JUDGMENT : K.B. Panda, J. - The Appellant stands convicted u/s 5(1)(c) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of 'Corruption Act, 1947 (II of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the Act, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 15,000/- or, in default to undergo R.I. for a further period of one year by the Special Judge (Vigilance), Orissa, Bhubaneswar, on 11-1-1971. 2. The charge against the Appellant was that he was in possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income to the tune of Rs. 1,93,447.66 which he could not account for. But the learned Special Judge on the assessment of evidence came to the finding that such assets in the possession of the Appellant were of Rs. 53,000/- only. However, even this he considered to be highly disproportionate to the known sources of income of the Appellant and hence convicted him. 3. The Appellant joined service under the Government of Orissa as an Assistant Agricultural Engineer on 15-12-1943 with a starting salary of Rs. 190/- per month. From 9-1-1947 to 30-6-1949 he was abroad in U.S.A. on study leave. For this at first he had been granted a Study Loan of Rs. 28,196/-. This was later converted into Financial Concession which he had not to repay. On return from America, he worked in different capacities. From 31-5-1963 he had become the Director of Lift Irrigation. As such he was drawing a pay of Rs. 1,700/- plus Dearness Allowance of Rs. 100/- till his suspension on 31-8-1967 consequent upon the present prosecution. 4. On 23-8-1967, Anadi Kumar Sinha (p.w. 49) the then Inspector of Vigilance, Puri Squad, lodged F.I.R. (Ext. 40) on the basis of confidential information that the Appellant was in possession of assets highly disproportionate to his known sources of income. Accordingly a case was registered vide Ext. 40 1. Ramesh Chandra Misra (p.w. 52) the then Dy.S.P. Vigilance, at Bhubaneswar investigated into the case. Under Search Warrant (Ext. 46) the official residence of the Appellant in New Capital. Bhubaneswar, was searched on 24-8-1967 in the presence of witnesses including a Magistrate (p.w. 3) and various articles were seized under search list (Ext. 3). The search commenced from midday and continued till mid-night in presence of the Appellant. Under Search Warrant (Ext. 46) the official residence of the Appellant in New Capital. Bhubaneswar, was searched on 24-8-1967 in the presence of witnesses including a Magistrate (p.w. 3) and various articles were seized under search list (Ext. 3). The search commenced from midday and continued till mid-night in presence of the Appellant. The articles seized were given in the zima of the Appellant which were on different dates valued by different persons. p.w. 43 a Senior Technical-Officer (Accounts), Central Bureau of Investigation, Government of India, was entrusted with the work of preparing a disproportionate assets statement which he did - vide Ext. 39. (This contains 3 schedules and 8 Reports with a Note that his reports were subject to verification.) As calculated by p.w. 43, the income of the Appellant, as per Schedule 1, came to Rs. 3,61,226/-, his total expenses, as per Schedule II, came to Rs. 1,67,090/- thus leaving a saving of Rs. 1,94,136/-. The total assets as per Schedule III, were valued at Rs. 3,74,920/-. Thus according to p.w. 43, the disproportionate assets in the possession of the Appellant were worth Rs. 1,83,784/- (that is, assets Rs. 3,74,920/- minus savings Rs. 1,94,136/-). Prasant Chandra Das (p.w. 42), another Dy. S.P., Vigilance took charge of the investigation from p.w. 52 on 14-10-1968. The Governor accorded sanction for the prosecution of the Appellant - vide Sanction Order (Ext. 26) dated 11-1-1969. p.w. 42 submitted charge-sheet against the Appellant on 7-2-1969 mentioning that the Appellant was in possession of assets worth Rs. 1,93,447.66, disproportionate to his known sources of income. On that basis the trial proceeded. 5. The prosecution examined 53 witnesses and the defence 33. From both the sides several documents were filed. 6. The Appellant, while pleading generally not guilty to the charge, filed an elaborate written statement explaining all the items of accusation against him. His specific plea was that the prosecution had not given a complete picture of his income, for some known sources of his income had been suppressed while his expenditure had been inflated. He did not dispute the articles seized from his house, but contended that some of them belonged to the other members of the joint family who were then residing with him and that their valuation had been magnified. He did not dispute the articles seized from his house, but contended that some of them belonged to the other members of the joint family who were then residing with him and that their valuation had been magnified. One of the main assets of the Appellant is a building by the side of the Lewis Road, Bhubaneswar, over the valuation of which there was much controversy. According to the prosecution, the valuation of this building would be Rs. 2,50,000/- whereas, according to the defence, it would not exceed in any case beyond Rs. 1,45.000/-. The learned Judge has taken it at Rs. 2,00,0001/- 7. Ultimately the learned Judge held as follows: I thus find that the total assets acquired by the accused out of his known sources of income would value at Rs. 2,50,690.47 paise which may be taken as Rs. 2,50,000/- as against the probable savings of Rs. 1,96,813.67 paise which may be taken as Rs. 1,97,000/-. Thus the accused has been found in possession of assets worth Rs. 53,000/- disproportionate to his known sources of income, for which he has not been able to account satisfactorily. 8. It was contended by Mr. Mohanty on behalf of the Appellant that the learned Judge (i) has fallen into error in application of the law to the facts and circumstances of the cases; (ii) has unreasonably disallowed substantial income from some known sources while in others has allowed only a paltry amount, though the income was much larger; (iii) has, on the expenditure side, similarly accepted a very high figure on no evidence from the prosecution side and has relied on a part of the explanation of the accused while illegally rejecting the rest; and (iv) on controversial points even though there is no evidence on the side of the prosecution, yet has given benefit of doubt to it instead of the defence. On points of law Mr. Mohanty's contention was three-fold firstly, the sanction order (Ext.26) is defective on which no conviction can lie; secondly, in a case of prosecution u/s 5(1)(e) of the Act the learned Judge is not justified in taking into account properties acquired before Section 5(1)(e) was engrafted into the Act on 18-12-1964 and thirdly, the learned Judge has relied on some inadmissible evidence, particularly Ext. 39 prepared by p.w. 43 which, according to the learned Counsel, forms the sheet-anchor of the prosecution. 9. Mr. 39 prepared by p.w. 43 which, according to the learned Counsel, forms the sheet-anchor of the prosecution. 9. Mr. Y. Sanyasi Rao, learned Counsel for the prosecution while supporting the judgment generally, contended that on some points the learned Judge has gone wrong in giving an allowance as income of the Appellant for which there is no justification and similarly on the expenditure side also his assessment is low and thus the margin of disproportionate assets, as held by him to be Rs. 53,000/-would swell at least by Rs 53,000/- more. On the points of law raised by the defence, his answer is that they are not tenable. 10. I would first address myself to the points of law raised by the defence. There was a two-pronged attack on the sanction order (Ext. 26) in that there is no evidence that the Governor applied his mind while according sanction and secondly that by the time the matter was placed for obtaining sanction, the investigation was in progress and, therefore, all materials could not have been placed before the Governor. Thus the sanction order, according to the learned defence counsel, is vitiated. It may be mentioned here that the legality of the sanction order was not challenged before the learned Special Judge and so there is no discussion over the same in the judgment. It was contended by Mr. Rao on behalf of the prosecution that the sanction order is self-sufficient; that all the necessary materials were in fact placed before the sanctioning authority; and that only a grocer named Sukadev Hans (p.w. 29) was examined after submission of relevant papers to the sanctioning authority to corroborate the household expenses. It was submitted that the household expenses had already been put in Ext. It was submitted that the household expenses had already been put in Ext. 39 which had been placed before the sanctioning authority and, there was no point in the criticism that some new materials were collected which should have been placed before the sanctioning authority lastly it was urged that the question of invalidity of the sanction was not canvassed before the learned Special Judge; that Achutananda Pati (p.w. 30), who proved the sanction, was not questioned about it nor the Investigation Officer; nor was it raised in the lengthy written statement filed by the Appellant and thus there was no prejudice to the Appellant on that score and more particularly so when he was being defended by a team of eminent advocates. A number of citations were relied on by either side all of which need not be referred to. The importance of sanction while prosecuting a Government servant can hardly be over-emphasised. It is very much necessary to shut out (sic) litigations against Government servants who, while discharging their official duties, cannot afford to please every body. It serves as an amour that protects them from spurious prosecution. Thus according sanction is no idle formality. The sanctioning authority, therefore, should bring to the discharge of his duty a sense of responsibility and the industry required to examine relevant materials. This solemn duty can hardly be imagined to have been properly discharged by merely putting one's signature on a readymade sanction presented by the Police. 