Moidu, J.—The appellant has been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, to three months’ rigorous imprisonment under section 323. Indian Penal Code, and to four years’ rigorous imprisonment under section 326, Indian Penal Code. The conviction under section 302 was for causing the murder of one Joseph by the appellant stabbing him with M.O. 1 dagger and the conviction under section 323, Indian Penal Code, was for beating Joseph with his hands at about 7-30 p.m. on 18th April, 1972. The conviction under section 326, Indian Penal Code, was for causing grievous hurt to P.W.1 by stabbing him with M.O. 1 dagger at the same time and place. The sentences are to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution story was narrated as follows: Some dispute existed originally between P.W.5, a brother of deceased Joseph on the one hand, and P.W.7 a brother of the appellant’s brother in-law on the other, with regard to a transaction in paddy seeds. That dispute developed into enmity between the respective families of the appellant and deceased Joseph. While so a wordy altercation took place on the date of the incident near one Koomanthodu bridge between P.W.1 and deceased Joseph and the appellant. P.W.1 is the younger brother of deceased Joseph. They were on their way back home after sale of milk in the adjacent village. P.W.1 went walking a little ahead of Joseph when he met the appellant near the bridge. While they were engaged in some exchange of words Joseph came and disrupted the talk. Thereafter the appellant crossed the bridge and stood on the road on the other side. In the meanwhile Joseph walked through the channel and reached near the appellant when again there was a wordy quarrel between them during the course of which the appellant drew out M.O. 1 dagger intending to stab Joseph. But due to the timely intervention of P.W. 6, no untoward incident happened there. P.W.6 directed the appellant to go away from the place while he asked P.W.1 and Joseph to go home a little later. It was thereafter that the appellant went and stood in front of the house of deceased Joseph. The house of P.W.5, another brother of Joseph, was adjacent to it. P.W.6 directed the appellant to go away from the place while he asked P.W.1 and Joseph to go home a little later. It was thereafter that the appellant went and stood in front of the house of deceased Joseph. The house of P.W.5, another brother of Joseph, was adjacent to it. When Joseph reached in front of his house, the appellant beat him first on his face with his hand and then stabbed him with M.O. 1 causing a penetrating injury on his left eye. By then P.W.1 came running to the spot and P.W. 5 accompanied by P.W. 2, wife, and P.W. 3, daughter of Joseph, also arrived at the scene hearing the cry of Joseph. As soon as the stab on the eye was inflicted Joseph had caught hold of the appellant. While so the appellant stabbed him again on his back with the result that he fell down. P.W. 1 then intervened when he too was stabbed on his back with M.O. 1. However, he was able to overpower the appellant by wresting M.O. 1 from him with the help of P.W.5. After getting M.O. 1 from him it was handed over to P.W.5 who in his turn handed it over to P.W. 2. While wresting M.O. 1 from the appellant, P.W.1 sustained two more injuries on his hands. Finally, they tied down the appellant with a rope. P.Ws. 4 and 6 came there later and saw the appellant lying tied down with a rope. But the appellant’s brother released him a little later. 3. Joseph and P.W.1 were removed to the Government Hospital, Cannanore, where P.W. 9, Assistant Surgeon, met Joseph at 12-45 a.m. and P.W.1 at 1-15 a.m. On their examination, Exhibit P-7 wound certificate was issued for the injuries of Joseph and Exhibit P-8 wound certificate for the injuries of P.W. 1. P.W.9 sent Exhibit P-11 intimation at 1-50 a.m. to the Town Police Station, Cannanore. On receipt of that intimation P.W. 12 Head Constable reached the hospital at 9-30 a.m. when he recorded Exhibit P-12 first information statement from Joseph who was lying as an in-patient at the hospital. Crime No. 153 of 1972 was registered against one Jose at the Cannanore Town Police Station on the basis of Exhibit P-12. First information report was then transferred to the Iritty Police Station, within the jurisdiction of which the incident took place. Crime No. 153 of 1972 was registered against one Jose at the Cannanore Town Police Station on the basis of Exhibit P-12. First information report was then transferred to the Iritty Police Station, within the jurisdiction of which the incident took place. Crime No. 38 of 1972 was registered at that police station on the basis of the First information report at 6-20 p.m. on 19th April, 1972. Exhibit P-21 was the first information report. After registering the crime, P.W.16 Head Constable, Iritty, proceeded to the Cannanore hospital and questioned P.W.1 and Joseph, when he seized their blood-stained clothes and other articles (M.Os. 2 to 11) under Exhibits P-1 and P-4 mahazars. Then he went to the scene of the occurrence at which he prepared Exhibit P-3 scene mahazar and under Exhibit P-2 mahazar he seized M.O. 1 dagger which was produced by P.W.2. On the day on which Joseph was admitted to the hospital, he had been operated upon by P.W.18, Assistant Surgeon, when it was revealed that one of his kidneys was completely damaged due to the injury. So it was removed. But Joseph succumbed to the injuries on 21st April, 1972 at the hospital. 