Judgment Madan Mohan Prasad, J. 1. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for the issue of an appropriate writ quashing an order passed by the Subdivisional Magistrate under Rule 23 (4) of the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules (hereinafter called the Rules) rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner for the post of Mukhia of the Gram Panchayat. 2. It appears that the general election of the Kondi Gram Panchayat within Pandarak Block in the district of Patna was to be held in the year 1971. The 27th of March, 1971 was, according to the programme, the date for filing of nomination papers for the various posts. The petitioner filed his nomination for the post of Mukhia. Others who filed their nomination for the same post were respondent No. 3 and one Anandi Singh. It is said that the petitioner by way of abundant caution filed two nomination papers for the same post with the required fee of Rs. 20/-. In one of the nomination papers, however, by inadvertence the post of Mukhia was not mentioned and the column was left blank. Respondent No. 3, however, fraudulently enclosed a receipt for a sum of Rs. 10.00 with the nomination paper in which the column for the post was left vacant At the time of scrutiny respondent No. 3, who is the sitting Mukhia, raised an objection against the validity of the nomination paper of the petitioner on the ground that the two nomination papers of the petitioner were for the post of Mukhia and the membership of the Executive Committee. The Election Officer, therefore, rejected both the nomination papers of the petitioner by writing the word "rejected". The nomination paper of the third candidate Anandi Singh was also rejected. The petitioner had, however, stated before the Election Officer at the time of scrutiny that he had not filed the nomination paper for two posts, that the receipt for Rs. 10.00 had not been enclosed by the petitioner or his proposers and that in any case the second nomination paper not showing the post for which he had been nominated ought to be ignored. He also filed a petition before the Election Officer stating the facts aforesaid. 10.00 had not been enclosed by the petitioner or his proposers and that in any case the second nomination paper not showing the post for which he had been nominated ought to be ignored. He also filed a petition before the Election Officer stating the facts aforesaid. On perusing this application and after considering the circumstances the Election Officer, then passed an order by which he accepted the first nomination paper and declared him to be duly nominated candidate. As against this order respondent No. 3 filed a petition of objection before the Subdivisional Magistrate under Rule 23 (4) mainly on the ground that the Election Officer had no right to review his own order. The Sub-divisional Magistrate accepted the objection and declared the nomination of the petitioner to be invalid. Hence this application. 3. It is further stated by the petitioner that respondent No. 3 has not yet been declared elected as the Mukhia. A counter-affidavit has been sworn on behalf of respondents 1 and 2. namely, the Sub-divisional Magistrate and the Election Officer, wherein it has been stated that respondent No. 3 was declared elected at 9-30 a.m. on the 16th of April. 1971 before the stay order was passed by this Court and could be received by them. In this connection it may be mentioned that the present application was filed on the 15th of April, 1971 and it was admitted on the 16th of April, 1971 and by an order passed on that date the declaration of the result had been stayed. 4. The main point raised by learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the Election Officer was acting as a quasi-judicial officer and every person or authority exercising judicial functions has an inherent power to review its own order and, therefore the Election Officer had rightly reviewed his own order and accepted the nomination paper of the petitioner. Secondly, it is urged that the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate committed an erorr of law in rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner merely on the ground that the Election Officer had no right to review his order and without considering the question on merits as to whether the nomination paper of the petitioner had been improperly rejected in the first instance and rightly accepted by the subsequent order. Learned counsel for the parties have stated that they have not been able to find out any decision of any High Court on the question as to whether a person or authority exercising functions under the law of elections has such a right of review. 