11. In spite of a plethora of decisions on the point, the case of AIR 1948 82 (Privy Council), still holds the field. It lays down that facts in respect of which sanction was given should either be referred to on face of sanction or it must be proved by extraneous evidence that they were placed before sanctioning authority. Sanction not doing this is invalid and the defect cannot be cured u/s 537, Code of Criminal Procedure. From the different authorities on this point, what amerges is like this. A sanction can take one out of the four following shapes-(i) No sanction; (ii) Invalid sanction; (iii) Defence sanction; and (iv) Proper sanction. So far as the first category is concerned there is absolutely no difficulty. It vitiates the trial, gives no jurisdiction to the Court to try the accused and therefore prejudice or no prejudice can be raised at any time. So far as the first category is concerned there is absolutely no difficulty. It vitiates the trial, gives no jurisdiction to the Court to try the accused and therefore prejudice or no prejudice can be raised at any time. The second category of invalid sanction are cases when an authority not competent to grant it, has granted it. This will also vitiate the trial and can be raised at any time without any question of prejudice to the accused. The case of R.J. Singh Ahuluwalia Vs. The State of Delhi is an instance of the type. The third category 'defective sanction' means a readymade sanction or a sanction granted in a routine manner without application of the mind Indu Bhusan Chatterjee Vs. The State. This type presents all difficulties. However, evidence can be led by the prosecution aliunde to establish that all the materials had been placed before the sanctioning authority and the same after scrutiny has accorded sanction and not mechanically. If no such evidence is adduced from the side of the prosecution and it appears to have been formally done, prejudice or no prejudice the trial will be vitiated. But if otherwise the fact is established, unless there is prejudice and objection taken at the earliest opportunity the judgment cannot be interfered with. So far as the last category is concerned it offers no difficulty. In the instant case, the sanction order can never fail in the first three categories. It runs thus: Government of Orissa Irrigation and Power Department. ORDER Dated. Bhubaneswar, the 11-1-1969. No. 942 whereas Shri Hemanta Kumar Mohanty is in employment under the Government of Orissa as Director, Lift Irrigation, Orissa and has been placed under suspension pending investigation into Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No. 27 dated 23-8-1967 u/s 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 registered against him; And that the said Shri Hemanta Kumar Mohanty and his wife and,children on his behalf have been found in possession of pecuniary resources and property, disproportionate to his known sources of income, to the tune of Rs. 1,93,447.66 and which he could not satisfactorily account for; And whereas, the said fact mentioned in the para above constitutes an offence of criminal misconduct u/s 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, punishable u/s 5(2) thereof; And whereas, the State Government after duly and carefully examining all the materials before it in regard to the said charge and the circumstances of the case, considers that the said Shri Hemanta Kumar Mohanty should be prosecuted in a Court of Law for the said offence; Now, therefore, the State Government do hereby accord sanction u/s 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (II of 1947) for prosecution of the said Shri Hemanta Kumar Mohanty for the said offence and any other offences arising out of the said facts. By order of Governor Sd/- A.K.B. Chief Secretary to Government. As is evident it is self sufficient. It says who is going to be prosecuted and why and for what exact amount. Thus no criticism is available that it is wanting in any thing. In act it gives a complete picture to the person prosecuted as to the case he is going to meet. 12. The other aspect is what materials are to be placed before the sanctioning authority. As admitted by p.w. 52, the investigating Officer, he examined p.w. 28 on 7-1-1969 and effected some seizure on 24-1-1969. From Ext. 26 it appears that materials were placed before the sanctioning authority on 11-12-1968 and therefore what had been collected till then could alone have been placed before it. The charge-sheet was submitted on 7-10-1969. Admittedly, therefore, some part of the investigation still remained before the sanction was given. It is to be seen if this has in any way vitiated the sanction order. What is necessary is placing of 'necessary materials' before the sanctioning authority and not 'necessary evidence' before the sanctioning authority. Sanctioning authority is not supposed to carry on a preliminary investigation before according sanction. This Court as early as in 1952 in the case of Biswabhusan Naik v. State ILR 1952 Cutt. 108, in held: It is not necessary that the particulars of the offence or the essence of the evidence relating thereto should be set out in the sanction or should be proved to have been placed before the sanctioning authority. This Court as early as in 1952 in the case of Biswabhusan Naik v. State ILR 1952 Cutt. 108, in held: It is not necessary that the particulars of the offence or the essence of the evidence relating thereto should be set out in the sanction or should be proved to have been placed before the sanctioning authority. x x x x Nor does the proof that the particulars of the offence were still under investigation necessarily make out want of due deliberation on the part of the sanctioning authority if the sanction is granted at that stage to prosecute a person for a specific alleged offence stating the broad outlines of the constituent facts thereof. Accordingly I will hold that even if a part of the investigation was done after obtaining sanction, yet in the facts and circumstances of the case, the sanction order does not suffer from any infirmity on that score. 13. The next contention of Mr. Mohanty was that the Act came to be amended by the Anti-Corruption Law (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Central Act 40 of 1964) that received the assent of the President on 18-12-1964. In this amendment, Clause (e) was added to Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act and its Section 5(3) was deleted. By addition of Clause (e), possession of disproportionate assets became a substantive offence for the first time and consequently assets which were acquired before 18-12-1964 could not possibly become the subject-matter of the charge. In answer to this, Mr. Sanyasi Rao for the State contended that the amendment was merely a restatement of the law; in other wards, what was u/s 5(3) was deleted but incorporated in Section 5(1)(e) ; that this amendment did not make the law more strengthen but rather softened its rigour in favour of the accused, and that previously as the law stood, a presumption was available to the prosecution which was abrogated thus putting the prosecution at a disadvantage. So according to him, there being no change in the law itself, no legitimate exception could be taken to the letting in of evidence of assets acquired before the amendment came into force. In support of this contention of Mr. Rao relied on certain observations made in Biswabhusan Naik v. State ILR 1952 Cutt. 108. The Appellant has been charged as follows (relevant portions extracted): That you ... In support of this contention of Mr. Rao relied on certain observations made in Biswabhusan Naik v. State ILR 1952 Cutt. 108. The Appellant has been charged as follows (relevant portions extracted): That you ... or about the 31st day of August 1967 ... were found In possession of assets ... of the value of Rs. 3,74,920/- out of which you could not satisfactorily account of pecuniary resources and property of the value of Rs. 1,93,447.66 disproportionate to your known sources of income which you obtained by committing the offence mentioned in Sub-section (1)(e) of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947.... Admittedly the prosecution case relating to the disproportionate assets relates to the entire service period of the Appellant from 15-12-1943 to 31-8-1967. Similarly the assets and expenditure have been taken for the entire period vide Ext. 39. In this context it was argued by Mr. Mohanty that Sub-section (3) of Section 5 merely provided a rule of evidence but no substantive offence which only became so by the amendment, that is u/s 5(1)(e) from 18-12-1964. For appreciation of the arguments advanced on either side, the relevant law as it stood previously and after the amendment may be extracted: Old Section 5(3) New Section 5(1)(e) In any trial of an offence punishable under Sub-section (2) the fact that the accused or any other person on his behalf is in possession, for which the accused person can not satisfactorily account, of which the accused person can not satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income may be proved, and on such proof the Court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the accused person is guilty of criminal misconduct. In the discharge of his official duty and his conviction there for shall not be r invalid by reason only that it is based solely on such presumption. (Inserted by Central Act 40/ 64 dated 18-12-1964). Section 5(1)A public servant is said to commit the offence of Criminal misconduct- (a) x x x x (b) x x x x (c) x x x x (d) If le or any person on his behalf is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession, for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. It was conceded by both the sides that there is no direct ruling on the point either of any High Court or of Supreme Court. Both the sides relied much on certain observations made in the case of Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab 1964 S.C.D 874. However, Mr. Mohanty relied much on the case of Gopinath Patra v. State 1971 (2) C.W.R. 555, and the case of Gopinath Misra v. State 1972 (1) C.W.R. 576. Mr. Sanyasi Rao frankly conceded that if the interpretation of law would be that the assets acquired before 18-12-1964 would not be taken into consideration, the prosecution has no case. 14. The sale point for consideration therefore, if the amended Section 5(1)(e) introduces a ban on evidence of property acquired before 18-12-1964 while a computing assets at the hands of the Appellant in course of trial. In view of the categorical finding of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab 1964 S.C.D 874, it is no more open to argue that Section 5(3) was a substantive offence and Section 5(1)(e) is a mere reproduction of the same. Their Lordships have held: The argument that Section 5(3) relates to an offence of criminal misconduct by public servant in the discharge of his official duty is unsound, The sub sect on does nothing of the kind. It merely prescribes a rule of evidence for the purpose of proving the offence of criminal misconduct, as defined in Section 5(1) for which an accused person is already under trial. In an earlier case reported in C.S.D. Swamy Vs. The State their Lordships also took a similar view and observed: It is true that Section 5(3) of the Act, does not create a new offence but only lays down a rule of evidence, enabling the Court to raise a presumption of guilt in certain circumstances. Therefore, the prosecution contention that it was a mere restatement of law can hardly be sustained. In that contest Mr. Mohanty's further contention was that bringing in evidence of assets acquired prior to the amendment of 18-12-1964 would tantamount to convicting a person for an offence that did not exist. Therefore, the prosecution contention that it was a mere restatement of law can hardly be sustained. In that contest Mr. Mohanty's further contention was that bringing in evidence of assets acquired prior to the amendment of 18-12-1964 would tantamount to convicting a person for an offence that did not exist. This is contrary to the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 20(1) of the Constitution which provides that no citizen shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of commission of the Act charged as an offence. In face of the observation of their Lordships in Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab 1964 S.C.D 874. I do not think such an argument is yet available to Mohanty. Their Lordships have held therein: Mr. Lall contends that when the section speaks of the accused being in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income only pecuniary resources or property acquired after the date of the Act is meant. To think otherwise, says the learned Counsel, would be to give the Act retrospective operation and for this there is no justification. We agree with the learned Counsel that the Act has no retrospective operation. We are unable to agree, however, that to take into consideration pecuniary resources or property in the possession of the accused d or any other person on his behalf which were acquired before the date of the Act is in any way giving the Act retrospective operation. A statute cannot be said to be retrospective, because a part of the requisites for its actions is drawn from a time antecedent from its passing (see Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Ed. 211). In para 14 of the said judgment, their Lordships observed thus: Looking at the words of the section and giving them their plain and natural meaning we find it impossible to say that pecuniary resources and property acquired before the date on which the Prevention of Corruption Act came into force should not be taken into account even if in possession o the accused or any other person on his behalf. To accept the contention that such pecuniary resources or property should not be taken into consideration one has to read into the section the additional words 'if acquired after the date of this Act' after the word 'property'. To accept the contention that such pecuniary resources or property should not be taken into consideration one has to read into the section the additional words 'if acquired after the date of this Act' after the word 'property'. For this there is no justification. On the same analogy it can be safely held that letting in evidence of property before the amendment would not amount to giving retrospective effect to the amendment. Also the amendment being 'is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession', there is no justification for introducing a Clause into it 'of assets acquired after this amendment'. Accordingly I would repeal the contention that evidence of acquisition of property prior to the amendment cannot be taken into consideration and if done it would violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 20(1) of the Constitution. 