adequate and special reason. In a city like Ahmedabad people belonging to the weaker section of the society and staying in outlying areas would of necessity be required to approach petty traders having small shops in their locality for purchase of their day to day requirements. Even this does not appear to be adequate and special reason. In a city like Ahmedabad people belonging to the weaker section of the society and staying in outlying areas would of necessity be required to approach petty traders having small shops in their locality for purchase of their day to day requirements. It is those people belonging to either backward class or weaker section of the society who would fall a prey to the machination of such petty traders. A man belonging to the affluent section of the society would buy his spices and other foodstuffs for the whole year and prepared by more sophisticated process and is not likely to be cheated out of his wit day in day out. But large bulk of our population belongs to the weaker section of the society who of necessity are required to buy foodstuffs and spices in small quantities out of their daily earnings and would be buying the same from the petty traders and therefore the activities of these petty traders would be all the more harmful. Hence that aspect in my opinion would be hardly relevant while deciding the quantum of sentence. It must be confessed that while deciding the quantum of fine that may be imposed upon such petty trader his capacity to pay may be taken into consideration. But when he is to be given substantive sentence the fact that he is a petty trader is hardly a relevant consideration and must be wholly ignored. Third ground that appealed to the learned Magistrate was that the man showed repentance by pleading guilty. Any one having slightest experience of criminal Courts would hardly believe that plea of guilty flows ever from repentance. It either flows from the substantive sentence starring in ones face and tries to generate sympathy which may be convenient both to the Court and litigant namely that the case is soon disposed of without further trial and the accused escapes by paying a paltry fine and both rejoice as a result of it In the process killing the entire spirit of legislation. This tendency must be put down if necessary with a heavy hand. Plea of guilty not only does not indicate repentance but more often it is the result of bargain and judiciary must frown upon such bargain. This tendency must be put down if necessary with a heavy hand. Plea of guilty not only does not indicate repentance but more often it is the result of bargain and judiciary must frown upon such bargain. One is very much reminded of an observation which was made years back that confession is made not necessarily because one feels sorry for what he has done but one is worried about what is in store for him soon after. Such confessions in my opinion are a cloak to generate false sympathy in the Court and could not be countenanced. One fails to understand what the learned Magistrate has to do with plea of guilty. Assuming that the accused pleads guilty and the case is over he starts another case for him one case is as good as any other case. But it was said that an atmosphere was created or generated in the Court where these cases are tried which almost impelled the accused to plead guilty. It is not possible to believe that some peculiar atmosphere was prevalent in the Court of law and sheer atmosphere of the Court induced an otherwise innocent man to plead guilty to the charge. If the accused is really guilty and pleads to the same he in no way advances the cause of justice and if he is really innocent and yet pleads guilty it is a tendency which must be set at naught. Therefore viewed from either angle this voluntary confession or plea of guilty can hardly be said to be either adequate or special reason for awarding less than the minimum sentence. There can never be generosity in determining the reasons which can be said to be adequate or special. Word special signifies special to the facts of the case or the accused and adequacy of the reasons has to be examined in light of the nature of the offence magnitude of the offence circumstances in which it is committed and degree of possible harm caused. Word special signifies special to the facts of the case or the accused and adequacy of the reasons has to be examined in light of the nature of the offence magnitude of the offence circumstances in which it is committed and degree of possible harm caused. ( 8 ) CONCEDING straightway that the quantum of sentence is a matter within the discretion of the trial Court and the higher Court should not lightly interfere with the same it becomes the duty of the Court if the trial Court under complete misunderstanding of the law on the subject reaches a conclusion which is not only wholly erroneous but contrary to the sprit of the legislation itself. Therefore even though the question of sentence is a matter of judicial discretion relevant consideration in determining sentence broadly stated include motive for and the magnitude of the offence and the manner of its commission (vide Dharma Rama Bhagare v. the State of Maharashtra (1973) 1 S. C. C. 537 ). Mr. G. N. Desai learned Government Pleader in this connection drew my attention to a few cases bearing on the topic of sentence. In M. V. Joshi v. M. U. Shimpi and another A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1494 it was observed that the penal statutes should be construed strictly. Having said this it must also be remembered that while so construing the penal provisions in a statute the Court must find out the express intention of the legislature and give effect to it. In State of Maharashtra v. Jwala Prasad Dube 70 Bom. L. R. 693 the Court awarded sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1000/in a case in which it was found that milk was adulterated with water to the tune of 28. 