5. In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, placed reliance on two decisions first in the case of Aijaz Ahmad V/s. Nazirul Hasan, (AIR 1935 All 868) and the second in the case of Jagir Singh Sobha Singh v. Settlement Commissioner, Pepsu, (AIR 1959 Punj 457) (FB). In the Allahabad case there was a decree passed by the Civil Court which had been transferred for execution to the Collector and during its execution certain properties were sold and purchased by the decree-holder and the sale having been confirmed the records were sent back by the Collector to the Civil Court. The decree-holder had obtained the sale certificate and formal delivery of possession. Thereafter the judgment-debtor had filed an application before the Collector for setting aside the sale on the ground of fraud. The Collector had passed an order setting aside the sale. A suit was then filed by the decree-holder-auction-purchaser for a declaration inter alia that the order of the Collector was without jurisdiction. The trial Court upheld the plaintiffs contention that the Collector had no jurisdiction either to set aside the sale or to review his own order confirming the sale. There was an appeal to the High Court. The learned Judges held that the Collector had the power to confirm or set aside the sale--a power similar to the powers conferred on the Civil Court by the Civil Procedure Code. On the next point their Lordships observed as follows:- - "It is well settled that a Court has inherent jurisdiction to recall and cancel its invalid orders, and to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. On principle there is no difference between an order passed by a Court and an order passed by an officer acting judicially. The orders passed by both are judicial orders, and if a Court has inherent power to correct its judicial orders there seems no justification for holding that an officer acting judically has not similar powers. On principle there is no difference between an order passed by a Court and an order passed by an officer acting judicially. The orders passed by both are judicial orders, and if a Court has inherent power to correct its judicial orders there seems no justification for holding that an officer acting judically has not similar powers. If a Court has power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, an officer acting judicially must on principle have similar powers....." Their Lordships held that although the Collector had become functus officio after the records of the case had returned to the Civil Court the inherent power vested in him to correct his judicial order entitled him to do so even thereafter and that the aforesaid right did not depend on the continuance of the proceeding in the course of which the order was previously passed and it could be exercised even after the termination of the proceeding. 6. In the Full Bench case of Jagir Singh Sobha Singh, AIR 1959 Punj 457 (FB) one of the questions before the learned Judges was whether an order made by the Revenue Minister acting for the State Government could be subsequently cancelled by the State Government. In that case a scheme of consolidation had been framed and confirmed but the Revenue Minister had subsequently found that the scheme had not been prepared on fair and equitable lines and, therefore, had directed a repartition of the entire village to be done afresh. Thereafter an order was issued by the Government in which it was said that the ex-Revenue Ministers order being illegal and without jurisdiction be ignored and no re-partition need be done. The second order was challenged by a writ petition on the ground that in the absence of any statutory power the previous order could not be reviewed. In connection with this argument Dulat, J. who delivered the judgment for the Court said: "Stated in that form as rigid rule of law the proposition, to my mind, is wholly unacceptable. I say this because it seems to me essential to affirm that every tribunal has inherent power to correct its own error, provided, of course, the circumstances are such that the correction of that error is necessary in the interest of justice. I say this because it seems to me essential to affirm that every tribunal has inherent power to correct its own error, provided, of course, the circumstances are such that the correction of that error is necessary in the interest of justice. Such inherent power is necessarily implied in the setting up of any authority on whom the responsibility of deciding any matter rests, and seems to me that to deny such power to any tribunal would render that tribunal incapable of properly deciding the matter entrusted to it." The learned Judge relied on the decision of Iqbal Ahmad, J. in the Allahabad case, AIR 1935 All 868 mentioned above and applying the aforesaid principle held that the State Government was not debarred from recalling an invalid and unjust or erroneous order made by it previously. 7. No decision has been cited by learned counsel for the respondents. There is, however, a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ramnath Prasad V/s. State Transport Appellate Authority, Bihar, Patna, ( AIR 1957 Pat 117 ) wherein the learned Judges held that it is well settled that a power of review is riot inherent in any authority and that the moment a right to decide is exercised the authority becomes functus officio, except for the matter of grave clerical error or mistake committed by the authority for which the authority is responsible. In this case the question involved was whether the Regional Transport Authority had any power to review its order passed earlier. Their Lordships held that under the statute and the rules it had no such power and apart from the statute there was no inherent power in the authority to review its order. In Patna Electric Supply Workers Union V/s. A. Hassan, 1957 BLJR 705 = ( AIR 1958 Pat 427 ), another Bench decision of this Court the question for consideration was whether the Appellate Authority under Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 could exercise inherent powers or like powers envisaged by Sections 151, 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) which