15. What remains for consideration yet in this connation are the two citations of the Court relied on by Mr. Mohanty. In the case of Gopinath Patra v. State 1971 (2) C.W.R. 555, Das, J., observed: Once it is recognized that the possession of disproportionate assets came to be a substantive offence for the first time on 19-12-1964 from the date the amendment came into force, the inhibition of Article 20(1) of the Constitution cannot be ignored...The amending law in question clearly enough was not and could not have been given any retrospective effect and on 8-11-1963 such possession was not any offence of criminal misconduct. The latter case of Gopinath Misra v. State 1972 (1) C.W.R. 576, was based on the earlier case, both being delivered by Das. J, The two cases are clearly distinguishable. In the earlier case, house of the accused was searched on 8-11-1963 by the Vigilance Department in course of an investigation for an offence under Sections 409 and 120-B, Indian Penal Code and thereafter he stood trial along with others in G.R. Case No. 4(Vig.) of 1963. On the basis of the assets disclosed in course of the aforesaid search, the A.S.P. Vigilance, reported to the S.P. of there being prima facie evidence of unaccounted for excess assets in possession of the Petitioner on 8-11-1963. This report is dated 12-1-1968 and charge-sheet was filed u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Act. On the basis of the assets disclosed in course of the aforesaid search, the A.S.P. Vigilance, reported to the S.P. of there being prima facie evidence of unaccounted for excess assets in possession of the Petitioner on 8-11-1963. This report is dated 12-1-1968 and charge-sheet was filed u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Act. The Special Judge took cognizance of the offence on 17-1-1970 and charged the accused thus: That you on or about 8-11-1963 while employed in the Public Health Department...were found in possession of assets disproportionate and thereby committed an offence of criminal misconduct u/s 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947.... From the above charge it is clear that the possession of disproportionate assets as on 8-11-1963 was going to be considered. The amendment, that is Section 5(1)(e) of the Act came on 18-12-1964 by which date the search and investigation were over. So it is patent that the accused there was being prosecuted for possession of assets on or about 8-11-1963 when the amendment in question was yet to come into existence. It is obvious) therefore, that the accused therein could not have been tried for an offence u/s 5(1)(e) when the basis of the offence alleged was on or about 8-11-1963 more than one year anterior to the coming in of the amendment. The latter case only followed the former and, therefore, needs no special treatment. The facts of the instant case are quite different. F.I.R. is dated 23-8-1967. The search was on 24-8-1967 and both were after the passing of the amendment and, therefore, the entire cause of action is after the passing of the amendment unlike the two C.W.R. cases. The two decisions of this Court cannot, therefore, come to the assistance of the Appellant. In the result, the two-fold contention of the defence that the assets acquired before the amendment cannot be taken into consideration or, if so done, it would be hit by Article 20(1) of the Constitution, fails. 16. Incidentally it was urged that Ext. 39, the disproportionate statement prepared by p.w. 43, is inadmissible in evidence being hit by Section 162, Code of Criminal Procedure. p.w. 43 Sri Mulla is a Senior Technical Officer (Accounts), C.B.I., Government of India. He is a Chartered Accountant. 16. Incidentally it was urged that Ext. 39, the disproportionate statement prepared by p.w. 43, is inadmissible in evidence being hit by Section 162, Code of Criminal Procedure. p.w. 43 Sri Mulla is a Senior Technical Officer (Accounts), C.B.I., Government of India. He is a Chartered Accountant. At the request of the I.G. of Police, Vigilance, Orissa, Cuttack, to prepare a disproportionate assets statement in the case on the basis of materials supplied to him, he prepared Ext. 39. It was contended that he merely did the calculation work on materials furnished by the investigating Officer and, therefore, that document having been prepared in course of investigation is inadmissible in evidence. The contention of the prosecution is that it is a technical job and so expert advice had to be taken and there is no bar for admitting the same. I think any body cannot prepare such a statement. Some knowledge of accountancy is necessary. Therefore, I am of the view that it is to be taken as an expert opinion u/s 45 of the' Evidence Act against which the bar u/s 162, Code of Criminal Procedure cannot operate. But all the same I would hold that it would be no proof of the facts mentioned in Ext. 39. These are mere figures which ought to be substantiated by independent evidence to prove their authenticity; in other words, Ext. 39 though admissible in evidence will not be a proof of fact contained therein. In fact also this report of p.w. 43 makes a mention at several places 'subject to verification.' 17. I would now advert to the factual aspects of the case. To avoid repetition I would at the outset state some of the facts which are beyond controversy. The case at hand has to be judged in this background. 18. The Appellant is a member of Mitakshyara joint family with his father D.w. 33 as the karta. D.w. 33 has got two other sons. The third son is a foreign qualified officer working under the Kalinga Tubes drawing a salary at the relevant time a little above Rs. 1500/- per month and the second is a member of the Orissa Judicial Service. D. w. 33 is a retired Professor of Chemistry. He joined Government service in 1918 as a Lecturer in Chemistry in the Revenshaw College, the premier educational institution of Orissa. 1500/- per month and the second is a member of the Orissa Judicial Service. D. w. 33 is a retired Professor of Chemistry. He joined Government service in 1918 as a Lecturer in Chemistry in the Revenshaw College, the premier educational institution of Orissa. Till 1947 he worked there with usual promotion in rank when he was transferred as Principal of Parlakimedi College. At the time of his retirement in 1950 he was drawing a salary of Rs. 1,000/-. He is still getting a pension of Rs. 477.80 per month. Prior to his actual retirement sometime in March 1950 he had taken four months preparatory leave to retirement and had come back to Cuttack by November 1949. Again from February 1953 to December 1955 he served as the Principal of Bhadrak Private College where he was getting a salary of Rs. 420/-, per month and enjoying free quarters. While he was Principal of Parlakimedi College he was also enjoying free quarters. During the tenure of his service as a, Lecturer in Chemistry in Ravenshaw College, he was for a bout 12 years Asstt. Superintendent and Superintendent of the hostels attached to the College and thus was getting free accommodation plus an allowance varying from Rs. 30/- to Rs. 45/- per month. H has constructed a house at Cuttack during the period of his service a two storied building with certain out-houses and he was occupying the same till 1960 when he shifted and resided with the Appellant at Bhubaneswar. At that time he let out the ground floor and out-houses at Cuttack and initially got a monthly rent of Rs. 250 which gradually increased to Rs. 350/-. He is originally a resident of ex-State of Mayurbhanj and has his ancestral properties in Manoharpur in Karanjia. He has a brother who retired in the year 1960 as a Deputy Magistrate. The ancestral properties are said to be 250, 300 acres. He admits that he does not get anything regularly from this source except rice and cereals on some ceremonial occasions. He has also about 22 acres of land at Salipur. There is no clear evidence as to the yield of the Salipur lands. Besides the three sons, he has 2 daughters. First daughter's marriage took place sometime in 1945 and his son-in-law (d.w. 28) is a Senior I.A. Section Officer. He has also about 22 acres of land at Salipur. There is no clear evidence as to the yield of the Salipur lands. Besides the three sons, he has 2 daughters. First daughter's marriage took place sometime in 1945 and his son-in-law (d.w. 28) is a Senior I.A. Section Officer. His second son-in-law is an O.A.S. Officer and the second daughter's marriage was sometime in the year 1954. He has purchased 31 acres of land near Old Bhubaneswar in Mohabhoi Sasan for a consideration of Rs. 4,000/- in the year 1957 from one who was a pleader's clerk attached to Advocate Swami B.N. Das. On the wife's side, the Appellant is also well connected. His wife is the daughter of late Bhubananda Das, who was a Member of the Constituent Assembly, Central Legislative Assembly, Loka Sabha and Rajya Sabha from 1937 till his death in 1958. Late B. Das was an Electrical Engineer and was an adviser to some of the Companies like Puri Electric Supply Company of which he was also the Managing-partner. Late B. Das had four daughters and two sons., His twin brother is Swami B.N. Das who was a leading lawyer of the Cuttack Bar. He has retire from practice as he is nearing 90. Swami B.N. Das soon after independence had become Advocate-General for a term. At the time the case was launched against the Appellant he was the Director of Lift Irrigation and was drawing a monthly salary from 1963 onwards ' Rs. 1700/- plus D.A. Rs. 100/-. At the time of search and seizure on 24-8-1967 the parents of the Appellant were staying with him and so too two children of his second brother. One Refrigerator and a Phillips Radio belonging to the second brother were found, at the time of search and seizure in the house of the Appellant. The articles seized under Ext. 3, the seizure list, are not denied to have been recovered from the residential house of the Appellant but it was asserted that all of them did not belong exclusively to him but to some other members of the joint family, particularly the parents. 