JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - Aggrieved against the assessment orders passed under the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961 in respect of the months of December 1970, January, February and March 1971 the petitioner filed a single appeal. The appeal was filed within the prescribed period of limitation from the date of the intimation of the assessment order, but the memorandum of appeal was not accompanied by proof of payment of the tax admitted by the appellant to be due from him as required by the proviso to Sec. 3(5) of the Act. At the hearing of the appeal it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that he may be permitted to deposit the admitted tax and the appeal be heard on merits after condoning the delay. The Assistant Commissioner-Cum-Appellate Authority held that there is no provision in the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961 applying Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act to proceedings under it. Section 3(5) which provides for an appeal does not authorise condonation of delay. On this view the appeals relating to the assessment orders for the months of December 1970, January and February 1971 were dismissed as, barred by time. The appeal relating to March 1971 was dismissed on merits. 2. In the present writ petition the orders holding that the appeals were barred by time hive been challenged. 3. Sub-sec. (5) of Section 3 provides for an appeal to be filed within thirty days of the intimation of the order. The proviso says : "Provided that (except in the case of tax recoverable in accordance with Section 3-A) no appeal shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of payment of the amount admitted by the appellant to be due from him." The question is as to the significance of the word "entertained" with reference to the appeal. The other question is whether the proviso requires the payment of the admitted tax within the prescribed period of limitation. In Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) I. Sales Tax, Kanpur Range, Kanpur 21 S.T.C. 154 the Supreme Court constructed a similar provision in Section 9 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. The other question is whether the proviso requires the payment of the admitted tax within the prescribed period of limitation. In Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) I. Sales Tax, Kanpur Range, Kanpur 21 S.T.C. 154 the Supreme Court constructed a similar provision in Section 9 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. It held that "entertainment" means the point of time when the appeal is being considered for the first time when the Court takes up the matter for consideration for the first time, satisfactory proof must be presented that the tax was paid within the period of limitation available for the appeal. Thus the payment of the admitted tax within the prescribed period of limitation for an appeal is a mandatory condition though the production of satisfactory proof of its payment is directory in the sense that such proof may be produced before the Appellate Authority, till the time when the appeal is taken up for the first time. In the present case the petitioner had not paid the admitted tax even till the time when the appeal was taken up for consideration. By that date the prescribed period of limitation for the appeal had long expired. The requisite mandatory condition not having been complied with the appeal was incompetent even on the date when it was taken up for hearing. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that in law the appeal could he deemed to have been filed on the date when the admitted tax was paid and the delay could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was urged that the finding of the Appellate Authority that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable was in law erroneous. 5. It was urged that the finding of the Appellate Authority that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable was in law erroneous. 5. Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 provides : "(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period, prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." It cannot be said that the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961, was not a special or local law. Section 3(5) thereof provides for a period of limitation of thirty days for an appeal. Admittedly, the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act does not make any provision for such appeals, but that will not make any difference because in Vidya Charan v. Khubchand, A.I.R. 1964 S. C. 1099 it has been held that Section 29(2) would apply even to cases where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for a limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act. There is no provision in the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961 either excluding or limiting the application, inter alia, of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Thus under Section 29(2), Section 5 of the Limitation Act is attracted to an appeal filed under Section 3(5) of the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961. The view of the Appellate Authority on this legal question was erroneous. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner informed us that the petitioner had deposited the entire amount of admitted tax in pursuance of the interim order passed by this Court on 13-2-1973. The question whether there was sufficient cause to merit condonation of delay is one of fact. In our opinion, It will be appropriate if this question is determined by the Appellate Authority. 7. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The question whether there was sufficient cause to merit condonation of delay is one of fact. In our opinion, It will be appropriate if this question is determined by the Appellate Authority. 7. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned appellate order dated 30-8-1972 is quashed in so far as it relates to the assessment orders for December 1970, January and February 1971. The matter is sent back to the Assistant Sugar Commissioner-Cum-Appellate Authority for decision of the appeal afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. We however, make no order as to costs.