JUDGMENT K.B.N. Singh, J. 1. The present revision application is directed against an order dated the 3rd March, 1970, by which the prayer of the petitioner for representation through lawyers for the purpose of explaining the accusation under section 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, (hereinafter referred to as the Code) has been refused. 2. Petitioner No.1, Roop Kumari Tiwary and Petitioner No.2, Sant Bajpai, are Directors of Messrs Tiwary Bechar and Company Private Limited, Petitioner No.3 is the company itself, while Petitioner No. 4 Satya Gopal Sarkar is the Secretary of the said Company. On the 7th of June, 1969, the Registrar of the Companies filed a complaint against the petitioners for prosecution under section 220 (3) of the Companies Act, 1956, for non- filing of the balance-sheet for the period ending on the 31st March, 1968. The learned Sub-divisional Magistrate took cognizance and transferred the case to Shri A.P. Choudhary, Munsif Magistrate, First Class, Patna, for disposal. On the 10th June 1969, summonses were issued against the petitioners by the transferee court and, on receipt thereof, an application was filed on the 2nd December, 1969, for dispensing with the personal appearance of the petitioners under Section 205 of the Code and the learned Magistrate allowed the first two petitioners to be represented through lawyer under Section 205 of the Code. On the 28th February, 1970, the learned Magistrate fixed the 3rd of March, 1970, for explaining the accusations against the accused, and directed all the accused persons, including the first two petitioners, to be present in court. On the 3rd March, 1970, it was submitted by learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners that the appearance of petitioners 1 and 2 having been dispensed with under Section 205 of the Code, personal appearance of those two petitioners was not necessary, and the accusations under Section 242 of the Code, the case being a summons case, could be explained to the lawyer representing them. This prayer has been rejected by the learned Magistrate by the impugned order. Hence this revision application. 3. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has urged that the learned Magistrate has erred in relying on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta and another vs. The State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 381=1969 (2) S.C.A. 18=1969 Cr. Hence this revision application. 3. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has urged that the learned Magistrate has erred in relying on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta and another vs. The State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 381=1969 (2) S.C.A. 18=1969 Cr. L.J. 654=1969 (1) S.C.J. 867=1969 (1) S.C.W.R. 325 for holding that the personal appearance of the petitioners was necessary and the accusations could not be explained to the lawyer representing the two petitioners. He has relied on a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Deolakhan Thathera vs. The State of Bihar, 1963 B.L.J.R. 853 in support of his submission that the first two petitioners could be represented by lawyer for the purpose of questioning under Section 242 of the Code. 4. Mr. Jha, appearing on behalf of the Respondent, however, has urged that the observation in the aforesaid Bench decision of this Court was obiter, inasmuch as that decision related to a case under section 342 of the Code. He, however, urged that the privilege to explain the accusation being one peculiar to the accused, on the principle of the decision of the Supreme Court, the lawyer could not be said to represent the accused for the purpose of Section 242 of the Code. These rival contentions of the parties fall to be considered in this revision application. 5. Section 205 of the Code, under which the personal appearance of the first two petitioners had been dispensed with, runs as follows:– (1) "Whenever a Magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused, and permit him to appear by his pleader. (2) But the Magistrate inquiring into or trying the case may, in his discretion at any stage of the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of the accused and if necessary, enforce such attendance in manner herein before provided." Another provision under which appearance of the accused can be dispensed with is contained in Section 540A of the Code, with which we are not concerned in the instant case. 6. There is no dispute that for violation of the provisions of Section 220 (2) of the Companies Act, the petitioners are liable to a fine of Rs. 6. There is no dispute that for violation of the provisions of Section 220 (2) of the Companies Act, the petitioners are liable to a fine of Rs. 50/- every day during which the default continued, under section 220 (3) read with Section 62 of the Act and the case obviously is one triable as a summons case. Chapter XX, consisting of Sections 241 to sections 250, of the Code lays down the procedure to be followed in the trial of summons cases. Section 242 of the Code reads thus:– "When the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him, and