19. The relevant portion of Ext. 40 the F.I.R. need be quoted: To The Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Central Division, Cuttack. 19. The relevant portion of Ext. 40 the F.I.R. need be quoted: To The Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Central Division, Cuttack. Sir, On receipt of confidential information that Sri H.K. Mohanty, Director of Lift Irrigation, Bhubaneswar has amassed vast wealth by adopting corrupt practices, I made confidential enquiry into this allegation. It was ascertained during the confidential enquiry that the said Sri H.K. Mohanty, s/o. Sri Gurucharan Mohanty of village Monoharpur, P.S. Salepur, Dist. Cuttack has constructed a palacial building and shops by the side of the Lewis Road, Bhubaneswar, the approximate value of which would be rupees 2 lakhs if not more; that he has spent nearly rupees one lakh. in the marriage of his daughter during the year 1965, that he purchased about 35 acres of land in Mahabhoi Sasan and 1/4 acre of land in Ashok Nagar, all worth Rs. 7,000/- and that he has in his possession a Car, Refrigerator, valuable furniture, ornaments, costly dresses and has made heavy investments in Banks, which would be worth a bout Rs. 3,00,000/-. He it is reliably learnt has made these acquisitions by abusing his power as a public servant. Sri H.K. Mohanty joined as Asst. Engineer in 1943 and has become Director of Lift Irrigation. During this enquiry it was ascertained that he has not obtained valuable assets as share from the properties of his father, who comes of a middle class family and whose financial condition was bad, when he retired as Professor of Chemistry. Apart from his acquisition of assets and investments mentioned above the value of the building and shops will be about rupees 2 lakhs which cannot be the savings from the known sources of his income and as such is disproportionate. In order to collect evidence regarding his disproportionate assets and get the valuation of his building and lands done, registration of a case u/s 3(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act is necessary. I, therefore, request that a case may be registered u/s 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act (II/1947) for the purpose of investigation. Yours faithfully, Sd - A.K. Sinha. 23-8-1967. Inspector, Vigilance, Puri Squad. I, therefore, request that a case may be registered u/s 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act (II/1947) for the purpose of investigation. Yours faithfully, Sd - A.K. Sinha. 23-8-1967. Inspector, Vigilance, Puri Squad. To sustain a charge under Clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act, the prosecution has to show that (i) the Appellant is was a public servant; (ii) he himself or on his behalf some one else (iii) is possessed or has, at any time during the tenure of his office, been in possession of (iv) pecuniary resources disproportionate to his known sources of income for which he could not satisfactorily account. The Legislature has not chosen to indicate what proportion of the income would be considered disproportionate and the Court may take a liberal view of the excess of the assets over the receipts of the known sources of income. It has been held that 'known sources of income means 'known sources of income to the prosecution after a thorough investigation' and the onus of satisfactorily accounting for it is not as heavy an onus as is on the prosecution to prove its case beyond all possibility of doubt. This accounting for by the accused has to be liberally construed in favour of the accused and he will not be called upon to prove to the (sic) any assets to be found disproportionate to his known sources of incomes. It is in this light that I would now proceed to assess the evidence in the case. No doubt, there are several items, but it is not necessary to discuss all of them, particularly the minor ones. Since the learned Judge has found assets worth Rs. 53,000/- the Appellant was in possession of beyond his known sources of income, which he could not satisfactorily account for, Mr. Mohanty's main endeavor was so augment the income and minimize the expenditure and the worth of properties alleged to be in possession of the Appellant. 20. The learned Judge has enumerated 10 items of income which are not disputed. In the disputed list he has put in 5 items. Out of them he totally disallowed the savings of the Appellant from traveling allowances and daily allowances received by him during his entire service period, up to 31-8-1967. He has also disallowed Rs. 20. The learned Judge has enumerated 10 items of income which are not disputed. In the disputed list he has put in 5 items. Out of them he totally disallowed the savings of the Appellant from traveling allowances and daily allowances received by him during his entire service period, up to 31-8-1967. He has also disallowed Rs. 6,000/- claimed by the Appellant to have been received from his father for the clearance of customs duty and freight charges of his car brought from U.S.A. and Rs. 3,000 received by wife from her mother through Sri Khirod Kumar Patnaik (d.w. 31). So far as agricultural income of the Appellant is concerned, though a claim of Rs. 14,000/- was laid yet the learned Judge granted only Rs. 2,000/-. 21. I would first deal with the savings claimed by the Appellant from his travelling allowances which the learned Judge has charecterised as 'the highly controversial claim. In this context, facts admitted are that he Appellant, during the entire period of his service, has received a sum of Rs. 1,17,272-15 paise as T.A. and D.A. The break-up is like this: T.A. obtained for official tours undertaken by his own car. Rs. 87,122-34 Incidental charges & Daily allowance for journey by plane: Rs. 2,915-44 as per Exts. Do, for journey by train Rs. 3,209-87. W/R & Total: Rs. 93,247-65. W/V. Total T.A. and D.A. Rs. 1,17,272-15 (-) Total incidental etc. Balance: Rs. 24,024-50 (is the plane and train fares which are not taken into consideration.) The Appellant in his income tax Returns (Exts. 47 2 to 53 2 series,) called by the prosecution, has shown savings from journeys undertaken in his car for the years 1961-62 to 1966-67 thus: Total T.A. drawn Rs. 36,703-45 Petrol expenses over total mileage run both official & private and servicing, tax, insurance and repair charges. Rs. 29,396-80 Balance (is savings) Rs. 7,307-65 which works at 19% The Appellant in his examination u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure over this question (No. 21) has stated: x x x. I have received a net amount of Rs. 1,84,833-53 paise as my salary and allowance. In addition to this I had received a sum of Rs. 1,17,272-15 paise as T. A. and Daily allowance out of which after meeting the expenditure including the expenditure for the running and maintenance of the Car I have saved a bout Rs. 39,000/-. 1,84,833-53 paise as my salary and allowance. In addition to this I had received a sum of Rs. 1,17,272-15 paise as T. A. and Daily allowance out of which after meeting the expenditure including the expenditure for the running and maintenance of the Car I have saved a bout Rs. 39,000/-. At the trial stage the Appellant out of his receipts of Rs, 2.128-94 as incidental charges for air journeys, claimed at least Rs. 2,000/- as his savings and from receipts of Rs. 2,297-87 as incidental charges for train journeys claimed Rs. 760/- that is, a bout one-third. This has not at all been shown in the income side by the prosecution in the disproportionate statement (Ext, 39) nor any evidence adduced. The explanation of the prosecution for this is that "T.A. is not a legitimate source of income which is granted to an officer only to meet his out-of-pocket expenses" and thus prosecution was under no obligation to show that the Appellant took it as a profitable source of income. The learned Judge accepted the contention and disallowed the claim. The learned Judge has referred to several citations in support of his view which need not be traversed here. Neither party could place before me any direct authority for the proposition either way. The citations referred to by the learned Judge do not lay down any such universal proposition that in no circumstance can receipts from T. A. leave any savings to be reckoned as a substantial source of income. There are some casual observations here and there in the peculiar circumstances of each case that cannot hold good for all situations. Even Sajjan Singh's case 5, quoted by the learned Judge, does not postulate anything like that. There their Lordships only observed that in some cases the expenses might even exceed the amount received while in other cases it might not be so. In that case, even giving the maximum benefit of Rs. 10,000/- as income from T.A. the disproportionate assets could not be accounted for and so the conviction was upheld. True for income tax purposes travelling allowance drawn by an officer is not an income. It is so, for after meeting the propulsion charges, tax dues and repair charges, the balance is calculated towards the capital invested-be that a car, a motor cycle a bicycle or a horse as the case may be. True for income tax purposes travelling allowance drawn by an officer is not an income. It is so, for after meeting the propulsion charges, tax dues and repair charges, the balance is calculated towards the capital invested-be that a car, a motor cycle a bicycle or a horse as the case may be. To hold otherwise is to accept the contention that no part of the T.A. drawn by an officer is meant to cover the capital invested by the officer over the vehicle or animal or for the deterioration of its condition. It is of common experience that majority of officers do purchase vehicle on loan from Government and repay it monthly from their T.A. and if they are transferred to a job having no outing, they dispose it of. These are so rudimentary that any discussion may sound puerile or trite. Of course if an officer indulges in the luxury of moving with a revenue or of staying in expensive hotels, he will consume the whole of T.A. and D.A., nay something more also. But normally there would be savings meant to cover a part of the initial investment over conveyance. Otherwise it would mean as if officers purchase car from their pocket to undertake official tours which I consider nothing but a travesty of truth. From the above discussion the following principles flow viz., (i) T.A. cannot be taken as a legitimate source of income and therefore, onus would not be on the prosecution to lead evidence of the same; (ii) whether savings have been made or not being within special knowledge of the accused, it is on him to adduce acceptable evidence of the same; and (iii) if the accused successfully discharges that onus, it is not open to the Court to brush it aside with the aid of any fancied legal fiction, 22. Judged from the above standard, the instant case offers no difficulty. The reason is that much prior to the present prosecution, the Appellant in his income tax returns for 7 consecutive years from 1961-67 has shown a saving of Rs. 7,307 65, as shown above. His income tax returns for the previous years were not available to the prosecution. These savings for 7 years exclude the servicing charges, M.V. taxes, insurance and repair charges. The total receipts for these 7 years from his T.A. by his own car was Rs. 36,704,45. 7,307 65, as shown above. His income tax returns for the previous years were not available to the prosecution. These savings for 7 years exclude the servicing charges, M.V. taxes, insurance and repair charges. The total receipts for these 7 years from his T.A. by his own car was Rs. 36,704,45. The expense or propulsion both for official and private work - was estimated at Rs.