JUDGMENT V.Khalid, J. 1. This petition comes before us on a reference by a learned Single Judge of this Court. The petitioner seeks a declaration that Para.7 of Ex. P1 is illegal as being opposed to S.115(7) of the States Reorganisation Act and to quash the appointment of the 2nd respondent as Chief Engineer as per Ex. P8. The petitioner is the Superintending Engineer, National Highways, Ernakulam, and the 2nd respondent was Superintending Engineer, Irrigation, South Circle, Trivandrum when the petition was filed. He has since been promoted as Chief Engineer (Irrigation). 2. The petitioner entered service in the erstwhile Cochin State and the 2nd respondent in the erstwhile Travancore State as Junior Engineers. Both were promoted as Assistant Engineers in the Public Works Department. The integration of the erstwhile princely State of Travancore and Cochin took place on 1-7-1949. Although most of the departments of the two States were integrated, the Public Works Departments of both the States were kept separate maintaining separate seniority lists. The promotion in the said department was effected on the basis of a ratio 1:3 for Cochin and Travancore officers respectively. The personnel of Travancore State were to continue as old cadre (Travancore) and those of Cochin State as old cadre (Cochin). 3. In 1956 when the States Reorganisation became a certainty and the formation of the Kerala State imminent, the then Travancore Cochin Government felt that integration of the officers of the Public Works Department was necessary before forming an integrated Kerala list of officers. Accordingly the Government by G. O. dated 24-10-1956 marked as Ex. R2 ordered that these two wings of the Public Works Department be integrated in a common gradation list as on 1-4-1956. And a list was also prepared according to which the petitioner's rank was 35 among permanent Assistant Engineers and that of the 2nd respondent 36. 4. The 2nd respondent was promoted as Executive Engineer on 5-8-56 and the petitioner on 3-10-1956. These promotions were made on the basis of the ratio 1:3 as between old cadre (Cochin) and old cadre (Travancore) as mentioned above. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent was promoted as Superintending Engineer on 29-11-1967 and the petitioner on 31-8-1968. The Government by G. O. dated 11th August, 1970, a copy of which is marked in this petition as Ex. These promotions were made on the basis of the ratio 1:3 as between old cadre (Cochin) and old cadre (Travancore) as mentioned above. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent was promoted as Superintending Engineer on 29-11-1967 and the petitioner on 31-8-1968. The Government by G. O. dated 11th August, 1970, a copy of which is marked in this petition as Ex. P1, gave protection to persons who acquired superior position by virtue of promotions and confirmations after 1-4-1956 and before 1-11-1956. 5. The main contention of the petitioner's counsel in this petition is that Ex. R2 declared the conditions of service of Assistant Engineers as on 1-4-1956 and all further promotions can thereafter be only with reference to the seniority as on that date. His further contention is that this was the law as on 1-11-1956 when the reorganisation of States took place and as such no law can be enacted without the consent of the Central Government altering existing conditions of service as it would be a violation of sub-s.(7) of S.115 of the States Reorganisation Act. On this basis, it was contended that the promotions given to the 2nd respondent over the head of the petitioner, who was admittedly senior to him as on 1-4-1956, are in violation of the above said provision. The protection given in Ex. P1 to those who acquired superior position by virtue of their promotion or confirmation after 1-4-1956 and before 1-11-1956 is also invalid. 6. In support of this contention, the petitioner's counsel brought to our notice a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal Nos. 136 and 149 of 1965. These appeals arose from the dismissal of two writ petitions filed by two Cochin officers who were dissatisfied with the Kerala Integrated Gradation List prepared contrary to Ex. R2 G. O. In that case, the Division Bench observed as follows: "That the principles contained in Ex. P2 (GRS1.2-17115/56/PD dated 24-10-1956) formed part of the conditions of service of the appellants in the public Works Department of the Travancore Cochin State was conceded by the State Government in Para.7 of its affidavit. And that the principles related to the fixation of seniority as on 1-4-1956 as between the Travancore and Cochin cadres of the Travancore Cochin Service does not make them any the