Gulzarilal Agarwalla v. Onkarmal Agarwalla — 1973 DIGILAW 44 (PAT)

Judgment G.N.Prasad, J. 1. This appeal is by defendant No. 1. It arises out of a suit filed by respondents 1 to 3 in which subject-matter of dispute was about 300 bighas of land in village Birsinghpur in the district of Dhanbad comprising two collieries known as Khudia Colliery and East Mahatadih Colliery. Main reliefs as originally claimed by plaintiff-respondents were as follows:- - (a) A decree declaring that the managing contract by virtue of the Indenture dated 11-5-1951 stood determined and terminated. (b) A decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking possession of the collieries in suit and from interfering with the Possession of the plaintiffs of the same and from removing any machinery or any article or thing from the said collieries. (c) A decree directing defendant No. 1 for bringing back to the said collieries the machineries etc. taken away by him clandestinely as detailed in Schedule C of the plaint or in the alternative to pay Rs. 32,827/- their market value. (d) A decree directing the defendants to render true and proper accounts of all raisings and despatches from the collieries in suit from 1954 to 1958 and to pay the amount that would be found due on such accounts to the plaintiffs and on failure of the defendants to do so within the time to be fixed by the court, for appointment of a commissioner to ascertain the amount due to the plaintiffs on account of royalty and a decree for such amount on taking additional court-fees for the amount exceeding the tentative claim, (e) A decree for Rs. 2,112/- as price for the fuel coal and (f) A decree for Rs. 60.00 on account of cesses and taxes. The suit was instituted on the 17th of September, 1960. The managing contract in favour of the appellant was executed on the 11th of May, 1951 for a period of ten years. On expiry of the said period of ten years the plaintiff-respondents got the relief for declaration amended by adding to it that the managing contract had stood determined and terminated "also by efflux or expiration of the period of the said managing contract". In 1964 they got another relief added for delivery of khas possession of the property in suit after evicting the defendants therefrom which was numbered as (a-1). 2. In 1964 they got another relief added for delivery of khas possession of the property in suit after evicting the defendants therefrom which was numbered as (a-1). 2. In the memorandum of appeal large number of grounds were taken, but it appears from order No. 15, passed by this Court that in order to get the hearing of the appeal expedited, the appellant conceded that he would challenge the judgment and decree of the court below only on two grounds, namely. (1) that the purchases of plaintiffs were hit by the relevant provisions of Mineral Concession Rules. 1949 and (2) that the deed of managing contract (Ext. C) in form as well as in substance was a sub-lease in favour of the appellant. On account of this concession many documents which would have otherwise been included in the paper book were not included therein. At the time of the final hearing of the appeal Mr. Shreenath Singh, learned counsel for the appellant wanted to urge some other grounds as well taken in the memorandum of appeal, but in the circumstances, mentioned above, we did not allow him to do so. Thus he confined his arguments to three grounds only the aforesaid two and the effect of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Ordinance. 1973 (No. 1 of 1973) published in the Union Gazette dated the 30th of January. 1973 on the litigation. 3. Since the arguments were confined only to three grounds as aforesaid it is not necessary to state facts of the case in detail. I would briefly state only such of the facts which are necessary for the decision of the three grounds. Admittedly the property in dispute belonged to proprietor of Pandra Raj. The proprietor executed a lease in favour of the East India Coal Company. This Company granted a lease in favour of Rabindra Nath Sarkar in 1917 and after a few intermediate transactions the lease-hold interest came to be owned by Baidyanath Dutt and other members of his family (hereinafter referred to as the Duttas). In Title Partition Suit No. 44 of 1950 of the court of the Subordinate Judge at Dhanbad which was being fought between family members of the Duttas, two Receivers Baldeo Singh and Bholanath Dey were appointed. With the permission of the court they executed on the llth of May, 1951 the deed (Ext. In Title Partition Suit No. 44 of 1950 of the court of the Subordinate Judge at Dhanbad which was being fought between family members of the Duttas, two Receivers Baldeo Singh and Bholanath Dey were appointed. With the permission of the court they executed on the