JUDGMENT H.R. Krishnan, J. This appeal is against an order of the first appellate Court in a suit for adjustment under the Accommodation Control Act setting aside the decree in favour of the plaintiffs passed by the trial Court not on any dissident finding on the facts but on the ground that the plaintiffs having failed to mention in the plaint that the business they were going to start in premises was one dealing in books, they could not be heard to state this in evidence. The landlords on the other hand, pointed out that though the defendants had sought to make this a ground in the written-statement, and had actually suggested that the trial Court might call for particulars, it had not done so and in any event the plaintiff had in his evidence which was the very first step in the trial, clearly stated that he was interested in the book trade and was going to start a book shop in the accommodation. The defendant had joined issue on the competency and the fitness of the plaintiff for running a business in books and various ancillary matters like the availability of funds with the plaintiff. These points had been examined by the trial Court and had resulted in a finding in favour of the plaintiffs. At no stage according to the plaintiff respondent in the appellate Court had the defendants felt any difficulty because of the non-mention of the book trade in the plaint or as for that matter in the notice. It is on this basis the second appeal has been filed. The findings on all the other issues in both the Courts are in favour of the plaintiffs; but the appellate Court's finding on the genuineness of the personal need is not complete. In case the appeal is dismissed there will be nothing more to be done in this regard. If, however, the appeal is allowed the case will have to go back either under Order 41, rule 25, Civil Procedure Code or on a complete remand to the appellate Court for a finding on this issue or for disposal in the light of the directions in this Court's judgment. The facts are for the most part common ground. If, however, the appeal is allowed the case will have to go back either under Order 41, rule 25, Civil Procedure Code or on a complete remand to the appellate Court for a finding on this issue or for disposal in the light of the directions in this Court's judgment. The facts are for the most part common ground. The plaintiffs are two brothers and had acquired the premises in question some time before the suit, soon after their arrival at Indore from their original home in Rajgarh. They are members of a trading family and soon after his arrival the elder brother--Dwarka Prasad had started a business in cotton textiles. The younger brother Omprakash till the time of the suit did not have any separate business of his own, but was seen from time to time sitting at Dwarka Prasad's shop and was assisting him. The accommodation concerned in the suit is a non-residential accommodation in a well-known business locality at Indore specialising in the book trade and popularly called the Khajuri Bazar. The defendants father and son are running a business in this line in those premises. The plaintiffs noticed the defendants terminating the lease and asking for the handing over of possession of the premises because "they wanted to run their own business in the accommodation". Actually there had to be two notices a notice in 1961 which was found by the Courts to be legally defective and a fresh notice in 1962 immediately before the instant suit. In both of them the requirement was stated generally as mentioned above. In the plaint also the requirements: We the plaintiffs have bought the accommodation for business purposes and for residence. We now want the accommodation in the tenancy of the defendants which is a rented shop for running business which we want to start in it. In their written-statement the defendants made out that this setting up of a personal requirement was only a pretence and the plaintiff's themselves had not set out in the plaint what particular business they are going to run in the accommodation. They requested the Court to call for clarification so that the defendants may not be "prejudiced" in the conduct of their case. However the Court did not find it necessary to call for any clarification. They requested the Court to call for clarification so that the defendants may not be "prejudiced" in the conduct of their case. However the Court did not find it necessary to call for any clarification. Soon after, issues were framed, one of them being, whether the plaintiffs genuinely needed the accommodation for business of their own. As usual the plaintiffs started evidence and the very first thing stated by Omprakash was- Plaintiff No. 2 Dwarka Prasad is my elder brother and he and I have bought this shop. Now I want to open a book shop in this accommodation. In the Khajuri Bazar there are book shops. I have got a taste for the book trade and I have passed the Matric and in addition I am a Visharad. So I want to sell books. Besides this accommodation I have no other suitable for this purpose in Indore. My brother plaintiff No. 2 is running a business in textiles in rented accommodation in the M. T. Cloth Market. He has been cross-examined at some length regarding his experience in this line and his special aptitude for it and the availability to him of the capital of ten to twelve thousand rupees which the witness stated was in his opinion necessary for starting this business. The effect of his evidence on these points will certainly have to be examined over again by the appellate Court which is the highest Court of facts. But that is not our immediate problem. The cross-examination of this witness and the defence evidence show clearly that, whatever the merits, the defendants were not hampered in the conduct of their case by the absence of these details in the plaint and their emergence only in the evidence of the plaintiff. That