4. In the meanwhile the appellant got himself admitted into the same hospital at 9-00 p.m. on 19th April, 1972. On the basis of Exhibit P-18 intimation, P.W.12 went to the hospital again on 20th April, 1972, when the appellant gave Exhibit P-19 statement at 12 noon on the basis of which another crime was registered at the Town Police Station, which also was subsequently transferred to the Iritty Police Station. P.W. 11, Assistant Surgeon, examined the appellant and issued Exhibit P-10 wound certificate. 5. P.W.20 Sub-Inspector held the inquest over the dead body. Exhibit P-6 was the inquest report, P.W.10 Assistant Surgeon conducted autopsy and issued Exhibit P-9 post-mortem certificate. The appellant was arrested after he was discharged from the hospital. The appellants case as set out in Exhibit P-19 was referred as false. 6. The appellant stated in his section 342 statement that while he was going to his sister’s house, he was beaten and hit with stones by P.W.1 and deceased Joseph and that the case was falsely foisted on him. 7. P.Ws. 2 and 3, the widow and 13 years old daughter of deceased Joseph and P.Ws. 1 and 5, his two brothers, were the eye-witnesses to the occurrence. 7. P.Ws. 2 and 3, the widow and 13 years old daughter of deceased Joseph and P.Ws. 1 and 5, his two brothers, were the eye-witnesses to the occurrence. The learned Sessions Judge sought corroboration of their evidence from the appellant’s statement which he made to the police on 20th April, 1972 as per Exhibit P-19 after the police started investigation into the case on the basis of the first information Exhibit P-12 lodged by Joseph himself before his death to the police. Exhibit P-12 was recorded in the morning of 19th April, 1972. The admissibility of Exhibit P-19 in evidence was disputed even at the trial stage, but the Sessions Judge admitted it. Then he made profuse use of the contents of that statement against the appellant for corroboration of the evidence of the eyewitnesses. The way in which he made use of Exhibit P-19 in the course of his judgment to implicate the appellant to the crime may be seen from his judgment. He stated: "The relevancy of Exhibit P-19 statement lies in ascertaining the veracity or otherwise of the evidence of the witnesses examined by the prosecution as occurrence witnesses. The oral testimony of the occurrence witnesses has to be considered in the light of certain admissions made by the accused in Exhibit P-19." Then again he stated: "The evidence of P.Ws. 4 and 6 and admission of the accused in Exhibit P-19 thus fully corroborate the testimony of P.Ws. 1 to 3 and 5 that the accused was tied up by P.Ws. 1 and 5 at the scene of occurrence. His presence at the scene is hence proved." 8. The prosecution itself had a case in the beginning when investigation started that deceased Joseph was stabbed by one Jose and that he ran away after stabbing. To improbabilise that version reference was made to Exhibit P-19 and the Judge stated: "There is no mention whatever in Exhibit P-19 statement about the presence of Jose at the scene at any time. Although, the accused stated in Exhibit P-19 that he was unbound by his brother, the name of that brother is Mathew and not Jose." At another place in the judgment the learned Sessions Judge again referred to Exhibit P-19 for corroboration of the evidence of eye-witnesses. Although, the accused stated in Exhibit P-19 that he was unbound by his brother, the name of that brother is Mathew and not Jose." At another place in the judgment the learned Sessions Judge again referred to Exhibit P-19 for corroboration of the evidence of eye-witnesses. There it is stated: "The evidence of these witnesses, as already mentioned above, is to be scrutinised in the light of the admissions made by the accused in Exhibit P-19 statement and also the evidence of P.Ws. 4 and 6." There was a quarrel between the appellant and deceased Joseph by the side of one Koomanthodu bridge just prior to the incident. The only evidence to prove that quarrel was that of P.W.1. The defence did not admit any such quarrel. Yet the learned Judge sought corroboration of the evidence of P.W.1 on the basis of Exhibit P-19 by saying: "That fact has been admitted by the accused in Exhibit P-19 statement." 9. During the cross-examination of P.Ws 1 to 3 and 5 several contradictions had been brought on record between their evidence in Court and their statement to the police during the investigation under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code They were proved against the prosecution and marked as Exhibits D-1 to D-12. Without considering the impact of those contradictions on the veracity of the prosecution case, the learned Judge sought refuge in Exhibit P-19 to reduce its relevancy and importance and stated as follows: "The evidence of these witnesses has been attacked by the defence by bringing out certain contradictions. When it is clear from Exhibit P-19 statement of the accused that there was an incident in which the accused and the deceased and P.W.1 were involved, much of the contradictions proved in this case have not much relevance. ............ On a reading of their evidence along with the admissions contained in Exhibit P-19 and the testimony of P.Ws. 4 and 6. I am satisfied that their evidence regarding the occurrence can be believed. I am satisfied and I hold that the injuries on the deceased and P.W.1 were caused by the accused stabbing them with a dagger.“ 10. On perusing the judgment, it is established beyond dispute that the learned Sessions Judge was influenced by the statement of the appellant in Exhibit P-19 and not by the veracity of the evidence of the eye-witnesses as to the truth of the prosecution case. On perusing the judgment, it is established beyond dispute that the learned Sessions Judge was influenced by the statement of the appellant in Exhibit P-19 and not by the veracity of the evidence of the eye-witnesses as to the truth of the prosecution case. It did not appear that the learned Judge considered the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 and 5 independently of Exhibit P-19 to arrive at the truth of their evidence. The conclusion of the Judge was therefore tainted with irrelevant and faulty reasoning. This was to a large extent due to the admission of Exhibit P-19 at the trial as a piece of evidence against the appellant. 11. Exhibit P-19 statement was recorded during the investigation of the crime started on the basis of Exhibit P-12 first information lodged earlier in the case. The investigation was commenced on the basis of Exhibit P-12. Acounter-case had been registered on the basis of Exhibit P-19 and thereafter investigation was continued simultaneously in both the crimes and the police referred the crime registered on the basis of Exhibit P-19. Therefore the question has arisen as to whether Exhibit P-19 can be used as evidence against the appellant in the Sessions trial which culminated in the conviction of the appellant under section 302, Indian Penal Code. 12. It is the cardinal principle of criminal trial and inquiry that no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation shall, if reduced into writing, be used for any purpose at the inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made. But if any part of such statement has been proved at the trial or inquiry, that part can be used either by the accused or the prosecution to contradict or corroborate the witness with that part of the statement in the manner provided in section 145 or section 157 of the Evidence Act. Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, together with the proviso and sub-section (2) thereof may be seen. It reads: ”162. Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, together with the proviso and sub-section (2) thereof may be seen. It reads: ”162. (1) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a policediary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, he used for any purpose (save as hereinafter provided) at an inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made: Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused, and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination. (2) Nothing in this section shall be. deemed to apply to any statement falling within the provisions of section 32, clause (1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, or to affect the provisions of section 27 of that Act.“ 13. Even the first information lodged in a case for the police to set in motion the process of investigation is not a substantive evidence at the trial. The first information is the one which is reduced to writing and signed by the first informant as required by section 154, Criminal Procedure Code. The scope and impact of a first information statement leading to its admissibility have been dealt with in an effective manner by the Supreme Court in Faddi v. State of Madhya Pradesh1. At page 1853 it is stated as follows: ”The report is not a confession of the appellant. It is not a statement made to a police officer during the course of investigation. At page 1853 it is stated as follows: ”The report is not a confession of the appellant. It is not a statement made to a police officer during the course of investigation. Section 25 of the Evidence Act and section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not bar its admissibility." In Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh1 Kapur, J., who spoke for the Court, said: "A first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under section 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict it under section 145 of that Act. It cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, nor to corroborate or contradict other witnesses". The concluding part of the above observation was, however, explained in Faddi’s case2, pointing out that the observation was limited to the facts of that case inasmuch as the first