JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS appeal has been filed against an order passed by the Motor accidents Claims Tribunal, Indore, dismissing the appellants application for compensation under section 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, on the preliminary ground that it being a petition against the Union of India a notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code was necessary which was not given in the case. ( 2. ) THE facts giving rise to this appeal are that the applicants daughter rampyari Bai aged about 12 years, was injured on 22nd November 1966 as a result of an accident by Motor Vehicle No. DD-4083 driven by a driver in the defence Services because the vehicle belonged to the Defence Services of the government of India. As a consequence, the applicant, who is the father of the deceased Rampyari Bai submitted an application under section 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act for grant of compensation on the allegation that the driver of the vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently. Amongst other grounds of defence, a plea was raised before the Tribunal that the claim being against the Union of India, a notice under section 80, Civil Procedure code was necessary and that as admittedly no notice under section 80 was given, the claim-petition could not proceed. The tribunal framed an issue on this question and treated it as a preliminary issue, and having held in favour of the respondent the Tribunal dismissed the petition on this short ground. ( 3. ) SHRI R. C. Mukati, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that section 80, Civil Procedure Code only applied to a suit instituted against the government. The word suit is not defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, and section 26, Civil Procedure Code only indicates as to how a suit is instituted and apparently that would be when a plaint is presented in a civil Court. According to the learned counsel, a petition under section 110a of the Motor vehicles Act could not be said to be a plaint and at the same time the Claims tribunal could not be said to be a civil Court, and consequently no notice would be necessary under section 80, Civil Procedure Code. He placed reliance on Khairunnissa v. Municipal Corporation, Bombay (1966 ACJ 37.) and Bhagwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1964 SC 444 . ). He placed reliance on Khairunnissa v. Municipal Corporation, Bombay (1966 ACJ 37.) and Bhagwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1964 SC 444 . ). Learned counsel also contended that the decision in M. P. State Ed. Tra. Corp. v. Munnabai (1967 MPLJ 4963= 1967 ACJ 214.) happened to be a decision of a Division Bench of this Court where incidentally it is observed that a notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code is necessary and as notice was given in that case it could not be said to be a decision on the question. He contended that the observation about notice was not a decision on the question which was raised, and, therefore, the Tribunal was wrong in dismissing the application of the appellant. ( 4. ) SHRI R. K. Vijayvargiya appearing for the respondent contended that although a petition for compensation has been described as an application under section 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act, but it could not be lost sight of that originally the right to claim compensation was a right under the torts, which could only be claimed by way of a suit. According to the learned counsel, by the amendment in the Motor Vehicles Act only the procedure has been changed and consequently even if a petition for compensation has been described in the Act as an application, it could not mean that it does not fall within the purview of the word suit which is not defined in the code of Civil Procedure. He also contended that section 26, Civil Procedure code talks of plaint, but the word plaint has also not been defined and the ordinary dictionary meaning of that word would include even an application for claims as such. Learned counsel relied on the decision in Sawai Singhai v. Union of India ( air 1966 SC 1068 . ). He contended that the observations in M. P. State Rd. Tra. Corp. v. Munnabai are not obiter, and it being a Division Bench decision of this Court is binding unless re-considered by a larger Bench. He referred to certain decisions in support of his contention. ( 5. ) SECTION 80, Civil Procedure Code provides that a suit against a government cannot be instituted unless a notice is served on the Government concerned. v. Munnabai are not obiter, and it being a Division Bench decision of this Court is binding unless re-considered by a larger Bench. He referred to certain decisions in support of his contention. ( 5. ) SECTION 80, Civil Procedure Code provides that a suit against a government cannot be instituted unless a notice is served on the Government concerned. This section is as under- "no suit shall be instituted against the Government (including the Government of the state of Jammu and Kashmir) or against a public officer in respect, of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to, or left at the office of x x x x x" The word suit occurring in this section has not been defined in the Code of civil Procedure. But the manner in which a suit can be instituted has been provided in section 26 Civil Procedure Code which reads thus- "every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed. " This indicates that a suit under the Code can only be instituted either by presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed. The phrase "in such other manner as may be prescribed" apparently refers to the rules of procedure prescribed under the Code itself for presentation. The presentation of a suit contemplated under the Code will naturally apply to a suit presented in a civil Court, and although the word suit or plaint has not been defined, still it cannot mean any application presented before any tribunal. ( 6. ) SECTION 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for the presentation of an application for claim. It reads thus- "110-A (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 110 may be made- (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) where death has resulted from the accident, by the legal representatives of the deceased; or (c) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be. (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, and shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed. (3) No application for compensation under this section shall be entertained unless it is made within sixty days of the occurrence of the accident: provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of sixty days if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. " A tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act for entertaining applications under section 110a of the Act cannot be said to be a civil Court, as section HOC only confers power on the Tribunal of a civil Court for taking evidence on oath and attendance of witnesses during the course of enquiry. Section 110c is as under-110c (1) In holding any enquiry under section 110b the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. (2 ). The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of Compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil Court for all purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898.) (S) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for "the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of any matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry. " This provision, therefore, clearly indicates that a Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act is not a civil Court, but the powers of a civil court have been conferred on it for the particular purposes stated in the section. Consequently it cannot be doubted that when an application under section 110a is filed before the Tribunal, it is not a plaint filed before a civil court. Consequently it cannot be doubted that when an application under section 110a is filed before the Tribunal, it is not a plaint filed before a civil court. Consequently neither can it be said to be a plaint as contemplated under section 26 Civil Procedure Code nor can it be said to be the presentation of a suit in any other manner prescribed. ( 7. ) IN Khairunnissa v. Municipal Corporation Bombay, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court considered the question of statutory notice under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act when an application under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act was filed against the Municipal Corporation, Bombay. After consideration of the decision on the question, it was observed in that case- "it is no doubt true that these ease3 illustrate that the word suit is capable of having a very wide connotation and may include, depending upon the context, any legal proceeding commenced by one person against another in order to enforce a civil right. From this, it can-not necessarily be held that the word suit must be given such a wide meaning wherever is occurs. In order to determine the ambit of the word used, the Court must consider the object which the provision was intended to achieve. " And ultimately it was held in this decision that- "we accordingly, hold that the present application is not a suit under section 527 of the bombay Municipal Corporation Act, and, therefore, there is no impediment in the applicants way in proceeding with the same. " In M. P. State Rd. Trp. Corp. v. Munnabai while considering the quantum of compensation allowed by the Tribunal, a Division Bench of this Court reduced the compensation to the amount claimed in the notice on the ground that in the notice given under section 80 Civil Procedure Code something less was claimed, and while considering the question of reduction of compensation observed- "as such it can be asserted that the respondents not having made any larger claim in the notice, their claim for any excess amount would be without any statutory notice. At the time the notice was given, the Madhya Bharat Roadways was a Department of the State government and a notice under section 80 Civil Procedure Code was mandatory". At the time the notice was given, the Madhya Bharat Roadways was a Department of the State government and a notice under section 80 Civil Procedure Code was mandatory". It cannot be doubted that these observations clearly lay down that the amount of compensation claimed in excess of the amount mentioned in the notice under section 80 Civil Procedure Code would be a claim for which no notice was given, and holding that a notice is mandatory the claim which was in excess of the amount claimed in the notice was disallowed. Consequently, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that these observations are only obiter and are not binding on this Court cannot be accepted. Although there is nothing in the judgment to indicate that the question about notice was specifically raised and contested, still as referred to