less principles governing the conditions of service of the petitioners immediately before the appointed day, namely, 1-11-1956". And that the principles related to the fixation of seniority as on 1-4-1956 as between the Travancore and Cochin cadres of the Travancore Cochin Service does not make them any the less principles governing the conditions of service of the petitioners immediately before the appointed day, namely, 1-11-1956". In other words, this Court held that seniority for those two officers should be decided in accordance with the spirit of the G. O. dated 24-10-1956, and accordingly gave a direction to the Government to implement the G. O. As the Government did not comply with the direction and promotions were effected in violation of that direction one of the appellants in the writ appeals, Sri P. V. John, filed O. P. No. 4786 of 1968 on 17-11-1968 seeking this Court's interference and praying for implementation of the direction contained in the judgment in writ appeals mentioned above. This Court again directed the State Government to revise the Integrated Gradation List in accordance with the G. O. dated 24-10-1956. Strong reliance is placed on these decisions by the petitioner to contend that his position is identical with those of the appellants in the above writ appeals. 7. We find that there is a clear distinction between those cases and the case in hand on a particular question of fact. In those cases, promotions were effected after 24-10-1956. The conditions of service after 24-10-1956 are undoubtedly as laid down in Ex. R2 G. O. and that was the law as on 1-11-1956. If anything is done contrary to Ex. R2 without the consent of the Central Government, that will clearly be a violation of S.115(7) of the States Reorganisation Act. The subject matter of the two writ appeals were the gradation lists prepared in 1957 and 1959. In 1959 by G. O. Ms. No. 546/PW dated 10-8-1959 the principles contained in Ex. R2 G.O. were changed and new principles were adopted for the integration of the technical personnel of the Public Works Department. This was attacked as being opposed the provisions of S.115(7) of the State Reorganisation Act. It was in this connection that the Division Bench observed that the conditions of service as laid down in Ex. R2 were the same as on 1-11-1965 and any alteration to those conditions of service without the consent of the Central Government was wrong. 8. This was attacked as being opposed the provisions of S.115(7) of the State Reorganisation Act. It was in this connection that the Division Bench observed that the conditions of service as laid down in Ex. R2 were the same as on 1-11-1965 and any alteration to those conditions of service without the consent of the Central Government was wrong. 8. We are confronted with an entirely different situation in this case. The question here is as to what was the rule governing promotions of officers in the Public Works Department between the period 1-4-1956 and 24-10-1956. The answer is that the 1:3 ratio was in force during the said period. Shorn of various unnecessary details enumerated in the petition and the counter affidavit, the short question for consideration in this petition is whether there has been any violation of Ex. R2 G. O. in promoting the 2nd respondent over the head of the petitioner between the period from 1-4-1956 to 24-10-1956. The most important point which needs to be taken note of in this case is whether at the time when the 2nd respondent was promoted as Executive Engineer, the 1:3 ratio as between Cochin and Travancore Cadres was in existence. Ex. R2 G.O. did not do away with that ratio. The ratio became inoperative only from 25-10-1956. The promotion of the 2nd respondent as Executive Engineer was between the period 1-4-1956 and 24-10-1956. It cannot be contended that when promotions became due they should not be made. Ex. R2 G. O. dated 24-10-1956 came into existence only after the 2nd respondent was promoted. It is well established that a government order cannot have retrospective operation unless otherwise provided. By their promotion, both the petitioner and the 2nd respondent obtained vested right to continue in those posts. The petitioner's contentions can have any force only if promotions were made after 24-10-1956, as the entire picture changes after that date. But that is not the case here, because the promotions took place during the period when the 1:3 ratio was in existence and the Government cannot therefore be accused of having violated any law by promoting the 2nd respondent earlier than the petitioner. The whole confusion appears to be on placing reliance on the seniority list as on 1-4-1956 for what took place between