he shall be asked if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge." Section 243 deals with conviction on admission of the truth of the accusation and lays down as follows:– "If the accused admits that he has committed the offence of which he is accused, his admission shall be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by him and if he shows no sufficient cause why he should not be convicted, the Magistrate may convict him accordingly." Section 244 deals with procedure when no such admission is made and lays down that the Magistrate shall proceed to take evidence which may be produced in support of the prosecution and also to hear the accused and take all such evidence as may be produced by the accused in his defence. Section 245 lays down that after taking evidence, as stated above, the Magistrate will either acquit or convict the accused. 7. Form No. 1 in Schedule V, which contemplates an accused appearing by a Pleader, reads as follows:– "Whereas your attendance is necessary to answer to a charge of you are hereby required to appear in person (or by pleader as the case may be) before the (Magistrate) of on the day of. Herein fail not." The Patna Bench decision, relied upon by Mr. Singh, followed a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Prova Debi vs. Fernandes, A.I.R. 1962 Cal 203=1962 (1) Cr. L.J. 565. Herein fail not." The Patna Bench decision, relied upon by Mr. Singh, followed a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Prova Debi vs. Fernandes, A.I.R. 1962 Cal 203=1962 (1) Cr. L.J. 565. In that Full Bench decision, the Calcutta High Court, by a majority, held that a Magistrate may, in his discretion, examine the pleader on behalf of the accused under section 342 of the Code. The question that arose for consideration before the aforesaid Bench of this Court was also one under Section 342 and not under Section 242 of the Code, as has rightly been pointed out by Mr. Jha. The aforesaid majority decision of the Calcutta High Court has been overruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta and another vs. The State of West Bengal. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 381=1969 (2) S.C.A. 18=1969 Cr. L.J. 654=1969 (1) S.C.J. 867=1969 (1) S.C.W.R. 325 and it was held that there may be "exceptional cases when an examination of the accused personally under Section 342 is not necessary or possible. Where the accused is a company or other judicial person, it cannot be examined personally. It may be that the Court may then examine a director or some other agent on its behalf. Exceptional cases apart, only the accused in person can be examined under Section 342." The Supreme Court accepted the minority view in the aforesaid Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court. The principle laid down in the Supreme Court decision cannot be brought in aid in explaining the true import of Section 242 of the Code is apparent from the observations of their Lordships, which may be usefully reproduced:– "In Dorabshan vs. Emperor A.I.R. 1926 Bom 218, the Bombay High Court held that where the accused is permitted to appear by his pleader under Section 205 the pleader may, on his behalf be examined and may plead guilty under sections 242 and 243. Whether the Court can act upon an admission of guilt by the pleader under sections 242, 243, 251 A, 255 and 271 does not directly arise in this case and we express no opinion on it. Whether the Court can act upon an admission of guilt by the pleader under sections 242, 243, 251 A, 255 and 271 does not directly arise in this case and we express no opinion on it. It is sufficient to say that the language of those sections and the effect of admissions under them are entirely different." The Calcutta Full Bench decision and the Bench decision of this Court have referred to Section 242 of the Code for re-inforcing the argument for holding that the right of examination through a pleader could be availed in Section 342 as they did not find anything in the terms of Section 342, which, by necessary implication, requires the personal attendance of the accused for such examination, and, that is how the question of consideration of Section 242 arose in those two cases, although it was not a matter for decision in any of them. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court on the other hand, after quoting the provisions of Section 342 of the Code, have taken a different view and have observed that from the scheme, purpose and language of Section 342 the examination of the accused personally was necessary. Their Lordships observed. "The first part gives discretion to the Court to question the accused at any stage of an inquiry or trial without previously warning him. Under the Second part the Court is required to question him generally on the case after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called for his defence. The second part is mandatory and imposes upon the Court a duty to examine the accused at the close of the prosecution case, in order to give him an opportunity to explain any circumstance appearing against him in the evidence and to say in his defence what he wants to say in his