above the decision clearly lays down that a notice under section 80 Civil Procedure Code is mandatory. ( 8. ) IN Bhagwat Singh v. Slate of Rajasthan, a question about the commencement of proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for adjudication of an industrial dispute between the Ruler of a former Indian State and his employees came up for consideration, and in that context it was held that the proceedings are not barred under section 86 read with section 87-B Civil Procedure Code. In this context, the Supreme Court considered the word "sued" and observed- "the appellant is recognised under Article 366 (22) of the Constitution as a Rules of an indian State, but section 86 in terms protects a Ruler from being sued and not against the institution of any other proceeding which is not in the nature of a suit. A proceeding which does not commence with a plaint or petition in the nature of plaint, or where the claim is not in respect of dispute ordinarily triable in a civil Court, would prima facie not be regarded as falling within section 86 Code of Civil Procedure. The proceeding for adjudication under the industrial Disputes Act is founded in a reference made by the local Government under section 10 and the allied sections under the Industrial Disputes Act and is not commenced by a plaint or petition. An Industrial Tribunal is again not a Court within the meaning of section 86; it is a tribunal constituted for adjudicating industrial disputes. An Industrial Tribunal is again not a Court within the meaning of section 86; it is a tribunal constituted for adjudicating industrial disputes. Section 86 of the code excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and must be strictly construed. It does not debar the commencement of proceedings for adjudication of an Industrial Dispute for two reasons, neither party to the proceeding is sued by the initiation of the proceeding, and the tribunal is not a Court. " Although this decision is not directly on the point, but still it does indicate that a proceeding which does not commence with a plaint or a petition in the nature of a plaint and which is not presented in a civil Court cannot ordinarily fall within the ambit of a suit. In Sawai Singhai v. Union of India (AIR 1966 s C 1068.), the supreme Court was considering a suit under Order 21, Rule 63 Civil Procedure Code and in that context it was held that a suit under Order 21, rule 63 clearly attracts the provisions of section 80 Civil Procedure Code. But this decision cannot be of any assistance to the respondent as apparently a suit under Order 21, Rule 63 Civil Procedure Code is a plaint presented in a civil Court and, therefore, it cannot be doubted that it is a suit as contemplated in section 80 Civil Procedure Code. ( 9. ) THIS question was also considered in Firm Ramsukh Saligram v. Moranmal (ILR 1955 MB 413.) by a Division Bench of the Madhya Bharat High Court in connection with the M. B. Sthan Niyantran Vidhan where an application under section 7 of that Act was contemplated for fixation of fair rent. In that case, it was contended that for an application under section 7 a notice under section 80 civil Procedure Code was necessary, and in that context it was observed in that decision that- "the above expressions and the word plainly indicate that the Code of Civil Procedure i applicable only from the stage of trial in suits instituted under section 7. Now section 8 civil Procedure Code is not a provision concerning the trial of a suit after its institution. It is one which relates to the procedure for the institution of a suit. Now section 8 civil Procedure Code is not a provision concerning the trial of a suit after its institution. It is one which relates to the procedure for the institution of a suit. It has thus on the wording of section 9 (1) no applicability whatsoever to suits Sled under section 7 of the Madhya Bharat sthan Niyantran Vidhan. " ( 10. ) IN the context of these pronouncements, it cannot be doubted that the provisions of section 80, Civil Procedure Code can only be applicable if the proceedings are instituted by a presentation of a plaint in a civil Court. As discussed above, an application under section 110a of the Motor Vehicles act not being a plaint and the Claims Tribunal not being a civil Court, the provisions of section 80, Civil Procedure Code will not, in our opinion, be applicable. However, as there is a Division Bench decision of this Court taking a contrary view as discussed above, the matter deserves to be considered by a larger Bench. Consequently, we direct that this matter may be placed before My Lord the Chief Justice for the constitution of a larger Bench for consideration of the following question, namely- "whether notice under section 80 Civil Procedure Code is necessary for an application for compensation when filed under section 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act before a Claims tribunal constituted under the Act ? R. J. Bhave, J. ( 11. ) A Division Bench consisting of Honourable Justice Oza and Honourable Justice Vyas has referred the following question for our decision, namely :-"whether notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code is necessary for an application for compensation when filed under section 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act before a Claims Tribunal constituted under the Act ?" ( 12. ) THE facts of the case are that the appellants daughter Rampyari Bai aged about 12 years, was injured on 22nd November 1966 as a result of a motor accident and subsequently