8 per cent. This case was relied upon by Mr. Desai for pressing a point that even where the case was covered by the proviso the Court imposed minimum sentence. In Ibrahim Hali Moidee v. Food Inspector (1969) (3) S. C. C. 901 it was found as a fact that the accused sold 750 grams of lac-dhall which was found to be adulterated and each accused was sentenced to undergo minimum imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000. 00. In Ibrahim Hali Moidee v. Food Inspector (1969) (3) S. C. C. 901 it was found as a fact that the accused sold 750 grams of lac-dhall which was found to be adulterated and each accused was sentenced to undergo minimum imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000. 00. The Sessions Judge acquitted the accused and on appeal to the High Court the order of acquittal was set aside and the order of conviction and sentence was restored. The ratio of the decision of this case is not helpful because it deals with the question of ambit of the power of the High Court while dealing with appeal against order of acquittal. ( 9 ) BRIEFLY now dealing with the correct approach to the cases of this nature what standard should be laid down for awarding proper legal punishment in such cases so that such anti-social activity deleterious to the public health may be put down with a heavy hand. It does not need any elaboration. The Court dealing with such cases must bear in mind that one who adulterates article of food plays ducks and drakes with the health of the society. To illustrate what. I am trying to make out a poor man buys milk for an ailing child after incurring certain debt and in the process he buys water which is available free of charge. A daily bread earner buys food-stuffs and gets adulterated articles of food and pays for something which he never wanted to buy. It is the unsophisticated and gullible people who are victims of this anti-social activity carried on and indulged in on a large scale in this country by the people who want to thrive by putting into jeopardy lives of people. Could a man be allowed to augment his wealth by treachery and chicanery ? This is what these people are doing and have done. The society must react and have to react through its chosen representatives by amending law. This is what Sutherland and Cressey in Principles of Criminology call societal reactions to crime and criminality. These white collar criminals however are by far the most dangerous to society of any type of criminals from the point of view of effects on private property and social institutions. In Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. This is what Sutherland and Cressey in Principles of Criminology call societal reactions to crime and criminality. These white collar criminals however are by far the most dangerous to society of any type of criminals from the point of view of effects on private property and social institutions. In Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. II 24-B para 1975 it is observed that the legislature may fix the punishment for crime or may increase the punishment applicable to a certain class of offences and as a rule the power to fix the minimum and maximum punishment for all the crimes is conferred on the legislature only. Punishment should always be commensurate with the crime in order that the purpose and object of punishment may be accomplished. Generally if a fixed penalty is prescribed by the legislature the Court has no discretion with respect thereto and must impose punishment in conformity therewith. ( 10 ) IT was next contended that while dealing with these revision applications one important aspect that should be borne in mind is about lapse of time after which the Court has decided to suo motu exercise its revisional jurisdiction. There was an additional limb of the argument raised by Mr. G. D. Bhatt learned Advocate who appeared in Criminal Revision Application No. 574 of 1972. Mr. Bhatt contended that apart from the question of delay in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under sec. 439 his revision application is limitation in view of the provision contained in Article 131 of the Limitation Act. I would first examine the question of limitation because if the point is good all these Revision Applications will have to be dismissed without any further examination. Article 131 provides as undermr. Bhatt contended that the High Court exercises revisional jurisdiction conferred upon it by sec. 439 and the moment the High Court proceeds to exercise revisional jurisdiction article 131 is attracted and once article 131 is attracted this revisional jurisdiction can only be exercised within 90 days from the date of the order or sentence sought to be revised and thereafter the power of this Court comes to an end. Mr. Bhatt urged that if either State of Gujarat or the Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad had invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under sec. Mr. Bhatt