JUDGMENT C.S.P. Singh , J. - The petitioner is engaged in the business of transport of goods and owns a number of transport vehicles. These vehicles are registered in different States. The petitioner transports goods inter-State, and while doing so, the vehicles owned by it pass through the State of U.P. It is averred by the petitioner that while transporting these goods, the petitioner plies his vehicles only on National Highways. The petitioner, has to obtain temporary permits from the State of U.P. for passing through the area comprised in the State of U.P. These temporary permits are, however, issued for the sake of convenience by the authorities where the vehicles are registered. Before issuing temporary, permits, the registering Stale, makes, a charge of taxes at the rates fixed by the State of U. P. under two heads viz. U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1935 and the U. P. Motor Gadi (Mal-kar) Adhiniyam, 1964. The tax charges under the Adhiniyam, 1964, is a lump sum amount as envisaged by Section 9 of that Act, while the tax collected under the Taxation Act depends on the period during which the vehicles ply in U. P. and is charged under Sec. 5-A of that Act. The petitioner has, by this petition, challenged the levy and charge of both the taxes. 2. We propose to deal with the challenge made to taxes collected under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1935 first. 3. The petitioner has, by this petition, challenged the levy and charge of both the taxes. 2. We propose to deal with the challenge made to taxes collected under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1935 first. 3. Counsel for the petitioner hast contended (1) that the U. P. Legislature has no competence to enact a law which empowers it to levy taxes in respect of the vehicles plying on national highways, in as much as a law relating to national highways can be enacted only by the Parliament; (2) that in as much as the vehicles do not ply in U P., neither Section 4, nor Sec. 5-A, which are the relevant charging sections apply, and as such the imposition in question is wholly unjustified; (3) that; in as much as the route on which the petitioner's vehicles ply is a national highway, and the State cannot classify this route as required by Rule 5 of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1935, the tax sought to be collected is without the authority of the law; (4) that in as much as Sec. 5-A which is the relevant charging section did not receive the assent of the President of India, the tax in question offends Art. 301 and Art. 304 of the Constitution of India; (5) that in any event, the tax in question imposes an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner's right to carry on the business of transporting goods and as such violative of Art. 19(f) of the Constitution; (6) that the rate of tax is excessive and confiscatory and as such offends Art. 31 of the Constitution; (7) that the levy in question is also violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, in as much as it makes a hostile discrimination between the operation who ply exclusively in U. P. and the petitioner. We will deal with each of these arguments in seriatim. 4. Entry 23 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution empowers the Parliament to make laws in respect of national highways. Counsel for the petitioner has on the strength of this entry urged that the taxes, if any, could be imposed only by the Parliament and not by the State Legislature. In view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in M. P. V. Sundaramier Co. Counsel for the petitioner has on the strength of this entry urged that the taxes, if any, could be imposed only by the Parliament and not by the State Legislature. In view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in M. P. V. Sundaramier Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1958 S.C. 468 , it is now idle to contend that the general entry relating to national highways includes within its ambit the power of taxation. So far as taxes on goods and passengers carried by road is concerned, that is the subject matter of Entry 56 in the State list. In view of Entry 56, the State legislature was fully competent to levy taxes in respect of vehicles which ply on the national highways which pass through its territories. This contention must, therefore, fail. We are fortified in the view that we take by a Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of Amar Singh v. State of Haryana, I.L.R. (1971) 1 Punjab and Haryana 720. 