have not been made applicable to the Act or to the Appellate Authority. The learned Judges held: "It is well settled law that the powers of a Tribunal of special jurisdiction are circumscribed by the statute under which it is constituted. The learned Judges held: "It is well settled law that the powers of a Tribunal of special jurisdiction are circumscribed by the statute under which it is constituted. Such Tribunal must act within its powers conferred on it by the statute which creates it." It was further held that such an authority is not a court much less a civil court so as to enable them to exercise inherent powers. Reliance was placed, by the learned Judges on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J. K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Kanpur V/s. The Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union, Kanpur, ( AIR 1956 SC 231 ) where their Lordships were considering the scope and authority of an adjudicator under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and observed: "All the same, wide as their powers are, these Tribunalqs are not absolute, and there are limitations to the ambit of their authority......... Their powers are derived from the statute that creates them and they have to function within the limits imposed there and to act according to its provisions." In the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi V/s. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, ( AIR 1970 SC 1273 ) their Lordships were considering the question whether the commissioner appointed as a delegate of the State Government under Sec. 63 of the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act had the right to review an order passed by the Government. Their Lordships held in that connection as follows:- - "It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision of the Act was brought to our notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order." In the case of Haji Zakeria Suleman V/s. The Collector, Yeotmal, ( AIR 1963 Bom 233 ) the question was whether the Rent Controller or the Rent Control authorities under the C. P. & Berar Letting of House and Rent Control Order could exercise inherent powers. The learned Judges held:- - "Inherent power can only be implied in the civil courts having general jurisdiction but where, as here, special authorities are constituted under a special statute and for special object, it is not possible to imply inherent powers in them. We must turn to the statute itself to find the power either in its express terms or by necessary implication." They, however, held that although there is no express provision in the Rent Control Order permitting the controller or the appellate authority to dismiss for default or to restore to file an application or appeal, such a power must be implied in the provisions of the Act. 8. The question whether an Election Tribunal can be deemed to have inherent powers had arisen in some cases which I propose to discuss hereafter. In the case of Sunder Lal Mannalal V/s. Nandramdas Dwarkadas, (AIR 1958 Madh Pra 260) an election petition filed under the Representation of People Act, 1951, had been dismissed for default and restored by the Tribunal. The argument was that the Tribunal had no power to restore the election petition, there being no such power given to it. The learned Judges held:- - "Now the Act does not give any power of dismissal but it is axiomatic that no court or tribunal is supposed to continue a proceeding before it when the party who has moved it has not appeared nor cared to remain present. The dismissal, therefore, is under an inherent power which every Tribunal possesses. No express provision in the Act was necessary to empower the court to make the order of dismissal in default. The learned Judges further held:- - "No doubt the Act does not lay down in so many words that a petition dismissed in these circumstances can be restored : but we take it that the inherent powers which every civil court exercises are vested in the tribunal. It is the inherent right of a court to restore proceedings dismissed by it ex debito justitiae when sufficient cause has been made out....." The principle laid down in this case was, however, not accepted by the Allahabad High Court as will appear from the decision in the case of Vishwanath Prasad V/s. Malkhan Singh Sharma, ( AIR 1964 All 181 ). The learned Judges were also considering the competency of an Election Tribunal under the Representation of People Act to dismiss an election petition and the right to restore the same. They held that the Election Tribunal has no power to dismiss an election petition for default and, therefore, the question of restoring it cannot arise. They observed that a Tribunal cannot be said to possess inherent powers to dismiss an election petition in any way it likes. The learned Judges expressly said that they were unable to agree with the line of argument adopted by the learned Judges in the case of Sunderlal Mannalal, AIR 1958 Madh Pra 260 (supra). Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of K. Kamaraja Nadar V/s. Kunju Thevar, ( AIR 1958 SC 687 ) and Inamati Mallappa Basappa v. Desai Basavarai Ayyappa, ( AIR 1958 SC 698 ) and also on the case of Venkatasubbiah Chettiar V/s. Sesha Aiyar, (AIR 1924 Mad 797). In the case of Martin Burn Ltd. V/s. R. N. Banerjee, ( AIR 1958 SC 79 ) one of the questions before their Lordships was whether the Labour Appellate Tribunal could review its own order. Their Lordships held that the Labour Appellate Tribunal is the creature of the statute and all its powers must be found within the four corners of the statute. Their Lordships then proceeded to examine the powers of the Tribunal given by the Act and held on that basis that the Tribunal had such power. In the case of K. Kamaraja Nadar, AIR 1958 SC 687 (supra) their Lordships after discussing the provisions of law relating to elections said: "These provisions go to show that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and that the court possesses no common law power." In the case of Inamati Mallappa Basappa, AIR 1958 SC 698 (supra) their Lordships held that the Representation of the People Act is a self-contained Code governing the trial of election petitions and in spite of the provisions of Section 90 (1) of the Act the provisions of Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code do not apply to election petitions and further that the Election Commission has no such power. In the case of Venkata Subbiah Chettiar, AIR 1924 Mad 797 (supra) while an election petition was pending before the District Judge under the Rules of Madras District Municipalities Act a petition had been filed purporting to be under Sections 94, 141, 151 and Order 39, Rule 2 of the Code and an order had been passed restraining the petitioner of that case from taking his seat in the Municipal Council until the disposal of the petition. One of the rules said that every election petition shall be enquired into by the Judge as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to the trial of suits. The argument before the learned Judge was that the District Judge had a residuary power which enabled him to pass the order. It was held that the District Judge had acted without jurisdiction. 9. There is one case relating to the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, which has come to my notice. It is the case of Rameshwar Dayal V/s. Sub-divisional Officer, Ghatampur, AIR 1963 All 518 . In this case a direction had been given by the Sub-divisional Officer to stay transfer of the charge of the office of Pradhan to the person who was declared elected as the Pradhan and directing the stay of the removal of the petitioner from the office of the Pradhan during the pendency of an election petition filed by him against the election of the opposite party. The argument raised was that the Sub-divisional Officer had got all the powers conferred upon Courts by Sections 94 and 151 and Order 39, Rule 2 and Order 41, Rule 5 of the Code. Discussing the point in respect of the application of Sec.151 of the Code the learned Chief Justice who delivered the judgment for the Court said: "The inherent powers are of a Court and we do not accept that an Election Tribunal is a Court. Merely because it records evidence, hears parties and decides certain disputes between them, it does not become a Court which is invested with the power of making any order that it considers necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent abuse of process of the Court. Courts derive authority from the Crown but Election Tribunals do not and there is no question of their doing justice regardless of rules of procedure. Courts derive authority from the Crown but Election Tribunals do not and there is no question of their doing justice regardless of rules of procedure. They are created by the statute to decide certain disputes and are bound to decide them strictly according to law after following the prescribed procedure and have jurisdiction to do only what they are expressly empowered to do. Only those Courts which have the general jurisdiction to do justice are competent to pass any orders that they consider necessary in the interest of justice, even though they are not covered by express provisions of the laws of procedure." 10. An analysis of the decisions aforesaid thus clearly establishes the following propositions: (i) That there is no inherent power vested in every authority to review its own decisions. (ii) That an Election Tribunal or authority is a creature of a statute and does not have powers of common law. (iii) That the powers of such a creature of statute must be found within the four corners of the statute itself. (iv) That the power of review is different from the power to sit in appeal and howsoever thin the line may be in the exercise of such powers, a power of review cannot be exercised merely in the case of an erroneous decision in any guise whatsoever. 11. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case I proceed to determine whether or not the Election Officer had the right to review his own previous erroneous decision. It has been argued in this connection that Section 84-B of the Act lays down that no election held under this Act or the Rules made thereunder shall be called in question in any Court on any ground whatsoever, except by an election petition presented to such authority and within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. Rule 70 of the Rules also provides to the same effect. Rule 70 of the Rules also provides to the same effect. Rule 79 (2), however provides as follows:- - "Subject to the provisions of these rules, every election petition shall be tried by the Election Tribunal, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the trial of suits." On the basis of this rule it