Judgment SARWAR ALI, J. 1. These two writ applications have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. Petitioner in C. W. J. C.955 of 1969 (Rohtas Industries Mazdoor Sangh)and respondent No.6 (Rohtas Industries Industries Staff Union) in the said writ application are trade unions of workmen employed in Rohtas Industries Ltd. and Asoka Cement Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Companies ). Dalmianagar Mazdoor Sabha Sangh is another trade union of workmen, although the same has not been recognised by the Management of any of the two Companies aforesaid. 2. The case of the petitioner in C. W. J. C.955 of 1969 is that on June 4, 1969, the Management of the Companies gave notices under section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act (the act) to effect changes in the sick leave and gratuity affecting the conditions of service of the workmen employed in the two Companies. Strong protest was raised against the proposed action by the Companies. Copies of relevant correspondence on the subject between the petitioners and the executive Director of the Companies were sent to the Labour Commissioner and the local Conciliation Officer. On June 16, 1969 the Labour Officer, Dalmianagar, who is also a Conciliation Officer, issued notices fixing June 18, 1969 for conciliation. Before the conciliation aforesaid was concluded, the petitioner received a telegram from the deputy Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer at Patna in the evening of June 19, 1969 fixing conciliation at 3 p. m. on June 20,1969. The petitioner thereafter sent a telegram seeking extension of time in respect of conciliation proceeding proposed to be held on une 20, 1969. According to the petitioners case Government of Bihar without waiting for the conclusion of the conciliation proceeding at Dalmianagar, which was the only legal proceeding for conciliation, issued a notification making a reference of the disputes mentioned n the notification to the Industrial Tribunal, Patna. A copy of the notification is Annexure- 6 to this writ application. The notification is dated June 21,1969. Thereafter, i. e. on June 24, 1969 another notice of conciliation was issued by the Conciliation Officer, Dalmianagar, fixing June 25, 1969 as a date for conciliation. A copy of the notification is Annexure- 6 to this writ application. The notification is dated June 21,1969. Thereafter, i. e. on June 24, 1969 another notice of conciliation was issued by the Conciliation Officer, Dalmianagar, fixing June 25, 1969 as a date for conciliation. This conciliation, it is claimed, was in respect of the charter of demands submitted by the petitioner to the Management in the letter dated June 18, 1969, a copy of which is Annexure- 2-A to the writ application. It is further claimed that there was no dispute in respect of items 5 to 7 of the disputes referred to for adjudication under the impugned notification C. W. J. C.955 of 1969 was filed on august 21, 1969 challenging the reference to the Industrial Tribunal on various grounds which shall be noticed later. 3. The said writ application was admitted on August 25, 1969 and stay was granted. Before that date, i. e. Aug.12, 1969 the Government of Bihar issued another notification referring the disputes mentioned therein for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Patna. It may be stated that the disputes referred to by this notification are identical with the disputes referred to the Tribunal on June 21, 1969. The only material difference between the two notifications is that whereas in the earlier notification the workmen are described to be represented by the petitioner Rohtas Industries Staff Union, the second notification describes the workmen as represented by the Dalmianagar Mazdoor Sewa Sangh. The earlier reference gave rise to reference case No.50 of 1969 and the latter reference is numbered as reference No.78 of 1969. In the latter reference a joint petition was filed on behalf of Rohtas Industries Ltd. and the Dalmianagar Mazdoor Sewa Sangh stating that a settlement has been arrived at in respect of item No.7 of the dispute referred to the Tribunal. On the basis of this settlement the Industrial Tribunal gave an award in terms of the memorandum of settlement on April 13, 1970. Thereafter the petitioner filed C. W. J. C.1248 of 1970 challenging the second reference and the award. 4. On the basis of this settlement the Industrial Tribunal gave an award in terms of the memorandum of settlement on April 13, 1970. Thereafter the petitioner filed C. W. J. C.1248 of 1970 challenging the second reference and the award. 4. The case of the petitioner in C. W. J. C.1248 of 1970 is that the second reference is illegal as this reference could not be made in law with respect to the disputes which had already been referred for adjudication under the earlier reference giving rise to reference case 50 of 1969. Petitioners further case is that this reference is mala fide and the agreement arrived at between the Management and Dalmianagar Mazdoor Sewa Sangh is not binding on the petitioner. The award given by the Industrial Tribunal is fit to be quashed. 