is one of the reasons why the trial Court did not treat the omission to mention the particular kind of business as itself a ground for unseating the plaintiff. On the contrary that Court found both on the facts that the need was genuine and also on the absence of prejudice by the non-mention of this particular detail in the plaint. On the contrary that Court found both on the facts that the need was genuine and also on the absence of prejudice by the non-mention of this particular detail in the plaint. So as far as this point was concerned it was for the defendants to make out in the appeal, apart from their attack on the merits, that this particular feature of the plaintiffs' case, namely, the mention of the book business only in the evidence had prejudiced the conduct of this case in any manner. That has not been done. On behalf of the defendant-respondents here the position taken in this is not at all a case of prejudice. Quite on the contrary from their view point this failure on the part of the plaintiffs to mention this particular in the plaint is a failure to implement a mandatory requirement of the law. Case law has been cited; but there is nothing in the reported ruling to justify this inference. The most important ruling is the one reported in Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal A I R 1963 S C 499. There the facts a landlord should establish before obtaining an order of ejectment on the ground of his requirement for reconstruction have been set down in some detail. We are also given some guidance as to the purport of the word "bona fide" in this regard. But there is nothing in that judgment suggesting that the mere non-mention of the particular business in the plaint is fatal to the suit even where it is pointed out the first thing in the plaintiff's evidence and the defendant has obviously no prejudice. The other rulings are Dhannalal v. Kalyandas 1964 J L J Note 171, which on the face of it has followed the Supreme Court decision (supra). Otherwise the short note does not contain any particulars of the case and as such is not helpful. The ruling reported in Jagmohan v. Bipen Bihari 1969 R C R 704 is also a short abstract. But it deals with the validity of a notice in terms of a particular provision in the Accommodation Control Act in that State (West Bengal). It has nothing to do with the fullness or otherwise of the particularization of the business for which the accommodation is wanted. Accordingly that ruling has no application to the instant case. But it deals with the validity of a notice in terms of a particular provision in the Accommodation Control Act in that State (West Bengal). It has nothing to do with the fullness or otherwise of the particularization of the business for which the accommodation is wanted. Accordingly that ruling has no application to the instant case. In the Rajasthan case reported in Messrs Birdichand Rameshwarlal v. Ram Prasad 1970 R C R 442, not only was the particular of business not mentioned in the plaint but also even in the evidence the plaintiff had stated nothing more than- I want the shop vacated by the defendant so that I can settle my self in business in it. Naturally the Court was unable to find out what exactly was the business for running which the plaintiff was going to settle down in the shop. In course of the judgment there is some indication that the omission of this particular in the plaint itself was of some significance. But where the plaintiff would not state what business it was even in his evidence the Court had no choice than to hold it was not bona fide. In the instant case that is not the position. There is the non-mention in the plaint and a clear mention in the evidence with the defendant himself not suggesting that he was in any manner prejudiced in the conduct of his defence. Therefore it was necessary for the Court to examine on merits the allegations in the evidence in all its details. I would, therefore, conclude that in principle the failure to mention what the business was for which the non-residential accommodation was wanted is not the violation of a mandatory requirement under Order 6 but only a case of possible prejudice. Accordingly where prejudice to the other side is pleaded or is patent the Court should take steps for its removal subject to conditions. Where no prejudice is pleaded nor is obvious and the defect is removed by the fuller statement in the evidence, the Court should go into the merits and not unsuited the plaintiff simply because he had failed to mention the particulars of the business in the plaint itself. On the different grounds urged by the defendants why the plaintiffs' statement in the evidence should not be accepted the appellate Court has not given any finding. On the different grounds urged by the defendants why the plaintiffs' statement in the evidence should not be accepted the appellate Court has not given any finding. The appellate Court is the highest Court on the facts and it is necessary in the interest of justice that its finding should be on record. Here again there are two courses open to this Court. The first is to set aside the judgment of the first appellate Court and to send the entire case to that Court for reconsideration in the light of the foregoing findings, with a caution that neither party should be permitted to adduce further evidence. The second is to ask the first appellate Court to hear the parties on Issue No. 3 of the lower Court- Whether the plaintiffs are genuinely in need of this accommodation for their business and whether they do not have any other accommodation in the city of Indore suitable for this purpose. In principle both of them come to the same thing. But the latter course, namely, a direction to hear the parties on merits of this particular issue and send a report to this Court is likely to be more expeditious. Accordingly the first appellate Court is directed to act accordingly