has been urged that the Code of Civil Procedure applies and, therefore, even Sec.151 of the Code applies and the inherent powers of a Civil Court to review its own order in certain cases are thus available to the Election Officer. I am afraid I cannot accept this contention. The provision applying the Code of Civil Procedure makes the procedure applicable only to the trial of election petitions. It does not make the procedure applicable to other functions exercised either by the Election Officer or by the Sub-divisional Magistrate under Rule 23 (4) of the Rules. These provisions are, therefore, of no avail for the purpose of determining the point. In my view, the Election Officer is a creature of statute and all his powers must be found within the four corners of the statute. He does not have, therefore, any inherent power to review his own decisions. In this connection it may also be mentioned that Sec.151 of the Code does not clothe the Civil Court with inherent powers. It merely saves the inherent powers which a Court possesses. It cannot be said in the case of a creature of statute that it had any inherent power because all its powers must be given to it by the statute which creates it. 12. That leads me to the next question as to whether the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act or the Rules made thereunder give any such power to the Election Officer. In the whole of the Act nowhere is there any provision which either expressly or by implication gives the Election Officer any power to review or alter his own decision in any circumstance. In the Election Rules also no such power has been expressly given to him. The functions of the Election Officer under Rule 17 begins on the eve of each general election when he fixes up a programme for the same. In the Election Rules also no such power has been expressly given to him. The functions of the Election Officer under Rule 17 begins on the eve of each general election when he fixes up a programme for the same. Next comes the stage of receipt of nomination papers and their scrutiny, provisions in respect of which have been made in Rules 18 to 20. Rule 21 provides for disqualification for election and other matters relating to the qualification of a person entitled to file a nomination paper, the manner in which it has to be delivered to the Election Officer etc. Rule 23 deals with the matter of scrutiny. Rule 23 which is the relevant provision is as follows :- - "Time for scrutiny: (1) On the date and hour appointed for the scrutiny of the nomination papers, the candidates and one proposer of each candidate may and, except for the purpose of assisting the Election Officer, no other person shall be present at the place where the scrutiny is done. The Election Officer shall give such persons all reasonable facilities to examine the nomination papers of all candidates which have been received. (2) The Election Officer shall then examine the nomination papers and shall decide all objections which may be made at the time to any nomination and may, either on such objection or on his own motion after such summary enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, reject any nomination paper on any of the following grounds, namely:- - (i) that the candidate is disqualified from being chosen to fill the vacancy under Sec. 4 or Section 79 or Sub-rule (1) of Rule 21; or (ii) that the proposer is disqualified from subscribing a nomination paper under Sub-rule (4) of Rule 21; or (iii) that there has been any failure to comply with any provision of these rules; or (iv) that the signature or thumb marks of the candidate or of any proposer has been obtained by fraud; or (v) that the candidate has not deposited the nomination fee required under Sub-rule (7) of Rule 21. (3) The Election Officer shall endorse on each nomination paper his decision accepting or rejecting the same, and if the nomination paper is rejected or if it is accepted after objection has been taken to its validity, he shall record in writing a brief statement of his reason for such acceptance or rejection. Subject to any decision to the contrary given by the Election Tribunal on the trial of an election petition calling in question the election or subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (4), the decision of the Election Officer shall be final. (4) Where the powers of the Election Officer under the preceding Sub-rule are exercised by an officer other than the Sub-divisional Magistrate, any person aggrieved by an order of the Election Officer accepting or rejecting a nomination paper may, within seven days from the date of such order, file an objection petition before the Sub-divisional Magistrate who shall consider the grounds of objection raised in the petition and pass orders thereon within a week of the filing of the objection petition. Any order passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate under this Sub-rule shall, subject to any decision to the contrary given by the Election Tribunal on the trial of an election petition calling in question the election, be final." 