E. MOHAMMAD v. KUNHAHAMMAD HAJI — 1973 DIGILAW 4 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. The office note indicates that there is a delay of six days in filing the appeal to this Court. According to counsel for the appellant the delay is only of one day and the note put up by the office indicating that there is a delay of six days is erroneous. As to the delay of one day, an explanation has been offered by counsel and it is urged that the delay ought to be excused. Since the difference between the number of days of delay as noticed by the office and as contended by counsel for the petitioner has arisen from the different approaches made in the matter of reckoning of days to be excluded and since the question is of quite common occurrence, I should go into this matter in detail. 2. The relevant dates for the purpose of this appeal are the following: Table:#1 3. The period of limitation for filing the appeal is 90 days from the date of decree and judgment. Under 0. XX R.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure the decree shall bear date and the day on which the judgment was pronounced. This would be the case even when a decree is actually drawn up later and is also signed later by the judge who has pronounced the judgment. From the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from is to be excluded under S.12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the decree or order is founded is to be excluded under S.12(3) of the Act. Since it may be necessary to refer to the section in due course, I will extract S.12 here: "12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings: (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded. (3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the decree or order is founded shall, also be excluded. (4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. Explanation: In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded." Though is the earlier Act, namely the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, there was a corresponding provision in S.12, the Explanation in the Section in the Act in force is new. 4. What is the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or judgment is a matter on which it could be said that there was considerable controversy. Once the party makes as application to obtain a copy it is not within his volition to get it as early as he would like to. It would depend upon the convenience of the court which issues such copy and naturally therefore the time which is taken for obtaining copy has to be excluded from the period of limitation as a period for which the party is not responsible. Though it may be said that the period commencing from the date on which a party files an application to the date when the application is ready for delivery to him could be excluded, some doubt may arise in working out this in practice. Whether the date on which the application is to be made has to be excluded, whether the date on which stamp papers are called for are to be excluded and if stamp papers are produced on the next working day whether any period has to be excluded on this account, are matters on which more than one view is possible. Whether the date on which the application is to be made has to be excluded, whether the date on which stamp papers are called for are to be excluded and if stamp papers are produced on the next working day whether any period has to be excluded on this account, are matters on which more than one view is possible. Apparently the office has taken the view that the judgment having been pronounced on 29th July, 1972, the party has lost two days in July, 31 days in August and the first four days in September because the application was made only on the 4th of September. 4th is the day on which the party did act. Should it not be excluded or should it be considered as part of the time during which period of limitation will run is one of the questions on which there is controversy. Copying sheets were called for on 8 91972 and that was a Friday 9th and 10th were holidays, 9th being a Second Saturday and 10th a Sunday. Copying sheets were produced on 11th September. According to the office, there is a delay of three days because the party could have produced stamp, papers on the 8th September itself in which case there would have been no delay at all and since he had not produced it on the 8th, even if holidays intervened, they must be reckoned as part of the period lost and therefore three days must be found to be so lost. Of course, the date notified for appearance to receive the copy of the order is 5101972 and copy was ready on that day and the office note has calculated the period from 5-10-1972 as a period during which limitation would run. On that there is no controversy. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted, then the delay would only be of two days and not six days (not one day as is mentioned in the affidavit of the petitioner). 5. S.12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that when computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal the day from which such period is to be reckoned has to be excluded. Therefore the date of the judgment has necessarily to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. 5. S.12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that when computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal the day from which such period is to be reckoned has to be excluded. Therefore the date of the judgment has necessarily to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. The provision in S.12(2) enables the exclusion of the day on which the judgment was pronounced as also the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. What exactly is meant by "time requisite?". Since the question has received judicial notice, I would rather notice the relevant decisions than go into this question elaborately. In Ramakrishna v. Shrawan (AIR. 1944 Nag. 356) Bose J. said thus; "In the first place, it is accepted that the day on which the copies are applied for and the day on which they are delivered are both to be excluded. Why? Because the law takes no account of the fractions of a day. In some cases a copy is delivered the moment the office opens at 10 or 11 in the morning and the appeal is filed the same day. But in other