(sic) servicing charges at Rs. 846/-, M.V. taxes at Rs. 840/-, insurance charges at Rs. 5,645/- and repair charges at Rs. 6,408.50/- total being Rs. 29,396.80, and the net saving was Rs. 7,307.65. However much one may sail on theory, the fact remains that much prior to the present prosecution, the Appellant has given returns to the income tax department the total receipts of his T.A. by his own car deducting expenses and has paid income tax on it. It is not out of pleasure that one pays income tax when it is not liaviable on a particular source. The Appellant has not done it casually for one year, as the documents (Exts. 47/2 to 53/2) available would show but for seven consecutive years. The tendency would be normally to inflate the expenses and minimise the savings so that income tax levied would be less. Even the calculation shows a savings of Rs. 7,000/- and odd in seven years which works out at 19% (nineteen per cent) of the total" receipts. This is no after thought to be ignored. So far as the incidental charges received for journeys by air are concerned, it is experience of every such passenger that the incidental charges received from the Government of Orissa (one-sixth of the air passage) are not even touched. Take for instance, a journey by air from Bhubaneswar viz. Calcutta to Delhi - the recognised route. It takes maximum 6 hours including the break at Air Port Dum Dum in Calcutta. One has not to spend a pie even over coolie charges. Tea and Tiffen are supplied free. So I do not find anything wrong if the Appellant has claimed Rs. 2,000/- as saving from a total receipt of incidental charges for journeys undertaken by air amounting to Rs. 2,128.94. So far as the savings from incidental charges for travels undertaken by train, he has claimed Rs 760/- out of a receipt of Rs. 2,297.87 which works out at one-third. 2,000/- as saving from a total receipt of incidental charges for journeys undertaken by air amounting to Rs. 2,128.94. So far as the savings from incidental charges for travels undertaken by train, he has claimed Rs 760/- out of a receipt of Rs. 2,297.87 which works out at one-third. I have no hesitation in holding that one can safely save this amount after meeting his incidental expenses. It is not that the Appellant would be getting down at every station, and covering a certain distance in some taxi or hackney carriage. Ordinarily in long distance journeys, the incidental charges are much minimised. The learned Special Judge has disallow d the claim from T.A. for tours by his own car on the following reason: The savings, if any, out of such allowance can be within the special knowledge of the accused and in order to show that he did have savings, he is to eliminate the usual expenses including the payments made by him for the maintenance of a driver. In his income tax returns regarding the car, the accused had no doubt claimed some savings, but it has not been established by him in this Court as to how he has claimed these savings. Accounts, if any, maintained by a public servant showing the actual costs incurred by him for,the purchase of petrol, maintenance of the car, payments to the driver and food expenses while travelling on Government duty, if found to be well-founded can show saving or loss. No such accounts have been produced and proved by the defence. The claim of savings from incidental charges received were also disallowed on similar reasoning thus: As has been submitted by the learned Special Public Prosecutor incidental charges are paid for the expenditure incurred on the way and for each trip. The incidental charges must not have been heavy amounts and were likely to have been spent by the accused while performing his journeys by train and in the absence of any accounts showing the actual expenses, incurred by the accused during his journeys by air to different places which would be within the special knowledge of the accused, no part of the incidental charges should be included to his income. From the above reasoning it is clear that the learned Judge would have accepted the claim of the Appellant if he would have provided vouchers,- cash memos, or bills for purchase of petrol, spare parts, garage charges, Dank Bungalow or Circuit House charges, fooding charges and coolie charges etc. To say the least, it is expecting too much - not in consonance with law but contrary to it. The Appellant is to satisfactorily account for the disproportionate assets and not to prove his claim with mathematical exactitude beyond all possibility of doubt. One in many might be keeping accounts of expenditure for his satisfaction; but why should he procure and preserve supporting bills and vouchers? These are not government cash to be audited. Besides why should one keep them from the beginning of his career till his superannuation anticipating to be required in a Court of Law? Even for certain expenditure, supporting vouchers are not feasible for which audit accepts a flat rate. Conversely have the materials in support of the Appellant's claim been properly appraised? It is admitted that the Appellant received quite a sizeable amount from travelling allowances and incidental charges and much before the present prosecution has given returns to income tax authorities showing a net savings of 19%. It was contended that with what motive the Appellant had furnished such returns is not known to the prosecution. But for that it cannot escape the effect of the necessary presumption drawn therefrom. Why should the Appellant furnish such returns and Court assessment? And, if he has, is the Court justified in ignoring it? Is it no proof of actual savings? I do not think one can legitimately shut one's eyes to such a tell-tale fact. For journeys by car, the Appellant had received Rs. 86,048.66. The savings taken at 19% come to roughly Rs. 16,410/-. To this be added the savings of Rs. 2,000/- from the incidental charges received for journeys by air and further Rs. 760/- from journeys by train. Thus the total comes to Rs. 19,170/-. The Appellant had put in a little more than 21 years of service including the study leave period. The average income from this source, therefore, is less than Rs. 1,000 per annum which works out at Rs. 80/- per month in the average. 760/- from journeys by train. Thus the total comes to Rs. 19,170/-. The Appellant had put in a little more than 21 years of service including the study leave period. The average income from this source, therefore, is less than Rs. 1,000 per annum which works out at Rs. 80/- per month in the average. For an officer with All-Orissa tour and at times outside the State, in my opinion, this is very modest, rather meagre. Accordingly I see no reason why the claim of the Appellant on this head should be disallowed in toto. On the above calculation I allow roundly claim of Rs. 19,000/- which should be added to his Income. 23. In this context it is desirable to dispose of a connected matter. The Appellant had undertaken some journeys by car on his private work. The learned Judge holds that he must have incurred expenditure to the tune of Rs. 20,000/- on this count. Thus he adds to the Appellant's expenditure Rs. 20,000/-. There is no evidence whatsoever on the side of the prosecution that Appellant spent that amount from his pocket. The statement of the Appellant u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure seems to be the only basis. The learned Judge appears to have relied on Ext. 39. The reasoning of the learned Judge is thus: In Schedule II of Ext. 39, these costs have been given as Rs. 20,300/-. p.w. 43 x x x x has stated about it. He has given evidence that the figure has been supplied to him by the I.O. (p.w. 52) x x x. The learned Special Public prosecutor has invited my attention to Exts. 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51, the income tax: returns for the assessment years 1961-62, 1962-63, 1963-64, 1964-65. and 1965-66 respectively giving the particulars regarding the car. In each of these returns, the mileage shown for private use for each year was 4320 miles x x x. The cost of maintenance for private use on the calculation made by the investigating agency and as given in Ext. 39 would come to less than Rs. 100/- per month. x x x x. I would hold that the expenditure on this account would come to Rs. 20,000/-, if not more; This finding is very vulnerable. Firstly, it is based on no evidence, Ext. 39 is no proof of facts mentioned therein. The author of Ext. 39 would come to less than Rs. 100/- per month. x x x x. I would hold that the expenditure on this account would come to Rs. 20,000/-, if not more; This finding is very vulnerable. Firstly, it is based on no evidence, Ext. 39 is no proof of facts mentioned therein. The author of Ext. 39 (p.w. 43) has no personal knowledge. What' materials the I.O. furnished, he put that in it and, therefore, that on no account can form the basis. It is evident from the about quoted reasoning that the basis of this item of expenditure is the income tax return of the Appellant and the mileage given there for personal use has been utilised for the purpose. It is rather strange that the same income tax returns were rejected while assessing the income of the Appellant but accepted in calculating the expenditure. I have already held that Ext. 39 is no proof of facts mentioned therein. They are to be proved independently. Unfortunately there is no such corroboration except the condemned income tax returns of the Appellant, exhibited on behalf of the prosecution. These exhibits only show that the expenditure on account of the personal use of the car is covered leaving a margin of savings to the extent of 19% of the total receipts, as discussed above while dealing with the income on this source. Coming to the statement of the Appellant on this point, it is that his savings from travelling allowances is inclusive of the expenditure incurred for use of the car on private work. This statement can only be accepted or rejected as a whole and not broken up and the part favourable for the prosecution accepted and the other rejected. In this connexion it was urged that since the Appellant was undertaking extensive tours, he must be maintaining a driver whose pay has to be taken into consideration. No question has been put to any of the defence witness s nor any of the prosecution witnesses has stated that the Appellant maintained a driver of his own. That apart, it is the common knowledge that top officers or heads of departments have the advantage of getting the services of an orderly-driver. Any way this is a minor point which needs no special treatment in the absence of any evidence on that score. That apart, it is the common knowledge that top officers or heads of departments have the advantage of getting the services of an orderly-driver. Any way this is a minor point which needs no special treatment in the absence of any evidence on that score. To conclude this aspect of the case, the finding of the learned Judge cannot be sustained both factually and legally. The proper approach to assess the evidence in such cases is to Judge the matter on broad probabilities - much depending on the maturity of understanding of the Judge. His experience of men and matters is the touch-stone which would refuse to accept the alloy. In the result, I see no reason why the learned Judge should not have allowed an income of Rs. 19,000/- to the Appellant on this head or should have burdened him with an expenditure of Rs. 20,000/-. Even then I am prepared to give a discount of Rs. 4,000/- for the wear and tear of the car for use on private work. Accordingly the defence contention is accepted to the above extent. 