JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - The Petitioner, Om Prakash Jaiswal alias Lalloo, a prominent businessman of Allahabad, has applied Under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus on the following averments. 2. On 13-4-1973 Pawan Kumar, a student of Moti Lal Nehru Engg. College, Allahabad lodged a report with the Principal of the said College which was forwarded by him to the S.O,, P.S. Colonelganj, Allahabad and received by him on 15-4-1973. The allegations in the report were that on 13-4-1973 at about 7-30 a.m. he was returning from Chowk on a rickshaw to his hostel. When he reached in front of the Prayag Sangit Samiti the jeep of one Lalloo coming on Elgin Road from Civil Lines touched the rickshaw from left side with the result that the rickshaw overturned and he fell down on the ground and sustained injuries. When Pawan Kumar resented such rash and careless driving by Lalloo, the latter lost his temper. He along with his four companions in the jeep forcibly kidnapped Pawan Kumar and threw him in his jeep on the point of dagger. All the occupants of the jeep were in a drunken state. Lalloo who was driving at a very high speed used grossly abusive language and those persons carried Pawan Kumar to Civil Lines assaulting him all the time. On Lalloo's direction his companions manhandled Pawan Kumar and later brought him to Katra main crossing near Lalloo's Mercury Dry Cleaning shop. There they stripped Pawan Kumar of his clothes, shaved half of his bead and left him in a nude state threatening him with dire consequences. Lalloo also mobilised the mob by declaring Pawan Kumar a thief and thereby provoked the mob to stone and manhandle him. He relieved Pawan Kumar of a sum of Rs. 70/- which he had kept in the pocket of his pant. On the basis of this report a case Under Sections 147, 279, 342 and 395 IPC was registered as Crime No. 339 of 1973 against the Petitioner. 3. On 14-4-1973 the Petitioner also lodged a report against some students of Moti Lal Nehru Engg. College Allahabad to the effect that they had unlawfully entered the Petitioner's farm and set fire to it and were destroying and damaging his property. 3. On 14-4-1973 the Petitioner also lodged a report against some students of Moti Lal Nehru Engg. College Allahabad to the effect that they had unlawfully entered the Petitioner's farm and set fire to it and were destroying and damaging his property. When he reached the spot along with the driver of his vehicle he was informed that a mob of students had collected on the spot and had hurled brickbats at the Fire Brigade and actually surrounded it. All these acts of vandalism on the part of the students had resulted in heavy loss to the Petitioner's farm and godown and also the destruction of some important documents belonging to him. Bachchan Singh, the driver of the Fire Brigade had also lodged a report at P.S. Colonelganj on 14-4-1973 at 3-10 a.m. and a case was registered against Pawan Kumar and others u/s 147, 353, 427, 379, 332 and 336 IPC as Crime No. 336. Even prior to this another report had been lodged against the students of the Engineering College with the allegations that they had looted Paradise Hotel, Katra and a case had been registered as Crime No. 338. In that case also Pawan Kumar was a suspect. Thus, there were as many as three cognizable cases for non-bailable offences registered against Pawan Kumar at P.S. Colonelganj. 4. The Petitioner's contention in brief is that even though there were reports in respect of three cognizable oases for non-bailable offences against Pawan Kumar at P.S. Colonelganj, the latter was not available to the Investigating Officer so that he could not be arrested. This showed that on the report lodged against the Petitioner also Pawan Kumar had not really been contacted or examined by the Investigating Officer and his alleged (examination u/s 161 Code of Criminal Procedure was fictitious. In the circumstances it was submitted that the Petitioner's detention was illegal and he should be ordered to be released forthwith. 5. The petition was resisted by the Respondent and a counter affidavit as well as a supplementary counter affidavit were sworn by Raj Bahadur Singh now posted as Second Officer, P.S. Colonelganj, Allahabad who was the Investigating Officer of Crime No. 339 of 1973. 5. The petition was resisted by the Respondent and a counter affidavit as well as a supplementary counter affidavit were sworn by Raj Bahadur Singh now posted as Second Officer, P.S. Colonelganj, Allahabad who was the Investigating Officer of Crime No. 339 of 1973. The averments made in the counter affidavit are that in connection with the interrogation of Crime No. 339 of 1973 the deponent interrogated Pawan Kumar on 15-4-1973, that out of fear from the Petitioner Lalloo, Pawan Kumar refused to accompany the deponent to the spot and hence no site plan could be prepared. The witnesses of the incident in which the Petitioner is accused were all students of the Engg. College and after examinations they had gone to their respective places and were not available to the deponent when he tried to Contact them on various dates. The witnesses of all the three localities where the incidents are said to have taken place were not willing to come forward and give evidence against the; Petitioner but the deponent was still trying to collect