JUDGMENT H.N. Sethi, J. - By this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner Satish Chandra Kudesia an Excise Inspector has questioned the validity of the order of the Excise Commissioner, dated July 15, 1969, as communicated to him by the Superintendent of Excise (P) Allahabad vide his letter dated July 26, 1969. placing him under suspension. 2. From 12th July, 1967 to 8th July, 1968, the petitioner was posted as Excise Inspector at Daurala Sugar Works Distillery, Daurala, District Meerut. On 7th April, 1968, the Additional General Manager of the aforesaid Distillery made a report to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Meerut, as a result of which a case under Section 420/468/120-B, I. P. C. was registered against certain persons. After some investigation, on 2nd March, 1969, the police submitted a charge-sheet against 7 persons (not the petitioner). Subsequently, the police thought that the material collected by it indicated that the petitioner was also involved in the crime, and therefore at the instance of the Superintendence of Police, the Excise Commissioner, U. P. passed the order dated 15th July, 1969, placing the petitioner under suspension. Thereafter the petitioner instead of being paid his full salary and allowance was paid merely the subsistence allowance. After due investigation the police submitted a supplementary charge-sheet against the petitioner on April 17, 1970. The proceedings in criminal court have continued to be pending ever since then and the trial of the persons who were charge-sheeted has not commenced as yet. The petitioner made several representations to the Excise Commissioner for payment of his salary and revocation of the suspension order. Ultimately, on 22-5-1971 the Excise Commissioner, U.P. addressed a letter to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Meerut, bringing it to his notice that the petitioner had been arrayed as an accused along with seven other persons and the case was likely to drag on for long. It appeared that other accused persons were adopting all means to prolong the case which probably suited their purpose. The situation, which had been so created by other accused, was entirely against the interest of a suspended Government servant who could not endure the extreme financial strain for such a tremendous length of time. The petitioner was facing such hardship and the prolongation of the existing state for which no limit could be placed, depended as it did on factors beyond his control. The petitioner was facing such hardship and the prolongation of the existing state for which no limit could be placed, depended as it did on factors beyond his control. Linked, as he was, with other powerful persons, it was not possible for him to try for an expeditious disposal of the case. The order suspending him could be revoked during the pendency of criminal proceedings only if the police felt that his reinstatement would not adversely affect the prospects of the case pending against him. This object could be achieved by posting the petitioner to a place far away from Meerut. He therefore, requested the Superintendent of Police to let him know whether he had any objection to the petitioner being reinstated during the pendency of criminal proceedings on humanitarian ground. The Senior Superintendent of Police, on 3th June, 1971 replied that he had no objection to the petitioner's reinstatement provided he was posted away from Meerut. In spite of this, when the Excise Commissioner did not pass an order revoking petitioner's suspension order, he filed the present writ petition on 17th December. 1971 praying that the order dated 15-7-1969 passed by the Excise Commissioner, suspending him from service be quashed and the Excise Commissioner be commanded to reinstate the petitioner forthwith and to give him all the benefits and privileges of continuity of service. 3. The petitioner questions the validity of the order dated 15th July 1969, suspending him from service, on the ground that the Excise Commissioner had passed it merely at the instance of the police without applying his independent mind to the allegations made against him. As neither departmental proceedings were being taken against the petition, nor were they under contemplation, the Excise Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass suspension order under Rule 49 of the Civil Service Classification Control and Appeal) Rules. After coming to the conclusion that in view of the delay in commencement of Criminal proceedings, for reasons beyond petitioner's control, he was being put to lot of hardship, the Commissioner should have revoked the suspension order. 4. After coming to the conclusion that in view of the delay in commencement of Criminal proceedings, for reasons beyond petitioner's control, he was being put to lot of hardship, the Commissioner should have revoked the suspension order. 4. It is significant to note that in this case the respondents do not rely upon the provision of Rule 49-A of the Civil Service (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules which provides that a Government servant against whose conduct an enquiry is contemplated, may be placed under suspension, and that, as far, as possible, suspension order should immediately precede the framing of charges and their communication to the Government servant concerned. The order suspending the petitioner was passed as far back as 15th July 1969 and no charge-sheet in respect of the facts pointed out by the Superintendent of Police, and on the basis of which the Excise Commissioner made the order placing the petitioner under suspension, has been framed or served upon the petitioner so far. As a matter of fact the allegations made in the counter-affidavit make it clear that the respondents are waiting for the outcome of the criminal proceedings so that they may decide what departmental proceedings, if any may be or can be initiated against the petitioner. 