5. Coming now to the second contention, it is necessary to quote the relevant parts of Secs. 4, 5-A and item VI part B of the First Schedule to the Act: - "Section 4. Imposition of taxes. (1) Save as otherwise provided by this Act or by any Rule made thereunder or any other law for the time being in force, no motor vehicle shall be used in any public place in Uttar Pradesh unless the owner thereof has paid in respect of it a tax .........." "Section 5-A - Vehicles not to be used in Uttar Pradesh without payment of taxes. (1) No transport vehicle plying under a permit granted by an authority having jurisdiction outside Uttar Pradesh under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 shall be used in Uttar Pradesh, unless there has been paid in respect thereof a tax........" "Item VI. Vehicles plying for hire for the transportation of goods only." 6. It is urged that the vehicles in question do not ply in Uttar Pradesh, as they neither load or unload goods in Uttar Pradesh, and further because their entire journey in Uttar Pradesh is confined to the national highway. Vehicles plying for hire for the transportation of goods only." 6. It is urged that the vehicles in question do not ply in Uttar Pradesh, as they neither load or unload goods in Uttar Pradesh, and further because their entire journey in Uttar Pradesh is confined to the national highway. In this context, it has also been urged that a vehicle can be said to ply only when it plies for hire, in the sense that it stops to load or unload goods for reward, and a vehicle which merely passes on a particular route cannot be said to be plying in that area. In support of this contention, counsel relied upon a Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Amar Singh v. State of Haryana, I.L.R. (1971) 1 Punjab and Haryana 720. Before we proceed to consider the applicability or otherwise of Amar Singh's2 case to the present controversy, it will be useful to examine this contention in the light of the provisions of the Act which we have already extracted above. Sec. 4 makes it incumbent on motor vehicles to pay a tax, if they are used in any public place. There is no gain saying the fact that the national highways are public places. That being so, Sec. 4 of the Act clearly applies. 7. Coming now to Section 5 of the Act, here too, the liability to pay tax arises on the use of a motor vehicle in Uttar Pradesh. Even if the petitioner's contention is accepted (Although we shall later on show that the petitioners are entitled on the terms oi their permit to ply on routes other than national vehicles) that they only use the national highways, they cannot escape liability to pay tax as portions of the national highways pass through the territory of Uttar Pradesh. Tins being so, the conditions requisite for the applicability of Sec. 5-A are fulfilled viz. that the vehicles should be used in Uttar Pradesh. Counsel for the petitioner has tried to get round the difficulty created by phraseology of Secs. 4 and 5-A of the Act by referring to item VI part B of the First Schedule which has already been quoted. It will be noticed that item No. VI of the First Schedule use the words "plying for hire". Counsel for the petitioner has tried to get round the difficulty created by phraseology of Secs. 4 and 5-A of the Act by referring to item VI part B of the First Schedule which has already been quoted. It will be noticed that item No. VI of the First Schedule use the words "plying for hire". On the strength of this it has been contended that the word `used' in Section 4 and Sec. 5-A should be read as "plying for hire". We feel hesitant to take such a step in view of the clear phraseology of the two sections which render a vehicle liable to tax under the first section on its user in a public place, and under the second section on its user in Uttar Pradesh. This apart, we are of the view that item No. VI, Part B of the First Schedule is descriptive of the nature to which the vehicle is put to use on any part of the road and does not exclude vehicles which may or may not be loading or unloading goods within Uttar Pradesh. 8. There is another aspect of the matter to which we must now refer to. In the supplementary rejoinder affidavit, a temporary permit granted to one of the operators has been filed as I an exemplar. Item No. 6 of permit runs thus:- "Allowed to ply as public carrier from Patna to Delhi via direct and shortest routes." Conditions 2 and 3 which are relevant may be extracted : - "(2). Goods should not be transported between any two points within the reciprocating State." "(3). The vehicle should not load or unload any goods anywhere within five miles on either side of Arrah-Sasaram road." 9. A perusal of this permit belies the petitioner's contention that the petitioner is permitted to ply only on the national highways. The permit allows the petitioner to ply as a public carrier from Patna to Delhi via direct and shortest route. The operators are thus free to travel by routes other than the national highways, which may be more direct or shorter than the national highways. It is not clearly averred in the petition that the national highways are more direct and shorter than other roads in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The operators are thus free to travel by routes other than the national highways, which may be more direct or shorter than the national highways. It is not clearly averred in the petition that the national highways are more direct and shorter than other roads in the State of Uttar Pradesh. That being so, the contention that the vehicles are not liable to pay tax as they only ply on national high- ways, as they do not use any other routes is without substance. The conditions contained in the permit rings the death