13. It must be noticed that an Election Officer has to decide all objections which may be made at the time of scrutiny of any nomination paper and he may either on such objection or on his own motion reject any nomination paper. The grounds on which he may reject the nomination paper have, however, been clearly laid down in Sub-rule (2). In accordance with Sub-rule (3) he has to endorse on the nomination paper itself his decision accepting or rejecting the same. He is also required to record in writing a brief statement of his reasons for such acceptance or rejection. The most important point which emerges out of Sub-rule (3) is that the decision of the Election Officer is final, subject to the decision, if any, to the contrary given either by the Election Tribunal or the Sub-divisional Magistrate under sub-rule (4). It appears that this is the principle adopted by the rule-making authority as there is a similar provision making final the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate under Sub-rule (4), subject to a contrary decision by the Election Tribunal. It appears that this is the principle adopted by the rule-making authority as there is a similar provision making final the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate under Sub-rule (4), subject to a contrary decision by the Election Tribunal. The provision thus leaves no no room for doubt that the order of the Election Officer becomes final as soon as it is passed by him except that it is subject to the decision of the Sub-divisional Magistrate or the Election Tribunal. It is difficult to find anything in Rule 23 which may by implication suggest that the Election Officer has any right to review his own decision. 14. It is not necessary to refer to other powers of the Election Officer under the Rules because there appears to be no other provision which may appear to give implied authority to the Election Officer to review his own decision. On the other hand, the rule-making authority has taken care to make final the decisions of the Election Officer in respect of various matters. Under Rule 31 the Election Officer has to select the polling station. The rule provides that once approved the polling stations shall not be changed. Under Rule 50 if the polling is interrupted by a riot or natural calamity etc. the Election Officer has to appoint a date for taking a fresh poll and if such Election Officer is an officer other than the Sub-divisional Magistrate he has to do so with the previous approval of the Sub-divisional Magistrate. Under Rule 61 the scrutiny of nomination papers in respect of the post of Up-Mukhia or Up-Sarpanch has to be done by the Mukhia or Sarpanch and their decisions also are final subject to revision by the Election Officer or the Election Tribunal. It will thus appear thai the Legislature and the rule-making authority have given specific powers to the Election Officer and taken care to provide that the Election Officers decision shall in some cases be final subject to its revision by other authority. It is in these circumstances difficult to accept that in the absence of any provision either expressly or in an implied manner giving a power to review, the Election Officer has such power. 15. It is in these circumstances difficult to accept that in the absence of any provision either expressly or in an implied manner giving a power to review, the Election Officer has such power. 15. In the present case what the Election Officer did was to reject the nomination paper on the ground that the petitioner had filed two nomination papers, one with which was appended a receipt for Rs. 20.00 and the other with which was appended a receipt for Rupees 10/-. Later, however, he passed an order by which he approved the nomination paper of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner had filed an application saying that he had filed only one receipt of Rs. 20.00 and the payment in connection with the other receipt had not been made by him and that the same had been paid by somebody else with a view to get the petitioners nomination paper rejected. The second ground which the Election Officer gave was that in the second nomination paper the column for the post for which nomination is filed is blank. It is quite obvious from the order aforesaid that he had accepted the nomination paper on the basis of new facts which he had not taken into consideration at the time of rejecting it. In view of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 23 it was open to him to make an enquiry, if he so liked, in respect of the objection and then, to have either accepted the nomination paper or rejected it. It appears, however, that the present enquiry on the basis of which he came to the con-elusions aforesaid was made subsequent to the rejection of the nomination paper. In my view, the Election Officer having rejected the nomination paper had become functus officio and he had no jurisdiction whatsoever to review the order and come to an entirely contrary conclusion. There cannot be the slightest doubt, therefore, that not having the power of review the Election Officer acted illegally in doing so. 16. In my view, the Election Officer having rejected the nomination paper had become functus officio and he had no jurisdiction whatsoever to review the order and come to an entirely contrary conclusion. There cannot be the slightest doubt, therefore, that not having the power of review the Election Officer acted illegally in doing so. 16. The second point raised by learned counsel is that the Sub-divisional Magistrate ought not to have set aside the subsequent order of the Election Officer accepting the nomination paper of the petitioner merely on the technical ground that the Election Officer had no such right of review and without