5. In C. W. J. C.955 of 1969 a counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State. The Management has not appeared in this writ application. According to the counter affidavit of the State, after the issue of various notices by the Management under Sec.9-A of the Act, notifying their intention to bring about changes in the existing service conditions of workmen, various trade unions raised industrial disputes regarding the contemplated change. Consequently, the Labour and Conciliation Officer, Dalmianagar, started a conciliation proceeding. The conciliation officer aforesaid having failed in his efforts to bring about a settlement, submitted a failure report under Section 12 (4) of the Act on June 19, 1969 through a special messenger, which was received by the State Government on June 20, 1969. It is further stated that since the unilateral action of the Management and reaction of various trade unions created a strong apprehension that there would be serious labour trouble in the two Industries concerned, the deputy Labour Commissioner, Sri S. K. Dutta, thought it proper to intervene in the dispute, and called a conciliation proceeding on June 10, 1969, after giving notice to the parties concerned by an express telegram sent on June 16, 1969. In the meeting held on June 20,1969 representatives of Dalmianagar Mazdoor Sewa Sangh and Rohtas industries Staff Union appeared before the said Deputy Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer. None, however, appeared on behalf of the petitioner. No settlement could be arrived at in the said conciliation proceeding. In the meeting held on June 20,1969 representatives of Dalmianagar Mazdoor Sewa Sangh and Rohtas industries Staff Union appeared before the said Deputy Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer. None, however, appeared on behalf of the petitioner. No settlement could be arrived at in the said conciliation proceeding. Consequently, Sri Dutta also submitted a failure report under Sec.12 (4) of the Act to Government on June 20, 1969. The counter-affidavit denies the receipt of any telegram from the petitioner praying for adjournment of conciliation proceeding which was scheduled to be held and was actually held at Patna on June 20, 1969. Apart from the notices issued under Sec.9-A of the Act by the Management on June 4 and 7, 1969, the Management issued other notices on June 11 and 19, 1969 proposing to bring about further changes in the condition of services which were to be effective on different dates beginning from June 25, 1969. The action taken by the Management had enraged the workmen who had threatened to launch a strike. It was in view of these circumstances and the non-compromising attitude of the Management that the Deputy Labour commissioner had to call the conciliation proceeding and had submitted his failure report. At two places paragraphs 2 (e) and 2 (h)- it is stated that it was after consideration of the failure reports of the two Conciliation Officers that the reference was made. At one place-paragraph 2 (g)it is stated that the State Government was competent to refer the disputes for adjudication on consideration of the report of Mr. Dutta. The specific case of the State further is that the petitioner had served a demand-cum-strike notice on the Management on June 18, 1969 threatening to call a strike on any day after June 23, 1969 in case the 30 points demand mentioned in the Annexure to the said notice were not fulfilled by the Management in the meantime. If is said that the conciliation proceeding on June 25, 1969 at the initiative of the Labour and Conciliation Officer, Dalmianagar, after giving prior notice to the parties concerned on June 24, 1969, was in respect of the dispute arising out of the said demand-cum-strike notice as mentioned above. Thus the conciliation called on June 25, 1969 was not connected or in continuation of the earlier conciliation which had already failed and a report in this respect had already been submitted. Thus the conciliation called on June 25, 1969 was not connected or in continuation of the earlier conciliation which had already failed and a report in this respect had already been submitted. It is the further case of the State that items 5 to 7 of the disputes referred to adjudication were items of disputes which had actually been raised. 6. In C. W. J. C.1248 of 1970 no counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State nor on behalf of the Companies. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Mazdoor Sewa Sangh. In this affidavit it is stated that the Management had arbitrarily terminated the agreement dated December 18, 1964 and had cancelled all existing incentive bonus and peace rate schemes. This resulted in protests by the Sangh and the matter was brought to the notice of the Labour department. It supports the case of conciliation being held at Dalmianagar and at Patna each of which resulted in failure and report of the failure to the Government. Thereafter a reference was made on June 21, 1969. In this reference, it is asserted, the claim of Sewa Sangh was ignored and the said Sewa Sangh was not made a party in the reference. It is claimed that after protest against the arbitrary and discriminatory attitude of the Government, the second reference was made in which the Sewa Sangh was described as a party to the dispute. This reference, it is asserted, is a legal reference. The settlement arrived at in this reference is, therefore, legal and valid. 7. In C. W. J. C.955 of 1969 the first contention that has been raised by Mr. B. C. Ghose on behalf of the petitioner is that two parallel conciliation proceedings could not be held and that the proceeding before the Conciliation Officer, Dalmianagar, was pending when reference was made by the Government. The conciliation purporting to have been held by Mr. Dutta, the Deputy to Labour Commissioner was illegal and there could not be any reference on the basis of failure report said to have been submitted by Mr. Dutta. 8. It is first necessary to examine whether the conciliation started by the Conciliation Officer at Dalmianagar was pending on the date of reference. Dutta, the Deputy to Labour Commissioner was illegal and there could not be any reference on the basis of failure report said to have been submitted by Mr. Dutta. 8. It is first necessary to examine whether the conciliation started by the Conciliation Officer at Dalmianagar was pending on the date of reference. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the conciliation was pending on the basis of the notice served on the petitioner on June 24, 1969 (Annexure7) fixing June 25,1969 as the date of conciliation. This argument cannot be accepted. It has been categorically stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Bihar that the conciliation proceeding started by the Conciliation Officer at Dalmianagar in pursuance of notice dated June 16, 1969 resulted in failure and after the said failure a failure report under Sec.12 (4) of the Act was submitted on June 19, 1969 through a special messenger which was received by the State Government on June 20, 1969. There is no reason to doubt the statements made. So far as conciliation notice dated June 24, 1969 is concerned it has been explained in the counter-affidavit that this was a fresh proceeding relating to demands made on the Management on June 18, 1969 in respect of 30 demands mentioned in the notice served by Rohtas Industries Mazdoor Sangh (the petitioner ). It is, therefore, clear that this fresh effort at conciliation was not in respect of matters which were subject-matter of conciliation earlier, and in respect (of) which a failure report had already been submitted. It is thus not possible to accept the contention of the petitioner that the conciliation proceeding started by the Conciliation Officer at Dalmianagar by virtue of his notice dated June 16, 1969 was pending when the impugned reference was made. 9. It was next contended in this connection that the reference in this case was on the basis of consideration of failure report of Mr. Dutta, the Deputy Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer who was holding a concurrent conciliation proceeding which was illegal. Without deciding the question whether Mr. Dutta had, in the circumstances, jurisdiction to start a conciliation proceeding, I am of the view that before making a reference the State Government had before it and had considered not only the failure report of Mr. Dutta but also the failure report of the Conciliation Officer at Dalmianagar. Without deciding the question whether Mr. Dutta had, in the circumstances, jurisdiction to start a conciliation proceeding, I am of the view that before making a reference the State Government had before it and had considered not only the failure report of Mr. Dutta but also the failure report of the Conciliation Officer at Dalmianagar. This I accept because of the categorical statements made in paragraphs 2 (e) and 2 (h) of the counter-affidavit of the State. In both these paragraphs it is clearly stated that it was on consideration of the failure reports of the two Conciliation Officers aforesaid that the reference was made. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that this could not be accepted as these statements were contradicted by the statements made in paragraph 2 (g ). The statement relied upon is as follows: "2 (g) The State Government were, therefore competent to refer the said items of disputes to adjudication on June 21, 1969 on a consideration of the report of the Deputy Commissioner of labour and Conciliation Officer, Sri S. K. Dutta. " In my view there is no contradiction between this statement and the statement referred to by me earlier. In the two paragraphs 2 (e)and 2 (h) the factual position has been explained. In paragraph 2 (g), however, what is stated, is, what is conceived to be the legal position, namely, that on consideration of the failure report of Mr. Dutta alone it was competent for the Government to make a reference. This statement in this paragraph, in my view, does not contradict the statements made in paragraphs 2 (e) and 2 (h ). There is thus no illegality in the reference on the ground suggested by the learned counsel as noticed above. 10. Learned counsel contended on the basic of the assumption that conciliation proceedings were pending at Dalmianagar that, as a matter of law, if a conciliation proceeding has been started which is pending on the date of reference the State Government has no legal authority to make a reference. Since this point of law raised in this case is of importance and may arise in other cases, it is proper that the legal position should be examined on the assumption that the conciliation proceeding was pending on the day of the reference. 11. Since this point of law raised in this case is of importance and may arise in other cases, it is proper that the legal position should be examined on the assumption that the conciliation proceeding was pending on the day of the reference. 11. The contention of the learned counsel is that once a conciliation proceeding has been started under Sec.12, the appropriate government must wait till the submission of the report of the Conciliation Officer before making a reference. Reference in this connection is made to Sec.12 of the Act. It is said that the procedure to be followed by the Conciliation Officer is mentioned in this section and sub-section (5) states that it is on consideration of the report of the Conciliation Officer that the appropriate Government, if satisfied that it is a fit case for reference, may make a reference. The argument of the learned counsel amounts to this: that powers exercisable under Sec.10 are controlled by Sec.12. I do not find merit in this argument. Sec.10 so far as relevant is: "10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals - (1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any Industrial Disputes exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing: (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in second schedule or the third schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication. : * * * provided further that where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under Sec.22 has been given, the appropriate Government shall, unless it considers that the notice has been fivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so to do, make a reference under this Act notwithstanding that any other proceedings under this Act in respect on the dispute may have commenced. * * * it may be noticed that Sections 10 and 10-A (Chapter III) are under a separate Chapter whose heading is reference of Disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals. In next Chapter procedure, power and duties of authorities are mentioned. Sec.12 lays down the duties of the Conciliation Officer. Chapter III is a self-contained Chapter. * * * it may be noticed that Sections 10 and 10-A (Chapter III) are under a separate Chapter whose heading is reference of Disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals. In next Chapter procedure, power and duties of authorities are mentioned. Sec.12 lays down the duties of the Conciliation Officer. Chapter III is a self-contained Chapter. The placing of Sec.12 in a completely different Chapter (Chapter IV) is some indication, although not conclusive of the fact that the powers under Sec.10 cannot be said to be controlled by Sec.12. What, however, is of greater importance is that the language of section 10 is plain, wide and unambiguous. The foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction under Sec.10 is laid down in the section itself. There is no reason why any limitation should be read in the wide language of the powers given in the section. The use of expression at any time in my opinion is of particular significance. This alone is sufficient to negative the contention that the exercise of power to make a reference is limited or controlled in any way except those engrafted of the section itself. If the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted it would really amount to reading into the section after the expression at any time expressions like after the receipt of the report of a Conciliation Officer, where a conciliation proceeding has been started. If the intention of the Legislature was to limit the exercise of power under the section in the way suggested by the learned counsel, the Legislature would have used appropriate expressions to do so. But it has not done so. It is there fore, not legitimate to read the limitation suggested by the learned counsel. 