24. The Appellant had claimed to have received Rs. 14,000/- as income from the land at Mohabhoi Sasan. It is in evidence that D.w. 33 purchased this land in the year 1957. The area of this land is 31 acres, lying in one compact block near old Bhubaneswar. The purchase is in the names of the three daughters-in-law for a consideration of Rs. 4,000/-. D.w. 22 is in charge of the cultivation of the land. According to D.w. 22, the yearly yields were being paid by him to the wife of the Appellant at Cuttack from 1957 to 1960 and at Bhubaneswar thereafter. In course of investigation. p.w. 52 the Investigating Officer addressed a letter dated 7-9-1968 (Ext. W/E) to the Agricultural Officer, Puri, to make a local inspection of the land and give the probable yield. It was done and the report was received by the succeeding Investigating Officer on 26-11-1968. For reasons best known to the prosecution, neither the Agricultural Officer, Puri, was examined as a prosecution witness nor his report exhibited. Even though in the F.I.R. (Ext. 40) this finds place on the basis of which probably the above requisition (Ext. W/E) was sent to the Agricultural Officer. Puri yet the disproportionate assets statement prepared by p.w. 43 (Ext. For reasons best known to the prosecution, neither the Agricultural Officer, Puri, was examined as a prosecution witness nor his report exhibited. Even though in the F.I.R. (Ext. 40) this finds place on the basis of which probably the above requisition (Ext. W/E) was sent to the Agricultural Officer. Puri yet the disproportionate assets statement prepared by p.w. 43 (Ext. 39) does not make mention of it. In the property statement (Ext. 17) submitted by the Appellant for the year 1966, he has specifically claimed one-third share in the above land. The explanation of the prosecution not to include this in the income of the Appellant is that it did not take this as income of the Appellant. Even if he has any interest, it is only one-third interest and not the full interest and that in any case cannot exceed Rs. 2,000/- for the 10 years in view of the fact that it is not a profitable source which had been purchased for a paltry sum of Rs. 4,000/- only. Though the agricultural Officer, Puri, was not examined by the prosecution, the defence examined him as D.w. 9. He stated that he visited the land and found paddy and Kulthi crops there. He has estimated the income to be about Rs. 300/-net on the average per acre. There are 200 palm trees on the ridges, a small tank, a parennial stream flowing by its side and there has been installation of an electric pump. D.w, 22, who is in actual cultivation of the land on behalf of the owners, has stated how he grows potatoes, sugarcane besides paddy which he gets about thirty-five bharans. He has given a detailed estimate of the various crops, the yield from the tank and the trees. On a calculation it comes roundly to Rs. 270/- net per year per acre. The learned Judge discarded the evidence of d.ws. 9 and 22 as unsatisfactory and has dubbed their assessment of income as 'astronomical'. Some of the reasons why he discarded the evidence of D.w. 22 are that the neighouring tenants have not been examined, none of the coolies who was employed in different years has been examined, no account of the yearly produce or the agricultural expenses filed and no receipt from the wife of the Appellant produced for the various articles said to have been supplied in different years. I am afraid, if the learned Judge is not over punctilious and has not misplaced the onus. The income of the Appellant from this source, as from any other, has to be taken broadly and not to the nearest pie with reference to documents and receipts. D.w. 9 was obviously a prosecution witness who was addressed to estimate the income. One fails to understand why the prosecution did not choose to produce his report nor examined him as a witness. The defence comment is that the prosecution has been all through guilty of suppression and has attempted to by-pass witnesses not found convenient to it. When this was an asset mentioned in the F.I.R. the prosecution should not have felt shy of mentioning it as a source of income in Ext. 39. This only leads support to the criticism made by the defence that the prosecution was all along guilty of suppression. The only contention of the prosecution, which has been accepted by the learned Judge also, is that the income from this land cannot be high because it has been purchased for a sum of Rs. 4,000/- only. I do not think, that is a proper index to assess the potentiality of any piece of land. Admittedly the land is not third class barren field or gochar or hill-track. Out of the 31 acres, 13 acres are high land, 10 acres are majhi the sarad and 8 acres are bada sarad. There is a mala by the side of land which is perennial. Various reasons might be there why one should sell away an immovable property for any amount. It may be his urgency; it may be that there is no body to look after it; it may be to avert a danger or it may also be absence of a ready purchaser and the like. D.w. 33 says that after purchase he had spent Rs. 2,000/- for improving it, was requisitioning a diesel pump for irrigation from the perennial stream and thereafter had installed an electric pump. The land is in one compact area with 200 palm trees and a tank within. It is a property by itself on which, according to the present standards of land reform and ceiling, three families can depend entirely. From the evidence of D.w. 9 it is clear that the land is not in an uncared for state but in thriving condition. It is a property by itself on which, according to the present standards of land reform and ceiling, three families can depend entirely. From the evidence of D.w. 9 it is clear that the land is not in an uncared for state but in thriving condition. The vendor is none else but the clerk of Swami B.N. Das, Advocate, the uncle-in-law of the Appellant. It is in the evidence of D.w. 33 that there was no question of bargaining and whatever the vendor quoted be paid it. Regard being had to the relationship between the vendor and the vendees there is nothing absurd about it. Be that as it may, the consideration paid, to say the least, can never indicate the yield of the land which may become many times more, if it falls in the hands of a worthy owner or else may go to utter decay yielding nothing. Any way the fact remains that the prosecution knowing fully well that it was a source of income of the Appellant, did not examine D.w. 9 on its behalf nor mentioned about this income in Ext. 39 which was prepared on the information furnished by the Investigating Officer. From the defence side, it is in the property list submitted by the Appellant in 1966 that he has got one-third share in it. It was contended that the family being joint, and the parents living as they are with the Appellant, the bulk of the income was appropriated by the Appellant. The jointness of the family, the parents staying with the Appellant, some of the children of his brother also staying with the Appellant-being all facts, the defence contention cannot be jettisoned as frivolous. I do not consider that the claim laid by the Appellant at Rs. 14,000/- during a period of 10 years is exorbitant. Any body who has a little insight into agriculture, regard being had to the escalating price of agricultural produce, would take Rs. 300/- as a very modest figure of yield from one acre of land. Ordinarily one acre of first class Sarad land at present yields Rs. 1,200/-gross and with improvement methods of agriculture, double crop and use of fettilisers, it can easily be doubled. Here the protentiality of the land is quite great. 300/- as a very modest figure of yield from one acre of land. Ordinarily one acre of first class Sarad land at present yields Rs. 1,200/-gross and with improvement methods of agriculture, double crop and use of fettilisers, it can easily be doubled. Here the protentiality of the land is quite great. When there is no evidence from the prosecution side while it is in the evidence of the defence that potatoes and sugarcane are grown besides paddy, and that apart fish is sold and the plam fruits and its leaves also, I do not see any justification for overthrowing it as 'astronomical'. I would, therefore, hold that the net yield of one acre of such land should be on an average for, all the years Rs. 240/-in the minimum giving a reasonable deduction of 50% towards agricultural expenses. Out of this the Appellant has claimed one-third share. This is a very reasonable and modest claim with which I am not at all inclined to interfere. The learned Judge's reasonings in discarding the evidence are too lop-sided to be acceptable. The onus lay on the prosecution to adduce evidence if the income was so unusually low as that. Obviously the prosecution did not choose to do. It withheld examining D.w. 9 as a (sic) witness. It is guilty of suppressing this as a source of income in Ext. 39. It did not care to adduce any other evidence regarding its alleged an productivity. In this setting it does not behave of the prosecution to turn round and pick holes in the defence evidence. I would, therefore, hold that the learned Judge had no justification for bringing the claim of Rs. 14,000/-down to Rs. 2,000/- per year as share of the Appellant. I may add, rather indications are that in view of the jointness of the family, the Appellant actually utilised much more than his one-third share. In the result on my above estimate I would allow a claim of Rs. 12,000/- on this score. 25. The next disputed items regarding receipt of Rs. 6,000/- by the Appellant from his father towards the clearance of customs duty and freight of his car brought from U.S.A. while returning therefrom on completion of his study leave. The learned Judge has disallowed it on the ground that the sole witness on this point is D.w. 33 and his evidence is highly unsatisfactory. 