J. B. MEHTA, S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff Mahila Sahakari Udyog Mandir a society registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act 1925 has filed these two revision applications as the plaintiffs suit against the concerned defendants-tenants had been dismissed by both the Courts. The appellate Court had held that the plaintiff-society had purchased the suit premises on November 29 1962 from Bai Taragauri widow of Maganlal Narandas for Rs. 25000/and had proved its title. The lower appellate Court also held that the plaintiff would have greater hardship and concurred with that finding of the trial Court. The plaintiffs suit however was dismissed on the short ground that the plaintiff-societys requirement could not be said to be a reasonable requirement because the plaintiff society sought to use these residential premises for the purposes of the society contrary to the bar created by sec. 25 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act. As there were conflicting decisions the learned Single Judge has referred the matter to the Division Bench and that is how it has come up before us. Sec. 25 (1) of the Act enacts that a landlord shall not use or permit to be used for a non-residential purpose any premises which on the date of the coming into operation of this Act were used for a residential purpose. Under sub-sec. (2) any landlord who contravenes the provisions of sub-sec. (1) shall on conviction be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine or with both. ( 2 ) SEC. 25 (1) imposes an embargo on converting residential premises into non-residential premises provided that they were used for a residential purpose on the date when the Act came into operation. The salutary object of sec. 25 (1) is to see that the residential accommodation which is available in the area in question is not curtailed by the landlords changing or permitting change of the user of the said premises. This mandatory obligation created by sec. 25 (1) is sought to be implemented by the penalty provided by sec. 25 (2) and the penal provision has therefore to be strictly construed. Sec. 13 (1) however provides that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of sec. This mandatory obligation created by sec. 25 (1) is sought to be implemented by the penalty provided by sec. 25 (2) and the penal provision has therefore to be strictly construed. Sec. 13 (1) however provides that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of sec. 15 a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purpose of the trust. There is no dispute that the plaintiff society is a registered public charitable trust. Therefore after this 1953 amendment in sec. 13 (1) (g) such a landlord which is a private or a public charitable trust is also entitled to recover possession of the suit premises under sec. 13 (1) (g) provided the premises are required for occupation for the purpose of the trust. Of-course as pointed out by the Division Bench in Abdulrehman v. Maniar Jamat 9 G. L. R. 64 even in case of such a public trust the question of comparative hardship would have to be gone into as required under sec. 13 (2) before any eviction decree is passed on the ground specified in sec. 13 (1) (g ). In R. P. Mehta v. I. A. Sheikh A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1676 their Lordships pointed out that the term occupation of the premises in sec. 13 (1) (g) does not necessarily refer to the occupation as residence and the owner could occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. The landlord could even demolish the premises and make alterations before he occupied the same. Their Lordships pointed out that the Act restricts general right of the landlord in the special circumstances prevailing in regard to the availability of accommodation and the incidental abuse of those circumstances by landlords in demanding unjustifiably high rents. The Act has provided sufficient protection to the tenants against being harassed by threat of ejectment in case they are unable to satisfy landlords demands. Their Lordships pointed out that sec. The Act has provided sufficient protection to the tenants against being harassed by threat of ejectment in case they are unable to satisfy landlords demands. Their Lordships pointed out that sec. 17 provides that if the premises are not occupied within a period of one month from the date the landlord recovers possession of the premises or are re-let within a period of one year of the said date to any person other than the original tenant the Court may order the landlord on the application of the original tenant within the time prescribed to place him in occupation of the premises on the original terms and conditions. This tends to ensure that the provisions of sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act are not abused and the landlord does not eject the tenant unless he required the premises for occupation by himself. That is why the term occupation was construed in the widest sense and was not restricted to the occupation as residence. That was the clarification made by the 1953 amendment by making benefit of this provision available even to such public trust which requires the premises for occupation for the purpose of the trust. ( 3 ) THE material question which however arises is as to whether sec. 13 (1) (g) can be for its true construction made subject to the provisions of sec. 25 as has been done by the lower Courts relying upon certain decisions. This question of construction of the statute must be resolved on the plain language of sec. 13 (1) which is absolutely clear and unambiguous. Sec. 13 (1) starts with a non-obstante clause and provides that a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied under sub-clause (g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself. . . . . . . or where the landlord is a trustee or a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purpose of the trust. The non obstante clause gives this right to such a landlord to recover possession notwithstanding anything contained in the Act and makes this right subject only to the provisions of sec. 15. The legislature has not subjected this right to any other provisions including sec. 25. Therefore the non obstante clause in sec. The non obstante clause gives this right to such a landlord to recover possession notwithstanding anything contained in the Act and makes this right subject only to the provisions of sec. 15. The legislature has not subjected this right to any other provisions including sec. 25. Therefore the non obstante clause in sec. 13 (1) would have the wider operation in connection with the landlords right to recover