knell of the argument that the vehicles of the petitioner cannot load or unload goods in Uttar Pradesh. The only restriction that is imposed by the permit is that goods cannot be transported between any two points within the reciprocating State, and further that the vehicle should not load or unload any goods within fives miles on either side of the Arrah-Sasaram Road. The operator is thus free to load goods from Patna and unload them at any place in Uttar Pradesh. So far as the restriction on the loading or unloading of the goods contained in condition No. 3 of the permit is concerned, that is relevant only for the State of Bihar as both Arrah and Sasaram fall within the State of Bihar. The mere tact that the petitioner as a matter of practice does not load or unload goods within the State of Uttar Pradesh is irrelevant for the purposes of deciding the liability of the petitioner to pay the impugned tax, for the petitioner cannot evade the liability created by Section 4 and Sec. 5-A of the Act by imposing restrictions of his own. This even assuming that the word `used' in Secs. 4 and 5-A of the Act has to be equated with the word "ply", the petitioner cannot still succeed, as on a perusal of the permit filed by them, it can be safely said that the conditions of tire permit do not impose any such restriction as would prevent them from "plying" within the Slate of U. P. 10. 4 and 5-A of the Act has to be equated with the word "ply", the petitioner cannot still succeed, as on a perusal of the permit filed by them, it can be safely said that the conditions of tire permit do not impose any such restriction as would prevent them from "plying" within the Slate of U. P. 10. So far as Punjab decision is concerned, all that need be said is that the provisions of the taxing statute as prevailing in the State of Haryana are not in pari materia with the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1935 and as such that decision is not strictly opposite to the controversy raised in the present case. 11. The third contention is also without substance. We have already noticed that the conditions of the permit granted to the petitioner does not prevent him from plying on roads other than national highways. Rule 5 of the Taxation Rules empowers every Regional Transport Authority to classify all routes within its jurisdiction as Special Routes of A, B and C class routes. Rule 6 lays down the consideration to be applied when classifying the routes. In classifying the routes as A, B and C class routes, the potential income which may be expected to accrue to the operators of the public services on the route, has to be taken into consideration as also the costs of maintenance of routes and the necessity for development of the proposed routes in the public interest. Counsel for the petitioner has contended that in as much as the State Government does not spend a pie on the maintenance of the national highways, it would be improper to interpret Rules 5 and 6 so as to confer, jurisdiction on the Regional Transport Authority to classify a national highway as either A class, B class or C class routes. Unfortunately, the factual substratum for such an argument is lacking in the present case, because the petitioners are free to ply not only on the national highways but also on other roads. This being so, the mere fact that for a major part of their journey, they use the national highways, will not absolve them from the liability of payment of the motor vehicle tax, in as much as they can, if they so desire ply on roads maintained exclusively by the State Government. This being so, the mere fact that for a major part of their journey, they use the national highways, will not absolve them from the liability of payment of the motor vehicle tax, in as much as they can, if they so desire ply on roads maintained exclusively by the State Government. In fact, in the counter-affidavits that have been filed in some of the cases, there are averments that the operators do not confine their journey to national highways, but also ply on roads maintained exclusively by the State Government. This being so it is not necessary to decide the question as to whether the operators would be liable to the payment of the tax in case they ply exclusively on national highways, which according to the petitioner is founded by the Central Government. 12. The fourth contention may now be considered. It has not been disputed that Sec. 5-A did not receive the assent of the President. Neither is it denied that the tax is collected from operators employed in carrying goods from one State to another. The question is whether this brings the tax within the mischief of Art. 301 or 304 of the Constitution. In the case of Automobiles Transport (Rajasthan) v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1962 S.C. 1406 , which is also a case where the assent of the President had not been taken in respect of the taxing statute, their Lordships of the Supreme Court hold that regulatory measure or measures imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities, do not come within the purview of the restrictions contemplated by Art. 301, and as such, these