llth of May, 1951 the deed (Ext. C) in favour of the appellant for a period of ten years. In the document itself it is stated to be a deed of managing contract. Subsequent to the execution of this deed within the period the 4th of June, 1952 to the 8th of February, 1955 different members of the family of the Duttas executed nine registered deeds (fully detailed in Schedule B to the plaint) in favour of one Shrimati Bhagwati Devi. According to the case of the a plaintiff-respondents she was a mere benamidar of theirs and they have acquired right title and interest of the Duttas in the disputed property by the aforesaid deeds and thus have become fully entitled to the entirety of the two collieries. In the plaint as originally filed they pleaded that the managing contract under Ext. C stood determined and terminated on account of violation of the terms and conditions of the contract, such as negligence in paying the current and arrears of the commission royalty or of minimum royalty, submission of statements of monthly raisings and despatches, delivery of fuel coal, payment of cesses taxes and other public charges and impositions and clandestine and stealthy removal of machineries, plant, tubs, boilers etc. By the amendments which they got subsequently made they averred that the managing contract under Ext. C stood determined and terminated by efflux or expiration of the period thereof and they were entitled to khas possession of the property in dispute. Defendant No. 2 (respondent No. 4) was made a party to the suit on the allegation that he had been taken in as a partner by the appellant for carrying on the contract work under Ext. C. 4. The appellant alone contested the suit. He challenged the assertion of the plaintiff respondents that they were the real owners of the collieries under the aforesaid nine deeds in favour of Bhagwati Devi. According to him those documents were void and illegal being hit by the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Acts of 1948 and 1957 and Mineral Concession Rules. He challenged the assertion of the plaintiff respondents that they were the real owners of the collieries under the aforesaid nine deeds in favour of Bhagwati Devi. According to him those documents were void and illegal being hit by the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Acts of 1948 and 1957 and Mineral Concession Rules. He denied to have acted in violation of any term and condition of Ext. C. In the additional written statement which he filed after the amendment of the plaint he further denied that the managing contract had expired on the 10th of May, 1961 and was no longer existing. 5. The court below framed various issues, the two main issues being-- "3. Are the alleged documents in favour of Srimati Bhagwati Devi as also the deed of release by her in favour of the plaintiffs hit by the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Acts, 1948 and 1957 as also by the Mineral Concession Rules framed thereunder and have the plaintiffs acquired any title to the suit properties? 4. Whether the managing contract in question in favour of the defendant has been terminated so as to entitle the plaintiffs to khas possession of the properties in suit?" On issue No. 3 it has found that the documents in favour of Bhagwati Devi were not hit by the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Acts of 1948 and 1957 as also by Mineral Concession Rules and that plaintiffs acquired good title to the suit properties under those documents. It has answered issue No. 4 in the affirmative. In connection with issue No. 4 a question arose before it whether under Ext. C the appellant was a sub-lessee or a mere licensee. It has held that the aforesaid deed did not grant any lease but only a licence in favour of the appellant. The order portion of its judgment on the basis of which the decree has been drawn up runs as follows: "That Title Suit No. 33 of 1960 be decreed on contest with costs against the contesting defendant Gulzarilal Agarwala and ex parte without cost against defendant No. 2 inasmuch as he did not appear to offer any contest. The order portion of its judgment on the basis of which the decree has been drawn up runs as follows: "That Title Suit No. 33 of 1960 be decreed on contest with costs against the contesting defendant Gulzarilal Agarwala and ex parte without cost against defendant No. 2 inasmuch as he did not appear to offer any contest. It is hereby declared that the managing contract by virtue of the indenture, dated 11-5-51 has terminated on its expiry by efflux of time and the defendants therefore are permanently restrained from retaining possession of the suit collieries or from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs of the same as also from removing any machineries or articles therefrom. The