possession under sec. 13 (1) (g) as it is not subjected to any of the provisions of sec. 25 on a plain reading of the section. ( 4 ) MR. Shah vehemently argued that this would make sec. 25 a dead letter. Mr. Shah ignores the material question that it is only when there is conflict between sec. 25 and sec. 13 (1) that the non-obstante clause would come into operation so that the landlords right to recover possession under sec. 13 (1) (g) would not be affected by anything contained in sec. 25. But for this conflict sec. 25 would have full operation and effect. If a landlord and a tenant by mutual consent effect any conversion of the premises which were used for a residential purpose on the date of the coming into operation of the Act to a non-residential purpose or even if the landlord were to enter into partnership for such purpose the landlord would be violating the mandatory obligation created by sec. 25 (1) by using or permitting the user of such residential premises for a non-residential purpose. Besides if the tenant were to surrender possession or give up his tenancy the landlord would not be entitled to let the premises to another tenant so as to change the residential premises into non-residential premises. Therefore sec. 25 (1) would have the full scope and application in such circumstances which are clearly within the contemplation of the statute. Sec. 25 would not therefore be redundant. It should also be borne in mind that sec. 25 (1) prohibits user by the landlord or even the act of permitting of such landlord to convert residential premises into nonresidential premises. The embargo created by sec. 25 (1) does not penalise mere intention especially when the landlord seeks to avail of the remedy provided specifically under sec. 13 (1) (g) to him. In that case there is clear conflict and that situation is specifically dealt with by the non-obstante clause of sec. The embargo created by sec. 25 (1) does not penalise mere intention especially when the landlord seeks to avail of the remedy provided specifically under sec. 13 (1) (g) to him. In that case there is clear conflict and that situation is specifically dealt with by the non-obstante clause of sec. 13 (1) which enacts that the landlords right to recover possession through Court under sec. 13 (1) (g) shall be notwithstanding anything contained in the Act and there is no other saving except of what is provided in sec. 15. This provision has therefore an overriding effect over anything contained in the Act including what is provided in sec 25. Therefore even if the case was of an individual landlord where the ground under sec. 13 (1) (g) was of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the premises for occupation by himself or in case of a public charitable trust the requirement was for the purpose of the trust while considering such requirement sec. 25 could not be resorted to for deciding the reasonableness or lawful character of such requirement. Sec. 25 could not prevail over the landlords right specifically provided under sec. 13 (1) (g) especially when the legislature while providing this overriding right has enacted the other statutory provisions in the Act so that this right is not abused by the landlord and is available when the landlord really and genuinely requires the premises as contemplated under sec. 13 (1) (g ). In Ashwini Kumar v. Arbinda Bose A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 370 at page 376 their Lordships had in terms laid down the correct approach to the construction of such a non-obstante clause. It should be first ascertained what the enacting part of the section provides on a fair construction of the words used according to their natural and ordinary meaning and the non-obstante clause is to be understood as operating to set aside as no longer valid anything contained in relevant existing laws which is inconsistent with the new enactment. ( 5 ) IN view of this settled legal position it would be a fallacious reading if in spite of this non-obstante clause in sec. ( 5 ) IN view of this settled legal position it would be a fallacious reading if in spite of this non-obstante clause in sec. 13 (1) (g) the landlords right to recover possession of the premises reasonably and bona fide required for occupation by himself or for its purposes by a public trust was sought to be whittled down by anything contained in sec. 25 which prohibits conversion of user of certain residential premises to non-residential purpose. The operative portion in sec. 13 (1) (g) shows that the landlords right to recover possession of the premises has to be judged by giving only ordinary meaning to the expression reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord for occupation by himself or requirement of the public charitable trust for occupation for the trust purposes. If there was no such non-obstante clause in sec. 13 (1) or even if this wide operation thereof was made subject to sec. 25 ordinarily sec. 25 and sec. 13 (1) (g) would have to be harmonised by referring to that statutory prohibition. The question of harmonising these two provisions would however not arise when the legislature by this non-obstante clause gives overriding effect to sec. 13 (1) over the provisions of sec. 25. Therefore nothing is sec. 25 could operate so as to defeat this landlords right which is specifically created under the section subject to the fetter which the legislature has imposed by enacting sec. 17 for preventing abuse of this right and for seeing that the landlord gets benefit only when he really requires premises for such occupation. Tarkunde J. of the Bombay High Court in Karim Usman v. Kai Khushru Civil Revision Application No. 2172 of 1957 decided on September 3 1959 had adopted the same fallacious approach which is criticised by their Lordships in Ashvinkumar case by holding that although sec. 13 (1) (g) was not controlled by sec. 25 both the provisions had to be read together so that-the result would be that where a landlord wanted to convert the residential premises for business premises that would affect the question whether he required premises reasonably and bona fide for his occupation and the court could not pass a decree of eviction. This view was followed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Laxmi Co-operative Bank 74 Bom. This view was followed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Laxmi Co-operative Bank 74 Bom. L. R. 186 and by Vakil J. in Civil Revision Application No. 896 of 1963 decided on March 6/7 1967 (Bai Raju v. Achandas Dayaram ). On the other hand Raju J. in Mohamed Ahmed v. Ranchhoddas Tribhovan 4 G L R. 279 had not adopted that view. Raju J. had pointed out that secs. 25 