the period 1-4-1956 and ( 24-10-1956. The whole confusion appears to be on placing reliance on the seniority list as on 1-4-1956 for what took place between the period 1-4-1956 and ( 24-10-1956. It is the earlier promotion of the 2nd respondent as Executive Engineer that has entitled him to seniority over the petitioner and hence the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. We are of the opinion that the protection clause contained in Para.7 of Ex. P1 is redundant, although the Government by way of abundant caution tried to protect officers who were promoted during 1-4-1956 and 24-10-1956. These promotions took place before the G. O. Ex. R2 came into force and therefore the rights of the promotees before that G. O. cannot be defeated by a G. O. which came into existence after their promotion. 9. The learned Government Pleader raised an objection, which according to us is well founded, that this petition is barred by res judicata by the decision in O. P. No. 2133 of 1968 filed by the petitioner. The prayer in that O. P. was directed against the State of Kerala and the Chief Engineer for failure to promote the petitioner as Superintending Engineer. It is pertinent to observe that when this original petition was filed, the 2nd respondent had already been promoted as Executive Engineer over the head of the petitioner and also as Superintending Engineer, again disregarding the alleged claims of the petitioner. If, in fact, the petitioner had any grievance against the 2nd respondent's promotion earlier as Executive Engineer and as Superintending Engineer he should have questioned those promotions in time. In O. P. No. 2133 of 1968, we find that the 2nd respondent was not even made a party. All that the petitioner wanted in that petition was to give him promotion as Superintending Engineer. Since he was promoted as Superintending Engineer during the pendency of that original petition, the petition was disposed of recording the fact that he has since been promoted and that he could take appropriate action if this ranking was altered to his disadvantage. What is contended by the learned Government Pleader is that the petitioner should have at least put forward all his contentions which he now puts forward against the 2nd respondent in that original petition. It was in August 1956 that the 2nd respondent was promoted as Executive Engineer. The petitioner had no quarrel with that promotion. What is contended by the learned Government Pleader is that the petitioner should have at least put forward all his contentions which he now puts forward against the 2nd respondent in that original petition. It was in August 1956 that the 2nd respondent was promoted as Executive Engineer. The petitioner had no quarrel with that promotion. Again, it was on 29-11-1967 that the 2nd respondent was promoted as Superintending Engineer. He had nothing to complain about that when he filed O.P. No. 2133 of 1968. If he was really aggrieved by the promotions, he should have questioned those promotions in that original petition. His failure to raise such pleas in the original petition certainly disentitles him from putting forward the same pleas in this petition. All pleas which the petitioner ought or might have put forward should have been put forward in that case and if he did not do so, then the bar of constructive res judicata applies to the same pleas being now put forward before us. 10. It is well settled that principles of res judicata are applicable to original petition also. We can do no better than to quote the observations of Raman Nayar C.J., in the decision reported in M. P. Raghavan Nair v. State Insurance Officer (1971 (1) LLJ 196 (F. B.) ): "17. The principles underlying statutory provisions like the .Limitation Act and S.11 and O.11 R.2. of the Code of Civil Procedure, are, we should think, applicable to petitions under Art.226 of the Constitution. These provisions are not to be regarded as embodying technical rules of procedure. They are based upon principles of public policy aiming at justice , the securing of which is the very object of Art.226. The principles are principles of repose and peace. "Long dormant claims have often more of cruelty than of justice to them" said Best CJ. in A' Court v. Cross (130 English Reports 540). And so, we might add. has the fighting of the same legal battle over again with the same adversary, or, once a wrong has been suffered, the fighting of the battle for redress placemeal". We hold that this Original Petition is barred by res judicata in view of the decision in O. P. No. 2133 of 1968. In the result we hold that there is no merit in this writ petition. Accordingly it is dismissed, however, without costs.