defendants are further directed to account for all machineries taken by them and to make over possession of the same to the plaintiffs as mentioned in Schedule B of the indenture of managing con-tract Ext. C along with those as shown in Schedule C of the plaint and in the alternative to pay to them Rs. 32,827 which is their market value which has not been disputed. The defendants are further directed to render true and proper accounts of all raisings and des-patches made from the collieries in suit in between 1954 to 1958 and to pay the amount so found due from them on such accounts within two months from the date of this order failing which a commissioner will be appointed to take such accounts and to ascertain the amount to be due to the plaintiffs on account of royalties. They are also directed to pay the plaintiffs a sum of Rs. 2.112 for the price of fuel coal as in the plaint together with a sum of Rs. 60 claimed on account of cess and taxes. Interest pendente lite and future at six per cent. per annum. Pleaders fee at the minimum contested scale," 6. Sec. 4 (1) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 (Act LIII of 1948) (hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Act) provided that no mining lease would be granted after the commencement of the Act otherwise than in accordance with the rules made under the Act. Sec. 4 (2) laid down that any mining lease granted contrary to the provisions of Sec. 4 (1) would be void and of no effect. Rule 48 of the Mineral Concession Rules. Sec. 4 (2) laid down that any mining lease granted contrary to the provisions of Sec. 4 (1) would be void and of no effect. Rule 48 of the Mineral Concession Rules. 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the 1949 Rules) framed under the said Act barred transferability of right except as subject to the restriction mentioned therein. The 1948 Act, however, was re placed by the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (LXVII of 1957) (hereinafter referred to as the 1957 Act). Sec.13 of this Act relates to power of Central Government to make rules in respect of minerals. Sec.16 provides for bringing all mining leases granted before the 25th day of October, 1949 into conformity with the provisions of the Act and the rules made under Sections 13 and 18. Sec.18 casts a duty upon the Central Government to take all such steps as may be necessary for conservation and development of the minerals in India and to make such rules as it thinks fit for that purpose. Sec.19 deals with licences and provides that prospecting licences of mining shall be void if they are in contravention of the Act. According to Sec.29 all rules made or purporting to have been made under the 1948 Act are to be deemed to have been made under 1957 Act unless and until they are superseded by any rules made under the latter Act. It may be stated here that in the Mineral Concession Rules of 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the 1960 Rules), framed under the 1957 Act, Rule 48 of 1949 Rules has been re-numbered as Rule 46. Four months after the passing of the 1957 Act another provision was made by the Parliament and incorporated in that Act as Sec.30-A. The amendment was introduced by Act XV of 1958. Four months after the passing of the 1957 Act another provision was made by the Parliament and incorporated in that Act as Sec.30-A. The amendment was introduced by Act XV of 1958. Sec.30-A reads as follows: "30-A. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 9 and of subsection (1) of Sec.16 shall not apply to or in relation to mining leases granted before the 25th day of October, 1949, in respect of coal but the Central Government, if it is satisfied that it is expedient so to do may by notification in the Official Gazette direct that all or any of the said provisions (including any rules made under Sections 13 and 18) shall apply to or in relation to such leases subject to such exceptions and modifications, if any as may be specified in that or in any subsequent notification." 7. When the appeal came for hearing before us in January. 1970, one of the questions which was canvassed before us was whether the right of transfer of a lessees interest under a lease created before the 25th of October, 1949, had been affected by Sec.13 of the 1957 Act read with Rule 46 of the 1960 Rules or whether Sec.30-A of the Act saved such coal mining leases from the operation of Sec.13 of the Act and of the relevant Rules. In Sm. Kamla Bala Devi V/s. Ojha Brothers Ltd., (1962) ILR 41 Pat 412 a Bench of this Court took the view that Sec.30-A of the Act did not render the relevant rule of the Mineral Concession Rules inapplicable to mining lease in respect of coal lands. In Bhowra Kankanee Collieries Ltd. V/s. Sunil Kumar Roy (1968 Pat LJR 486) another Bench of this Court expressed the view that in respect of pre-1949 leases relating to coal lands Sec.30-A of 1957 Act made a clear exception with regard to the applicability of Sec.13 of that Act and Rule 46 of the 1960 Rules. In view of the conflict in the aforesaid two decisions we referred the matter to a larger Bench for decision of the true scope of Sec.30-A. The decision of the Full Bench ( AIR 1971 Pat 83 ) is to the effect that Sec.30-A provides exemption in favour of leases in respect of coal mines created before the 25th of October. 