cases, instead of the copy being delivered the first thing it is delivered the last and that gives the appellant no chance of filing the appeal on the same day however diligent he may be. The law ignores all these possibilities. It does not compel the appellant to file the appeal on the same day nor does it require the Courts to determine the exact moment the copy is delivered. Instead it takes no account of the fractions of a day and gives the appellant the benefit of both days, the day on which he applies and the day on which be receives the copy." The same view had been expressed as early as in 1882 by the High Court of Travancore in I.T.L.R. Appendix Page 7. This Court has, in Vijayan v. Parvathy (1960 KLT.1330), followed this view. The decisions of the Nagpur High Court in Ramakrishna v. Shrawan (AIR. 1944 Nag. 356) and the Madras High Court in Ramaseshayya v. Venkatarathnam (AIR. 1938 Mad. 823) were also referred to and followed by this Court. 6. This Court has, in Vijayan v. Parvathy (1960 KLT.1330), followed this view. The decisions of the Nagpur High Court in Ramakrishna v. Shrawan (AIR. 1944 Nag. 356) and the Madras High Court in Ramaseshayya v. Venkatarathnam (AIR. 1938 Mad. 823) were also referred to and followed by this Court. 6. I think it is quite logical to think that when an application which a person is bound to make on a particular day is made by him that day he is entitled to exclude that day in the computation of the period of limitation. Similarly the period of exclusion must take in the day on which copy is received. It is also not possible to take evidence in individual cases as to the time when the copies were received by parties. Therefore it is only practicable to exclude from the period of limitation the day on which the copy application is made. In other words, these days also must be reckoned for exclusion. 7. Then the question is whether the party is bound to furnish stamp paper on the same day the stamp papers are called for. Normally it is difficult to say that this must be the case because there is no knowing at what time the papers are called for and whether there was sufficient time for the party to comply with it on the same day. Besides, so far as the Kerala State is concerned, there is no difficulty in deciding this question. The Civil Rules of Practice indicate that there must be such exclusion. R.242 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice relates to calling for stamp papers and the provision is that, every day between the hours of 3 and 5 p.m. a list showing the applications in which records have been received and the number of stamp papers required shall be affixed to the notice board of the Copying Section. Such list will remain in the notice board for three days and within that time the applicant has to supply the stamp papers called for. R.29 of the same rules relates to presentation of proceedings and documents in court. All documents including applications for copies of judgments and orders have to be presented to or filed in court at any time before 3 p. m. or if the presiding officer so directs, even after 3 p. m. during office hours. R.29 of the same rules relates to presentation of proceedings and documents in court. All documents including applications for copies of judgments and orders have to be presented to or filed in court at any time before 3 p. m. or if the presiding officer so directs, even after 3 p. m. during office hours. Therefore the normal rule is that papers must be presented before 3 p. m. None can file any paper as of right after 3 p.m. though the court permits it to be done in appropriate cases. The notification calling for stamp papers is to be published daily only between 3 and 5 p.m. Hence it is not possible to comply with it by furnishing stamp papers on the same day. Necessarily it follows that the said day should be excluded. If in between that day and the next working day any holiday intervenes there is necessarily exclusion of the period of the holidays. Therefore between the 8th September and 11th September, 1972 there is no scope for reckoning any day as period spent for obtaining copy as has been reckoned by the office. 8. From what I have discussed above, it would be evident that the delay for this appeal is two days and the question is whether this delay has to be excused. But counsel for the appellant would contend that there is not even this delay This argument is based on the contention that the period taken for drafting the decree after the judgment has been pronounced must be excluded from computing the period of limitation. 9. According to counsel Sri. T. L. Viswanatha Iyer, the application for copy of a decree need be made only after the decree is drafted and the period taken between the date of judgment and the date of preparation and signing of the decree cannot be a period during which limitation would run. In other words, that period must be excluded. If the application had been made subsequent to the passing of the judgment but before the decree is prepared and signed, then, according to counsel, time will not run for the period up to the date when the application was made. That period, according to him must be excluded and if so excluded in this case, the appeal is in time, because the decree was certainly not prepared in two days, time. That period, according to him must be excluded and if so excluded in this case, the appeal is in time, because the decree was certainly not prepared in two days, time. Counsel relies on the decision of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in State of Bihar v. Md. Ismail (AIR. 1966 Patna 1) to support this contention. This is a decision of the Full Beach where the majority accepted a similar argument of counsel on the question of delay. Justice U. N. Sinha dissented from the majority view and in a very lucid judgment the learned judge has stated his reasons for taking a different view. 10. The majority judgment of the Patna High Court seems to assume that though the intention of the legislature in providing for an explanation in S.12 might be to specify that the period spent by the office in preparing a decree will not be available to a party to enlarge the period of limitation, the language of the section compels a construction to the contrary. I may notice here that in almost all cases where the court had taken the view that on the language of S 12 the period taken for drafting the decree prior to the date of the application must be reckoned as a period the benefit of which a party who applies for the application will get they have also noticed that legislative intent was to the contrary. It was to provide for different results that the Law Commission had suggested the incorporation of an explanation. But the Courts would say that on the language of the explanation the possible intent of the legislature must be found to have been defeated and it has to be construed as enabling a party to get the benefit of the period though, apparently the explanation was incorporated in the 1963 Act, only because in view of the conflicting decisions, the legislature wanted to make it clear that the party need not get the benefit. 