died. The Motor Vehicle No. DD-4083 belonged to the Defence Services of the Government of India. The appellant, therefore, preferred a claim under section 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act for grant of compensation against the driver of the motor vehicle as also the union of India on the ground that the vehicle was driven by the driver rashly and negligently causing the accident. The appellant, therefore, preferred a claim under section 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act for grant of compensation against the driver of the motor vehicle as also the union of India on the ground that the vehicle was driven by the driver rashly and negligently causing the accident. Amongst other grounds of defence, a plea was raised on behalf of the Union of India that the claim was not tenable, as a notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code was not served on the Union of India. It may be noted at this stage that the name of the driver was deleted from the array of the respondents, as his whereabouts were not known, and only the Union of India remained as the contesting party. The Claims Tribunal framed a preliminary issue on the said objection to the effect-"whether the claim petition cannot be entertained for want of a notice under section 80 civil Procedure Code ?" The claims Tribunal, relying on the decision in M. P. State Road Transport corporation v. Munnabai (1967 MPLJ 963 = 1967 ACJ 214) came to the conclusion that a notice under section 80 Civil Procedure Code was mandatory. In this view of the matter, the claim of the appellant was dismissed with costs. The appellant, therefore, preferred an appeal before this Court. ( 13. ) WHEN the matter came for hearing before the Division Bench, it was urged on behalf of the appellant that section 80, Civil Procedure Code applied only to a "suit instituted against the Government; and inasmuch as the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal could not be said to be initiated by a suit, the provisions of section 80, Civil Procedure Code were not attracted. It was also urged before the Division Bench that the Claims Tribunal was not a" civil Court and, as such, section 80, Civil Procedure Code was not attracted. In support, reliance was placed on Khairunnissa v. Municipal Corporation, bombay (1966 ACJ 37.) and Bhagwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1964 SC 444 . ). It was also urged on behalf of the appellant that in M. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Munnabai (supra) the observation that a notice under section 80 Civil Procedure Code is mandatory was obiter in nature and was not binding. ( 14. ). It was also urged on behalf of the appellant that in M. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Munnabai (supra) the observation that a notice under section 80 Civil Procedure Code is mandatory was obiter in nature and was not binding. ( 14. ) ON behalf of the respondent-Union, it was urged that although the petition for compensation has been described as an "application" under section 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is, as a matter of fact, a "plaint". It was also urged that the Claims Tribunal was, in fact, a "civil Court" constituted to decide the claims arising out of motor accidents. Though its jurisdiction was limited, it was still a Civil Court. Reliance was placed on Swami singhai v. Union of India (AIR 1966 SC 1088. ). It was also urged that the observation in M. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Munnabai (supra) was not in the nature of obiter and that the decision was binding on the Division Bench. ( 15. ) THE Division Bench held that the claim petition presented before the claims Tribunal could not be equated with a "plaint". The expression "suit" occurring in section 80, Civil Procedure Code is nowhere defined in the Code. Section 26 of the Code only provide? that every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed. It was held that the expression "in such other manner as may be prescribed" has again reference to the rules made under the Code. Hence, the presentation of the suit contemplated under the Code was before a Civil Court, the procedure before which was governed by the Code and that though the words "suit" and "plaint" were nowhere defined, any application before any Tribunal could not be treated as a "suit", ( 16. ) THE Division Bench further held that a Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, section 110a, is not a "civil Court" as under section HOC only the power of taking evidence on oath and enforcing the attendance of witnesses has been conferred on the Tribunal and the whole Code is not made applicable to its procedure. ) THE Division Bench further held that a Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, section 110a, is not a "civil Court" as under section HOC only the power of taking evidence on oath and enforcing the attendance of witnesses has been conferred on the Tribunal and the whole Code is not made applicable to its procedure. In support of the above findings, the Division Bench relied on the decisions in Khairunnissa v. Municipal Corporation, bombay (supra), Bhagwat singh v. State of Rajasthun (supra) and Firm Ramsukh saligram v. Moranmal (ILR 1955 M. B. 413.) ( 17. ) IN M. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Munnabai (supra) a notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code was, in fact, served on the corporation and the question as to whether a notice under section 80, Civil procedure Code was obligatory or not was not directly involved in that case. But the Division Bench of this Court disallowed the claim to the extent it was in excess of the claim mentioned in the notice under section 80, Civil Procedure code and in that context it was observed in that case: "as Such, it can be asserted that the respondents not having made any larger claim in the notice, their claim for any excess amount would be without any statutory notice. At the time the notice was given, the Madhya Bharat Roadways was a department of the State Government and a notice under section 80 Civil Procedure Code was mandatory. " It was, therefore, held that the above said observation could not be ignored as obiter inasmuch as on the finding that a notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code was mandatory the claim in excess of the one mentioned in the notice was negatived. As the Division Bench was not agreeing with the view expressed in the case of M. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Munnabai (supra), it referred the above said question for decision of a larger Bench. ( 18. ) FROM the facts narrated above, it is quite clear that two important questions arise for our decision. The first question is whether the Claims tribunal is a "civil Court", and even if it is a Civil Court, whether the provisions of section 80, Civil Procedure Code are attracted in this case. ( 18. ) FROM the facts narrated above, it is quite clear that two important questions arise for our decision. The first question is whether the Claims tribunal is a "civil Court", and even if it is a Civil Court, whether the provisions of section 80, Civil Procedure Code are attracted in this case. On a difference of opinion between Honourable S. B Sen J. and Honourable Raina J. as to whether a revision under section 115, Civil Procedure Code lies against an order of the Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, the matter was referred to one of us (Bhave J. ). Sen J. was of the opinion that the Claims Tribunal was a Civil Court and, as such, section 115, Civil Procedure Code was attracted. Raina J. , on the other hand, took the view that it was not a Civil Court. On reference, it held : "a tribunal constituted under any statute, by whatever name it is described, would be treated as a court of Judicature if it is called upon to discharge the judicial functions of the sovereign State, untrammelled by executive considerations, and in reaching its conclusions it is required to follow the well recognised judicial principles. There may be Civil Courts which enjoy general jurisdiction to decide all civil disputes between individuals inter se or between citizens and the State, and there may be Civil Courts whose jurisdiction is confined to certain specified disputes and in that sense they are somewhat different from the general Civil Courts established in the country. But the Special Courts still maintain their character as Civil Courts in spite of the fact that the matters entrusted to those special Courts are excluded from the general jurisdiction of the regular Civil Courts and that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to the proceedings of the Special Courts also unless specifically excluded. Krishna Gopal v. Dattatraya. ( 1972 MPLJ 485 .)" In face of the above said decision, Shri R. C. Mukati, who appeared for the appellant, did not press very seriously the point that the Claims Tribunal was not a Civil Court. Krishna Gopal v. Dattatraya. ( 1972 MPLJ 485 .)" In face of the above said decision, Shri R. C. Mukati, who appeared for the appellant, did not press very seriously the point that the Claims Tribunal was not a Civil Court. It may be mentioned that in Maghanmal v. Moolchand ( 1962 MPLJ 112 .), shiv Dayal J. had also held that the Tribunal appointed under section 4 of the displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 was a Civil Court amenable to the revisional Jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We may also refer to the decision in Hayatkhan v. Mangilal (1971 MPLJ 597)wherein it was held that a claim petition under section 110a of the Motor vehicles Act is a petition which for all material purposes is like a plaint pertaining to the dispute ordinarily triable in Civil Court; and that if the claimant is a minor on the date of the accident, he will be entitled to the benefit of section 6 of the Limitation Act. In that case, reference was made to section 2 (1)of the Limitation Act which states that "suit" does not include an appeal or an application. Hence it was held that the word "suit" as contemplated under the provisions of the Limitation Act has a wider meaning than the one which can be attributed to "suit" under the Code of Civil Procedure. In this view of the matter, it was held that section 6 of the Limitation Act was applicable to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal which were initiated by a suit as contemplated under section 2 of the limitation Act, if not under the Code of civil Procedure. On similar considerations, in another case, section 5 of the limitation Act was applied to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. It must, therefore, be held that the Claims Tribunal is a "civil Court. " ( 19. ) ON the footing that the Claims Tribunal is a Civil Court it must be further seen whether section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is attracted when a claim is preferred before the Tribunal against the State or a public servant. It must, therefore, be held that the Claims Tribunal is a "civil Court. " ( 19. ) ON the footing that