1949. 1949. The Full Bench further held that the Bench decision in Kamla Bala Devis case was not correct and overruled it. Before the Full Bench strong reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bishwanath Prasad V/s. Union of India ( AIR 1965 SC 821 ). Overruling the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the matter stood concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court Misra. C. J. who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench observed as follows:- - "Mr. Lal Narain Sinha has contended, however, that the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1965 SC 821 , holding such transfer void in terms, also has given this interpretation of Sec.30-A. Since, however, the attention of their Lordships was not drawn to this particular section and the argument at the Bar in the Supreme Court was only confined to the meaning of the word grant in terms of Sec. 4 of 1948 Act, the authority of that decision cannot be invoked for interpretation of the scope of Sec.30-A of the Act of 1957. It is clear that specific reference to Sub-section (1) of Sections 9 and 16 and rules under Sections 13 and 18 lump them together and there is no scope for applying the Rules under Sections 13 and 18 in part only." 8. In view of the decision of the Full Bench which is binding upon us, I have not referred to various provisions of the 1948 and 1957 Acts and the 1949 and 1960 Rules which are referred to in the said decision in detail-The view expressed by the Full Bench as to the scope of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bishwanath Prasads case, AIR 1965 SC 821 is also binding upon us. Mr. Shreenath Singh, learned counsel for the appellant has, however, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ballabhdas Mathuradas Lakhani V/s. Municipal Committee. Malkapur ( AIR 1970 SC 1002 ) has urged that it was not open to the Full Bench to explain the Supreme Court decision on the ground that provisions of Sec.30-A of 1957 Act were not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court and that in spite of the decision of the Full Bench, the decision of the Supreme Court in Bishwanath Prasads case is binding upon us. He has drawn our attention to the following passage in Ballabhadas Mathuradas Lakhanis case:- - "The first question is concluded by the judgment of this Court in Bharat Kala Bhandars case, 1965-3 SCR 499 = ( AIR 1966 SC 249 ). That case arose under the C. P. & Berar Municipalities Act. 1922. The right of a Municipality governed by that Act to levy under Sec. 66 (1) (b) a tax on bales of cotton ginned at the prescribed rate was challenged by a tax-payer. This Court held that levy of tax on cotton ginned by the tax-payer in excess of the amount prescribed by Article 276 of the Constitution was invalid and since the Municipality had no authority to levy the tax in excess of the rate permitted by the Constitution, the assessment proceedings levying tax in excess of the permissible limit were invalid and a suit for refund of tax in excess of the amount permitted by Article 276 was maintainable. The decision was binding on the High Court and the High Court could not ignore it because they thought that relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the Court." 9. In my opinion, there is no substance in the aforesaid contention of Mr. Singh. According to the learned Chief Justice, the decision of the Supreme Court in Bishwanath Prasads case AIR 1965 SC 821 could not be an authority on the scope of an interpretation of Sec.30-A of the 1957 Act, as it was not at all referred to in that judgment and if I may say so with respect, the learned Chief Justice is perfectly correct in making that observation. The decision of the Supreme Court in Ballabhdas Mathuradas Lakhanis case, AIR 1970 SC 1002 is of no real help to the appellant. In Bharat Kala Bhandar Private Ltd. V/s. Municipal Committee, Dhamangaon, ( AIR 1966 SC 249 ) the Supreme Court had earlier held that Municipalities in Madhya Pradesh had no power to levy under Sec. 66 (1) (b) of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act 1922, a tax on bales of cotton ginned by the tax-payer in excess of the amount prescribed by Article 276 of the Constitution and a suit for refund of tax in excess of the amount permitted by Article 276 was maintainable. In Ballabhadas Mathuradas Lakhanis case the High Court of Bombay at Naffpur held that a suit for refund of the excess tax paid was incompetent. It explained the decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Kala Bhandars case on the ground that the relevant provisions of law were not brought to the notice of the Court. The observations quoted in the preceding paragraph from the aforesaid case were made by the Supreme Court in that context. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further held on merits that where there is a bar against levy in excess of the amount specified in the Constitution, a suit for refund of the tax paid in excess is maintainable. In Bharat Kala Bhandars case the question of maintainability of a suit for refund of tax paid in excess of the amount specified in the Constitution had been decided and it was a matter of general application. It was, therefore, not open for any High Court to ignore the decision of the Supreme Court on the ground that relevant provisions of law were not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. In Bishwanath Prasads case the question before the Supreme Court was whether a particular lease in relation of Coal bearing lands was valid or invalid on account of Mineral Concession Rules. In that case while one party took the plea that it was invalid because it was hit by Rule 48 of the 1949 Rules, the other party did not urge that it was saved by Sec.30-A of the 1957 Act In the case before us the plaintiff respondents had taken a definite stand that the transfers in their favour were saved by Sec.30-A. If the transactions are really saved by Sec.30-A as held by the Full Bench, the plaintiff-respondents cannot be non-suited on the ground of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bishwanath Prasads case where as observed earlier scope and interpretation of Sec.30-A was not considered. In Ballabhadas Mathuradas Lakhanis case Supreme Court has also observed that the Bench of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur was not justified in taking the view that the suit was not maintainable when the maintainability of the suit was implied in the decision of the Full Bench, I shall be committing the same error if I take a view different from the decision of the Full Bench as to the scope and interpretation of Sec.30-A as well as the scope of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bishwanath Prasads case. It may also be stated here that the appellant prayed for a review of the decision of the Full Bench on the ground of observations of the Supreme Court in Ballabhdas Mathuradas Lakhanis case and the prayer was refused. In the State of Madhya Pradesh V/s. Dadabhoys New Chirmiri Ponri Hill Colliery Co. (P.) Ltd., ( AIR 1972 SC 614 ) the Supreme Court has interpreted Sec.30-A and observed as follows: "The section falls into two parts. Under the first part, the operation of Sections 9 (1). 16 (1) was suspended as far as pre-1949 mining leases for coal were concerned. The second part, however, empowered the Central Government on its satisfaction that it was expedient to do so, to direct that all or any of those provisions including rules made under Sections 13 and 18, should apply to such leases subject to such exceptions and modifications, if any as might be specified in that or any subsequent notification. The exceptions and modifications which might be so specified in the notification would obviously be in regard to the application, when such application was decided upon, of Sections 9 (1) and 16 (1) and the relevant rules". This decision supports the view taken by the Full Bench as to interpretation of Sec.30-A. Therefore, in accordance with the decision of the Full Bench, I hold that in absence of any notification under Sec.30A, the purchases by plaintiff-respondents (as specified in Schedule B of the plaint) were not hit by the provisions of Mineral Concession Rules. 10. Mr. Shreenath Singh has next argued that Ext. C which was described as a deed of managing contract, in form as well as in substance was a sub-lease in favour of the appellant. According to him the finding of the Court below that it was a mere licence was incorrect. 