11. There was considerable controversy between the courts in India on the question whether the time taken by the court in drafting a decree is a time which would extend the period of limitation by reason of exclusion of such period also from the computation of the period of limitation for filing an appeal. 11. There was considerable controversy between the courts in India on the question whether the time taken by the court in drafting a decree is a time which would extend the period of limitation by reason of exclusion of such period also from the computation of the period of limitation for filing an appeal. There are cases where applications for copies are made after the decrees are prepared and there are cases where such applications are made before the decrees are prepared. These have been sometimes viewed differently. Ultimately the Supreme Court noticing these conflicting views, held in Jagat Dhish Bharga v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava (AIR. 1961 SC. 832) thus: Where a decree is not drawn up immediately or soon after a judgment is pronounced, two types of cases may arise. A litigant feeling aggrieved by the decision may apply for the certified copy of the judgment and decree before the decree is drawn up, or he may apply for the said decree after it is drawn up. In the former case, where the litigant, has done all that he could and has made a proper application for obtaining the necessary copies, the time requisite for obtaining the copies must necessarily include not only the time taken for the actual supply of the certified copy of the decree but also for the drawing up of the decree itself" "There is, however, a sharp difference of opinion in regard to cases where an application for a certified copy of the decree is made after the said decree is drawn up. In dealing with such cases Courts have differed as to what would be the period requisite for obtaining the certified copy of the decree. The Bombay, Calcutta and Patna High Courts appear to have held that the period taken in drawing up of the decree would be part of the requisite period, while other High Courts have taken a contrary view. It is significant that though the High Courts have thus differed on this point, in every case an attempt is judicially made to do justice between the parties" "Then it was argued that the respondents should have moved the trial Court for the drawing up of a decree as soon as they found that no decree had been drawn up. It is significant that though the High Courts have thus differed on this point, in every case an attempt is judicially made to do justice between the parties" "Then it was argued that the respondents should have moved the trial Court for the drawing up of a decree as soon as they found that no decree had been drawn up. It may be assumed that the respondent might have adopted this course; but where the dual system does not exist it would be idle to contend that it is a part of the duty of a litigant to remind the court or its office about its obligation to draw up a decree after the judgment is pronounced in any suit. It may be that decrees when drawn up are shown to the lawyers of the parties, but essentially drawing up of the decree is the function of the Court and its offiice, and it would be unreasonable to penalise a party for the default of the office by suggesting that it was necessary that the party should have moved the Court for the drawing up of the decree." It is evident from the decision of the Supreme Court that it found that in cases where the litigant has applied for a copy before the decree is drawn up, time requisite for obtaining the copies must necessarily include not only the time taken for the actual supply of the certified copy of the decree but also for the drawing up of the decree itself. But the court has not pronounced on the question whether similar inclusion is to be allowed where application for copy is made after the decree is drawn up. Possibly the incorporation of the Explanation was by way of meeting the situation 12. What one has to see is whether there is any compelling reason to read the Explanation in the manner in which the Patna High Court has done, for, the Explanation, according to me, could be read otherwise, and I would even say, with due respect to the majority judges in the Patna case, only in that manner. I see no reason why one should strain to construe the Section in a manner different from that which is indicated by the legislative intent. I see no reason why one should strain to construe the Section in a manner different from that which is indicated by the legislative intent. Though the Anglo-Saxon rule of construction of statutes that the intention of the legislature as evidenced by debates in the Parliament or discussions elsewhere at the time of passing of the enactment may not be relevant in construing a statute has been adopted in this country for many decades past, it is not unusual to find courts looking into the background of legislations invariably to understand the true intent and meaning of the legislations. I do not think that a strict and technical adherence to the rule that under any circumstances the court is not to have an intelligent reference to the background of a legislation is the principle to guide a court in construing statutes. If an illustration is necessary an eloquent instance is furnished by this case. Even the majority judges in the Patna decision seem to indicate that the construction they are making of the section is not what the framers thought it ought to be. I may mention here of the very illuminating judgment of my learned brother Krishna Iyer J. in an unreported decision in S. A. Nos. 974, 975 and 976 of 1970 in which the learned judge has referred to the background of this legislation and has very clearly indicated that the legislature meant differently from what it is attempted to be read now. As I see it, I think, the provisions should be read in consonance with the intent of the legislature if that is possible without straining the language, even if it is possible that another meaning could be given to it. But as I would presently show the one and only meaning, according to me, of the provision in the Explanation may be what the Law Commission and Legislature meant and not what according to the Patna High Court it should be read as, in the context. 