information lodged by a co-accused could not be used as evidence against the other accused in that case. 14. It is relevant at this stage to consider as to how the conduct of an accused person has been admitted in evidence under section 21 of the Evidence Act as pointed out in Aran Kumar Banerjee v. The State3. In that case one Arun made a report at the police station about his missing wife on 1st August, 1960, though the dead body of his wife was recovered with fatal injuries on 25th July, 1960. The report made by Arun was recorded in the general diary of the police station. It was revealed later that Arun himself was the murderer of his wife. The admissibility of the entry in the general diary against Arun was in dispute in that case. The Calcutta High Court supported its admissibility in the following words: "........this general diary entry in this case is not the first information report at all but is only a missing information. A first information report has to answer certain tests, namely, that it must relate to a cognizable offence. A report that somebody is missing is not an information relating to the commision of a cognizable offence under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Then also it has to be signed by the person giving it. A first information report has to answer certain tests, namely, that it must relate to a cognizable offence. A report that somebody is missing is not an information relating to the commision of a cognizable offence under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Then also it has to be signed by the person giving it. This general diary entry is not signed by appellant Arun.....Mr. Dutta in fact could not bring to our notice or cite any case which has decided that a missing information such as is contained in this particular general diary entry cannot be used as a circumstance proving the conduct of the accused. Nor do we consider that this exhibit is at all hit by section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is not a statement made to a police officer in course of investigation nor is it signed by the person making it." 15. In Tika Ram v. The State4, the question which arose for consideration was whether the first information statement lodged as Exhibit P-14 by one person as against the first information already lodged by another [both appeared as prosecution witnesses at the trial] in respect of the same incident was inadmissible in evidence as against its maker coming within the bar of section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. On the authority of an earlier Bench decision of the same High Court in Emperor v. Aftab Mohamed Khan5, it was held: "that if there was a report which was found to have been made quite independently of, and in no relation to, any pending investigation, was not designed to promote a pending investigation, and had no reference at all to the investigation which had in fact already begun, it was a document admissible for the purpose of corroborating the evidence of its maker. ....................We have therefore no hesitation in upholding the admissibility of the report Exhibit P-14. It is of course not substantive evidence of the facts stated therein, but it is evidence to corroborate Nek Ram (maker) under section 157 of the Evidence Act, or to contradict him under sections 155 and 145." 16. It is not every statement made to the police in the course of the investigation that is shut out under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. It is not every statement made to the police in the course of the investigation that is shut out under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. The bar is only for statements made to the police in the course of their investigation under Chapter XIV, Criminal Procedure Code. To make this point clear, reference may be made to the observation made in Padmaraju Konstiraju v. Padmaraju Subbaraju1. It reads: “Section 162 refers not to every statement recorded by the police, but only to statements made to them in the course of their investigation under Chapter XIV and prohibits the use of the statements to the police only ‘at any enquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made.‘An enquiry made by the police on a petition referred to them by a Magistrate under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is not an investigation under Chapter XIV, or in respect of any ‘offence’. A proceeding before a Magistrate under section 145 is not an enquiry or trial in respect of any ‘offence.‘Therefore an order disallowing a party to the proceedings under section 145 from cross-examining a witness with reference to certain statements he had made to the police during the course of their enquiry on the ground that the statements fell within the ban of section 162 is clearly erroneous”. 