considering on merits the points raised by the petitioner in respect of the validity of his nomination paper. It appears that the petitioner had filed an affidavit before the Sub-divisional Magistrate saying that the deposit of Rs. 10.00 had not been made by him or on his behalf and that it had been made fraudulently by his rival candidate, respondent No. 3, in order to create mischief and that he had filed the nomination paper only for the post of Mukhia and no other post. It appears from the order of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate that he refused to go into the question as to whether apart from the second order of the Election Officer the nomination paper of the petitioner could be declared valid. The learned Sub-divisional Magistrates order shows that on behalf of the petitioner he had been specifically invited to consider the first order passed on the nomination paper itself rejecting the nomination and that if this were done it would have shown that in one of the nominations the column meant for post had not been filled up. The learned Sub-divisional Magistrate, however, refused to consider the matter because according to him in view of Sub-rule (4) of Rule 23 he was entitled to consider only such petitions as are filed under that Sub-rule and, therefore, he limited the consideration of the matter only to the second order accepting the nomination paper and refused to go into the question as to whether the nomination of the petitioner had been improperly rejected in the first instance. 17. 17. The aforesaid Sub-rule (4) obviously enables any person aggrieved by an order of the Election Officer accepting or rejecting a nomination paper, to file an objection and the Sub-divisional Magistrate is to "consider the grounds of objection raised in the petition and pass orders thereon". This provision has been read by the Sub-divisional Magistrate to mean that he is not entitled to consider anything other than what are raised as grounds of objection in the petition. This, in my view, is not a correct reading of the provisions of Sub-rule (4). 18. It is true that the Sub-divisional Magistrate has to consider the grounds raised in the petition of objection. In order to decide upon the objection, however, he has also to consider the points raised by the opposite party. It is well recognised principle of natural justice that a person who is likely to be adversely affected by an order has to be given a hearing and when such hearing is given the points made by him have to be considered before a final decision of the matter. It cannot, therefore, be said that the points raised by the person in whose favour the order had been made cannot or ought not to be considered. If this were so there would be no point in giving a hearing to the other side and Sub-rule (4) would mean that the Sub-divisional Magistrate has to decide on the objection ex parte. That could not be the effect of Sub-rule (4). The provisions of Sub-rule (4) are not such which may be construed to provide for a remedy strictly in the nature of an appeal from the order of the Election Officer. If this were to be treated as an appeal then only the parties who had made an objection before the Election Officer would be entitled to file an appeal. In such a case the questions to be decided would be limited to the questions already raised earlier. Sub-rule (4) does not contain any such limitations. Even a voter who could have raised no objection at the time of the scrutiny can raise an objection before the Sub-divisional Magistrate for the first time (see Ram Saran Singh Azad V/s. Tribeni Pd. Sukul, 1961 BLJR 801). Sub-rule (4) does not contain any such limitations. Even a voter who could have raised no objection at the time of the scrutiny can raise an objection before the Sub-divisional Magistrate for the first time (see Ram Saran Singh Azad V/s. Tribeni Pd. Sukul, 1961 BLJR 801). I have also held so in the case of Salisram Sharan Singh V/s. The State of Bihar, C. W. J. C. 474 of 1971 disposed of on 31-1-1973 (Pat). Therefore, the provisions of Sub-rule (4) are not to be strictly interpreted. It is more in the nature of revision than in the nature of an apoeai. Acting under Sub-rule (4), therefore, a Sub-divisional Magistrate has got to consider the case made or the points raised by the person who is to be adversely affected by his decision in the matter of acceptance or rejection of the nomination paper. 19. The matter substantially before the Sub-divisional Magistrate was whether the first order of the Election Officer was correct and if the second order was illegal. The second order had the effect of undoing the first order. In the circumstances of this case it was not open to the petitioner to file any petition of objection before the Sub-divisional Magistrate obviously because the Election Officer himself had recalled his previous order. The order of recall or review may be wrong in law, but surely because of that the petitioner could not have filed a petition of objection under Sub-rule (4). Therefore, he could only raise the same points which he had raised earlier before the Sub-divisional Magistrate and in my view, the Sub-divisional Magistrate was bound to consider the case presented before him by the petitioner. In fact the Sub-divisional Magistrate was to decide upon, finally, the question whether the nomiation raper of the petitioner ought to be accepted or rejected. He was not sitting as a Court of appeal merely to find out the illegality of the order passed by the Election Officer, He, however, limited himself to the question as to whether the subsequent order passed by the Election Officer was legal and he refused to go into the question whether in the circumstances of the case the nomination of the petitoner ought to be accepted or not. The Sub-divisional Magistrate thus refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him. The order cannot be sustained for that reason. 