10. Mr. Shreenath Singh has next argued that Ext. C which was described as a deed of managing contract, in form as well as in substance was a sub-lease in favour of the appellant. According to him the finding of the Court below that it was a mere licence was incorrect. When questioned what was the relevancy of this contention, he submitted that if Ext. C created a sub-lease in favour of the appellant that alone could be recognized by the State Government under Section 10 read with Sec.10-A of the Bihar Land Reforms Act and the lease (by assignment) of the plaintiff-respondents shall have to be ignored. Even if Ext. C created a sub-lease, it could not be recognized by the State Government under Sections 10 and 10-A of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. Sec.10-A was added to the Bihar Land Reforms Act by Act III of 1965. Before this new section was enacted, the term of Ext. C had expired. It was for a period of ten years only which ended on the 10th of May. 1961. Clause 2 of Ext. C provided for deposit of Rs. 10,000.00 by the appellant in cash as security. Clause 27 of it reads as follows: "27. If on the expiry of the terms of this Managing Contract by efflux of time, the First party fails to pay up the security amount of Rs. 10,000 or the balance thereof after deduction therefrom whatever amount may be found due by the Second party to the First party, then the Second party will continue to work as Managing Contract of the two collieries on these terms till the amount found due to him is paid off." Order No. 97 dated the 3rd of May, 1963 of the Court below shows that Rs. 10,000.00 the security money was deposited by the plaintiff-respondents. The managing contract created by Ext. C, therefore, came to an end on the 3rd of May, 1963 before introduction of Sec.10-A in the Bihar Land Reforms Act. It has been held by Bench of this Court in State of Bihar V/s. Saubhagya Sundari Devi, ( AIR 1972 Pat 200 ) that a sub-lease which had come to an end before the insertion of Sec.10-A in the Bihar Land Reforms Act could not be taken into consideration for the purposes of Sections 10 and 10-A of that Act. It. It. has been further held in that case that interest of a lessee which was not subject to a sub-lease when Sec.10-A was inserted could not vest in the State under Sec.10 of the Act. Mr. Singh, therefore, is not right in contending that if Ext. C was a sub-lease, the right created thereunder is still existing by virtue of the provisions of Sections 10 and 10-A of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 11. However, since the question whether Ext. C created a lease or a licence only in favour of the appellant was argued at some length. I propose to consider briefly that matter as well. It was conceded by learned counsel for both the parties that if Ext. C amounted to a demise and created an interest in the property in favour of the appellant, it was a lease; if it did not amount to a demise and did not create any interest in the property in favour of the appellant it was a licence. Learned counsel for the parties further conceded that for deciding the aforesaid question the document as a whole has to be taken into consideration. The entire deed was placed before us. While Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant relied on the clause which provided for payment of royalty and other clauses which according to him put the appellant in exclusive possession of the property and conferred upon him a right to deal with the property. Mr. J.C. Sinha for the plaintiff-respondents relied on such clauses in it which show that no inte-rest in the property was created in the appellant. Mr. Singh strongly relied on Clause 9 which described the lease in favour of Duttas as head lease. Mr. Mr. J.C. Sinha for the plaintiff-respondents relied on such clauses in it which show that no inte-rest in the property was created in the appellant. Mr. Singh strongly relied on Clause 9 which described the lease in favour of Duttas as head lease. Mr. J. C. Sinha drew our specific attention to Clause 16 which gave the first party, i.e. the Receivers appointed in the suit the interest of Duttas the right to inspect the underground working of the collieries as well as to inspect end to take copies of the registers recording raising and despatches of coal, Clause 22 which says that the second party would not have any proprietary right in the coal land or in any of the collieries nor should he be entitled to mortgage the coal land of the collieries or the machineries etc., Clause 23 providing for execution of a proper power of attorney of the second party, i.e., the appellant by the first party if found necessary for the purposes of presenting and cashing all cheques, bills etc. and entering into agreement and contract with Railways. Government and with all other parties for sales of coal and for supply thereof and Clause 24 according to which one of the office rooms and the Managers quarter was to remain in possession of the first party. The Court below in paragraphs 36 and 37 of its judgment has given good reasons for its finding that Ext. C created a mere licence in favour of the appellant and not a lease. I am in entire agreement with the view taken by the Court below as to the nature and character of Ext. C end it is not necessary to repeat all those reasonings of the Court below in this judgment. After having considered the entire document Ext. (C) I am of the opinion that it does not amount to a demise and does not create any interest in the property in favour of the appellant. Thus it is not a lease but a mere licence. 