17. The Supreme Court had to consider the admissibility of a letter which was purported to have been sent by the accused in a case to the Sub-Inspector who investigated that case in Baleshwar Rai v. The State of Bihar2. That was an anonymous letter marked as Exhibit 6 which on examination by a handwriting expert was found to have been sent by the accused himself. The Supreme Court pointed out that Exhibit 6 was admissible in evidence as an admission as to the motive under section 21 of the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court gave the following reasons in support of its admissibility at page 439: “Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code only bars proof of statements made to an investigating officer during the course of investigation. Section 162 does not say that every statement made during the period of investigation is barred from being proved in evidence. The Supreme Court gave the following reasons in support of its admissibility at page 439: “Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code only bars proof of statements made to an investigating officer during the course of investigation. Section 162 does not say that every statement made during the period of investigation is barred from being proved in evidence. For a statement to come within the purview of section 162, it must not merely be made during the period of investigation but also in the course of investigation. The two things, that is, ‘the period of investigation’ and ‘course of investigation’ are not synonymous. Section 162 is aimed at statements recorded by a police officer while investigating into an offence. This is clear from the opening words of section 162. They speak only of statements made to a police officer during the course of investigation. This implies that the statement sought to be excluded from evidence must be ascribable to the enquiry conducted by the investigating officer and not one which is de hors the enquiry. A communication like Exhibit 6 will not fall within the ambit of such statements. In this- view we hold that the document in question is not hit by section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the High Court was right in admitting it in evidence.” 18. On any stretch of imagination, it cannot be held that the statement made by an accused person in the course of investigation to the police shall be taken and treated as first information statement as contemplated under section 154, Criminal Procedure Code, though initially it would have been so recorded at a time when the police officer in charge of the police station or the police officer who takes down the information at any other place is not conversant with the facts of the case. In the instant case which is in hand, Exhibit P-19 was never intended to be a first information in the present case. On the other hand, it was a statement made by the accused in the course of the investigation. If it is such a statement, its admission at the trial of the accused in the case is hit by the provisions of section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. On the other hand, it was a statement made by the accused in the course of the investigation. If it is such a statement, its admission at the trial of the accused in the case is hit by the provisions of section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. Exhibit P-19 as well as Exhibit P-12 was recorded by P. W. 12 Head Constable who was conversant with the facts of the case already when the deceased furnished the earliest statement. It was only after the investigation started that Exhibit P-19 was recorded. 19. Almost identical to the facts of the case in hand were the facts in a decision of the Supreme Court in Mohar Rai v. State of Bihar1. In that case two complaints, one by A and the other by M in respect of the same incident were made to the police giving divergent versions. Statement of A was recorded as first information in one case and statement of M was recorded as first information in the other. Simultaneous investigation was conducted an both the cases. B was questioned during the investigation and his statement was recorded. Finally prosecution was launched against B and M. During the course of the trial, the statement of B was marked as Exhibit 4. Hegde, J. who spoke for the Court, held: “The trial Court and the High Court relied on Bharath Rai’s statement that it was Naulakh Rai who fired a pistol to contradict the statement of Mohar Rai in his complaint that a pistol was fired by Bhudhnath. No portion of Exhibit 4 could have been used for that purpose either under section 157 or section 145 of the Evidence Act as Bharath Rai was not examined as a witness in the present case his previous statement could not have been used either to contradict his evidence or corroborate it even, if it is to be held that it is a statement coming under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 20. The decisions of the Supreme Court; neither in Faddi v. State of Madhya Pradesh2, nor in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar3, were in conflict with Mohar Rai v. State of Bihar1. The decisions of the Supreme Court; neither in Faddi v. State of Madhya Pradesh2, nor in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar3, were in conflict with Mohar Rai v. State of Bihar1. In those two earlier rulings the first information statement was lodged under section 154, Criminal Procedure Code, by a person who turned out