urged that if either State of Gujarat or the Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad had invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under sec. 439 the accused could have confidently argued the question of limitation and could have invited this Court to reject the revision application on the only ground that it is barred by limitation. Urged Mr. Bhatt that if that be the position the situation is not at all altered merely because the High Court suo motu chose to exercise its revisional jurisdiction because bar of limitation would apply to it as well. Mr. Bhatt says that article 131 takes no notice of the distinction between invocation of revisional jurisdiction at the instance of some party or suo motu exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court because the accused would meet the same fate either if someone invokes the revisional jurisdiction or this High Court suo motu chooses to exercise the same and the position of the accused cannot be different only because in one case some one invited the Court to exercise its jurisdiction and in another case the High Court suo motu chooses to exercise its revisional jurisdiction. Article 131 finds its place in the Third Division of the Articles in the Schedule annexed to the Limitation Act 1963 First Division is headed Suits. Second Division is beaded Appeals and Third Division bears the heading Applications. Article 131 begins with the expression to any Court. The language in which the Article is couched and the Division in which it finds its place would unmistakably show that the article can only be invoked where some one tries to invoke revisional jurisdiction of this Court by making application to the High Court. Suo motu invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be put on par with some one inviting the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction. The High Court in such a case will have to examine the contentions put forth by the party and the High Court cannot straightway refuse to exercise jurisdiction. The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court which it can suo motu exercise would only be exercised in the interest of justice alone. There would be no vendetta of a private party. It would not be exercised to satisfy the sense of revenge or vengeance or lust. The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court which it can suo motu exercise would only be exercised in the interest of justice alone. There would be no vendetta of a private party. It would not be exercised to satisfy the sense of revenge or vengeance or lust. When Court itself exercises jurisdiction the Court would be guided purely by the duty for which it is constituted. Where the cause of justice has suffered because of certain lapse on the part of the subordinate Court this Court would not readily exercise its jurisdiction in its own wisdom and it would put a fester on its own power in that it would exercise its jurisdiction of a special kind to set right the course of justice and if cause of justice has suffered there cannot be any limitation on the power of the High Court. If the jurisdiction was to be exercised if and only if some one invokes jurisdiction one expression in sec. 439 would lose all significance and that expression is: which otherwise comes to its knowledge. If the High Court comes to know of miscarriage of justice in any of the Courts subordinate to it from any source or even from an item appearing in a newspaper and no one is interested in moving the High Court yet the High Court in order to see that cause of justice does not suffer that administration of justice is not stigmatized it can suo motu exercise revisional jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction of widest amplitude which the legislature has conferred upon the High Court cannot be hedged in by imparting the concept of limitation as envisaged in Article 131. Article 131 uses the expression application to any Court which only means some one making an application to invoke its jurisdiction. Therefore upon true construction of the language employed in Article 131 itself it cannot apply to a situation where the High Court proceeds to suo motu exercise is revisional jurisdiction. And apart from that looking to the language of sec. 439 such power of widest amplitude could not by process of construction be hedged in by concept of limitation. Such construction would do immense harm to the accused whatever may be the approach in the facts of the present case. And apart from that looking to the language of sec. 439 such power of widest amplitude could not by process of construction be hedged in by concept of limitation. Such construction would do immense harm to the accused whatever may be the approach in the facts of the present case. To illustrate time without number this Court comes across cases where number of persons are tried together and a good number of them are convicted and only one prefers appeal. While hearing that appeal the High Court feels that the conviction of those who have not appealed is unsustainable and the exercise of this very jurisdiction conferred by sec. 439 would enable the High Court to acquit them without being bothered about any limitation or any other limitation on its power. Would it therefore be possible to circumscribe or to delimit or to put fetter on this power of widest amplitude by the construction canvassed for by Mr. Bhatt. I think not. Therefore