measures need not comply with the requirements of the proviso to Art. 304(b) of the Constitution. At page 1425 of the report, their Lordships formulated the test to decide as to whether the tax is compensatory or not, and observed as under : - "It seems to us that a working test for deciding whether a tax is compensatory or not is to enquire whether the trades people are having the use of certain facilities for the better conduct of their business and paying not patently much more than what is required for providing the facilities. It would be impossible to judge the compensatory nature of a tax by a meticulous test, and in the nature of things that cannot be done." 13. It would be impossible to judge the compensatory nature of a tax by a meticulous test, and in the nature of things that cannot be done." 13. Counsel for the State has contended that the tax imposed by the State Government is compensatory in nature, and that the revenue so raised is utilised for the purposes of maintaining roads, and constructing new roads and bridges which are used by operators, and as such even if Sec. 5-A did not receive the assent of the President, this provision cannot be successfully attacked on account of these considerations. Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the tax in question is not compensatory, as no facility is provided by the State of Uttar Pradesh. We have already held that the operators are under the permit free to ply on any route within the State of U. P. as also on national highways. It is undisputed that the roads other than the national highways, are exclusively maintained by the State. The particular trade which the petitioner carries on cannot thrive unless the roads on which they ply are kept in good motor able condition, and new roads are constructed. This brings the tax in question within the ambit of a compensatory tax, provided that it is not excessive. Counsel for the petitioner relying on the Final Report of the Road Transport Taxation Enquiry Committee made in November, 1967, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Transport and Shipping (Transport Wing) has contended that the State of Uttar Pradesh is receiving more money than it spends on roads. He has in particular referred us to page 208 of this report which sets out the estimates of State Revenue From Road Transport and Expenditure on Roads by States in India, during 1965-66 and 1966-67. Estimate of Revenue for U. P. for the year 1965-66 is 1,114.93 lacs while the expenditure on maintenance is said to be 956.73 lacs. For the year 1966-67, the estimated revenue is 1,217.73 lacs while the estimated expenditure is Rs. 1,073.68 lacs. In the first place, the report does not set out the actual of revenue receipts or the expenditure incurred by the State and in the second place only the expenditure on maintenance is set out in the Report. It is not denied that the Stale constructs new roads etc. 1,073.68 lacs. In the first place, the report does not set out the actual of revenue receipts or the expenditure incurred by the State and in the second place only the expenditure on maintenance is set out in the Report. It is not denied that the Stale constructs new roads etc. and unless the figures for the amount spent by the State Government on the construction of new roads and bridges etc. are also available, it is not possible to hold that the State Government was making a profit in the years in question. 14. Mr. B. N. Asthana, learned counsel for the petitioner then relied on another Report viz. that of the Taxation Committee constituted by the State Government. This Committee in its Report of the 15th February 1969 set out on page 69 the revenue received by the State Government for the years) 1960-61, 1965-66 and 1966-67 and also 1967-68. The revenue in 1966-67 received from the various taxes imposed on motor vehicles and motor spirit amount to 13.31 crores while the expenditure, according to the Road Transport Taxation Enquiry Committee's final Report of 1967, for maintenance was only Rs. 10,73,68,000/. Similarly, the revenue for the year 1965-66 was to the tune of Rs. 11,15,00,000/- according to the U.P. Report, while the expenditure according to the Taxation Enquiry Committee's Final Report of 1967 was Rs. 9,56,73,000/-. Counsel for the petitioner contends that this shows a clear surplus in the years in question. We have already adverted to the fact that the expenditure shown in the Taxation Enquiry Committee Report of 1967 is expenditure incurred only for the maintenance of the roads, and does not take into account the amount spent by the State Government for construction of new Roads. In deciding the question as to whether there is a surplus left to the State Government, it is relevant not only to take into account the amount spent by the State Government on maintaining of the existing roads, but also to consider the expenditure incurred by it in extending the existing road facilities. It has not been contended that if the amount spent for the construction of new roads is taken into account, there would still be a surplus, Counsel for the State has filed a chart based on budget estimates which we