to be an accused later in the stage of investigation in which case the question considered was whether any part of that statement was confession. If it was a confession then it is hit by the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act; if it is admission then that part of the admission is admissible under section 21 of the Evidence Act. ax. Reference may be made again to Faddi’s case2. The admission part of a first information is held to be admissible in that ruling. It is stated as follows at page 1853: “The report is not a confession of the appellant. It is not a statement made to a police officer during the course of investigation. Section 25 of the Evidence Act and section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not bar its admissibility. The report is an admission by the accused of certain facts which have a bearing on the question to be determined by the Court, viz., how and by whom the murder of Gulab was committed, or whether the appellant’s statement in Court denying the correctness of certain statements of the prosecution witnesses is correct or not. Admissions are admissible in evidence under section 21 of the Act. Section 17 defines an admission to be a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact In issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, thereafter mentioned, in the Act. Section 21 provides that admissions are relevant and may be proved as against a person who makes them. Illustrations (c), (d) ana (e) to section 21 are of the circumstances in which an accused could prove his own admissions which go in his favour in view of the exceptions mentioned in section 21 to the provision that admissions could not be proved by the person who makes them. It is therefore clear that admission of an accused can be proved against him.” 22. It is therefore clear that admission of an accused can be proved against him.” 22. The decision in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar3, limited the scope of the admissibility of an admission by an accused person in his first information statement and has dealt with the scope and admissibility of an accused person’s first information statement in its entirety. The specific first information statement of the accused involved in that case was split up into 18 separate parts, of which parts 1, 15 and 18 alone were held to be admissible under section 21 of the Evidence Act as an admission and the rest of the parts were found to be confessions on which the bar of section 25 of the Evidence Act operated. The observation in the above case may be seen at page 123: “If the first information is given by the accused himself, the fact of his giving the information is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under section 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information is a non-confessional statement, it is admissible against the accused as an admission under section 21 of the Evidence Act and is relevant......But a confessional first information report to a police officer cannot be used against the accused in view of section 25 of the Evidence Act.” At page 125: “If the first information report is given by the accused to a police officer and amounts to a confessional statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by section 25. The confession includes not only the admission of the offence but all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the offence contained in the confessional statement. No part of the confessional statement is receivable in evidence except to the extent that the ban of section 25 is lifted by section 27.” 23. In the same decision the Supreme Court pointed out that even if part of the report is properly severable from the strict confessional part, the severable part also cannot be used in evidence. Pointing out the exact portion of an admission out of the first information statement of the accused person as admissible the Supreme Court held at, page 125 as follows: “Some of the decided cases took the view that if a part of the report is properly severable from the strict confessional part, then the severable part could be tendered in evidence. We think that the separability test is misleading, and the entire confessional statement is hit by section 25 and save and except as provided by section 27 and save and except the formal part identifying the accused as the maker of the report, no part of it could be tendered in evidence. We think, therefore, that save and except parts 1, 15 and 18 identifying the appellant as the maker of the first information report and save and except the portions coming within the purview of section 27, the entire first information report must be excluded from evidence.” 24. It is now clear from a review of these decisions of the Supreme Court that a first information statement by an accused person under section 154, Criminal Procedure Code, is inadmissible in evidence in respect of every part of that statement if that part forms a confession under section 25 of the Evidence Act and that if any portion of that first information statement appeared to be an admission, that part of the admission is admissible under section 8 or section 21 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of identification of the person who made the first information statement as the accused. 