evidence in the case and efforts were now being made too contact the students of the Engg. College through the Principal and Proctor of the Institution. The last letter; in this connection was sent to the Principal on 14-8-1973. It was also averred that the Petitioner was already allowed a short term bail by the 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Allahabad on 9-5-1973, that thereafter he had been released on parole by virtue of several orders of parole passed by the Sessions Judge, Allahabad the last such order being the one that was passed on 11-8-1973. It was pointed oat that though the Petitioner's application for bail had been rejected by the High Courts yet oh account of the various orders of parole referred to above the Petitioner had been on parole bail since 9-5-1973. On the basis of this circumstance the Respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the present habeas corpus petition. 6. The first question which, therefore, arises for determination is as to whether this habeas corpus petition is competent or not. The contention of the learned Govt. Advocate was that a person must be in actual custody before he can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court for issuing a writ of habeas corpus. 6. The first question which, therefore, arises for determination is as to whether this habeas corpus petition is competent or not. The contention of the learned Govt. Advocate was that a person must be in actual custody before he can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court for issuing a writ of habeas corpus. Reliance was placed on Clause (b) of Section 491(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads as follows: 491(1) Any High Court may, whenever it thinks fit, direct-- (b) that a person illegally or improperly detained in public or private custody within such limits be set at liberty. It was, therefore a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction u/s 491 Code of Criminal Procedure that a person must suffer loss of physical liberty. Where the Petitioner was actually free an in the instant case on a short term reliase on bail, a petition for habeas corpus on the ground of alleged illegal ill detention would not be maintainable' in law. From the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the various sections relating to investigation, enquiry and trial of offences and also for enlarging accused persons on bail it appears that what was contemplated was actual physical custody of the prisoner and not merely notional or judicial custody. It was submitted that the word 'custody' occurring in Section 491 or in Sub-section (3A) of Section 457 Code of Criminal Procedure or Section 344(1A) of the Code must be given a restricted meaning of actual, physical custody. If it was given a wide cleaning so as to include notional custody; then even Section 169 of the Code would be included within its purview and habeas corpus petition might be made by a person who was released by the police officer or his executing a bond for appearance before a Magistrate, since in that case also the accused may claim to be in the notional custody of the Magistrate. On these and various other grounds it was vehemently urged that no habeas corpus petition by an accused who was already enlarged on bail would lie. On these and various other grounds it was vehemently urged that no habeas corpus petition by an accused who was already enlarged on bail would lie. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner, however, relied on a division Bench decision of this Court in Zahir Ahmad v. Ganga Prasad 1962 AWR 543 where Jagdish Sahai, J. speaking for the Court observed: It h clear from the various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a person released on bail remains Under the control of the court and notionally in the custody of the court and that, persons, who are his sureties, are only the agents of the court. Hence, even a person who has been temporarily let out on bail but still on trial, can present an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The Bench referred to a catena of authorities--English and Indian for the proposition that a writ of habeas corpus was not confined to a person who was in actual custody. The learned Govt. Advocate tried to distinguish that case on the ground that there the Petitioner had been detained under orders passed u/s 107 Code of Criminal Procedure and the question of either obtaining orders of remand from the Magistrate concerned or examining other relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not arise. In the case in hand it was submitted that the facts were different and there was nothing in the Code which may justify a person already enjoying an order of bail, challenging his alleged detention as unlawful. It is true that in Zahir Ahmad's case (supra) the facts were different, nevertheless with respect we are in general agreement with the principle enunciated therein. It is not axiomatic that a person who applies for bail and accepts his release on bail disentitles himself from challenging his detention by applying for a writ of habeas corpus. His release on bail does not operate as an estoppel or bar precluding him from applying to the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Hence we are not inclined to accept the contention that the present habeas corpus petition is not maintainable on the ground that the Petitioner is already released on short term bail. We, therefore, over-rule the preliminary objection and proceed to decide the case on merits. 