direct to be brought on the record. It has not been contended that if the amount spent for the construction of new roads is taken into account, there would still be a surplus, Counsel for the State has filed a chart based on budget estimates which we direct to be brought on the record. According to this chart, which is not controverted the total receipt from taxes received under the Motor Vehicles Act and U. P. Motor Vehicle Taxation Act, Surcharge on Road Tax and Refund for the year 1969-70 comes to Rs. 6,89,45,301/-; for the year 1970-71 it comes to Rs. 8,80,09,410/-; for the year 1971-72 it comes to Rs. 9,41,05,800/-. The receipt from Passenger Tax and Goods Tax collected during this period for the years 1969-70 comes to Rs. 5,10,43,285/- for the Passenger Tax, Rs. 2,67,42,362/- for Goods Tax. The figure for 1970-71 for these two taxes are Rs 5,65,92,898/- and Rs. 3,10,52,493/- and for the year 1971-72 is Rs. 6,14,33,023/- and Rs. 3,23,95,253/-. For the year 1971-72, Surcharge on Passenger Tax was also collected and it amounted to Rs. 49,27,401/-. According to the statement showing the expenditure on Road including Bridges and Culverts under original work and repairing during last three years. The amount spent in 1969-70 comes to Rs. 17,16,39,800/-; for the year 1970-71 it comes to Rs. 22,26,35,300/-; for the year 1971-72, it comes to Rs. 31,00,30,700/-. In the budget grant for 1972-73 an amount of Rs. 25,79,96,200/- has been provided for. As these figures do not admit of any controversy, counsel for the petitioner was unable to pursue his contention. These figures clearly establish that there was no surplus in the years 1969-70, 1970-71 or 1971-72. This being so, the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 15. The fifth and sixth contention do not also stand scrutiny in view of our conclusion on the fourth contention. It has already been seen that the State Government is spending large amounts in excess of amount it receives from its taxation measures. The revenues that are raised are required by the State to carry on the functions of the Government to sustain the manifold activities taken by it. In Khyerbai Tea Co. It has already been seen that the State Government is spending large amounts in excess of amount it receives from its taxation measures. The revenues that are raised are required by the State to carry on the functions of the Government to sustain the manifold activities taken by it. In Khyerbai Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1964 S.C. 925 , it has been held that while considering a challenge to tax on the ground of Art. 19, it is relevant to take into consideration the fact that the tax is imposed for raising revenues. In that case, the tax was upheld on the ground that it was compensatory in character and restrictions imposed on the petitioner's freedom of trade and commerce could be sustained on the ground that the tax was not raised merely to raise general revenue for the State but for keeping the water was and roads which the petitioner used in good condition. In the present case too, it has been seen that the State has not only spent huge amounts in excess & of what it receives, but the expenditure directly benefits the operators. This being so, it cannot in these circumstances be said that the tax imposed on petitioner imposes an unreasonable restriction and is violative of the guarantee given under Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. 16. The sixth contention is also baseless, as it has not been established that the rate of tax is such that the petitioner is unable to bear its burden, or he has incurred loss in the business as a result thereof. This contention must also, therefore, fail. 17. Turning now to the attack made on the ground of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The tax that is levied on the operators who ply under the permits granted by authorities having jurisdiction outside the U. P., is by Sec. 5-A calculated at the rates specified in the First Schedule, and is dependent on the number of weeks of the use or stay of the vehicle in Uttar Pradesh. Under Sub-sec. 2 of Sec. 5-A, the tax payable for a week or part thereof, is one-fifty-twelfth of the appropriate rate specified in the First Schedule. It is not contended that the rate specified in the First Schedule for vehicles which obtain permit outside Uttar Pradesh is higher than the rate for vehicles plying exclusively in Uttar Pradesh. Under Sub-sec. 2 of Sec. 5-A, the tax payable for a week or part thereof, is one-fifty-twelfth of the appropriate rate specified in the First Schedule. It is not contended that the rate specified in the First Schedule for vehicles which obtain permit outside Uttar Pradesh is higher than the rate for vehicles plying exclusively in Uttar Pradesh. This being so, in as much as the tax that is imposed on the petitioner is based upon the length of the period during which they operate or stay in Uttar Pradesh, we fail to see how there is any discrimination between U. P. operators and ex. U. P. operators as the incidence of the lax for an equivalent period is the same. 18. The challenge made to the imposition of tax under the U. P. Motor Gadi (Mal-Kar) Adhiniyam, 1964 may now be considered. Before this contention is considered on merits, it is necessary to clear the ground by disposing of an objection raised on behalf of the State. It is asserted that the operators do not have any locus standi to file the petition in as much as they have paid the tax voluntarily. It is asserted that in lieu of paying the tax in accordance with Section 3 of the Adhiniyam, the operators pay a lump sum under an agreement envisaged by Section 9 of the Act. Under Section 3 of the Adhiniyam, the operators have to pay a tax calculated on a percentage of the freight payable for the carriage of goods in the State. Secs. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17 and 18 lay down the procedure for the levy, assessment, calculation and refund of the tax. Sec. 9 gives an election to operators to pay a lump sum, in lieu of the amount of the tax that may be payable for such period as might be agreed upon by the operators and the State Government, or an officer authorised by it in this behalf. It is undisputed in the present case that the operators have not beer assessed in accordance with the procedure provided for under Section 10 or 12, and they paid a lump sum as envisaged by Sec. 9. It is undisputed in the present case that the operators have not beer assessed in accordance with the procedure provided for under Section 10 or 12, and they paid a lump sum as envisaged by Sec. 9. In paragraph 16 of the counter-affidavit, it is asserted that it is impossible to levy the tax on the number of trips made by operators in the State, and as such the permit issuing authority charges a tax and remits it to the State of Uttar Pradesh, Counsel for the petitioner has urged that, the permit issuing authority does not grant permits unless and until the operators pay a lump sum as envisaged by Section 9, and that in view of this, the payment made by the operators was made under the force of compelling circumstances. Counsel for the State after taking time, stated that m application in Form III as envisaged, by Rule 5(2) was made by the opera this, and neither did the operators give their consent as envisaged by Part III of Form III, nor did the competent an authority pass any order as contemplated by Part II of Form III. This being so, the contention on behalf of the State has to be overruled, and this objection must fail. 19. We may now advert to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner to challenge the tax imposed under the Adhiniyam. The constitutional validity of the tax has been attacked on grounds similar to those raised in respect of the tax imposed under the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. Apart from challenging the constitutionel validity of the provisions of the Adhiniyam, it has been contended that Section 3 in terms does not apply to the carriage of goods on vehicles which merely pass through the State of U. P. staring their journey from a point outside the State and terminating it also at a point outside the State. It is a settled principle of law that a Court should refrain from pronouncing on the constitutional validity of an enactment, in case it is possible to give relief on other considerations. In the present case, we are of the view that Section 3 of the Adhiniyam does not apply and as such it is not necessary to deal with the argument based on the infringement of the provisions of the Constitution. Sec. 3 of the Adhiniyam may be quoted: - "3. In the present case, we are of the view that Section 3 of the Adhiniyam does not apply and as such it is not necessary to deal with the argument based on the infringement of the provisions of the Constitution. Sec. 3 of the Adhiniyam may be quoted: - "3. Levy of tax on goods carried by public goods vehicles : - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall, from and after the coming into force of this section, be levied and paid to the State Government a tax on all goods carried by road in a public goods vehicle at a rate equivalent to five per cent of the freight payable for such carriage of goods in the State : Explanation I - Where goods are carried by a public goods vehicle from or to any place outside the State, an amount bearing the same proportion to the total freight payable as the distance within the State bears to the total freight payable for the carriage of goods in the State. Explanation II - Where no freight is payable or the freight payable is less than the amount calculated at such rates as may be fixed by the State Government from time to time, which shall not be more than eighty per cent under any other law for the time being in force, the amount so calculated shall be deemed to be the freight payable. (2) Except in case of agricultural produce, minerals, mineral ores and petroleum goods, the State Government may, by notification in the Gazette, increase the rate of tax leviable under Sub-sec. (1), but not so as to exceed fifteen per cent of the freight referred to in that sub-section." 