Article 131 has no application to the facts of this case and the contention that these revision applications are barred by limitation must be negatived. ( 11 ) IT was however contended that even if there is no specific period of limitation for exercise of power under sec. 439 it must be remembered that every power conferred upon any Court or Tribunal or even on an administrative officer must be exercised in a reasonable manner and exercise of power in a reasonable manner inculcates its exercise within a reasonable time. It is by now well settled that power conferred upon administrative and quasi judicial Tribunals must always be exercised in a reasonable manner which implies within a reasonable time. In a case under the Land Acquisition Act a Division Bench of this High Court struck down a notification under sec. 6 which was issued after a long lapse of time after issue of a notification under sec. 4 and question that was raised before the Court was that even though there is no particular period of limitation within which notification under sec. 6 should follow after issue of notification under sec. 4 yet as all power must be exercised reasonably idea of exercise within reasonable time is inculcated therein and if power is exercised after a long unexplained delay the Court would step in and deny exercise of such power. 6 should follow after issue of notification under sec. 4 yet as all power must be exercised reasonably idea of exercise within reasonable time is inculcated therein and if power is exercised after a long unexplained delay the Court would step in and deny exercise of such power. This aspect was also examined by the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and others 10 Guj. L. R. 992. In that case validity of an order made by the Commissioner interfering with the order of the Collector under sec. 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code was questioned. Power to revise order was exercised under sec. 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code which did not prescribe any period of limitation within which power can be exercised. It was urged before the Supreme Court that every power must be exercised in a reasonable manner and reasonable manner of exercise of power inculcates within its fold that it must be exercised within a reasonable time and reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised. This contention found favour with the Supreme Court and order of the Commissioner was quashed observing that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional power within six months from date of the order of the Collector. What has been considered reasonable length of time in the facts of that case is not decisive of the matter because the Supreme Court has in terms observed that length of reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and nature of the order which is being revised. Now it must be remembered that the Court in that case was concerned with the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by either administrative or quasi. judicial Tribunal. It would be improper to put judicial Tribunal on par with quasi judicial or administrative Tribunal. Judicially trained mind is always in a position to properly determine as to at what point of time it can interfere with some orders is respect of which there is no period of limitation. It must not be forgotten that this power of widest amplitude only with one limitation namely that in exercise of this power this Court cannot convert the order of acquittal into one of conviction has been conferred upon the highest Court in the State. It must not be forgotten that this power of widest amplitude only with one limitation namely that in exercise of this power this Court cannot convert the order of acquittal into one of conviction has been conferred upon the highest Court in the State. Exercise of such power is reserved in very rare cases. But even while exercising this power it is true that it must be exercised within reasonable time. But one cannot adopt period of six months as considered reasonable in Raghav Nathas case (supra) as decisive of the matter where such power is required to be exercised within reasonable time. In all the cases before me barring one revisional jurisdiction is sought to be exercised within one year from the date of conviction and it must be borne in mind that the Court can suo motu exercise its power under sec. 439 when certain facts come to its own knowledge. Now if while coming across large number of cases showing scant respect for statutory provisions this Court exercises revisional jurisdiction within a period of three months to one year it is not possible to say that the power is not exercised within reasonable time. Observations in Raghav Nathas case are in the context of the exercise of power by administrative or quasi judicial Tribunal which if not checked are likely to act in an arbitrary manner. Such a thing cannot be said in respect of judicial Tribunal and that is the distinguished feature and therefore both the prongs of contention of Mr. Bhatt must be negatived. ( 12 ) MR. Shethna learned Advocate appearing for some accused also drew my attention to some of the decisions of this High Court showing how such cases have been dealt with by the Court and in the process urging that very serious view of the matter is not called for. My attention was drawn to Bhavnagar Municipality v. Navnitrai Dipchand and others 82 Guj. L. R. 817 