the Claims Tribunal is a Civil Court it must be further seen whether section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is attracted when a claim is preferred before the Tribunal against the State or a public servant. In Krishna Gopal v. Dattatraya (supra) it has already been pointed out that when special Courts are established by a sovereign State, the provisions of the code of Civil Procedure become applicable to the proceedings of those Courts unless specifically excluded. Under section 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act an application for compensation is required to be presented before the Claims tribunal within the specified period. Section HOG provides that the Claims tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit, and it further provides that the Claims tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed ; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This provision clearly shows that the procedure to be followed is entirely left to the discretion of the Claims Tribunal and it would exercise the powers of the Civil Court conferred on it under the Code of Civil Procedure for taking evidence on oath, enforcing the attendance of witnesses and discovery and production of document etc. The rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act do not also make the Code of Civil Procedure as such applicable to the procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal. The rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act do not also make the Code of Civil Procedure as such applicable to the procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal. In State of Seraikella v Union of India ( AIR 1951 SC 253 .) it was held by Mahajan J. (as his Lordship then was) : "by section 204 of the Government of India Act exclusive original jurisdiction was conferred on the Federal Court in respect of suits between States and States which were outside the ken of the Code of Civil Procedure By section 214 of the Government of India Act, the federal Court was authorised to make its own rules of procedure. The Code in section 4 ha3 enacted that it does not affect any special jurisdiction or special forms of procedure. Rule 5 of the Federal Court Rules framed under section 214 of the Government of India Act lays down in clear and unambiguous language that none of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to any proceedings in the Federal Court unless specifically incorporated in these rules. The provisions of section 80 have not been incorporated in the rules and that being so, section 80 cannot affect suits instituted in the Federal Court under section 204 of the Government of India Act, 1935". (p. 266 ). The contention of the Attorney General that the condition precedent for instituting a suit laid down in section 80 was not a matter of procedure falling within the ambit of section 214 of the Government of India Act and that the federal Court could not make rules eliminating the condition precedent laid down in section 80 before a suit could be instituted against the Government was repelled. It was held by his Lordship: ". . . this contention is not sound. Section 214 lays down that the Federal Court may from time to time with the approval of the Governor General make rules of court for regulating generally the practice and procedure of the Court, practice in its larger sense like procedure, denotes the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished from the law that gives and defines the right. procedure as defined in Wharton means the mode in which successive steps in litigation are taken. procedure as defined in Wharton means the mode in which successive steps in litigation are taken. It seems to roe that what is enacted in section 80 is the first step in litigation between the parties when the cause of action is complete. Section 80 in effect provides that an advance copy of the plaint should be served on the defendant and no suit should be instituted in Court until the expiry of two months after such service. Section 80 does not define the rights of parties or confer any rights on the parties. It only provides a mode of procedure for getting the relief in respect of a cause of action. It is a part of the machinery for obtaining legal rights, i. e. , machinery as distinguished from its products" (p. 266)The situation in the present case is not, in any way, different. What procedure is to be followed by the Claims Tribunal is left to its discretion subject to rules framed by the State in that behalf. We have already pointed out that no rules have been made so as to apply section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. The provisions of the code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable only to the extent of taking evidence on oath, enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling of discovery and production of documents etc. It cannot, therefore, be said that section 80 of the Code becomes automatically applicable to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in The employees State Insurance Corporation, Bombay v. Bharat Barret and Drum manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. ( AIR 1967 Bom 472 .) Section 96 of the Employees State Insurance act, 1948, empowers the State Government to make rules for certain matters including the procedure to be followed in proceedings before the Employees insurance Courts and for execution of orders made by such Courts. In exercise of the above said powers the State Government had framed rule 17 which provided that every