5. In order to justify the impugned order, the respondents rely upon the provisions of second paragraph of Rule 199 of the Financial Hand Book, Volume II, Chapter XX which is headed as : "Suspension during pendency of Criminal Proceedings or proceedings for arrest for debt or during detention under a law providing for preventive detention." and runs as follows :-- "A servant of Government against whom proceedings have been taken either for his arrest for debt or on a criminal charge or who is detained under any law providing for preventives detention, should be considered as under suspension for any period during which he is detained in custody or is undergoing imprisonment, and not allowed to draw any pay and allowances (other than any subsistence allowance that may be granted in accordance with the principles laid down in Fundamental Rule 53) for such period. until the termination of the proceedings taken against him or until he is released from detention and allowed to rejoin duty, s the case may be. until the termination of the proceedings taken against him or until he is released from detention and allowed to rejoin duty, s the case may be. An adjustment of his allowances for such periods should thereafter be made according to the circumstances of the case, the full amount being given only in the event of the Government servant being acquitted of blame or (if the proceedings taken against him were for his arrest for debt) of its being proved that his liability arose from circumstances beyond his control or the detention being held by any competent authority to be unjustified. A servant of Government against whom a criminal charge or a proceedings for arrest for debt is pending should also be placed under suspension by the issue of specific orders to this effect during periods when he is not actually detained in custody or imprisoned (e.g. whilst released on bail), if the charge made or proceeding taken against him is connected with his position as a Government servant, or is likely to embarrass him in the dis-charge of his duties as such or involves moral turpitude. In regard to his pay and allowance, the provisions of paragraph 1 above shall apply." It is contended on their behalf that, according to second paragraph of Rule 199 quoted above. a Government servant against whom a criminal charge is pending has to be placed under suspension by issuing specific orders to that effect, in case the charge levelled against him concerns his position as a Government servant or involves moral turpitude. While a criminal charge was being investigated, the Superintendent of Police informed the Excise Commissioner that the petitioner was involved in an offence which was connected with discharge of his duty as a Government servant and that a charge-sheet was going to be submitted. In the circumstances, a criminal charge connected with petitioner's position as a Government servant was pending against him and therefore, he could be placed under suspension. He pay and allowances were to be governed according to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Rule 199 which enabled the petitioner to draw only the subsistence allowance admissible in accordance with Fundamental Rule 53. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondents, further urged that in any case a supplementary charge-sheet has already been submitted against the petitioner on 19th April, 1970 and since then criminal proceedings against him are actually pending before. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondents, further urged that in any case a supplementary charge-sheet has already been submitted against the petitioner on 19th April, 1970 and since then criminal proceedings against him are actually pending before. a criminal court. Accordingly, no exception to the order, placing the petitioner under suspension, can now be taken. 7. A perusal of Rule 199 show that it provides for the suspension of Government Servants under certain specific circumstances and for the regulation of allowance payable to them during the period of suspension. First part of the rule provides that Government servant against whom proceedings have been taken either for his arrest for debt or on a criminal charge or who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention is to be considered as being under suspension for any period during which he is detained in custody of is undergoing imprisonment. According to this part, the moment a Government servant, want is taken into custody on a criminal charge, he is automatically considered to be as under suspension and the suspension continues till such time as he is released from custody or continues to suffer imprisonment. It is significant to note that according to this part, mere detention of a Government servant on a criminal charge irrespective of whether that charge involves moral turpitude or not and whether it is connected with his official duty or not, is sufficient to treat him as being under suspension for the duration of his detention. Second part of the rule, however, confers on the authority concerned, an additional power to place a Government servant under suspension by issuing specific orders to that effect in cases where he has not been arrested and if arrested has been released from custody (e.g. "released on bail), but against whom, a criminal charge in connection with his official position as a Government or which is of such a nature that it is likely to embarrass him in the performance of his official duties or which involves moral turpitude, is pending. 8. As mentioned above the respondents have tried to justify the impugned order passed in the case only under the second part of Rule 199. 8. As mentioned above the respondents have tried to justify the impugned order passed in the case only under the second part of Rule 199. The substantial question therefore, that arises for consideration in this connection is whether in a case where accusations have been made against a Government servant which are under investigation by the police, it can be said that a criminal charge as contemplated by Rule 199 of the Financial Hand Book Vol. II becomes pending against him. 9. A reading of the second paragraph of Rule 199, along with the hearing under which rule has been framed. makes it clear that the intention of rule making body is to authorise suspension of a Government servant at a time when some proceeding on the basis of a criminal charge is pending against him. It is in this light that the expression "criminal charge is pending" as used in second paragraph of Rule 199 is to be understood. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents pleads that the expression "criminal charge is pending" should be given a wider meaning so as to include within its ambit not only the proceedings pending before a criminal court competent to deal with the case but also the proceedings at the stage when police suspects that the Government servant is concerned in a crime and is investigating the matter. If the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the expression "criminal charge is pending" includes within its ambit, not only the criminal proceedings pending before a criminal court but also the proceedings for the investigation of the accusation made against the Government servant pending before the Police Officer is accepted, it will lead to lot of hardship to the Government servant concerned which, in my opinion, was never contemplated by Rule 199. While performing his duties a Government servant is likely to incur the displeasure of a large number of persons. If the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents is accepted it will mean that as soon as any person lays information with the police that a Government servant is concerned, or is suspected to be concerned in the commission of an offence and the police decides to look into the matter and to investigate the case, the Government servant will have to be placed under suspension as required by Rule 199. This will have to be done even though the allegations made against him have not been scrutinised by any one and ultimately the investigation may reveal that the information laid before the police was without any basis and was malicious. If such an interpretation is countenanced, there will always be a large number of Government servants who would be required to be placed under suspension. Adoption of such a procedure will have great demoralizing effect on Government servants as a class. Surely such a thing could never have been intended by the authority framing Rule 199 contained in the Financial Hand Book Vol. 2. it appears that under second paragraph of Rule 199, a power to place a Government servant under suspension, when a criminal charge is pending against him, has been given as at that stage after full investigation or on a preliminary scrutiny made by a Magistrate it has been found that there is a prima facie case against the Government servant concerned. This rule does sot contemplate that a Government servant should be placed under suspension merely because the police is investigating into certain accusations made against him, irrespective of the fact whether those accusations have any substance or not. In the context the expression `criminal charge is pending' obviously means that some proceeding on the basis of a criminal charge is pending. So long, as the police continues to investigate the accusation made against a Government servant, it cannot be said that he has been charged with an offence. He stands so charged only when after completing the investigation the police levels a charge against him before a competent criminal court and proceedings on its basis become pending when the criminal court takes notice of the same. I am accordingly of opinion that under second paragraph of Rule 199 a Government servant cannot be placed under suspension till such time as the criminal proceedings do not come to be pending before a criminal court. 11. In this case, after investigation the police submitted a charge-sheet against seven persons (not the petitioner) on 3rd July 1970. A supplementary charge-sheet against the petitioner was submitted only on 19th April 1970. It is, therefore, clear that when on 15th July 1969 the order placing the petitioner under suspension was passed no criminal charge or criminal proceedings on the basis of a criminal charge were pending. A supplementary charge-sheet against the petitioner was submitted only on 19th April 1970. It is, therefore, clear that when on 15th July 1969 the order placing the petitioner under suspension was passed no criminal charge or criminal proceedings on the basis of a criminal charge were pending. The order dated 15th July 1969 therefore cannot be justified under second paragraph to Rule 199. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents then contended that as held by the Supreme Court in the case of R. P. Kapur v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1964 S. C. 787, apart from the provisions of Rule 49-A of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and Rule 199 of the subsidiary rule contained in Financial Hand Book Volume II, the respondents had ample power to suspend the petitioner. Accordingly, if the order, dated 15th July 1969, passed by the Excise Commissioner does not fall within the ambit of Rule 199 still, it cannot be interfered with. 13. In my opinion reliance on R. P. Kapur's' case, by the respondents, is completely misplace. The Supreme Court, while holding that apart from rules, the general principle is that an employer can suspend an employee pending enquiry into his conduct, summarised the general principle applicable to such Government servants as follows :- "The general principle, therefore, is that an employer can suspend an employee pending an enquiry into his conduct and the only question that can arise on such suspension will relate to the payment during the period of such suspension. If there is no express term in the contract relating to suspension and payment during such suspension or if there is no statutory provision in any law or rule, the employee is entitled to his full remuneration for the period of his interim suspension; on the other hand if there is a term in this respect in the contract or there is a provision in the statute or the rules framed thereunder providing for the scale of payment during suspension, the payment would be in accordance therewith. These general principles, in our opinion apply with equal force in a case where the Government is the employer and a public servant is the employee with this modification that in view of the peculiar structural hierarchy of Government, the employer in the case of Government, must be held to be the authority which has the power to appoint a public servant. On general principles, therefore, the authority entitled to appoint a public servant would be entitled to suspend him pending a departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal proceeding, which may eventually result in a departmental enquiry against him. This general principle is illustrated by the provision in Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, No. X of 1897, which lays down that where any Central Act or Regulation gives power of appointment that includes the power to suspend or dismiss unless a different