in which Divan J enhanced sentence of fine of Rs. 50 imposed upon the accused to Rs. 250/for an offence punishable under see. 16 (1) (a) (ii ). In that case the accused was charged with selling adulterated ground nut oil. It was found as a fact that the sample of groundnut oil contained castor oil and did not conform with the standard prescribed for ground nut oil. 50 imposed upon the accused to Rs. 250/for an offence punishable under see. 16 (1) (a) (ii ). In that case the accused was charged with selling adulterated ground nut oil. It was found as a fact that the sample of groundnut oil contained castor oil and did not conform with the standard prescribed for ground nut oil. The trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced the accused to imprisonment till rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 50. 00in default to suffer S. I. for 20 days for an offence under sec. 16 (1) (a) (i) and further sentenced him to imprisonment till rising of the Court and pay a fine of Rs. 20. 00in default to suffer S. I. for seven days for an offence punishable under sec. 16 (1) (a) (ii) of the Act. Revision Application was preferred by the Bhavnagar Municipality to the Court of Sessions for enhancement of sentence which application was dismissed. Bhavnagar Municipality preferred revision application to the High Court praying for enhancement of sentence. Mr. Mehta learned advocate who appeared for the Municipality conceded that the case fall within the proviso. It is in this background that Divan J. enhanced the sentence from Rs. 50/to Rs. 250/only. As there was a concession the Court did not take upon itself examination of the question whether the ease at all fell within or outside the proviso. My attention was also drawn to Criminal Revision Application Nos. 112 to 116 of 1972 praying for enhancement of sentence imposed upon the accused in those cases. The Court proceeded on the assumption that the case fell in the proviso and enhanced the sentence of fine to Rs. 1000/but did not award any substantive sentence of imprisonment. Reference was also made to the judgment delivered by C. V. Rane J. in Criminal Revision Application No. 11 of 1972 decided on 26th April 1972 (State v. Prataprai ). The accused in that case were found selling adulterated ground nut oil. It was not contended before the Court that the case would not fall within the proviso. But it was assumed that the case would be covered by the proviso. In this background sentence of fine was enhanced and the accused was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 3500. 00in default to suffer R. I. for two months. It was not contended before the Court that the case would not fall within the proviso. But it was assumed that the case would be covered by the proviso. In this background sentence of fine was enhanced and the accused was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 3500. 00in default to suffer R. I. for two months. Reference was also made to State v. Raghubir Das 1970 Cr. L. J. 1051 in which the accused was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/for having sold turmeric which was found not to conform with the standard prescribed for the same. On appeal to the Sessions Court sentence was reduced to R. I. for three days and fine of Rs. 100. 00. The State moved the High Court for enhancing the sentence. The High Court refused to interfere with the sentence awarded to the accused observing that the sentence is to be enhanced only if it is manifestly inadequate so as to amount to miscarriage of justice. It was further observed that except when the cause of justice demands enhancement High Court is reluctant to exercise its power of enhancement of sentence and the State has failed to make out a case for enhancement. Reference was also made to In re Salem Govindappa Chetty 1970 Cr. L. J. 1058 in which the accused convicted for an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 was given benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. The question whether the accused who has committed an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is entitled to the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act is concluded by the decision in Jai Narains case (supra) and also by the decision in Isher Das 9. State of Punjab; A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1295. However in the facts of the case the Supreme Court declined to give benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused before the Court. Mr. Shethna also drew my attention to that decision in Dilo Seo v. The State of Bihar 1971 Cri. L. J. 1047 which also lays down the same principle that an accused convicted for having committed an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. Mr. Shethna also drew my attention to that decision in Dilo Seo v. The State of Bihar 1971 Cri. L. J. 1047 which also lays down the same principle that an accused convicted for having committed an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. The question is not whether the accused who is convicted for having committed an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is entitled to the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act but whether in the facts and circumstances of given case such benefit should at all be given more so when a young man at a very young age starts indulging into these anti-social activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fine enhanced. .