12. The view, based on the interpretation of the section itself, as expressed by me, is fully supported by the scheme of the Act. A reference of Sec.20 of the Act is relevant. Sec.20 (2) so far as relevant is: "20 (2) A conciliation proceeding shall be deemed to have concluded. * * * * * (c) When a reference is made to a Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under Sec.10 during the pendency of conciliation proceedings. This clearly envisages reference under Sec.10 of the Act even while a conciliation proceeding is pending. * * * * * (c) When a reference is made to a Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under Sec.10 during the pendency of conciliation proceedings. This clearly envisages reference under Sec.10 of the Act even while a conciliation proceeding is pending. In my view, the provision quoted above is by itself a complete answer to the contention of the learned counsel. The learned counsel for the petitioner, who very rightly, had himself brought to our notice this provision was aware of the difficulties created by this section. In order to get over this difficulty he contended that the deeming clause in Sec.20 (2)must relate to a public utility service and is not wide enough to cover conciliation proceedings in respect of non-public utility service. Learned counsel says that since sub-section (1) relates to public utility service sub-section (2) must also relate to the same. This argument is wholly unacceptable. Sub-section (1) relates to public utility service, because reference to Sec.22 is made in the said sub-section itself, which section relates to public utility service. The language of sub-section (2) is much wider and compasses within its scope non-public utility service by virtue of the language used in the said sub-section. Moreover if a reference is made to sub-section (3), it will be clear that this sub-section cannot in any way be said to relate only to public utility service. If this sub-section relates both public utility and non-public utility service there is no reason why sub-section (2) should be confined in the way suggested. I find that the argument of Mr. Ghose is not only unacceptable for the reasons aforementioned, but is contrary to the observations of the Supreme court in the case of Andheri-Marol-Kurla Bus Service V/s. State of Bombay (1959 2 L. L. J.236 at 238 ). There, Kapur, J. observed: "the provisions of sub-section 20 (2) apply to all conciliation proceedings whether in regard to utility service or otherwise. " 13. The view, I have expressed, is consistent with the view expressed in decisions of other High Courts. The question for consideration in the case of Rajus Cafe, Coimbatore V/s. The Industrial Tribunal (A. I. R.1951 Mad.865) was whether before the Government makes reference under section 10 (i) of the Act, the procedure indicated under Sec.12 of the Act should be followed. The question for consideration in the case of Rajus Cafe, Coimbatore V/s. The Industrial Tribunal (A. I. R.1951 Mad.865) was whether before the Government makes reference under section 10 (i) of the Act, the procedure indicated under Sec.12 of the Act should be followed. Although no final pronouncement was made in that case on this argument, the contention was examined by Rajmannar, C. J. Referring the argument the learned Judge observed: "under Sec.12, in the case of disputes in non-utility concerns the Conciliation Officer may take steps but may not. The position then would be that, in spite of the existence of a real dispute, the government would be powerless to make a reference under Sec.10 (i ). If the intention of the Legislature had been that before the Government could make a reference under Sec.10 (i), the conciliation procedure should, be compulsorily resorted to, then the provisions would have run differently. The Conciliation Officer would then have been compelled to make attempts to settle the matter and send his report within a prescribed time and it would have been specifically mentioned in Sec.10 (i) that the Government may, after considering the report of the Conciliation Officer make a reference. In the absence of such provisions we cannot place any restriction on the power undoubtedly conferred on the Government under Sec.10 (i) of the Act to make a reference whenever in its opinion there is a dispute or an apprehension of a dispute. " This case, in my view, rightly emphasises the width and aptitude of Sec.10 (i) of the Act and also points out the inference to be drawn on account of absence of any legislative provision limiting the exercise of power under the section. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that it has been held in other cases that initiation of a conciliation proceeding is not an essential preliminary to the making an order of reference under Sec.10 (i ). See for instance, B. N. Elias Company Private Ltd. and others V/s. Mukherjee (A. l. R.1959 Cal.339 ). Incidentally, it may be pointed out that it has been held in other cases that initiation of a conciliation proceeding is not an essential preliminary to the making an order of reference under Sec.10 (i ). See for instance, B. N. Elias Company Private Ltd. and others V/s. Mukherjee (A. l. R.1959 Cal.339 ). 14 I may also refer to the observation of Shah, C. J. in the case of Kanti Cotton Mills Ltd. V/s. The State of Saurashtra (A. l. R.1953 Sau.46) which is as follows: "section 10 (i) is an independent provision and is not controlled by Sec.12 (5) so far as it relates to the exercise of the Government discretion to make or not to make a reference. " 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to support his contention by suggesting that the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act was agreement through conciliation and as such Sec.10 must be controlled by Sec.12. This argument presupposes that the only purpose of the Act is to bring about agreement through conciliation. But this is not the correct appreciation of the scope and purpose of the act which, to put it broadly, is the settlement of Industrial disputes and promotion of industrial peace. The wide powers given under section 10, if unrestricted and uncontrolled by provisions of Section 12, in my view, will be more consistent with the main purpose and objective of the Act than the construction suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner. There may be cases (and the present case appears to be one of those cases), where during the pendency of conciliation proceeding (if the conciliation proceeding was in fact unconcluded) strike notice may be given and there may be a threat to stoppage of production and destruction of industrial peace. In such a situation it is difficult to see how the wide powers given under Section 10 to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication, and thereby prevent an immediate stalmate, would not be consistent with the purpose of the Act. 16. For all these reasons it is not possible to accede to the contentions of law raised by Mr. B. C. Ghose as referred to above. 17. The contention that the reference in respect of items 5 to 7 is invalid on account of the fact that there was no industrial dispute in respect of these items is equally unacceptable. 16. For all these reasons it is not possible to accede to the contentions of law raised by Mr. B. C. Ghose as referred to above. 17. The contention that the reference in respect of items 5 to 7 is invalid on account of the fact that there was no industrial dispute in respect of these items is equally unacceptable. It has been explained in paragraphs 2 (f) and 2 (1) of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Bihar that industrial dispute was, in fact, raised in respect of these items also. In view of these statements it is not possible to hold that there was no industrial dispute in respect of the items aforesaid. 18. It was lastly contended that the reference was a mala fide reference. In this connection it was contended that the reference was made on a pre-conceived opinion, there could not be a reference with such promptitude and that the Government conduct in making subsequent reference dated August 12, 1969 clearly shows mala fide. It is not possible to accept any of these contentions. The reference cannot be said to have been made on any pre-conceived opinion. As already noticed the State affidavit clearly states that the report of the two Conciliation Officers was before the Government and it was on perusal of thos failure reports that the Government made the reference. There is no question of any pre-conceived opinion formed by the Government before making the reference. I do not appreciate the argument that if the Government acts with promptitude it leads to an inference of mala fide. In this case we find that two conciliation efforts had failed and a notice containing threat to call a strike on any day after June 23, 1969 had already been served by the petitioner on the Management on June 18, 1969. In those circumstances the Government cannot be blamed for acting with promptitude in respect of a public utility service. Inference of mala fide cannot be drawn on the ground that the Government was acting without any delay and with promptitude. Even if the subsequent reference made on August 12, 1969 was misconceived and should not have been made, it will not, in my view, lead to an inference of mala fide so far as the reference made on June 21, 1969 is concerned. Even if the subsequent reference made on August 12, 1969 was misconceived and should not have been made, it will not, in my view, lead to an inference of mala fide so far as the reference made on June 21, 1969 is concerned. In fact no material has been brought to our notice from which a legitimate inference of mala fide could be drawn. 