intention appears. Though this provision does not directly apply in the present case, it is in consonance with the general law of master and servant. But what amount should be paid to the public servant during such suspension will depend upon the provisions of the statute or rule in that connection. If there is such a provision the payment during suspension will be in accordance therewith. But if there is no such provision, the public servant will be entitled to his full emoluments during the period of suspension. This suspension must be distinguished from suspension as a punishment which is a different matter altogether depending upon the rules in that behalf. On general principles therefore the Government, like any other employer, would have a right to suspend a public servant in one or two ways. it may suspend any public servant pending departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceedings, this may be called interim suspension, or the Government may proceed to hold a departmental enquiry and after his being found guilty order suspension as a punishment if the rules so permit. This will be suspension as a penalty. it may suspend any public servant pending departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceedings, this may be called interim suspension, or the Government may proceed to hold a departmental enquiry and after his being found guilty order suspension as a punishment if the rules so permit. This will be suspension as a penalty. These general principles will apply to all public servants but they will naturally be subject, to the provisions of Art. 313.........." It will thus be seen that the respondents may be entitled to place the petitioner under suspension in the sense that they may not permit him to perform his duties as a public servant but so long as the order suspending the petitioner is not covered either by subsidiary Rule 199 or Rule 49-A of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, they will not be entitled to withhold the emoluments to which he would be otherwise entitled to. Since the respondents purport to suspend the petitioner under second paragraph of the Rule 199, thereby withholding emoluments which would otherwise be payable to him which in the circumstances of the case they could not do, the suspension order so passed cannot be allowed to stand, merely because as an employer they have a right not to take any work from the petitioner. It would still be open to them to keep the petitioner under suspension in the sense that they may not permit him to work, but then they must not in the purported exercise of the power under subsidiary Rule 199 withhold the emoluments admissible to the petitioner. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents then urged that in any case the criminal charge became pending before the criminal court when the police submitted the supplementary charge-sheet on 19-1-1970. Accordingly, the suspension of the petitioner after that this submission too has no force. Second paragraph of Rule 199 of the subsidiary rule provides that a Government servant against whom a criminal charge is pending may be placed under suspension by competent authority by issuing specific orders to that effect. This rule does not authorise the authority concerned to make an order suspending a Government servant before a criminal charge comes to be pending against him. In this case the order dated 15-7-1969 suspending the petitioner from service was not valid on the date on which it was made. This rule does not authorise the authority concerned to make an order suspending a Government servant before a criminal charge comes to be pending against him. In this case the order dated 15-7-1969 suspending the petitioner from service was not valid on the date on which it was made. It would not revive and become valid merely because subsequently a criminal charge came to be pending against the petitioner. No valid specific order placing the petitioner under suspension, after a criminal charge became pending against him, under subsidiary Rule 199; has been passed by the Excise Commissioner. 15. Learned counsel for the State then stated before me that subsequently another order placing the petitioner under suspension certain other placing the petitioner under suspension certain other allegations have been passed. That order is subject-matter of another writ petition. In the circumstances, it would be futile to issue a writ as prayed for by the petitioner. As pointed out above, if the order dated 15-7-1969 purporting to be made under subsidiary Rule 199 is quashed, the petitioner would be entitled to the emoluments to which he would have been entitled to had the order not been passed. He would be entitled to such pay and allowance till such time he has not been validity placed under suspension either under subsidiary Rule 199 or some other rule according to which he loses his right to draw his full pay and allowance. Accordingly, it cannot be said that in view of the subsequent order, the relief claimed in this writ petition has become infructuous. However, I wish to make it clear that, while making this observation, I am not in any way adjudicating upon the validity of the subsequent suspension order which is the subject-matter of another writ petition or with regard to the right of the petitioner to receive his pay and allowance after the date of that order. 16. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Excise Commissioner dated 15th of July 1969 placing the petitioner under suspension in exercise of his power under second paragraph of subsidiary Rule 199 is quashed. 16. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Excise Commissioner dated 15th of July 1969 placing the petitioner under suspension in exercise of his power under second paragraph of subsidiary Rule 199 is quashed. It is made clear that this order does not preclude the respondents either from passing a fresh order under subsidiary Rule 199 or in placing the petitioner under suspension in the sense that he may not be permitted to work as Excise Inspector subject to the condition that the respondents continue to pay him his salary and allowance to which he may otherwise be entitled to. It is also made clear that this order does not in any way effect the operation of any subsequent suspension order that might have been made against the petitioner. Considering the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.