25. But no part of a statement, either made as confession or admission, by an accused person to the police officer during the course of the investigation of a crime against him shall be admitted in evidence as such a statement is barred by section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. However, the statements falling under sections 27 and 32 (1) of the Evidence Act are exceptions to this rule. 26. Considering the case in hand, it is clear that Exhibit P-19 statement is hit by the provisions of section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, as it was recorded after the investigation had been commenced. It is therefore inadmissible in evidence. 27. The next question for consideration is whether the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3 and 5 was worthy of acceptance and whether on the strength of other evidence it is possible to hold that the crime has been proved against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. P. Ws. 1 and 5 are the brothers of deceased Joseph and P.W. 2 his wife and P. W. 3 his daughter. Exhibit P-12 was the earliest document which came on record in his case. P. Ws. 1 and 5 are the brothers of deceased Joseph and P.W. 2 his wife and P. W. 3 his daughter. Exhibit P-12 was the earliest document which came on record in his case. In that document the accused person was alleged to be one Jose who is a brother of the appellant. The same name was incorporated in Exhibit P-13, F.I.R. and in Exhibit P-11 intimation from the hospital to the police station. But it: appeared that when P.W.16 Head Constable visited the hospital and met the deceased on 20th April, 1972, he came to know from him that the name of Jose was a mistake for the appellant. First of all, it was doubted whether Joseph would have been in a position to answer any questions put to him after he underwent an operation for the removal of his damaged kidney on the morning of 19th April, 1972. If Joseph had mentioned the name of the appellant as the real accused it was an important piece of evidence to be used against the appellant. But no such question was put to the appellant under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code. Exhibit P-12 further stated that the accused had run away from the place after Joseph and P.W. 1 were stabbed. But it was the prosecution case that the appellant was tied down at the spot at the instance of P.Ws. 1 and 5 and therefore there was no chance for the appellant running away. The statement in Exhibit P-12 that Joseph ran away after the incident was an indication that the real accused may not be the appellant. 28. The evidence of P.W.3 was that she saw the appellant inflicting one stab on Joseph. Then she stated that she saw the first stab being inflicted in the eye of Joseph. The prosecution case was that P.Ws. 2, 3 and 5 came to the spot after the appellant inflicted the first stab on Joseph. If P.W.3 had witnessed the first stab in the eye of Joseph, she could have seen as to how P.W.1 sustained stab injuries. But she stated that she did not know how P.W.1 sustained some injuries. That was an indication that she was not a truthful witness. She was a 13 year-old student. It was likely that she was tutored to give evidence. But she stated that she did not know how P.W.1 sustained some injuries. That was an indication that she was not a truthful witness. She was a 13 year-old student. It was likely that she was tutored to give evidence. Neither P.W.2 nor P.W.3 was able to say the site of the injury due to the single stab they witnessed. P.W.2 saw only pushing and pulling between Joseph and the appellant in which P.W.1 was also involved. According to her the appellant stabbed Joseph and P.W. 1 during the tussle. She, however, did not see the appellant stabbing P.W.1 though she was alleged to have reached the spot before P.W. 1 arrived there. In cross-examination she stated that she came out of her house after the tussle between Joseph and the appellant was over. She was able to see the injuries on the person of Joseph only when she went near the place where he was lying down. It was due to the moonlight that she was able to see the incident. That appears to be the reason why she was not able to see the injuries being caused to Joseph as a result of the stabs. In the committal Court, she stated that as soon as Joseph was sighted by her from her house, he was lying on the ground. If that be so P.W.2 was not likely to have seen the appellant stabbing Joseph. The prosecution case was that Joseph had been stabbed before he fell down on the ground. 