20. The Sub-divisional Magistrate thus refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him. The order cannot be sustained for that reason. 20. Assuming, however, that the Sub-divisional Magistrate had no such jurisdiction, in the circumstances of the present case the question has been raised before me that the first order of the Election Officer rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner itself wa:; not a valid order and the effect of upholding the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate would be the rejection of the nomination paper of the petitioner. The error in the order of the Election Officer is apparent from the records. He rejected the nomination paper on the ground that the petitioner had filed two nomination papers. Filing of two nomination papers by itself is not illegal. In view of Rule 21 (6) more than one nomination paper can be filed for the same post and in such a case only one fee is required to be paid. Therefore, that by itself could not be a valid reason for rejecting the nomination paper. Secondly, since there, was a receipt of Rs. 20,- attached to on nomination paper and of Rs, 10/ with another nomination paper it was takes to mean that the nominations were for two different posts. Again, it is quite clear that the Election Officer overlooked the fact that the column meant for post nominated for was not filled up in one of the nomination papers with which a receipt of Rs. 10.00 was attached. Obviously, therefore, it was not a valid nomination paper at all since it could not be gathered therefrom as to what was the post for which the nomination paper had been filed. This was a fatal infirmity in the nomination paper itself and this nomination paper was thus absolutely worthless. The Election Officer should have, therefore, ignored this nomination paper at the very initial stage as he did subsequently. Thirdly, the explanation given before him, being that one one else had done it fraudulently in order; to get the nomination paper of the petitioner invalidated, it should have been enquired into by the Election Officer. His, order, however, shows that he made no such enquiry in the first instance and gave no finding on the point and that he had rejected the nomination paper without satisfying himself in this behalf. His, order, however, shows that he made no such enquiry in the first instance and gave no finding on the point and that he had rejected the nomination paper without satisfying himself in this behalf. Obviously, therefore, the order passed by the Election Officer was absolutely illegal and without jurisdiction. 21. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the rejection of the nomination paper by the Sub-divisional Magistrate inasmuch as he has set aside the subsequent order of the Election Officer accepting the nomination paper, did materially affect the election in the present case. The result has been that the petitioner has not been allowed to contest the election for the post of Mukhia without any good reason. As stated earlier when this case was filed the result of the election had not been declared and such a declaration had been stayed by this Court. An affidavit has, however, been sworn on behalf of the Sub-divisional Magistrate and the Election Officer that the result was declared on the 16th of April, 1971, the very day the stay order was passed by this Court, before the receipt thereof. In the case of Ram Lochan Mahton and 13 others V/s. State of Bihar and 11 others, (1971 BLJR 9B) also the respondent had been declared elected before the stay order was received. The question was that in view of the alternative remedy open to the petitioner of going to the Election Tribunal whether this Court would grant any relief. It was held that when the election was void this Court would bo justifeid in granting the relief prayed for. In the present case the remedy of going to the Election Tribunall is barred. I have no doubt tha;, if the petitioner had gone to the Election Tribunal his nomination paper would have been held to be valid and its rejection by the Sub-divisional Magistrate wrong The more fact that tha result of the election has been declared during the pendency of this application is, therefore, of no avail. 22. In the result, I find that the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner is not valid and cannot be sustained. It is accordingly quashed. The election of respondent No. 3 as Mukhia was also in violation of law and, therefore, void and is set aside. 22. In the result, I find that the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner is not valid and cannot be sustained. It is accordingly quashed. The election of respondent No. 3 as Mukhia was also in violation of law and, therefore, void and is set aside. The election authorities including respondents 1 and 2 may take steps for a fresh electionv for the post of Mukhia of the aforesaid Gram Panchayat.