7. The Petitioner's detention was challenged on two main grounds. Hence we are not inclined to accept the contention that the present habeas corpus petition is not maintainable on the ground that the Petitioner is already released on short term bail. We, therefore, over-rule the preliminary objection and proceed to decide the case on merits. 7. The Petitioner's detention was challenged on two main grounds. Firstly, it was argued that his detention was not supported by a legal order of remand and was, therefore, unlawful and secondly that no investigation had actually commenced against the Petitioner and in the absence of any investigation against him his detention could not be justified under any provisions of law. 8. We may first examine the contention as to whether the Petitioner's detention was not based on a valid and legal order of remand. The admitted facts of the case are that he surrendered in court on 17-4-1973 and he was remanded to judicial custody for 14 days by the ADM (J) Allahabad which expired on 30-4-1973. On that date the Investigating Officer had gone to Kanpur in connection with what is described as "V.I.P. duty". This fact was brought, to the notice of the aforesaid Magistrate who extended the remand to another 14 days but the Petitioner succeeded in getting an order of bail passed by the 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Allahabad on 9-5-1973. Since then he has not surrendered. It is, therefore, clear that the last order of remand passed by the ADM (J) expired on 14-5-1973. The Petitioner's contention is that it was incumbent on the police authorities to obtain a fresh order of remand and in the absence of such remand the detention of the Petitioner became unlawful. It was contended by the learned Govt. Advocate that the Petitioner, being on bail, could not be produced before the Magistrate and no order of remand could or need be obtained in his absence. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner sought to counter this argument by relying on some recent decisions of the Supreme Court wherein it was held that an order of remand may in certain circumstances be obtained even in the absence of the accused person i.e. without producing him in court. In Raj Narain Vs. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner sought to counter this argument by relying on some recent decisions of the Supreme Court wherein it was held that an order of remand may in certain circumstances be obtained even in the absence of the accused person i.e. without producing him in court. In Raj Narain Vs. Superintendent, Central Jail, New Delhi, AIR 1971 SC 178 , Hidayatullah, J. observed (para 7 of the Report): There is nothing in the law which required his personal presence before the Magistrate because that is a rule of caution for Magistrates before granting remands at the instance of the police. However, even if it be desirable for the Magistrate to have the prisoner produced before them, when they recommit him to further custody, a Magistrate can act only as the circumstances permit. Where the prisoner's custody is transferred to a superior Court such as this the Magistrate can only, adjourn the case at the same time extending the period of remand. It is for this Court to see that the custody by it continues under proper orders and if this Court is satisfied that the prisoner is in proper custody under a proper order of remand, the prisoner will not be released. This Court does not order detention and cannot extend the remand. Its custody is co-terminous with the remand order by the Magistrate. If the Magistrate extends the period of remand and communicates the order to the person having the immediate custody of the prisoner with intimation to this Court and the prisoner, nothing more is expected of him. The object of production of the prisoner before the Magistrate is more than answered by his production before this Court because the prisoner has the protection of his interest transferred from the Magistrate to this Court. The same decision was followed in A. Lakshmanarao Vs. Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Parvatipuram and Others, AIR 1971 SC 186 wherein an order of remand had been obtained against a person, even though he had not been produced in court because of want of escort. The said order of remand was held to be legal and the habeas corpus petition was dismissed. 9. We are of the opinion that the above decisions cannot be of any assistance to the Petitioner because in those; cases the Petitioner was admittedly in actual custody. The said order of remand was held to be legal and the habeas corpus petition was dismissed. 