13. S.12, it must be understood at the outset, deals with periods of exclusion. Sub-sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 specifically provide for exclusions of certain periods and all these sub-sections end with the words "shall be excluded". Either certain particular days or certain periods have to be so excluded. These are to be excluded from what? Of course, from the periods of limitation. Sub-sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 specifically provide for exclusions of certain periods and all these sub-sections end with the words "shall be excluded". Either certain particular days or certain periods have to be so excluded. These are to be excluded from what? Of course, from the periods of limitation. Normally one would ask whether these are the only exclusions. Of course, that is so. The Parliament which incorporated an explanation in S.12 in the Limitation Act, 1963 would have certainly been aware of the conflict of decisions on the corresponding section of the Limitation Act of 1908 and would have intended to resolve the conflict. Though the period mentioned in the explanation is not a period to be separately provided for, it was incorporated only by way of an explanation indicating that the period mentioned in the explanation shall also be excluded. The explanation starts with the words "in computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order". That refers to the time mentioned in sub-sections 2 and 3 of S.12. Then it provides that any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded. That is, if any time is taken in the matter of preparation of decree prior to the date of application, a party cannot claim to include that period in the period of exclusion mentioned in sub-sections 2 and 3. Therefore "shall not be excluded" has to be read as meaning "shall not be excluded" from the period of limitation. The fact that the explanation starts with the words "in computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order" does not justify reading it as meaning that the non-exclusion is from the "time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree", or in other words that such time should be 'included' in computing the time requisite for obtaining copy of decree or order. The Explanation is necessarily to be read along with the rest of the Section which deals with exclusion from the periods of limitation. The purpose of the Explanation is apparently to explain that a particular period shall not be excluded from the period of limitation. It appears to me that the meaning is quite plain enough. 14. The Explanation is necessarily to be read along with the rest of the Section which deals with exclusion from the periods of limitation. The purpose of the Explanation is apparently to explain that a particular period shall not be excluded from the period of limitation. It appears to me that the meaning is quite plain enough. 14. I think it is an erroneous or an irrational approach to read the words "shall not be excluded" to mean 'shall be included'. S.12 does not deal with any inclusion of periods. On the other hand, it deals only with exclusion of periods. The words "shall not be excluded" need not always mean shall be included. At any rate, so long as there is no difficulty to understand the plain meaning of the words "shall not be excluded", I see no reason for the approach adopted by the learned judges who were in the majority in the Patna decision. 15. It is rightly observed by Mahapatra J. that " A cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes is that when the language and grammatical construction of particular provision in the statute are without any ambiguity, they should receive the plain and natural meaning." The only question is whether it should lend to the construction put on it by the majority Judges. In support of their construction the judgment proceeds to state "The draftsman having used the word "excluded" at the end of each of the four sub. sections, appears to have thought fanciful to use the same word at the end of the Explanation, to have as it were, a rhythmical effect. To counteract the natural meaning of "exclu-ded", he used another negative form in the same expression so that the real meaning will not be lost. The expression "shall not be excluded" means Undoubtedly "shall be included". This could best be answered in the words of U. N. Sinha J. who wrote the dissenting judgment in that case. According to the learned judge "S.12 is not concerned with any inclusion of time at all. The section is concerned with exclusion of time, and, therefore, it is not possible to interpret the explanation by holding that the expression, "shall not be excluded" means "shall be included" as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree". According to the learned judge "S.12 is not concerned with any inclusion of time at all. The section is concerned with exclusion of time, and, therefore, it is not possible to interpret the explanation by holding that the expression, "shall not be excluded" means "shall be included" as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree". Notwithstanding the fact that I may be guilty of repetition, T would once again state that it appears to me to be a wrong approach to construe the section in the manner in which the majority judges have done in the Patna decision. "Shall not be excluded" is a term which has got a meaning of its own and could be understood without being converted into some other form