application to the Court shall be brought within 12 months from the date on which the cause of action arose or, as the case may be, the claim became due. In exercise of the above said powers the State Government had framed rule 17 which provided that every application to the Court shall be brought within 12 months from the date on which the cause of action arose or, as the case may be, the claim became due. This Rule was challenged on the ground that it was in excess of the powers conferred on the State Government inasmuch as section 96 only authorised framing of rules for the procedure to be followed in proceedings before such Courts, that is to say, after the proceedings were initiated and not for any antecedent activity. This contention was upheld by the Bombay High court and the Rule was struck down. While discussing this matter, it was observed by the Bench : "there can he no dispute that the law of limitation is a procedural or adjectival law and is not a part of substantive law. It is procedural or adjectival, because it regulates the manner in which substantive rights can be enforced by judicial action. In that sense the impugned Rule 17 is clearly a procedural rule. That does not, however, mean that the rule is a part of the procedure to be followed in proceedings, on which topic the State Governments have been empowered by section 96 (1) (b) to make rules. In deciding a case a Court has to apply procedural law as well as substantive law. But it is clear that the whole of the procedural law is not on that account a part of the procedure followed by a Court. An illustration may help making this distinction clear. In this very Act there is section 80 which lays down that an employees Insurance Court shall not direct the payment of any benefit to a person unless he has made a claim for such benefit in accordance with the regulations made in that behalf, within twelve months after the claim became due. Mr. Nariman referred in this connection to the regulation making powers of the Corporation under section 97 (2) (viii) and argued, quite rightly, that section 80 requires an employee to make a claim within twelve months to the corporation for any benefit which is receivable by him under the Act, and that the making of such a claim to the Corporation is a condition of the maintainability of his application in an employees Insurance Court. Now, section 80 is clearly a procedural section, for it regulates the manner in which a person should proceed to secure the payment of any benefit to which he may be entitled under the Act. It cannot, however, be claimed that because section 80 is procedural in character it is a part of the procedure to be followed in proceedings before an Employeesinsurance Court. Another instance is of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure which requires a notice to be given to the Government or a public officer before filing a suit against them. That section is also procedural, but it cannot be held to be a part of the procedure to be followed in a proceeding before a Court (p. 477)". From the decision of the Bombay High Court it is clear that a distinction is made between the procedure that a party may be required to follow as a condition precedent for instituting the proceedings, and the procedure that a Court is required to follow after the proceedings are instituted. Mow, under the motor Vehicles Act no provision is made regarding any procedure to be followed before presentation of the claim before the Claims Tribunal. The only antecedent procedure prescribed is that the application should be filed within a specified period. As to the procedure that is to be followed by the claims Tribunal, the same is entirely left to its discretion subject to rules made by the State Government and the indications given in sub-section (2) of section HOC of the Motor Vehicles Act. In this view of the matter, we are inclined to hold that the provisions of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not attracted in the matter of filing a claim petition before the Claims tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act. We may observe that in m. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Munnabai (supra) the question whether section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was attracted in the claim proceedings was not directly before that Court. The Division Bench proceeded on the assumption that the provisions of section 80 were attracted and on that basis the claim of the respondents was confined to the amount mentioned in the notice. As there is no discussion of the paint involved, it is not necessary to say anything further on that matter. ( 20. The Division Bench proceeded on the assumption that the provisions of section 80 were attracted and on that basis the claim of the respondents was confined to the amount mentioned in the notice. As there is no discussion of the paint involved, it is not necessary to say anything further on that matter. ( 20. ) IN the view we have taken it is not further necessary to decide as to whether the claim petition can be equated with a plaint and in that sense whether it can be said that the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal are by way of a suit or not. ( 21. ) OUR answer to the question referred to us is: "notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code is not necessary for an application for compensation when filed under section 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act before a Claims tribunal constituted under the Act. " Reference answered.