29. P.W.5 was definite that Joseph had not been stabbed after he fell into the tapioca garden which is next to the place of occurrence. But during the investigation he told the police that when he reached there running, he found Joseph lying down in the tapioca garden and the appellant stabbing him. On another occasion he told the police that the appellant stabbed Joseph on his back when he was lying on the road which is the place of occurrence. It is not correct to say that he heard the cry of Joseph as “Ayyo” while he was standing on the steps of his compound. He told the police that when he heard the cry “Ayyo” he was inside his house. So he could not have seen any part of the stabbing incident by the time he reached the spot. It is not correct to say that he heard the cry of Joseph as “Ayyo” while he was standing on the steps of his compound. He told the police that when he heard the cry “Ayyo” he was inside his house. So he could not have seen any part of the stabbing incident by the time he reached the spot. P.W.5 stated in the committal Court: “I looked that side; by then stabbing was over”. According to him, it took only five minutes between the 1 tearing of the cry “Ayyo” and the tying down of the appellant with a rope. But in the committal Court he stated that it took only one or two minutes. That was an indication that he could not have seen the incident. 30. The evidence of P.W.1 was not consistent with the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3 and 5. He stated in his examination-in-chief that after Joseph fell down the appellant did not stab him. The other witnesses did not support P.W.1 in that version. But in cross-examination P.W.1 stated that the appellant stabbed Joseph twice after he fell down. The prosecution had a case that the appellant beat Joseph before he was stabbed. There was no corresponding injury due to the beating. In the committal Courts P.W.1 did not say that the appellant beat Joseph before he was stabbed. He told the police that the appellant beat Joseph first as a result of which he fell down and then the appellant stabbed him. This version was contrary to his previous version. During the inquest he told the police that the place of occurrence was in the tapioca garden. But in the evidence the place of occurrence was mentioned as the road. But when he was further questioned he stated that he was stabbed at the tapioca garden. In one of the contradictions marked as Exhibit P-5 the appellant told the police that Joseph had been stabbed before P.Ws. 2, 3 and 5 arrived at the scene. If any value was to be attached to these contradictions, it would be impossible to say whether any one of these witnesses would have seen the incident. 31. There was absolutely no evidence as to how the incident started. Even according to P.W.1 he came to the scene seeing both the appellant and Joseph engaged in a tussle. If any value was to be attached to these contradictions, it would be impossible to say whether any one of these witnesses would have seen the incident. 31. There was absolutely no evidence as to how the incident started. Even according to P.W.1 he came to the scene seeing both the appellant and Joseph engaged in a tussle. P.W.6 stated that during the first incident near the bridge both P.W.1 and deceased Joseph were in an aggressive mood and that they wanted to beat the appellant. The appellant was a student of 18 years of age. P.W.6 stated that the appellant had implored both to P.W.1 and deceased Joseph not to beat him. P.W.6 found him in an exhausted and weak condition after the incident. He had on his person two contusions and some abrasions soon after the incident (vide Exhibit D-16 body mahazar). How these contusions were found on his person had not been explained. The learned Sessions Judge found that M.O. 1 dagger was not the dagger with which Joseph was stabbed. According to him it must have been some other dagger which was used for stabbing. The evidence against the appellant was not cogent, convincing or reliable. It is difficult to enter a conviction in this case on the basis of the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 5. It was brought out that there was a family quarrel between the appellant and deceased Joseph. In that case the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 5 could not be relied upon as it came from a hostile camp. On a reappraisal of the evidence it was conclusively established that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant is therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt. 32. In the result, in allowing the appeal the convictions and sentences are set aside. The appellant is acquitted. He is set at liberty. He shall be released forthwith. Narayana Pillai, J.- To be fair to the accused the prosecution was bound to produce in Court the first information statement in the counter case. The purpose in producing Exhibit P-19 was only that. It could not be used as an item of evidence against the accused as it is hit by section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is unsafe to act on the prosecution evidence. The purpose in producing Exhibit P-19 was only that. It could not be used as an item of evidence against the accused as it is hit by section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is unsafe to act on the prosecution evidence. I agree in allowing the appeal, in setting aside the convictions and sentences and in acquitting the accused. M.C.M. ----- Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence aside.