6,000/- by the Appellant from his father towards the clearance of customs duty and freight of his car brought from U.S.A. while returning therefrom on completion of his study leave. The learned Judge has disallowed it on the ground that the sole witness on this point is D.w. 33 and his evidence is highly unsatisfactory. D.w. 33 stated that the Appellant returned from America sometime in the middle of 1949. The car purchased in U.S.A. reached India towards the end of 1949 by ship. As the Appellant was not getting his salary then and he had no other source of income, he (d.w. 33) advanced that Rs. 6,000/- and the Appellant released the car. The learned Judge does not accept this evidence on the ground that the father is interested; that the evidence is uncorroborated; that there was no reason why D.w. 33 would keep that very heavy cash with him when he had a bank account and that it is not mentioned in Ext. 39 that the Appellant had received Rs. 6,000/- from his father for payment of customs duty and freight. I do not think any of these grounds can stand. D.w. 33 has stated that towards last part of his service he was at Parlakhimedi where there was no banking arrangement and when he came back to Cuttack on preparatory leave to retirement towards November 1949, he found the Appellant in need of money for clearance of his car and so advanced the amount. Admittedly D.w. 33 was the karta of the family the father of the Appellant and was an active earning member drawing a salary of Rs. 1,000/- per month besides getting other amenities as free quarters. The family of the Appellant admittedly were with him when the Appellant was abroad. The total cost of the car including frieght etc was Rs. 13,350/- out of which Rs. 7,350/- had been paid by the Appellant from his savings in America. The balance Rs. 6,000/- which was towards customs duty and freight paid in Calcutta Port is now under dispute. The learned Judge says that non-mention of it in Ext. 39 cannot be taken advantage of by the Appellant, because it is within his personal knowledge and he is to prove the same. This happened in the year 1949 when the Appellant had returned after two years of stay in Americ. The learned Judge says that non-mention of it in Ext. 39 cannot be taken advantage of by the Appellant, because it is within his personal knowledge and he is to prove the same. This happened in the year 1949 when the Appellant had returned after two years of stay in Americ. It is in evidence that he was not getting his salary at that time which was drawn at a time in lump for about 7 months. Admittedly the car was coming in shop and the customs duty and other charges were to be paid in Calcutta Port. The Appellant says that he got this Rs. 6,000/- from his father and his father supports it. In a family transaction like this it is too much to expect that there would be outsiders to witness the father giving money to the son. To expect such a thing is to expect something unnatural and abnormal and to adduce any such evidence would be artificial and suspicious. The broad probabilities are to be taken into consideration and the question decided. The son was in need at that time in the prime of his career and had no such power to (sic) as to raise a loan of Rs. 6,000/-. The father was able, earning and had savings. The evidence of the father shows what amount he had in the G.P. Fund and what he had saved. In the circumstances what would be the natural conduct of the father? Will he remain indifferent and leave the son to borrow from other sources? His sparing the money - is it so absurd? What cuts at the root of the matter is the property statement given by the Appellant Ext. 16 where he has clearly and in unambiguos terms stated that the car has been purchased partly with his savings and partly with the money of his father. Where was the need in the property statement submitted in the year 1955 for the Appellant to indicate that the car has been procured partly by father's money unless it be for the fact that he had got Rs. 6,000/- from him for the clearance of the customs duty and freight? However much one may cavil that the exact amount spared by the father has not been mentioned in Ext. 16, the fact remains that the car has been procured on the contribution of the father. 6,000/- from him for the clearance of the customs duty and freight? However much one may cavil that the exact amount spared by the father has not been mentioned in Ext. 16, the fact remains that the car has been procured on the contribution of the father. I do not think the prosecution can get over this hurdle on the handy explanation that the bank accounts of the father have not been produced or that the Appellant has not stated specifically in his property statement that Rs. 6,000/- was paid by the father. Accordingly I would hold that the disallowance by the learned Judge the Rs. 6,000/- claimed to have been obtained from the father is not sustainable and, therefore, this is to the income of the Appellant. 26. The next disputed item is the claim of the Appellant to have received Rs. 3, 000/- from his mother-in-law in 1966. The learned Judge has disallowed this claim in toto. The witnesses who deposed to this are d.ws. 31 and 32 - two co-sons-in-law of the Appellant. The learned Judge did not accept the defence plea on the ground that there is no independent corroboration and the witnesses are highly interested. It was contended on behalf of the defence that in the very nature of things no outsider could possibly be a witness to the transaction and so there was no valid reason for the learned Judge in discarding their evidence. True it would be so but when other reliable evidence could be produced but not produced necessarily it will have its impact. It is in the evidence that the mother-in-law of the Appellant encashed her National Defence Certificates for about Rs. 16,000/- and out of that she gave three 'thousand to each of her daughters. If it were so, then documentary evidence about encashment of the N.D.Cs. could have been easily available to lend support to this contention; but that not having been done. I do not think the learned Judge has gone wrong in not accepting the defence claim. I would, therefore, concur with the learned Judge and hold this claim to have been rightly rejected. 27. I would now refer to some of the claims of the prosecution in which its grievance is that the learned Judge has become too much liberal and allowed certain claims which were not reasonable. These items are (i) Rs. I would, therefore, concur with the learned Judge and hold this claim to have been rightly rejected. 27. I would now refer to some of the claims of the prosecution in which its grievance is that the learned Judge has become too much liberal and allowed certain claims which were not reasonable. These items are (i) Rs. 15,000/- said to have been received by the Appellant from his father towards construction of his building; (ii) Rs. 7,350/- towards purchase of the car from his savings from the loan stipend; and (iii) the valuation given to the building by the learned Judge at Rs. 2,00,000/-should at least go up by Rs. 25,000/- more. 28. The first two contentions are taken up together. So far as the father giving (sic) towards construction of the building the learned Judge has held this to be a fact and hence has allowed the same. He has arrived at this conclusion with reference to the withdrawals made by D.w. 33 from his bank accounts during the period of the construction of the house. The submission of the prosecution is that no heavy amounts had been drawn during this period of 2 years from 1962 to 1964 and therefore the learned Judge should not have accepted this amount. Regarding the purchase of the car in U.S.A. the prosecution contention is that the Appellant had received money not to purchase car and other valuables but for his studies and so he could not have purchased the car out of that amount and therefore the learned Judge was wrong in holding that in fact the Appellant had purchased the car from his savings in U.S.A. The Appellant was asked the following questions and thus were his answers: Q.24. It is in evidence of p.w. 52 Ramesh Chandra Misra, the Dy. Superintendent of Police (Vigilance) that he had ascertained from documents that you had received Rs. 15,000/- from your father and Rs. 12,000/- in cash and building materials from your brother for building your house. What have you to say? Ans. It is true. I had received Rs. 15,000/- from my father and Rs. 12,000/- in cash and in building materials, from my brother Sisir Kumar Mohanty, an officer of Kalinga Tubes, Chowdwar. Q.43. As per the report of p.w. 43, the Senior Technical Officer (Accounts) of the C.B.I. your expenses in the U.S.A. have been calculated to be Rs. Ans. It is true. I had received Rs. 15,000/- from my father and Rs. 12,000/- in cash and in building materials, from my brother Sisir Kumar Mohanty, an officer of Kalinga Tubes, Chowdwar. Q.43. As per the report of p.w. 43, the Senior Technical Officer (Accounts) of the C.B.I. your expenses in the U.S.A. have been calculated to be Rs. 21,150/-. What have you to say? Ans. I had received Rs. 28, 196/-including my outfit allowances. From the savings out of this amount, I have purchased a car in the U.S.A. for Rs. 7,400/-. This amount included the cost, insurance and freight up to Calcutta. In addition to this, I also purchased woolen clothings, two wrist watches, steel Wardrobe boxes, fountain pens etc. worth about Rs. 2,000/-. I brought these articles to India in 1949. These articles were seized from my house on 24-8-1967. Q.51. The cost of your car together with the duty has been calculated to be Rs. 13,350/- when p.w. 43 the Senior Technical Officer (Accounts) of C.B.I. prepared the Disproportionate Assets Statement. What have you to say? Ans. As I have already stated, this car was purchased in the U.S.A. I had paid Rs. 7,400/- towards the cost, insurance and freight upto Caluctta. The custom duty and other incidental charges incurred for bringing the car to Cuttack had been paid by my father. From the above it would be clear that the prosecution case was that the Appellant received Rs. 15,000/- cash from his father towards the construction of the house. There is absolutely no other evidence to dislodge this. On the contrary the investigation was directed in that line and the prosecution came to that finding for which it was put to the Appellant and the Appellant in his answers has accepted this. That being so, it is no more open to the prosecution to argue that the learned Judge has gone wrong in allowing Rs. 15,000/- to have been received by the Appellant from the father towards construction of the house. Regarding the purchase of the car in America, there is no evidence from the prosecution side that it is not so. The prosecution case is that out of the financial aid given to the Appellant of rupees twenty-eight thousand and odd, his expenses were Rs. 21,000/- as per report Ext. 39 of p.w. 43. Regarding the purchase of the car in America, there is no evidence from the prosecution side that it is not so. The prosecution case is that out of the financial aid given to the Appellant of rupees twenty-eight thousand and odd, his expenses were Rs. 21,000/- as per report Ext. 39 of p.w. 43. The explanation of the Appellant is that from the balance amount he purchased the car and some other articles. The Appellant in his property statement Ext. 16 has stated that the car has been purchased by self for Rs. 13,400/- in U.S.A. and in the remarks column it is stated that "this partly financed by father and partly by taking loan". This supports the answer of the Appellant in his explanation u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure. This property statement was submitted on 28-2-1955. Therefore, the plea of the Appellant that has been purchased partly by loan and partly financed by father is not an afterthought. It was contended by the prosecution that it is not mentioned to what extent the father financed nor it has been stated from what source the loan was obtained. To me it appears rather useless hair-splitting. The first part of the answer supports the defence stand that the father advanced Rs. 6,000/- for customs duty and freight charges while the second part supports that it was from the savings of the study loan. At the time the car was purchased it was a study loan that was to be repaid. So if he made any savings he was under no obligation to account for it. Even if he had been given study loan which later was converted to financial concession, and leading a frugal and economical life he saved anything, I do not think it would be misappropriation or cheating as contended by the prosecution. Fact remains that he did not make some savings. That is the prosecution case and it is not open to the prosecution now to turn back, split up the statement of the Appellant and urge to accept one part and reject the other. To conclude, the two contentions of the prosecution that the learned Judge was wrong in allowing Rs. 15,000/- as advance by the father for the construction of the house, and Rs. 7,4000/- as savings which was paid towards the purchase of the car, are not acceptable. 29. To conclude, the two contentions of the prosecution that the learned Judge was wrong in allowing Rs. 15,000/- as advance by the father for the construction of the house, and Rs. 7,4000/- as savings which was paid towards the purchase of the car, are not acceptable. 