20. It will be seen that the freight is payable on a percentage "of the freight payable for such carriage of goods in the State". Prima faide this postulates that it will only apply to such cases where the quantum of freight for the carriage of goods in the State has been agreed upon to between the operators and the owner of the goods. Prima faide this postulates that it will only apply to such cases where the quantum of freight for the carriage of goods in the State has been agreed upon to between the operators and the owner of the goods. In the present case, the freight that is settled is for the entire journey, and there is no agreement between the parties about the freight that would be payable for the part of the journey for the State of U. P. The substantive part of section, therefore, does not prima facie apply to the goods carried by the operators. It is, however, not necessary to express any final opinion on this aspect of the matter, as for the purposes of this case, the substantive part of Section 3 has to be interpreted along with Explanation I. On a perusal of Explanation I, it is clear that the Adhiniyam does not apply to cases where the goods are carried from a place outside the State to places which also fall outside. The First Explanation is vital for the petitioner's case, as the calculation of the tax has to be made on the basis of this Explanation, and in case this Explanation does not apply, the petitioners would be absolved from payment of tax under the Adhiniyam. Explanation I paraphrased would read as under : - "Where goods are carried by a public goods vehicle from any place outside the State or where goods are carried by a public goods vehicle to any place outside the State an amount bearing the same proportion................." The first part of the Explanation obviously applies only to those cases where the starting point of the journey is outside the State but the ending point is within the State, and the second part of the Explanation applies where the journey starts within the State and ends outside the State. In the present case, the journey starts outside the State and also ends outside the State. Thus Explanation does not cover the case of the petitioner. This being so, Sec. 3 read with Explanation I has no application to the carriage of goods undertaken by the present petitioner. The levy and collection of tax under the U. P. Motor Gadi (Mal-Kar) Adhiniyam, 1964 as such is unwarranted by the provisions of Section 3 of the Adhiniyam, which is the charging section. This being so, Sec. 3 read with Explanation I has no application to the carriage of goods undertaken by the present petitioner. The levy and collection of tax under the U. P. Motor Gadi (Mal-Kar) Adhiniyam, 1964 as such is unwarranted by the provisions of Section 3 of the Adhiniyam, which is the charging section. This being so, the respondents are not entitled to collect the tax under the Adhiniyam and the petitioner is entitled to relief in respect of this tax. 21. Counsel for the State as a last resort urged that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in respect of tax under the Adhiniyam, in as much as the tax has been collected by the authorities situate outside the State of U. P. and those authorities have not been made parties to the petition. We are not impressed by this contention. The Ex U. P. authorities collect the tax on behalf of the State of U. P. and in accordance with the provisions of the Adhiniyam and remit the same to the State. The Ex U. P. authority merely acts as an agent on behalf of the State of U. P. Further in case the tax is not paid by the operators, the respondents will not permit the operators plying in Uttar Pradesh. This being so, the petitioner's purpose would be served in case appropriate orders are issued to the respondents principals not to levy or collect the tax either by themselves or through their agents or officers. 22. The petition is accordingly partly allowed. The respondent Nos. 1 to 4 are restrained from realising or collecting the tax on goods carried by the petitioner on the strength of the U. P. Motor Gadi (Mal-Kar) Adhiniyam, 1964 or to prevent the petitioner from plying within the State of U. P. on the serength of the provisions of the aforesaid Adhiniyam. The relief for quashing the imposition of tax under Secs. 4 and 5-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and for directions restraining the respondents from charging any tax under the aforesaid Act is refused. In view of partial success and failure of the parties, they shall bear their own costs. 23. This judgment will also govern Writ Petition Nos. The relief for quashing the imposition of tax under Secs. 4 and 5-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and for directions restraining the respondents from charging any tax under the aforesaid Act is refused. In view of partial success and failure of the parties, they shall bear their own costs. 23. This judgment will also govern Writ Petition Nos. 6432, 6440, 6495 to 6500, 6502, 7236 to 7238, 7518 to 7529, 8070 to 8074, 6403 to 6405, 6433 to 6437, 6439, 6441, 6874 to 6880, 7774 to 7776, 8557 to 8559, 8673, 8780, 8781, 7037 to 7039, 7239, 7240 to 7244, 7329, 7330, 7425 to 7428, 7772,7773 of 1971 and 559, 311, 580 and 581 of 1972 and 8672 of 1971.