such as "shall be included'. I do not know whether the words "shall not be excluded" have a rhythmical effect as the majority judges would observe. With great respect to the learned Judges, I think there is no reason to assume so. Sub-sections 1 to 4 enumerate that certain periods shall be excluded and that from the period of limitation prescribed under the Act. The legislature apparently wanted to make it clear in the Explanation that a particular period shall not be excluded and the meaning appears to be quite evident that such non-exclusion is from the period of limitation. According to me the error in construing it otherwise arises from unnecessary emphasis en the context in which the words "shall not be excluded" appear in the Section. Read with the apparent purpose for which the Explanation has been incorporated in the new Act the meaning is quite clear and if that be the case, it appears to me to be plain to read S.12 read with Explanation as providing as follows: 16. The periods of limitation for suits, appeals and applications are those prescribed in the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963. In applying these periods for determining the limitation for any such proceeding the question may arise whether the day from which period is to be reckoned has to be excluded. Time from which period begins to run is indicated in the 3rd column of the Schedule and it is the day from which such period would commence as provided in the 3rd column that will have to be so excluded from computation. Time from which period begins to run is indicated in the 3rd column of the Schedule and it is the day from which such period would commence as provided in the 3rd column that will have to be so excluded from computation. In the case of an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or revision or for review of judgment a question would arise whether date of pronouncement of judgment will have to be excluded. Sub-s. (2) of S.12 provides that it will have to be excluded. Sub-s. (2) provides that a further period, being the time taken to obtain a copy of the decree or order, will also have to be excluded. A similar exclusion of period for obtaining the copy of judgment or order is provided in Sub-s, (3). In spite of these specific provisions a question may arise as to the meaning of the term "time requisite for obtaining a copy of decree". In fact that has so arisen in many courts. If the time taken by a court for preparing the decree is to be considered as time during which a party is not obliged to apply for copy of decree, as he could get the copy only after the decree is ready, then it may very well be said that such period has to be excluded. The other possible view is that the decree comes into existence the moment the judgment is pronounced as indicated by O. XX R.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decree is already there. In fact the rights flowing from the decree operate even before the decree is formally prepared and signed. May be that a person's right or title is declared by a decree. That becomes operative not from the date the decree is signed but from the date the judgment is pronounced. The period of limitation for executing the decree Commences not from the date the decree is drafted and signed, but the date the decree is passed in the sense the date the judgment is pronounced. Supposing the decree is one for injunction restraining the defendant from trespassing upon property, the defendant cannot trespass after the date of judgment, on the plea that the decree is not ready and therefore there is no decree. There is a decree, but copy of the decree is available only when it is drafted and signed. Supposing the decree is one for injunction restraining the defendant from trespassing upon property, the defendant cannot trespass after the date of judgment, on the plea that the decree is not ready and therefore there is no decree. There is a decree, but copy of the decree is available only when it is drafted and signed. For this reason it is possible to hold that the time which the office of the court spends in preparing the decree is not a period with which the party is concerned. These conflicting views are intended to be set at rest by the incorporation of the Explanation in S.12 of the new Act. But unfortunately then again there continued to be a controversy on this section. But according to me there is no scope for any such controversy because viewed in this background it is quite evident that the words of the Explanation clearly provide that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or order shall not include the time prior to the date of application for a copy of the decree, on the plea that the copy is not ready by that time. The Explanation provides that a particular period shall not be excluded as if it is part of the time for obtaining a copy of a decree or order. In other words, whereas time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or order is to be excluded from the period of limitation, the time taken by the court to prepare such decree or order before the date of application for the copy shall not be considered as a part of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or order and for that reason shall not be excluded as time requisite for obtaining copy of decree or order. This, according to me, is the plain meaning. 17. Before U. N. Sinha J. it was attempted to be argued that anomalous situations may arise if the Explanation is construed in the manner I have attempted to construe. This, according to me, is the plain meaning. 17. Before U. N. Sinha J. it was attempted to be argued that anomalous situations may arise if the Explanation is construed in the manner I have attempted to construe. It was argued that if a person applies for a copy of the decree before it is prepared, the time elapsing after the application for copy is made and before the decree is prepared will be considered as part of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, whereas if an application is filed after the decree is prepared, the time between the pronouncement of the judgment and the preparation of the decree will not be taken as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. The very assumption that if an application is filed after the decree is prepared, the time between the pronouncement of the judgment and the preparation of the decree will not be taken as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree does not appear to be warranted and it is on this assumption that the anomaly is pointed out. I see no anomaly in any view of the matter nor do I see any indication in the judgment why one should consider this as an anomaly. 