9. We are of the opinion that the above decisions cannot be of any assistance to the Petitioner because in those; cases the Petitioner was admittedly in actual custody. We cannot also, loft sight of the fact that even in those decisions the need of personal production of the accused was emphasised and it was pointed out that it was a rule of prudence that the Accused should be produced before the (court. Those cases only took note of certain exceptional circumstances, of which the Magistrate concerned was the sole Judges in which physical production of the accused or his appearance in court on a particular occasion was not possible. Thus, in Raj Narain's case (supra) the remand order passed by the City Magistrate, Lucknow expired in the midnight prior to which the Supreme Court had passed an order regarding the transfer of the custody of the (sic). In those circumstances the physical transit of the detained person to the court of the City Magistrate was not possible and therefore, it was held that remand order may be obtained in abstentia. Similarly, in Lakshmanrao's case on account of certain difficulties no arrangement could be made for (sic) and therefore the detenu could not be physically produced before the Magistrate concerned. In these circumstances a remand in the absence of the accused was approved of. As we have already observed, the effect of the aforesaid decisions is merely the production of the accused being dispensed with in exceptional circumstances, without in any manner, minimising the general prudence and propriety of such production before obtaining an order of remand. 10. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has not been able to lay his hands on any authority for the proposition that even where the physical custody of a Petitioner has ceased i.e., he is actually free, law requires that a remand to custody be obtained from the court. In fact and remand implies a recommittal of custody of a person who is in custody. To speak of remand of a person who is not iii physical custody is, therefore, a contradiction in terms. In fact and remand implies a recommittal of custody of a person who is in custody. To speak of remand of a person who is not iii physical custody is, therefore, a contradiction in terms. This is also evident from the phraseology of Section 344(1A) which says: ...the court may...postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody... The question of remanding the accused by warrant does sot arise where the accused is not in custody i.e. he is physically free. Section 344 contemplates two limbs of an order which ought to be passed by a court, namely, an order adjourning an enquiry or the trial of the accused or the proceedings and ah order of remand which is executable through a wa Ram Narayan Singh Vs. The State of Delhi and Others, AIR 1953 SC 277 . 11. In the case in hand the Petitioner has been admittedly on bail since 9-5-1973. Hence, it would be sheer technicality to canvass that remand orders regarding his custody be obtained from the court even though he has not surrendered and is still on bail. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner invited our attention to the circumstances of the case and said that this was a fit case in which no remand should be granted. These points may be urged before the Magistrate concerned when the Petitioner-surrenders and an attempt is made to obtain further remand. That can, however, be no ground for claiming a writ of habeas corpus. We are, therefore, of the opinion that, where an accused person is on bail it is not necessary to obtain orders of remand u/s 341 Code of Criminal Procedure and it would not be tenable to argue that the detention of an accused becomes unlawful in such circumstances. 12. The other point urged on behalf of the Petitioner was that actually no investigation had commenced against him and therefore, there was no jurisdiction in the police authority to arrest him and his detention became illegal from the very inception. Great stress was laid on the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the petition that even though reports for three cognizable offences had been lodged against Pawan Kumar, the police had taken no steps to investigate the same. Great stress was laid on the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the petition that even though reports for three cognizable offences had been lodged against Pawan Kumar, the police had taken no steps to investigate the same. From this it was sought to be argued that as a matter of fact Pawan Kumar was not contacted by the police ever in Crime No. 339 relating to the Petitioner's case and there had been no examination of Pawan Kumar u/s 161 Code of criminal Procedure. In other words, no investigation worth the name had commenced against the Petitioner. Section 157 Code of Criminal Procedure provides: (Their Lordships then quoted in extenso Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and proceeded on to observe:) 13. It was contended that it was incumbent on a police officer on receiving information of a cognizable offence to make local inspection of the site to find out and examine the witnesses etc., to prepare a site plan then, if necessary, to take measures for the arrest of the person. If the preceding acts are not performed by the police officer, he does not acquire the jurisdiction to arrest the alleged offender. In the present case it is admitted that no local inspection was made, no site plan was prepared by the Investigating Officer, no witnesses were examined. The explanation offered by the Respondent in the counter affidavit is that most of the witnesses were drawn from amongst the students who could not be contacted on account of the intervention of summer vacations. It is also averred in the counter affidavit that Pawan Kumar himself was in such mortal dread of the Petitioner that he