Union of India v. Shyam Sunder Sharma — 1973 DIGILAW 432 (ALL)

JUDGMENT S. Malik, J. - This is a defendant's appeal against the judgment dated 4-3-1965 of the District Judge, Bareilly, dismissing its appeal and conforming of the judgment of the trial court decreeing the plaintiff respondent's suit for a sum of Rs. 2,622/- as arrears of pay with proportionate costs against the appellant. 2. The plaintiff-respondent, namely, Shyam Sunder Sharma, was an employee of the Northern Railway, at Moradabad as a cleaner in the Loco Department on a pay of Rs. 70/- per month. His services were terminated by the authority concerned by a notice dated 14-8-1950. Shyam Sunder Sharma thereupon filed suit No 217 Of 1953 on 23-5-1953 for a declaration that his dismissal was , illegal and void and that he continued to be in the service of the Northern Railway. The suit was decreed on 10-9-1956 but it appears that the decree was ignored by the Railway Authorities. Shyam Sunder Sharma, therefore, put the decree in execution and prayed for recovery of costs awarded to him under the aforesaid decree, for his reinstatement and also for recovery of arrears of pay with effect from 24-4-1950. The appellant filed objection in the execution court regarding the claim of Shyam Sunder Sharma to be reinstated and for arrears of pay. It appears that the objections raised by the defendants were upheld and the execution case was dismissed. It may be mentioned that the defendants deposited in the execution court the costs awarded to the plaintiff decree-holder in the previous suit before the dismissal of the execution case. As the defendants neither allotted any work to the plaintiff nor paid any amount as pay inspite of the decree in the previous suit, the plaintiff filed the suit giving rise to this appeal on 23-9-1958 (Suit No. 51 of 1958) for recovery of arrears of pay with effect from 24-4-1950 at the rate of 70/- per month and for his reinstatement and allotment of duties by the defendants. As mentioned, the suit has been decreed only for a portion of the pay claimed as arrears of pay. 3. The only question of law raised in this Court is whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. As mentioned, the suit has been decreed only for a portion of the pay claimed as arrears of pay. 3. The only question of law raised in this Court is whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that Section 22 of the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit of the nature filed by the plaintiff as the main relief claimed in the plaint was for arrears of pay or wages which could have been recovered by an application under Section 15 of the Act. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the other reliefs for reinstatement to the post which the plaintiff was holding on the date he was served with the notice of dismissal, or for allotment of duties, are merely ancillary reliefs not claimed in good faith and intentionally added to avoid the bar under Section 22 of the Act. It was pointed out that under Section 15 of the Act arrears of pay could be claimed before the amendment within six months from the date it became due and after the amendment within one year from the date on which the pay became due. As has been pointed out, in this case, the plaintiff claimed that his pay had not been paid from 24-4-1950 and the suit was filed on 23-9-1958, after more than eight years. 4. It is apparent from the provisions of Secs. 15 and 22 of the Act that the plaintiff could have obtained payment of his wages or pay under Section 15 of the Act in case he had applied for the same as they became due after he obtained a declaration on 10-9-1956 in the previous suit that his dismissal was illegal and void and that he continued to be in service of the Northern Railway. This was not controverted on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. Therefore, the real question which has to be gone into in this case, is whether due to the relief claimed by the plaintiff for reinstatement or allotment of duties, it could be said that Section 22 would not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit. 5. This was not controverted on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent. Therefore, the real question which has to be gone into in this case, is whether due to the relief claimed by the plaintiff for reinstatement or allotment of duties, it could be said that Section 22 would not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit. 5. No ruling is necessary for the proposition of law that every dispute of a civil nature can he entertained or decided by the Civil Court unless the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain such a dispute is barred by some statutory provision either in express terms or by necessary implication. It may also be pointed out that where the cause of action, is a composite one, or where the plaintiff claims more than one relief and in respect of some of the reliefs claimed there is no statutory bar against the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to one or more of the reliefs claimed and the Civil Court alone is competent to decide the question or questions, the Civil Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit though there may be statutory bar in respect of one or some of the reliefs claimed in the plaint unless it is shown that the other reliefs claimed had not been claimed in good faith and were added merely to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 6. In the instant case, the question as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for reinstatement or for a direction to the defendants to allot duties to him, cannot be gone into or decided under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, unless it is shown that these reliefs were not claimed in good faith by the plaintiff and were merely added to avoid the bar under Section 22 of the Act and make the suit cognizable by the civil Court, it could not be held that the Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 7. In order to determine whether the said relief or reliefs were claimed in good faith, it would be necessary to take into consideration the facts and the circumstances proved in this case. As has already been pointed out, the plaintiff appears to have been suspended with effect from 24-4-1930 and dismissed with effect from 11-8-1950. 7. In order to determine whether the said relief or reliefs were claimed in good faith, it would be necessary to take into consideration the facts and the circumstances proved in this case. As has already been pointed out, the plaintiff appears to have been suspended with effect from 24-4-1930 and dismissed with effect from 11-8-1950. He obtained a declaratory decree on 10-9-1956 that his dismissal was illegal and void and, therefore, he continued to be in service of the Northern Railway. In spite of this decree, neither was any duty assigned to him nor was he allowed to work. Not only this, he was not paid his wages or the costs awarded to him under the decree. It has to be kept in view that the plaintiff does not appear to be an educated person well versed with the relevant provisions of law though, in law `ignorance of law' is not considered to be a valid excuse. I thought it necessary to mention this because even at that stage he did not apply under Section 15 of the Act for realisation of the arrears of his pay. He instead tried to get himself reinstated or duties allotted to him and recover arrears of wages and costs by executing the decree in July, 1957. After that, the costs were deposited in court by the defendants but even then neither was any duty allotted to him nor was his arrears of wages paid. As a matter of fact, it appears that the defendants completely ignored the declaratory decree passed in the previous suit. Only after the present suit giving rise to this appeal was filed on 23-9-1958 the defendants called upon the plaintiff to join his duties but even then they did not pay his dues. Keeping in view the facts narrated, it could not be said that the plaintiff did not claim the relief for reinstatement or allotment of duties in good faith and merely added them to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and to avoid the bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 22 of the Act. 8. 8. It was next urged on behalf of the appellant that as in law the plaintiff could not claim to be reinstated or for allotment of duties the relief claimed by the plaintiff for the same was a relief which the Civil Court could not grant and, therefore, neither could such a relief be claimed in a Civil Court nor could the Civil Court be said to have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for such a relief and as the relief for arrears of pay, admittedly could be claimed under the Act, in view of Section 22, the Civil Court could not be said to have had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 9. This contention also does not appear to be sound. As has been pointed out, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to consider every question of a civil nature unless its jurisdiction is barred by some statutory provision (vide Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure). It cannot be denied that the question as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to a relief for reinstatement or allotment of duties, is a question of a Civil nature. If the relief claimed gives rise to a question of a civil nature and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court entertain such a question is not barred by some statutory provision, the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the suit and after it has entertained the suit, it will have to decide the question or in other words whether the relief claimed by the plaintiff can be granted or not. In view of what has been discussed, I find that the court below has rightly held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 10. Under the circumstances, the appeal is dismissed with costs.