19. I am thus of the view that there is no merit in C. W. J. C.955 of 1969 which is fit to be dismissed. C. W. J. C.1248/70: 20. The challenge to the reference made on August 12, 1969 which as already noticed, is in respect of identical items as covered by the earlier reference, is challenged on two main grounds, namely, (a) that there being already an earlier reference in respect of identical items of disputes between the Workmen and the Management, there could not be another reference in respect of identical disputes; (b) that the action of the State Government in making the reference was mala fide. 21. At the time of hearing the reference was supported only by shri Katriar on behalf of the Management, although no counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the Companies. Mr. Katriar relied on and made use of the counter-affidavit filed by the Mazdoor Sewa sangh, which was not represented at the time of hearing. The contention of Mr. Katriar is that at the earlier stage there was no dispute between the Workmen and the Management. The dispute, he contended, was between the Workmen and the Government. He further contended, on the basis of the affidavit of the Mazdoor Sewa Sangh that the said Sangh being not a party to the earlier reference, the subsequent reference was a valid and legal. He also contended that the reference was a bona fide reference. 22. In my view the second reference cannot be said to be a valid reference. I may at once state that the contention of Mr. Katriar that there was no dispute between the Workmen and the Management in respect of items 5 to 7 of the reference cannot be accepted as correct in view of the statements made in the counter-affidavit of the State, already referred to by me. Mr. I may at once state that the contention of Mr. Katriar that there was no dispute between the Workmen and the Management in respect of items 5 to 7 of the reference cannot be accepted as correct in view of the statements made in the counter-affidavit of the State, already referred to by me. Mr. Katriar referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sant Ram Sharma V/s. State of Rajasthan (1968 2 L. L. J.830 at 838 ). This case is easily distinguishable because in that case it was held on facts that no dispute was raised by the Workmen so far as their employers were concerned. This is not the position here. 23. The contention that since the Mazdoor Sewa Sangh was not a party to the reference, the second reference was legal and valid is equally unacceptable, based as it is on wrong appreciation of the legal position. When a dispute is referred to adjudication, it is the dispute between the Workmen and the Management that has to be adjudicated. The description of the workmen through a particular Trade Union is only for the sake of convenience. (See the Manager, hotel Imperial), New Delhi V/s. The Chief Commissioner, Delhi (A. l. R.1959 S. C.1214 ). Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of this Court in Rameshwar Pd. V/s. The State of Bihar (C. W. J. C.411 of 1969 decided on April 11, 1972) where the legal position is, if I may say so with respect, fully explained. The earlier reference, therefore, being between the entire body of the Workmen and the Management, it cannot be said that the dispute was not already referred to for adjudication when the second reference was made. The reference dated August 12, 1969 therefore, being in respect of identifical matters which was subject-matter of reference by the notification dated June 21, 1969, must be held to be illegal and without jurisdiction. It may be pointed out that in the circumstances of the present case it would have been open, and indeed it would be open, even now for the Mazdoor Sewa Sangh, to approach the Tribunal for separate representation. 24. So far as the allegation of mala fide is concerned it is not necessary to deal with the said allegation in view of my conclusion regarding the invalidity of the reference. 24. So far as the allegation of mala fide is concerned it is not necessary to deal with the said allegation in view of my conclusion regarding the invalidity of the reference. The State has not filed any counter-affidavit explaining the circumstances in which the second reference was made. It is, therefore, sufficient to observe that the circumstances in which the said reference was made remain unexplained by the State. 25. Certain other arguments were also advanced by Mr. Ghose challenging the validity of the reference, but it is not necessary to deal with them in view of my conclusion that the reference is illegal and has to be quashed. 26. In the result, C. W. J. C. ,955 of 1969 is dismissed, and C. W. J. C.1248 of 1970 is allowed. The reference made by the Sate Government on August 12, 1969 is quashed. The settlement arrived at between the Dalmianagar Mazdoor Sewa Sangh and the Companies is held not to be binding on the petitioner. There will be no order for costs in either of these writ applications.