declined to accompany the Investigating Officer to the spot. It was submitted that this explanation was fantastic and liable to be rejected. It was not conceivable that the police could not manage to visit either the Elgin Road crossing or the locality of Katra in order to comply with the provisions of Section 157 Code of criminal Procedure. Be that as it may, these are all details relating to the investigation of the crime. Situations cannot altogether be ruled out where the investigating agency may not be able to proceed with such precipitance as is expected of it. Be that as it may, these are all details relating to the investigation of the crime. Situations cannot altogether be ruled out where the investigating agency may not be able to proceed with such precipitance as is expected of it. In fact, there are reported decisions relating to the activities of Naxalites where investigation had to hang fire for an unconscionably long period. It is not for this Court to pronounce on the promptness or dilatoriness of the investigating agency in habeas corpus proceedings. In such petition the only question which has to be decided is as to whether the detention is unlawful. Sri T. Rathore, learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied on some authorities to the effect that where the case does not involve an elaborate enquiry into complicated questions of fact, it is open to the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction Under Article 226 to decide those facts. There is no quarrel with this general proposition of law. But the questions as to whether investigation has proceeded satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily or it is so slow as to amount to injustice is in our opinion a pure question of fact requiring a detailed factual enquiry which is not feasible Under Article 226 of the Constitution. We are, therefore, unable to hold that in the instant case no investigation had actually commenced notwithstanding the contrary assertions made in the counter affidavit or that the statement alleged to have been recorded u/s 161 Code of Criminal Procedure was a faked one. It is not proper to record such findings in exercise of writ jurisdiction lest the parties may be prejudiced in other proceedings. It is a settled principle of habeas corpus that this jurisdiction should be so exercised as not to interfere with the normal processes of law. The powers of investigating cognizable offences are contained in Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure Section 154 deals with information in cognizable offences and Section 156 with investigation into such offences Under those sections the police has a statutory right to investigate into circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory right to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power u/s 439 or under the inherent power of the court u/s 561-A of the Code of criminal Procedure. See State of West Bengal Vs. See State of West Bengal Vs. S.N. Basak, AIR 1963 SC 447 . Thus, any action which may tend to cause interference with the process of investigation has always been looked upon with disapproval. In this context the respective roles of the judiciary and the police were succinctly stated by the Privy Council in Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad 1945 AWR PC 21 in an of quoted passage which bears reproduction. It runs as follows: The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always of course subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved u/s 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 561-A has given increased powers to the court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the court are those expressly conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act. 14. In case tike Petitioner has any genuine grievance with regard to the pace, manner or the made of investigation in the present proceedings, these are matters which may be canvassed on his behalf before the Magistrate who may be approached by the police for obtaining further remand. On such allegations a habeas corpus petition cannot be founded. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in B. Mondal v. State of W.B. 1973 AWR 481 which was a case of a Naxalite Advocate it was observed: If the Petitioner is feeling aggrieved because of the (sic) in the trial of his case, his remedy is to move the trial Court or the High Court. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in B. Mondal v. State of W.B. 1973 AWR 481 which was a case of a Naxalite Advocate it was observed: If the Petitioner is feeling aggrieved because of the (sic) in the trial of his case, his remedy is to move the trial Court or the High Court. Likewise, if the Petitioner seeks bail because of the delay in the completion of investigation, his remedy is to apply for bail to the appropriate Court or the superior Court. No relief, as mentioned earlier, can be granted to the Petitioner in this petition Under Article 32 of the Constitution. 15. As we have already observed, these questions can be appropriately raised either in proceedings for obtaining bail orders or when the prosecuting agency asks for further remand of the accused. In the instant case, however, the Petitioner is already On bail. 16. We, therefore, find no merits in this habeas corpus petition which is hereby dismissed.