29. The last contention of the prosecution is that the learned Judge should have taken the valuation of the building at Rs. 2,25,000/- at least instead of two lakhs. The learned Judge has very exhaustively dealt with this aspect of the c se. Both the sides also advanced quite lengthy arguments on the point. Obviously there are very conflicting reports. D.w. 16 the Tax Daroga of the Notified Area Council, Bhubaneswar, stated that the capital cost of building has been taken at Rs. 1,17,000/-. In Ext. 39 the valuation has been put at Rs. 2,93,900/- and in the F.I.R. Rs. 2,00,000/. The Wealth Tax people valued it at Rs. 3,77,160/- which is now under appeal and the learned Counsel for the prosecution did not rely on this. p.w. 39 valued the main house for the purpose of fixation of rent at Rs. 1,99,876 in November, 1963. But again in June 1964 he held it to be Rs. 2,55,000/-. On the previous assessment the rent vias fixed at Rs. 1,000/- but on the subsequent higher valuation it was fixed at Rs. 1,275/- which the Appellant was getting. Be it stated that after the institution of the case, the actual measurement on site has not been done by the prosecution. D.w. 26 a retired Chief Engineer along with other two Chief Engineers has valued it by preparing a detailed estimate on the basis of the then market rates at less than Rs. 1,40,000/-. Even there is no uniformity in the plinth area or the rates prevalent at the time for every (sic). D.w. 24 an Executive Engineer attached to the Valuation Cell of the income tax Department in Calcutta has valued the building at Rs. 1,36,000/- vide Ext. W/T on the basis of the plinth area rate. His evidence shows that earlier Mr. S.R. Banerji, the Surveyor and the Valuer had surveyed the building and out-houses and valued it at Rs. 1,08,000/-. This surveyor has not been examined. 1,36,000/- vide Ext. W/T on the basis of the plinth area rate. His evidence shows that earlier Mr. S.R. Banerji, the Surveyor and the Valuer had surveyed the building and out-houses and valued it at Rs. 1,08,000/-. This surveyor has not been examined. The learned Judge has in view of the contention of the learned Special Public Prosecutor has observed thus: The learned Special Public Prosecutor has submitted before me that even on the calculations made by D.w. 27 according to the Schedule rates, the estimated costs of the main building would come to Rs. 1,16,000/- and odd giving an allowance of 5% for personal supervision and that if the costs of the outhouses as given by p.w. 41 at Rs. 47,2000/- the cost of sanitary installations as given by D.w. 13 at Rs. 11,925 and the cost of electrical fittings as given by D.w. 26 at Rs. 10,448/- are added, the entire costs would come to more than Rs. 1,85,000/. This, according to the learned Special Public Prosecutor, is according to the specifications given by D.w. 27 and thus if the specifications as given by D.w. 27 are not accepted and it is held that the standard specifications must have been adopted, the costs will be at least rupees two lakhs. In conclusion the learned Judge says: On a consideration of the entire evidence on record with regard to the valuation of the main building and out-houses of the accused, it would in my view, be reasonable to hold that the entire costs incurred by the accused for his main building and out-houses including the compound wall would come to Rs. 2,00,000/- in the minimum. As I have already said, the actual costs incurred by the accused could be but have not been proved by him the production and proof of his entire accounts and vouchers and on a review of the evidence, the Court has to take a reasonable view of the costs as has been done by me. In view of the evidence on record I do not think the valuation of the house and out-houses could be stretched beyond the findings of the learned Judge at Rs. 2,00,000/-. 30. The defence had challenged several other items, but I propose to refer only to two of them in the passing. In view of the evidence on record I do not think the valuation of the house and out-houses could be stretched beyond the findings of the learned Judge at Rs. 2,00,000/-. 30. The defence had challenged several other items, but I propose to refer only to two of them in the passing. The marriage expenses of the daughter of the Appellant was initially put at one lakh rupees in the F.I.R. but was brought down to thirty-five thousand in Ext. 39. The learned Judge has held it at twenty-five thousand. The Appellant also admits that the total expenses is twenty-five thousand but that includes 35 tolas of gold given by way of ornaments to the daughter from the jewellery of the mother. There is not an iota of evidence from the side of the prosecution on the expenses of the daughter's marriage of the Appellant. In this connexion the statement of the Appellant is as follows: Q.40. The Senior Technical Officer (Accounts) of the C.B.I. (p.w. 43) has mentioned in his report that an amount of Rs. 35,000/- has been spent by you for the marriage of your daughter Srimati Sanjukta. What have you to say? Ans. I had drawn a non-refundable advance of Rs. 15,000/- for the marriage of my daughter Sanjukta. But it was not necessary for me to spend more than Rs. 11,000/- out of this amount. No gold ornament was required to be purchased. Thirty-five tolas of gold belonging to my wife out of her dowry were utilised: My father had given Rs. 3,000/- for this marriage. My uncle N.K. Mohanty Rs. 250/-, presents in cash to an extent of Rs. 2,182/- had been received from near relations and friends. Presents in shape of ornaments, clothings and other stationary articles worth about Rs. 7,000/- were received from near relations and friends out of which articles worth Rs. 5,000/- were given to her when she left and articles worth Rs. 2,000/- were kept for future use as per the usual custom, Out of my income, I had spent only Rupees eleven thousand for the marriage of my daughter. This answer of the Appellant, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, is to be accepted as it is and cannot be directed and a part favorable to the prosecution accepted. This answer of the Appellant, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, is to be accepted as it is and cannot be directed and a part favorable to the prosecution accepted. It legally flows therefrom that 35 tolas of gold which has been held by the learned Judge to have been purchased and supplied to the daughter has to be excluded. Out of the jewellery the learned Judge has given a discount of seven tolas of gold which the mother of the Appellant Mrs. G.C. Mohanty was having on her person on the day of search as belonging to her. Admittedly the parents were staying with the Appellant for three years previous to the search. In this back ground it is inconceivable that Mrs. G.C. Mohanty would not be having a grain of gold ornaments besides what she had on her person. She had her heydays and was in affluent condition during cheap days when her husband D.w. 33 was well placed and gold was selling less than Rs. 25/- per tola. The family had shifted letting out their house at Cuttack. In this context, I for one, cannot associate myself with the idea that out of the gold ornaments found, nothing belongs to the mother. So far as gold ornaments are concerned it would be even niggardly to hold that ten tolas of gold at least belongs to the mother out of the claim of twenty-two tolas. This should be deducted from the assets of the Appellant. There are also some minor items on which some legitimate criticisms could be advanced. But it is unnecessary to go into these details in view of my above findings on the main items. 31. From the above discussions, it would follow that the disproportionate assets found by the learned Judge to the tune of Rs. 53,000/- in the possession of the Appellant which he could not satisfactorily account for, have been effectively explained away as follows: From Travelling Allowances ... Rs. 19,000/- From Mohabhoi Sassan land ... Rs. 10,000/- From father towards clearance of ... Rs. 6,000/- customs duty & freight (the income swells by) Expenditure: ... Rs. 35,000/- For use of car on private work ... Rs. 4,000/- I.e., out of estimated ... Rs. 20,000/- It is reduced by ... (+) Rs. 16,000/- Income: ... Rs. Rs. 19,000/- From Mohabhoi Sassan land ... Rs. 10,000/- From father towards clearance of ... Rs. 6,000/- customs duty & freight (the income swells by) Expenditure: ... Rs. 35,000/- For use of car on private work ... Rs. 4,000/- I.e., out of estimated ... Rs. 20,000/- It is reduced by ... (+) Rs. 16,000/- Income: ... Rs. 51.000/- Price of 35 toll as of gold given to the daughter and 10 toll as of gold belonging to the mother ' Rs. 160/- per (sic) ... (+) Rs. 7,2000/- Total accounted for assets ... Rs. 58,200/- (more as against the finding of ... Rs. 53,000/-) So disagreeing with the learned Special Judge I will hold that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge against the Appellant. 32. In the result, the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Special Judge against the Appellant is set aside. The Appellant is acquitted and he is released from the bail bond. 33. Before parting with the judgment I would like to record some of my reactions to the F.I.R. in this case in the larger interests of the society. The F.I.R. was submitted by one Sri A.K. Sinha, an Inspector of Vigilance, on the basis of his 'confidential enquiry'. Some of its outstanding features are: The Appellant has (i) spent nearly one lakh rupees in the marriage of his daughter in the year 1965, (ii) made heavy investments in banks which would be worth about Rs. 3,00,000/- and (iii) the financial condition of his father was bad when he retired as Prof. of Chemistry. The house of the Appellant was searched in consequence of this the next day. During investigation the one lakh expenditure on daughter's marriage climbed down to Rs. 35,000/- and during trial NIL evidence was adduced in support of it. Regarding heavy investment in Banks for three lakhs, it crashed down to roundly Rs. 3.500/- (Bank Balance Rs. 2,986.93 + Security deposit in S.B.I. Bhubaneswar Rs. 500/-. The financial condition of the father of the Appellant was not at all bad at any time and when he retired he had at least the savings, namely, G.P. Fund Rs. 8,000/- + Arrear Pay Rs. 4,000/- + Old Pass Book in Commila Bank Rs. 4,000/- = Rs. 16,000/-. One wonders what sort of 'confidential enquiry' the officer did to report like that, at least the second item. 8,000/- + Arrear Pay Rs. 4,000/- + Old Pass Book in Commila Bank Rs. 4,000/- = Rs. 16,000/-. One wonders what sort of 'confidential enquiry' the officer did to report like that, at least the second item. Prima facie the report would create an impression in the mind of any body that it is a fit case to be inquired into and so one would direct search. Once that is done, various extraneous considerations will come in to go the whole length of it, evidence or no evidence. Therefore, it is of very vital importance that while lodging F.I.R. for action under the Prevention of Corruption Act, great care and circumspection should be brought into it and all frivolousness be scrupulously eschewed. There is no magic in the word 'vigilance' to bring about any metamorphosis in the personnel belonging to it. It depends on his performance, his superior knack in detection and investigation. Or else, what is created for purity of administration would be an engine of oppression and blackmailing. Top people in the hierarchy will do well to discourage flippantness in such vital matters involving the prestige of the citizen.