12. I lastly take up for consideration the submissions of Mr. Singh as to the effect of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Ordinance. 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) on this litigation. Mr. Thus it is not a lease but a mere licence. 12. I lastly take up for consideration the submissions of Mr. Singh as to the effect of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Ordinance. 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) on this litigation. Mr. Singh strongly relied on Sec.2 (g) of the Ordinance which defines "mine", Section 3 which vests the management of coal mines in the Central Government on and from the appointed day and Sec. 5 (10) which authorises the Central Government to receive to the exclusion of all other persons any monies due to the coal mine realised after the appointed day notwithstanding that such receipt pertains to a transaction made at any tune before the appointed day. According to Mr. Singh after the Ordinance has come into force no decree at all could be passed in favour of the plaintiff-respondents so far as reliefs (1-1) (b) (c) (d) and (f) are concerned. He further submitted that a decalaration as claimed in relief (a) which could only be granted under discretion of the Court should also not be granted to the plaintiff-respondents when they were found not entitled to other reliefs. Prima facie Mr. Singh does not appear right in his contentions. The Ordinance does not vest the ownership of the coal mines in the Central Government. It merely vests the management. Under the Ordinance the Central Government merely becomes Manager of the persons holding interest in the mines. As a Manager the Central Government cannot get a decree in its favour in respect of any of the reliefs claimed in the suit. The reliefs are to be granted in favour of the persons holding interest in the coal mines though it may be that the Central Government as Manager may get advantage of that decree on their behalf. Therefore, if the plaintiff-respondents are entitled on merits to the reliefs claimed, and they are as found earlier, decree cannot be refused to them on the ground of the Ordinance coming into force. At best the appellant can raise an objection that the plaintiff-respondents cannot execute the decree by themselves. Because of the Ordinance, the decree can be only executed through the Central Government who according to the Ordinance is appointed Manager of their interest in the collieries. This question need not be decided at this stage. At best the appellant can raise an objection that the plaintiff-respondents cannot execute the decree by themselves. Because of the Ordinance, the decree can be only executed through the Central Government who according to the Ordinance is appointed Manager of their interest in the collieries. This question need not be decided at this stage. The proper time for raising and deciding this question will be when the decree is put into execution, I. therefore, refrain from expressing any definite opinion on that question and leave it to be decided by the executing Court if and when such objections are raised before it. For the present the contention of Mr. Singh that no decree at all can be passed in favour of the plaintiff-respondents because of the Ordinance coming into force has to be overruled. 13. Before closing the judgment it is necessary to deal with the three petitions which according to various orders passed by this Court were left for decision by the Bench hearing the appeal itself. One of these petitions is under Order 41. Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure for additional evidence and has been filed on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents. Their learned counsel, Mr. J. C. Sinha informed us that he would not press the application. The application has, therefore, to be rejected. The other two petitions were filed on behalf of the appellant. They are concerned with the receivership matter. It may be stated here that under orders passed by this Court the respondent No. 1 is acting as Receiver of the property in dispute. Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant informed us that these two petitions were being withdrawn for the time being to be filed if necessary and so advised in future in connection with taking accounts from the Receiver. The petitions are, therefore, allowed to be withdrawn. The aforesaid three petitions stand disposed of accordingly. 14. For the foregoing reasons. I find no merit in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. G.N.Prasad, J. 15 I agree.