ORDER G.L. Oza, J. The petitioner has filed this petition for a direction that the refusal to refund the excise duty paid by him between the period 29th May 1971 to 12th June 1971 be quashed. The petitioner is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, and is running an industry manufacturing Maida. According to the petitioner, till 1971 there was no excise duty on this commodity. But when Budget for the year was presented in Parliament on 28th May 1971 the Finance Minister proposed excise duty at the rate of Ten Paise per Kilogram of Maida processed and manufactured in flour mills. According to the petitioner, under the provisions contained in the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931, this duty had to be collected from the next day of the presentation of budget, that is from 29th May 1971, and consequently, the petitioner paid the duty at this rate upto 12th June 1971, Thereafter by a notification issued by the Ministry of Finance dated the 10th June 1971, this duty on Maida was withdrawn. On 10th August 1971 the Finance Act was enacted, and no duty on Maida was imposed. In pursuance of this, a notification (annexure-I to the return), was issued on 10th August 1971 exempting Maida from exercise duty. Consequently the petitioner moved an application for refund of the excise duty paid by him. The Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Indore, by his letter dated the 26th October 1971 informed the petitioner that refund claimed by him could not be granted. Consequently the petitioner has filed this petition. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that under section 4(c) of the Provisional Collection of faxes Act, 1931, (hereinafter called the Act) if the Bill is not enacted into law within sixty days from the date it is introduced, the Bill will cease to have force of law. In the present case, the Bill was introduced on 28th May 1971 and ultimately the Finance Act was passed on 10th August 1971. Consequently the Collection of duty which was being done under section 3 of that Act ceased to have the force of law and the amount so collected has to be refunded as provided in section 5 of the Act. Consequently the Collection of duty which was being done under section 3 of that Act ceased to have the force of law and the amount so collected has to be refunded as provided in section 5 of the Act. It was also contended that the provisions of the Act only empower collection of taxes even before the Bill introduced in Parliament ultimately becomes an act. Apparently the very scheme of the law indicates that these collections are provisional and when the Finance Act was ultimately passed the duty proposed on Maida was not imposed, and the provisional collections made under the Act to be refunded and there is no justification for the refusal of the same. Learned counsel appearing for the Union Government contended that for the first time exemption was notified by the notification issued by the Government on 10th June 1971, and consequently the duty charged upto that date could not be said to be not validly collected. It was also contended that this being a matter of refund about which an appeal would be competent, this petition should not be entertained. The Bill proposing a duty on the production of Maida was presented in Parliament for the first time on 28th May 1971. Ultimately when the Finance Act was passed on 10th August 1971 no duty was imposed on Maida. It cannot, therefore, be doubted, and is not also in dispute, that the duty on Maida, which was proposed in the Bill, was ultimately withdrawn. It has been provided in the Act that when a Bill is presented in the House the duties proposed in it can be lawfully collected from the next day. But it is also clear from the provisions in the Act that when such a declaration ceases to have any effect, the duty so collected has to be refunded. In the present case, it is not in dispute that ultimately the duty on Maida was not imposed. Consequently the duty so collected could not be retained. Apart from it, as the Bill itself was not passed within sixty days as provided for in section 5 of the Act, it automatically ceases to have effect. In the present case, it is not in dispute that ultimately the duty on Maida was not imposed. Consequently the duty so collected could not be retained. Apart from it, as the Bill itself was not passed within sixty days as provided for in section 5 of the Act, it automatically ceases to have effect. Section 5 is as under: 5 (1) Where a declared provision comes into operation as an enactment in an amended form before the expiry of the sixtieth day after the day on which the Bill containing it was introduced, refunds shall be made of all duties collected which would not have been collected if the provision adopted in the enactment had been the declared provision. Provided that the rate at which refunds of any duty may be made under this subsection shall not exceed the difference between the rate of such duty proposed in the declared provision and the rate of such duty in force when the Bill was introduced. (2) Where a declared provision ceases to have the force of law under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 4, refunds shall be made of all duties collected which would not have been collected if the declaration in respect of it had not been made. Consequently the petitioner was entitled to the refund claimed by him of an amount of Rs. 11,304/-. Although the sum collected was of Rs. 11,404/-, it was stated that out of it an amount of Rs. 100/- was towards fees. It cannot, therefore, be doubted that the amount paid towards duty was Rs. 11,304-. It was contended on behalf of the Union Government that the petitioner had an alternative remedy available, and so this petition should not be entertained. It is no doubt true that in appropriate cases the availability of an alternative remedy may be a ground for refusal to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. But as held in Durlabhkumar v. District Judge Indore 1973 MPLJ 150 , once a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been admitted, it cannot be thrown out on this ground alone when the alternative remedy itself has become barred by time. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Firday Narain v. I.T. Officer AIR 1971 SC 33 . Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Firday Narain v. I.T. Officer AIR 1971 SC 33 . Consequently, the petition is allowed, the order passed on 26th October 1971 is set aside, and the respondents are directed to refund the amount of Rs. 11,304/- (Eleven thousand Three Hundred and four) to the petitioner as they are not entitled to retain that amount. The petitioner shall be entitled to the costs of this petition. Counsel's fee Rs. 100/- (one hundred) if certified. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.