and 13 (1) (g) dealt with different topics and there was no question of one section controlling the other. But all the sections in the Act must be kept in mind when deciding any question falling under the Act. In that case the question was whether the decree for eviction was properly passed under section 13 or not. The question whether the landlord should be prosecuted if he converted the suit property into a maternity hospital was not a question for consideration at that stage and when that question would be considered the provisions of sec. 6 (1) of the Act namely in areas specified in Schedule 1 this part shall apply to premises let for residence education business trade or storage would have to be kept in mind. When sec. 13 (1) (g) specifically applies to such a situation and when it is given an overriding effect it is obvious that sec. 25 could not operate in that field. Both the sections would operate in different fields as explained. In that view of the matter when the landlord seeks to get a decree of eviction under sec. 13 (1) (g) there would be no question of the prohibition under sec. 25 being invoked. In Special C. A. No. 314 of 1965 decided on July 14 1969 (Chakubhai Nanji v. R. B. Shukla) as a Single Judge. I had held that sec. 25 did not apply to a mere intended user and therefore the wide sweep of sec. 13 (1) (g) could not be controlled by sec. 25. The decision of Sompura J. in Special C. A. No. 415 of 1964 decided on November 29 1968 was referred to. That decision does not consider the question of sec. 25 and it only decides the other question that a public trust also could have benefit of sec. 13 (1) (g) and even in that context the question of comparative hardship would have to be examined under sec. That decision does not consider the question of sec. 25 and it only decides the other question that a public trust also could have benefit of sec. 13 (1) (g) and even in that context the question of comparative hardship would have to be examined under sec. 13 (2) of the Act. Therefore that decision would not be helpful in this context. Therefore except for the fallacious approach which is adopted in the decision of Tarkunde J. and with great respect by Vakil J. as per the settled legal position the question of construction of sec. 13 (1) (g) would have to be examined and resolved by giving full effect to the non-obstante clause in sec. 13 (1) (g) and to the fact that that provision is not made subject to sec. 25 but is only made subject to sec. 15. If the plain statutory language is given effect to it must be held that where the case falls under sec. 13 (1) (g) the landlord is entitled to get an eviction decree without consideration of anything contained in sec 25. Therefore that view of the two lower Courts was obviously in plain violation of the term of sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Act. ( 6 ) MR. Shah vehemently relied upon the fact that even in that event this would not be jurisdictional error which would allow revisional jurisdiction to be invoked. Mr. Shah in this context referred to the latest decision of their Lordships in Bai Hiragauris case XIV G. L. R. 617 in Bai Hiragauri v. Abdul Kadar C. A. No. 1713 and 1714 of 1967 decided on April 3 1973 In that decision their Lordships had only followed the earlier decision by the Seven Judges in the case of Keshavlal Jethalal v. Mohanlal Bhagwandas 9 G. L. R. 868 by pointing out that in such cases where the appellate decree had become final under the unamended sec. 29 of the Act it could not be set aside in exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended sec. 29 (2) the amendment having been made long after the appellate decree had become final. In such cases the High Court could exercise revisional powers under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 29 of the Act it could not be set aside in exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended sec. 29 (2) the amendment having been made long after the appellate decree had become final. In such cases the High Court could exercise revisional powers under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The case before their Lordships was one where the appellate decision was given on January 31 1962 which was long before the amendment by Act No. 18 of 1965. In the present case the decision of the appellate Court is of July 31 1967 and therefore the appellate decision being after the 1965 amendment revisional jurisdiction would be attracted only under sec. 29 as laid down in the aforesaid Keshavlal Jethalals case. In fact in Keshavlal Jethalals case their Lordships had in terms kept open the wider question as to whether right to move superior Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction attached to litigation when it commenced. Their Lordships have followed the settled position as laid down in Motirams case 1960 S. C. R. 896. Besides in any event in the present case this point could hardly be raised because the error committed by the two lower Courts is clearly a jurisdictional error as this is not the question of mere incidental misconstruction but the question of not giving effect to the plain language of the statute and it is such patent error of law which would always result in an order ultra vires the Act. In Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. S. B. Bhatt and others A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 970 at page 974 in the context of semi-clerks agreement their Lordships in terms held that the question which was involved when the semi-clerks grade was asked by the cut-looker was not very much of construction of the agreement in question as of giving effect to the plain terms of that document. If clause 5 expressly provided for employees not falling under clause 2 and if that intention was clarified by such persons like cut-lookers being specifically included in clause 5 and still the appellate authority read that clause as subject to clause 2 that must be regarded as an error patent on the face of the record. It was not the case where two alternative constructions were possible. It was not the case where two alternative constructions were possible. It was the case of plain misreading of the provisions ignoring the object with which two separate provisions were made. Therefore the jurisdictional error committed by the lower appellate Court must surely be corrected even under the limited scope of sec. 115 of the C. P. Code when it failed to exercise its jurisdiction by refusing to pass a decree when the relevant ground under sec. 13 (1) (g) was made out and the further condition even under sec. 13 (2) was held to be proved on weighing of comparative hardship. Application allowed .