18. I am aware that the decision of the Patna High Court has been followed by the Orissa High Court in Koutuki v. Raghu (AIR. 1970 Orissa 116). The learned judges of the Orissa High Court referred to the 3rd Report of the Law Commission on the Limitation Act, 1908 wherein the Commission expressed its view that the delay in the office in preparing the decree before an application for copy is made should not count in favour of the party and suggested that an Explanation should be added to S.12 to make it clear. The Explanation suggested by them namely "Any time taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order before an application for copy thereof is filed shall not be regarded as time requisite for obtaining the copy within the meaning of this Section". is also noticed. But the learned judges proceeded to observe that the Explanation which was actually added to S.12 of the Act means just contrary to the suggestion of the Law Commission. is also noticed. But the learned judges proceeded to observe that the Explanation which was actually added to S.12 of the Act means just contrary to the suggestion of the Law Commission. After referring to the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court and particularly to the dissenting judgment, the learned judges of the Orissa High Court observed "If the expression "shall not be excluded" does not mean "shall be included", we fail to see how else time taken by the Court to prepare a decree or order before an application for any copy thereof is made is to be treated. In computing the time requisite for obtaining the copy, we cannot exclude the period because the Statute says definitely thai it shall not be excluded". According to me, here again the error was in considering that unless the words "shall not be excluded" are read as "shall be included" it will not be possible to give meaning to the section. I have already indicated that it is otherwise. I have indicated that "shall not be excluded" refers to exclusion from the period of limitation. It is by way of indicating that, if there be any doubt whether this particular period should also be excluded, the legislature does not intend it as part of the period to be excluded, as if it is part of the period requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order. 19. My learned brother Krishna Iyer, J., in the decision I have referred to in this judgment earlier, has noticed the difference in the rule of construction of statutes in the continent of Europe and the Anglo-Indian rules of construction of statutes. Then the learned judge proceeds "I am of the view that the court will be denying itself valuable assistance by eschewing such natural sources as have been adverted to above. May be the words count ultimately but in getting at the meaning of the words used. Judges need not be blind to natural light or move in blinkers". Of course, I respectfully agree with the learned judge in this approach. May be the words count ultimately but in getting at the meaning of the words used. Judges need not be blind to natural light or move in blinkers". Of course, I respectfully agree with the learned judge in this approach. But the learned judge considers the case before him in these words: "Of course, the law as it prevails is what I am bound to apply and statutory construction in India today has to be according to the golden rule of grammatical construction, indifferent to extrinsic aids such as I have indicated. I proceed to interpret the Explanation to S.12 excluding the Law Commission's report and the parliamentary literature". The learned judge then goes on to refer to the Patna decision and after citing a passage from both the majority judgment and dissenting judgment the learned judge observes "There is much to be said for this minority view, going by the background; of the amendment. But a dissenter speaks for the future and the majority lays down the law for the present". Of course, that is so with regard to the jurisdiction where the majority spoke. But if the minority view is good enough, the mere fact that the majority spoke otherwise need not be a reason for this Court to follow the Patna view. I do not find that the learned judge has attempted to construe the Explanation independently apart from referring to the Patna decision and even the learned judge seems to have appreciated the view of the minority judge and ultimately the learned judge winds up in these words "Not without qualms, I swim with the current and assent to the proposition upheld in these decisions for the additional reason that where two constructions of a limitation Law are reasonably possible, that which upholds the right to sue should be preferred". I would say that, of course, it is only the Patna and the Orissa decisions which have apparently been noticed by the learned judge and I do not think that the provision is so uniformly construed by other courts as to compel this Court to be persuaded to take the same view. I do not think that my learned brother Krishna Iyer J. has categorically expressed himself differently from what I have stated here. I do not think that my learned brother Krishna Iyer J. has categorically expressed himself differently from what I have stated here. Moreover since apart from and irrespective of my decision on this question the party succeeds on the merits I do not consider it necessary to refer the case to a larger Bench. Coming to the merits of the petition, counsel urges that the delay was caused by a miscalculation made in his office of the days available for filing the appeal. According to him in calculating the date available from 29th July to 4th September, the month of August was omitted to be noticed and therefore be thought that there was lot of time to file the appeal. There is no reason to think that this explanation is not true. The averments are not disputed. Hence the petition to excuse delay has to be allowed. I do so. Parties are directed to suffer costs in the petition.