Judgement This application by the plaintiff under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the order of remand passed by the Assistant District Judge No. 2, Cachar, Silchar, in Title Appeal No. 83, of 1969. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of his right, title and interest in the suit land measuring 5B, 7K. 12 Ch. 10 Gondas. His case is that the suit land belonged to one Jagat Chandra Nath, who died leaving lour sons, defendants Nos. 6 to 9, and one Jatindra Chandra Nath, father of defendant No. 9 and the husband of defendant No. 10. On 31-12-1956 the plaintiff purchased the suit land from defendant No. 6 by a registered deed and was in exclusive possession thereof pursuant to an amicable partition amongst the co-sharers. The plaintiff alleges that he was put in possession of the land purchased by him within specific boundaries. As defendants Nos. 4 to 6 disturbed him in his Possession, he filed a case under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against them, but the Criminal Court declared possession of the land in favour of the second party, namely, defendants; Nos. 1 to 4. The plaintiff, therefore filed the present suit for declaration of his right, title and interest in the suit land as stated above. He also prayed, in the alternative, for a decree for khas possession in case he failed to prove his possession and also prayed for refund of the entire purchase-money from his vendees (defendants 1 to 4) in case he failed to prove title to the entire land or refund of the proportionate purchase-money in case of his failure to prove his title to a part of the suit land. 3. Defendant No. 5 has filed a written statement and contested the suit. His case is that he purchased the suit land from defendants No. 6 to 10 on 15-5-1954 by a registered sale deed and got possession thereof and was in possession. He denies plaintiffs title to, and possession of, the suit land. He denies any interest in, or possession of. the suit land by defendants 1 to 4 also. He avers that the sale by defendant No. 6 in favour of the plaintiff was without consideration. He denies plaintiffs title to, and possession of, the suit land. He denies any interest in, or possession of. the suit land by defendants 1 to 4 also. He avers that the sale by defendant No. 6 in favour of the plaintiff was without consideration. He, however, admits that the patta number and the dag number of the land purchased by him from defendants 6 to 10 do not tally with the land in suit. 4. Defendants 6 to 10 also have filed a joint written statement. Their case is that their predecessor-in-interest, Jagat Chandra Nath, died leaving defendants 6, 7 and 8 and their elder brother Jatindra Chandra Nath, since deceased. Jatindra died leaving defendants Nos. 9 and 10 as his sole heirs. There was an amicable partition of their properties on 12-5-1955 in pursuance of which the co-sharers got their respective shares partitioned and were in possession of their respective shares. Accordingly defendant No. 6 held exclusive possession of the suit land which he sold to the plaintiff on 31-12-1956. In substance, they support the case of the plaintiff. 5. It may be mentioned that tine suit was first filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge on 10-10-1958 and was numbered as Title Suit No. 84 of 1958. as it was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the local Munsiff. The learned Subordinate Judge framed the following issues : (1) Is the suit maintainable in its present form ? (2) Is the suit barred by estoppel, waiver and acquiescence ? (3) Is the sale-deed dated 31-12-56 in favour of the plaintiff a legally valid document with consideration ? (4) Is the suit bad for multifarious-ness ? (5) Is the land in suit properly described ? (6) Has the plaintiff alleged right, title and interest in the disputed land ? (7) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? The suit was heard and disposed of by the Additional Subordinate Judge, who by his judgement and order dated 12-1-60 decreed the suit on contest with costs against defendant No. 5 and ex parte against the other defendants. Defendant No. 5 then preferred Title Appeal No. 6 of 1960 before the District Judge, who. after hearing, set aside the judgement and decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge and remanded the suit for retrial. Defendant No. 5 then preferred Title Appeal No. 6 of 1960 before the District Judge, who. after hearing, set aside the judgement and decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge and remanded the suit for retrial. The learned District Judge in his aforesaid judgment and order dated 23-12-61, inter alia, observed : "The plaintiff-respondent has filed the suit praying mainly for khas possession over the suit land on declaration of title, failing to get the decree for main prayer he claims in the alternative refund of the entire purchase-money if no title can be declared over the entire land or refund of part of the purchase-money in proportion if he fails to get title and possession over a part of the suit land. As the plaintiffs claim for title and possession has been decreed over the entire suit land he had no right or cause of appeal for the alternative relief. The appellant has filed the appeal, as I have already stated, against the plaintiff only. The other defendants including the vendor of the plaintiff and the vendors of the appellant were not made parties in the appeal though they were made parties in the suit. On the other hand no issue has been framed by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge about the alternative claim of the plaintiff-respondent which is a material point to be decided in the event of not granting the main relief in the entirety or in part. As there was no issue framed on that point no evidence has been led in the line in the suit. So I consider that without an issue about the alternative claim the disposal of the suit is not in accordance with law as I discussed above. There is also no issue with regard to the claims for compensation by the plaintiff-respondent which is also necessary for granting compensation in the suit." The learned District Judge then set aside the judgment and decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge and remanded the suit with the following order : "The suit is remanded for disposal