and send its report to this Court within three months. Costs to abide the final result of this case. [After the receipt of the finding from the Lower Appellate Court the following judgment was delivered.] This appeal by the landlord-plaintiffs in an ejectment suit against the tenant defendants is from the judgment of the first appellate Court dismissing the suit for ejectment differing from the trial Court which had decreed the suit. The appeal had came up for hearing once before and most of the points in dispute have been decided already, and the reasons set down in the judgment of this Court dated the 27th October, 1971. However, one issue No. 3 in the lower Court was sent to the first appellate Court for recording a finding and sending it to this Court. That issue was whether the plaintiffs are genuinely in need of this accommodation for their business and whether they do not have any other accommodation in the city of Indore suitable for this purpose. However, one issue No. 3 in the lower Court was sent to the first appellate Court for recording a finding and sending it to this Court. That issue was whether the plaintiffs are genuinely in need of this accommodation for their business and whether they do not have any other accommodation in the city of Indore suitable for this purpose. This was done because the appellate Court had set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court on the ground that, in the plaint, the plaintiffs had only averred that they wanted the accommodation for "business of their own" and had not stated there what business they were intending, to start in the premises. In the evidence it was brought out that one of the plaintiffs was going to start a business in book selling. The appellate Court was of the opinion that, not having particularised the business in the plaint, they could not be heard to adduce evidence on the particular business, they had in mind, it has already been held that this failure to particularise the business is not a basic defect ipso facto leading to the dismissal of the suit, but it was for the Court to examine if this omission of the particularisation of the business in the pleadings has prejudiced the defendants in the conduct of their defence. In the instant case, after examining the evidence in the trial Court, it was held that there had been no such prejudice. The appellate Court itself had not found that there had been prejudice but had dismissed the suit because it felt that this failure was the breach of a "mandatory provision". That was held to be wrong and the appellate Court was directed to give its finding on merits regarding this issue. The finding has come and is that the plaintiffs were in genuine and bona fide need of the accommodation for starting a Book Seller's shop. It was not merely a desire or a pretext but a requirement. Understandably, the plaintiffs-appellants have supported this finding in this Court whereas the defendants respondents have argued that it is a wrong finding and should not be accepted. Such findings are primarily ones of fact, but in certain cases, it is conceivable that the facts themselves have definite legal implications which might convert the finding of fact to a mixed one of fact and law. Such findings are primarily ones of fact, but in certain cases, it is conceivable that the facts themselves have definite legal implications which might convert the finding of fact to a mixed one of fact and law. Here, however, it is a straight question of fact whether plaintiff No. 1 younger brother of plaintiff No. 2 and joint purchaser of the accommodation really intends to start book-selling in that accommodation, has a business background, is able to invest ten or twelve thousand rupees and is, generally speaking, of such education and background as to make it extremely probable that he will actually start this business. Each of these elements is a point of fact on which the first appellate Court has given findings. The plaintiff No. 1 is a member of a trading family and in fact the other members have been running business in cloth and the like. Thus, the intention of the plaintiff No. 1 to start his own business and not to be merely a helper or sleeping partner in his brother's or father's business is quite understandable and is genuine. He has not done any book-selling before or, in fact, any other business solely on his own, but one has to start to at same time. He states that a capital of about ten or twelve thousands might be needed. It has not been suggested that this is an under estimate or that the family will not be able to provide this. Actually, it is a prospering trading family and both the father and the brother are doing quite well. As for the plaintiff No. 1's personal qualification, he states that he has studied upto matriculation and is a 'Visharad' in Hindi and further that he had been taking interest in books. Certainly, these qualifications are not very impressive; but, for running a book-business, all that one needs is to know how to read the title of the books and, after a glance tell the customer generally what a particular book might be about. This qualification certainly the plaintiff No. 1 has. In the result, the finding of the lower appellate Court is accepted. Combined with the findings already recorded in the earlier judgment, it justifies the decree of ejectment. This qualification certainly the plaintiff No. 1 has. In the result, the finding of the lower appellate Court is accepted. Combined with the findings already recorded in the earlier judgment, it justifies the decree of ejectment. Accordingly, the decision of the first appellate Court dismissing the suit is set aside and the decision of the trial Court allowing the suit and decreeing the ejectment is revived. The respondent shall pay the costs of this appeal to the plaintiffs-appellants along with the pleaders' fee on minimum contested scale. Appeal dismissed.