own words." He is not bound to answer the questions, but if he refuses to answer or gives false answers, the consequences may be serious, for under sub-section (2) the Court may draw such inference from the refusal or the false answer as it thinks fit. Under sub-section (3) the answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in the inquiry or trial. Under sub-section (3) the answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in the inquiry or trial. His statement is material upon which the Court may act and which may prove his innocence (See State of Maharastra vs. Laxman Jairam, (1962 Supp) 3 S.C.R. 230=A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1204=1962 (2) Cr. L.J. 284. Under sub-section (4) no oath is administered to him. The reason is that when he is examined under section 342, he is not a witness. Before action 342 A was enacted, he was not a competent witness for the defence. His statement under section 342 was intended to take the place of what he could say in his own way in the witness box. (See Hate Singh vs. State of Madhya Bharat, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 468=54 Cr. L.J. 1933. "Under Section 342 A, he is now a competent witness. But the provisions of Section 342 A do not effect the value of his examination under Section 342. Under sub-section (3) of Section 342 his answers may be put in evidence for or against him in other inquiries or trials for other offences. For instance if in a trial for murder he says that he concealed the dead body and did not kill the victim his statement may be used as evidence against him in a subsequent trial for an offence under Section 201". Thereafter, their Lordships have further observed as follows:– "The privilege of making a statement under Section 342 is personal to the accused. The clear intention of the section is that only he and no body else can be examined under it. This conclusion is reinforced if we look at Section 364." It is, therefore, apparent that the decision of the Supreme Court that under Section 342 of the Code personal examination of accused is required and not his examination through a pleader is based on the particular provisions contained under Section 342 of the code, coming as it does after the prosecution witnesses have been examined. Unlike section 342, Section 242 requires questioning and examination of the accused at a stage when no evidence is led, to be acquainted only with the accusations against him. If he pleads guilty, he may be convicted of such offence as is made out against him. Unlike section 342, Section 242 requires questioning and examination of the accused at a stage when no evidence is led, to be acquainted only with the accusations against him. If he pleads guilty, he may be convicted of such offence as is made out against him. In case, however, he does not plead guilty, then the obligation is on the prosecution to lead evidence in the first instance and then the Magistrate is to hear the accused and take all such evidence as is produced in his defence under section 244 of the Code. Thereafter, on consideration of all such evidence taken before him, the Magistrate may either acquit or convict the accused under section 245 of the Code. 8. The provisions dealing with summons cases relate to minor offences punishable with terms of imprisonment less than one year, and are aimed at quick disposal of petty cases. It is true that in a case where the Magistrate decides to impose a sentence of imprisonment, absence of the accused, when he pleads guilty through a pleader, may create difficulties. But, for that there is adequate provision in the Code to enforce the attendance of the accused and sub-section (2) of Section 366 of the Code may usefully be referred to in this connection:– "(2) The accused shall, if in custody, be brought up, or, if not in custody, be required by the Court to attend, to hear judgment delivered, except where his personal attendance during the trial has been dispensed with and the sentence is one of fine only or he is acquitted, in either of which cases it may be delivered in the presence of his pleader." It is true that the provisions of section 366 of the Code are applicable to warrant cases also, but, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in view of the scheme, purpose and language of Section 342, in spite of the provisions of Sections 353, 360, 361 and 366, providing for representation of the accused by pleader, came to the conclusion that the examination under Section 342 of the Code must be of the accused in person and not of his pleader. The purpose, scheme and the language of Sections 242 and 342 of the Code being different, I have no doubt in my mind that when an accused has been allowed to be represented by Pleader under Section 205 of the Code, he can be allowed to be represented by the pleader for the purpose of Section 242 of the Code as well. 9. In the result, this application is allowed and the order of the learned Magistrate, refusing permission to petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 to be represented by a Pleader for the purpose of Section 242 of the Code is set aside. Application allowed.