after framing necessary issues particularly on the point of alternative claim and the claim for compensation." (emphasis supplied). The plaintiff then filed Second Appeal No. 94 of 1962 against the aforesaid judgement and order of the learned District Judge before this Court. The plaintiff then filed Second Appeal No. 94 of 1962 against the aforesaid judgement and order of the learned District Judge before this Court. This Court dismissed the Second Appeal with the result that the order of remand passed by the District Judge stood, with the consequence that the suit came back to the Additional Subordinate Judge for disposal. Meanwhile the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsiff having been raised, the suit came to him for disposal. In pursuance of the District Judges order of remand he framed the three following additional issues : (8) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any refund to his consideration money or any Dirt thereof from defendant No. 6 in the event his title in the suit land be not declared ? (9) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any decree for mesne profits as claimed by him ? If so, to what extent ? (10) Whether there was any partition between the plaintiffs vendor defendant No. 6 and his co-sharers ? If so, whether the suit land fell to the exclusive share of the plaintiffs vendor ? 6. During trial the plaintiff examined "even witnesses including himself and defendant No. 5 examined six witnesses including himself, and after trial, the learned Munsiff decreed the suit on contest with costs, against defendant No. 5 and without costs against defendants 6 to 10 and decreed ex parte against the other defendants. 7. From the aforesaid Judgement and decree of the learned Munsiff. Title Appeal No. 83/69 was preferred before the Assistant District Judge. The appeal was heard and disposed of by Shri P.C. Barthakur, Assistant District Judge No. 2. Silchar. I am constrained to observe that it does not appear from his judgement that he applied his mind to the facts of the case and made a serious attempt to dispose of the appeal on merit himself. He appears to have taken the line of least resistance to remand the entire suit to the Munsiff for disposal afresh. He has made the remand on three grounds - (i) that "Issue No. 10 was most illegally framed" and it was, according to him. "redundant"; (ii) that "the hand-writing of the learned Munsiff is not at all legible and so I could not scrutinise the evidence of the witnesses for the purpose of arriving at a decision so far as issue Nos. "redundant"; (ii) that "the hand-writing of the learned Munsiff is not at all legible and so I could not scrutinise the evidence of the witnesses for the purpose of arriving at a decision so far as issue Nos. 8 and 9 are concerned"; and (iii) that "Issue No. 8 was not at all discussed and rather the Munsiff concentrated his attention in discussing Issue No. 10 which was redundant". 8. It is clear from the order of the learned District Judge Quoted above that the learned trial Court was directed to dispose of the suit after "framing necessary issues particularly on the point of alternative claim and the claim for compensation". Issues No. 8 and 9 reproduced above were clearly in terms of the directions of the District Judge. Exception has been taken by the learned Assistant District Judge to Issue No. 10, which, according to him is "redundant". But he has not given any reason to show that this issue is redundant, irrelevant or it does not arise from the averments in the pleadings. Even assuming, that this issue is "redundant" and the suit could be disposed of on the other issues alone the learned Assistant District Judge could have ignored the Munsiffs finding on this issue and disposed of the appeal on the other issues. 9. Bad hand-writing of a trial Court can be no ground of remand. After remand, the original Munsiff with bad handwriting may not be available at all for one reason or other. The new Munsiff to whom the case comes after remand, may be in the same predicament as the appellate court making the remand. 10. Rules 23 and 25 of Order 41 give power to appellate Court to remand a case. Rule 23 gives power to the Appellate Court to make a remand when the trial Court has disposed of the suit en the preliminary point and on appeal the decree of the trial Court is reversed by the Appellate Court. This rule is riot extracted to the present case. Rule 25 gives power to the Appellate Court to remand a case where a trial Court has omitted to frame or try any issue or has omitted to determine any question of fact, which appears to the Appellate Court essential to the right decision of the suit on merit; it may frame issue,, if necessary, and refer the same to the! trial Court for trial of the same. In this connection consideration of Rule 24 is essential. Rule 24 enjoins on an appellate Court to determine a case finally where the evidence on record is sufficient to enable the appellate court to pronounce the judgement. An appellate Court cannot, obviously exercise powers simultaneously under Rules 24 and 25, When there is sufficient evidence to enable the appellate Court to pronounce judgement. it is its duty to do it under Rule 24; it cannot pass on to Rule 25 to make a remand. Remand means delay in the disposal of the suit, and delay defeats Justice. In my opinion resort to Rule 25 is illegal, if an appeal can be disposed of under Rule 24. 11. In the Instant case it is not the case of the contesting defendant, nor has been found by the learned Assistant District Judge that there is no sufficient evidence to enable him to dispose of the appeal on merit. In my opinion the grounds on which the remand was made are extraneous. If any finding was arrived at on any "redundant" issue by the Munsiff, the illegality can be corrected by the appellate court itself, but not by remand. 12. In the result I hold that the learned Assistant District Judge has failed to exercise jurisdiction in failing to dispose of the appeal under Order 41, Rule 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The impugned judgement and order of remand are quashed and the Lower Appellate Court is directed to dispose of the appeal on the materials on record. The revision application is allowed with costs. The Rule is made absolute. Hearing fee Rs. 50/-. Revision allowed.