JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - By means of this petition Ghulam Nabi has prayed for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus directing the respondents Union of India, Senior Superintendent of Police, Varanasi acting as Civil Authority, State of Uttar Pradesh and the Jailor, District Jail, Chaukaghat, Varanasi to produce the petitioner before this Court and set him at liberty. 2. The petition is accompanied by an affidavit of Ghulam Mohammad claiming to be the real younger brother and pairokar of the petitioner. 3. The allegations material to the case are that the petitioner's permanent domicile was in India. He was born in Varanasi in 1923. His parents were citizens of India and he was also a born Indian citizen at the time of the commencement of the Constitution and continued to be so until he migrated. His wife and six children between ages of 2 and 22 years were all residents and nationals of India. Some time in the year 1954 the petitioner went to Pakistan without passport for a short visit and returned to India in 1956 on the basis of a Pakistani passport and visa issued by the Indian High Commissioner, Karachi. There was no other way, it was alleged, for the petitioner for coming back to India. Since his re-entry into this country on 15-7-1956 he had been residing here and resumed his ancestral work of a weaver in Varanasi. Later, however, the petitioner was arrested under tire orders of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Varanasi under paragraph 5/8 of the Foreigners (Internment) Order, 1962 and was lodged in the District Jail, Varanasi. It was alleged that the petitioner was not a foreigner but a born Indian national having Indian citizenship which he never renounced and so his detention was illegal. 4. On behalf of the respondents a counter-affidavit was filed by Sri Mahesh Prasad Varma, S. I. L. I. U. Varanasi. The main point asserted in the counter affidavit was that the petitioner had migrated to Pakistan before coming into force of the Constitution of India i.e. prior to 26th January, 1950. This assertion was supported by a copy of visa application made by the petitioner himself on 29-6-1956 at Karachi. Therein he mentioned his date of birth as 1926, place of birth-Banaras, nationality Pakistani, religion Islam and approximate date of migration 1950. This assertion was supported by a copy of visa application made by the petitioner himself on 29-6-1956 at Karachi. Therein he mentioned his date of birth as 1926, place of birth-Banaras, nationality Pakistani, religion Islam and approximate date of migration 1950. It was asserted that in the circumstances it was absolutely incorrect to suggest that the petitioner never renounced his nationality or continued to be an Indian citizen that as the aforesaid visa had expired on 14-10-56 and the period extended upto 1-3-57 also came to an end, the petitioner was not entitled to stay in India and being a foreigner he was rightly arrested under the provisions of the Foreigners (Internment) Order, 1962. 5. The petitioner filed a rejoinder affidavit wherein he unequivocally admitted the contents of the visa application and the recitals made therein. He, however, offered the explanation that since he had gone to Pakistan without an Indian Passport there was no way out for him except to represent himself as a Pakistani citizen for returning to his home town and to his family in India. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that on the above facts it is not established that the petitioner is a foreigner and the burden of proving that he was a foreigner lay on the respondents who had arrested him. He laid great stress on the explanation offered by the petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit and submitted that the petitioner had really gone to Pakistan in the year 1954 and hence he was an Indian citizen on the date of the commencement of the Constitution and there was nothing to indicate that he had lost his Indian citizenship. The question as to whether he had lost his Indian citizenship and acquired that of Pakistan was one which could be determined by the Central Government alone under Section 9 of the Citizenship Act. The above argument assumes that the petitioner went to Pakistan in the year 1954. 6. We are, however, not prepared to accept the above contention raised on behalf of the petitioner in view of the facts disclosed in the present case. The visa application made by the petitioner himself is an incontrovertible proof of the intention of the petitioner as well as the factual events regarding the date of his departure from this country and his entry into Pakistan. The visa application made by the petitioner himself is an incontrovertible proof of the intention of the petitioner as well as the factual events regarding the date of his departure from this country and his entry into Pakistan. They leave us in no doubt that he migrated to Pakistan somewhere in the year 1950. There is prima facie clear proof of the fact that he went to Pakistan m the year 1950 and not in the year 1954. There is absolutely no reason why the petitioner should not be pinned down to his own averments made in the visa application. It appears to us a very ingenious subterfuge that the petitioner should be permitted to go behind his own averments on the plea that under pressure of circumstances he was obliged to make those recitals in the visa application. In other words, having himself declared that he migrated to Pakistan in the year 1950 the argument now argued upon us is that it was a definitely false statement with a view to enabling the petitioner to return to India. It was also contended that at best this may be an admission made by the petitioner but admissions are not conclusive under Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act and they can be proved to be false. This argument completely loses sight of the fact that the rule embodied in Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act is subject to the rule of estoppel contained in Section 115 of the Evidence Act. Sec. 31 reads:- "Admissions are conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but they may operate as estoppels under the provisions hereinafter contained." The underlying principle of the rule of estoppel is that a person should not be allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act appears to be founded on a very sound principle. It proceeds on the footing that on the basis of a representation made by a person another person has acted or changed his position and in such circumstances therefore it is not consistent with justice that the former should be permitted to take advantage of the plea that the representation made by him was itself false. It is a rule of evidence which precludes a party from going back on what he himself had stated earlier. It is a rule of evidence which precludes a party from going back on what he himself had stated earlier. We, therefore, see no reason as to why the petitioner should not be confronted with his averments made in the visa application and by virtue of the same be estopped from now pleading that he did not migrate to Pakistan in the year 1950. The explanation offered by him is extremely tenuous and does no appeal to us. It is an obvious device to get over his own previous statement. We find it difficult to accept the petitioner's present defence that he migrated to Pakistan in the year 1954 in, the teeth of the recitals made by him in the visa application. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that in his original petition the petitioner wanted to keep this Court in dark as to the real date of his migration and but for the facts emerging from the counter affidavit he would have endeavoured to let this court remain under the impression that he never migrated to Pakistan prior to the year 1954. We feel that the High Court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution in aid of a person who having entered India on the basis of a declaration made by him that he was a Pakistani national and that he would stay in India for a short specified, period, was trying to go back on that declaration. In essence, therefore, the principle of estoppel applied to such cases and the petitioner cannot escape the facts stated by him in the visa. 7. In the alternative it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that even assuming that he migrated to Pakistan in the year 1950, the respondents had failed to fix precisely the date of his migration and therefore, it was still doubtful as to whether he migrated to Pakistan prior to 26th January, 1930. On the material before us it was contended that since the respondents had not placed any date before the Court which may irresistably lead to the conclusion that the petitioner went to Pakistan prior to 26th January 1950 it can safely be assumed that he left for Pakistan after 26th January, 1950. This argument is untenable. In our opinion it is wrong to place the burden of proof on the respondents. This argument is untenable. In our opinion it is wrong to place the burden of proof on the respondents. Where prima facie the petitioner is a foreigner and is being detained by the prescribed authority on the ground that he is a foreigner the onus lies on the petitioner to establish beyond doubt that he is not a foreigner. This appears to be in conformity with Section 9 of the Indian Foreigners Act which says: "9. If in any case not falling under Section 8 any question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act 1872 lie upon such person." The Foreigners Internment Order, 1962 does not contain any definition of the term `foreigner'. The said order was issued under the provisions of the Indian Foreigners Act in exercise of the powers conferred by Secs. 3, 4 and 8 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946) read with the Foreigners Law (Application) and Amendment) Ordinance, 1962. Therefore, the term `foreigner' for the purposes of the Foreigners (Internment) Order shall have the same meaning as assigned to it under Section 2 of the Foreigners Act. The definition in Sec. 2(1) of the said Act is to the effect that a `foreigner' is a person who is not a citizen of India. Thus the burden of proof lies entirely on the person who claims that he is not a foreigner. The petitioner has not been able to place adequate material before us to prove that he is a citizen of India and that he is not a foreigner. On the state of evidence in the instant case we are certainly left in doubt as to the precise date in the year 1950 when the petitioner migrated to Pakistan. The evidence is consistent with both propositions namely, that he migrated either prior to 26th January or after 26th January, 1950. In the absence of any clinching evidence on this crucial point it is the petitioner's contention which must fail. The evidence is consistent with both propositions namely, that he migrated either prior to 26th January or after 26th January, 1950. In the absence of any clinching evidence on this crucial point it is the petitioner's contention which must fail. A somewhat similar question arose before a division Bench of this Court in Gulam Rasool v. State of U. P., AIR 1962 Alld. 621. There also the appellant was faced with his approximate date of migration given in the declaration before the Pakistani authorities, namely that he. had migrated to Pakistan in 1950. It was held : "It was for the appellant to show that he did not in fact migrate before the 26th January 1950 in order to get any writ from this court." We have already referred to the fact that the High Commissioner of India conferred upon the petitioner the right of entering into India on a short visit for the ostensible purpose of seeing his father. All these circumstances are consistent only with the conclusion that his intention was to pay a temporary visit and that his statement regarding the approximate date of his entry into Pakistan was correct. So long as the possibility of the petitioner having migrated to Pakistan prior to 26th January, 1950 is not ruled out it is not possible to hold that he was a citizen of India. On these facts Art. 7 of the Constitution would be applicable for notwithstanding anything in Arts. 5 and 6 or the petitioner shall not be deemed to be a citizen of India. The writ petition is therefore, liable to be dismissed on account of the petitioner's failure to discharge the onus of proving that he is not a foreigner. 8. It is true that the question of the petitioner's citizenship has not been decided by the Central Government under Section 9 of the Citizenship Act but we cannot accept the petitioner's contention that it is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide for the purpose of this petition as to whether the petitioner is a foreigner or not. The question whether a person is an Indian citizen or a foreigner, as distinct from the question whether a person having once been an Indian citizen has renounced the citizenship and acquired a foreign nationality, is not one which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Government to decide. The question whether a person is an Indian citizen or a foreigner, as distinct from the question whether a person having once been an Indian citizen has renounced the citizenship and acquired a foreign nationality, is not one which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Government to decide. The courts can decide such a question. See State of Andhra Pradesh v. Abdul Khader, AIR 1961 S.C. 1467 . For the purpose of the present writ petition prima facie it appears that the. petitioner is a foreigner and, therefore, until the matter is decided by the Central Government there is no ground for interior once at this stage and the writ petition must fail. 9. For the reasons stated above we dismiss this habeas corpus petition.