JUDGMENT : B.D. Singh., J 1. This application by the sale petitioner under Section 561 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) is for quashing the entire proceeding, including the ORDER :dated the 1st of July, 1969, passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate taking cognizance against the petitioner, the relevant portion of which reads as ;- "Recorded the statement of the complainant on S.A. Took cognizance under Sections 420, 467 and 471 I.P.C. I transfer it to the Court of Shri S.C. Mukherjee for disposal where the JUDGMENT : is said to be deposited and statement given. The complainant will appear there on 3.7.69." 2. In ORDER :to appreciate the points involved in this application, it will be necessary to state briefly the facts. Gobind Sah, opposite party, originally lodged a first information .report on the 21st June, 1969, against the petitioner, a true copy of which is Annexure 1' to the application, alleging therein that the opposite party was undergoing a trial as an accused in Case No. 166 of 1966 pending before Shree S.C. Mukherjee, Magistrate, Bhagalpur. The opposite party had appeared before the Court in that, case till the 30th November, 1966, and had left appearing thereafter, because the petitioner who used to look after the case on his behalf, between the 30th November, 1966 and the 6th January, 1967, told the opposite party that the latter had been acquitted by the Court. Therefore, the petitioner took from' opposite party Rs. 401- in ORDER :to obtain, a certified copy of the ORDER :of acquittal, and relying on the statement of the petitioner, the opposite party on the 30th November, 1966, itself gave him Rs. 40/-. Later on, the petitioner gave to the opposite party a paper typed in English. The opposite party being illiterate, did not verify the same and took it to be an ORDER :for his acquittal. Subsequently, when the police came to his house in search of him with a warrant, he learnt that the opposite party was not acquitted, Thereafter, the opposite party went to the Court and related the matter in the court and the opposite party was advised to lodge a first information report in the police station. Accordingly, the opposite party lodged the first information report. 3. Accordingly, the opposite party lodged the first information report. 3. On the 28th June, 1969, the opposite party, making more or less similar allegations, lodged a complaint petition before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, stating therein that the police had not instituted a case on the first information lodged by the opposite party. A true copy of the complaint petition is Annexure 2' to the application. The Sub-divisional Magistrate, on the 1st July, 1969, examined the complainant on solemn affirmation under Section 200 of the Code, took cognizance against the petitioner under Sections 420, 427 and 461 of the Indian Penal Code and transferred the case to the Court of Shree S. C. Mukherjee for disposal, where the case against the opposite party was also pending as mentioned earlier. Thereafter, the case passed through various Magistrates, before whom the same was transferred under ORDER :s of the Sessions Judge. Witnesses were also examined on behalf of the complainant and the proceeding continued - till the 9th September, 1970, when it was staved under ORDER :s of this Court dated the 19th August, 1970. 4. Mr. S. C. Misra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has assailed the impugned ORDER :of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate taking cognizance against the petitioner, as well as he has challenged the entire proceeding. He has raised the following 3 points for consideration of this Court : (1) The Sub-divisional Magistrate has erred in his ORDER :dated the 1st July, 1969, in taking cognizance against the petitioner on the basis of the complaint as the police had already instituted a case on the first information report lodged by the opposite party . (2) The ORDER :of the Sub-divisional Magistrate taking cognizance is also bad because he had failed to issue processes against the petitioner. (3) The Sessions Judge has erred in transferring the case from the file of Shree S. C. Mukherjee to the other Munsif Magistrate. 5. I will take up for consideration point No. (1) first. Learned counsel submitted that the police has the statutory right to investigate into cognizable offences. He contended that it is well established that the police should not be interfered within investigation. In the present case the police had, in fact, instituted a criminal case on the first information report lodged by the opposite party, who falsely stated in the complaint petition that the police had not instituted such a case. He contended that it is well established that the police should not be interfered within investigation. In the present case the police had, in fact, instituted a criminal case on the first information report lodged by the opposite party, who falsely stated in the complaint petition that the police had not instituted such a case. The Sub-divisional Magistrate ought to have waited till investigation was completed by the police or final form was submitted by it. By taking cognizance, the Sub-divisional Magistrate has thus interfered in the investigation, which the police was conducting on the basis of the first information report. In ORDER :to substantiate his contention, the learned counsel relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (J) the State of West Bengal V. S. N. Basak (A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 447), wherein• it was observed that ;- "The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is in that Chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and Section 156 with investigation into such offences and under these sections the police has the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under Section 439 or under the inherent -.power of the Court under Section 561 of the Criminal Procedure Code." In my opinion, the above observations of their Lordships are not applicable to the facts of the instant case. Here the Sub-divisional Magistrate has not interfered at all with the investigation which the Police was conducting. In the complaint petition the opposite party has stated that the police had not instituted a case. Assuming that, in fact, the police had instituted ,a case on the basis of the first information report and the investigation was going on when the complaint petition was lodged, even in that circumstance, in my opinion, that will not amount to interference by the Sub-divisional' Magistrate by taking cognizance. Assuming that, in fact, the police had instituted ,a case on the basis of the first information report and the investigation was going on when the complaint petition was lodged, even in that circumstance, in my opinion, that will not amount to interference by the Sub-divisional' Magistrate by taking cognizance. A reference may be made to the case of (2) Shankarlal Bholaram V. Mohammad Ayyub and others (A.I.R. 1960 Bombay 116), where Kotwal, J. held :-"Under Section 190(1), a:- Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of an offence upon three grounds (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence and (b) upon information received from any person other than a Police Officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has• been committed. Therefore, the Magistrate in the instant case could certainly have cognizance of the offence upon the complaint filed before him. There is nothing in Sub-section (1) of Section 190 to indicate that the grounds for proceeding are mutually exclusive, and that if one of the grounds is already there, the Magistrate must reject a request to proceed on other grounds as he has done in the instant , case. I am fortified in my view by the decision of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court reported in Mukania V. Ahalia A.I.R. 1952 Rajasthan 160. Chief Justice Wanchoo delivering the JUDGMENT : on behalf of the Division Bench, after quoting Section 190(1), laid down : "It is open to a Magistrate to act on anyone of these three grounds but these three grounds are not, in our opinion, mutually exclusive and it is possible for a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence upon two or more of such grounds, e.g., both upon receiving a complaint and on a police report. We may, in this connection, refer to Bharat Kishore V. Judhistir Modak A.I.R. 1929 Patna 473, which is a Fun Bench decision. In that case it was held that the alternative upon which a Magistrate might take proceedings could not be treated as mutually exclusive and it was not correct to say that a Magistrate while taking cognizance of an offence should have done it under some one of the alternatives to the exclusion of the other. In that case it was held that the alternative upon which a Magistrate might take proceedings could not be treated as mutually exclusive and it was not correct to say that a Magistrate while taking cognizance of an offence should have done it under some one of the alternatives to the exclusion of the other. It follows, therefore, that if Magistrate has both a complaint and a police report before him about the same offence, he can take cognizance o~ that offence on the basis of both. The further question whether after taking cognizance• on the basis of both, he can amalgamate them and hold a joint trial of the accused named in the police report as well as in the complaint depends upon Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the discretion of the Magistrate, which has to be exercised according to the circumstances of each case.". The above observations make it clear that even if investigation is pending before the police, the Magistrate can take cognizance on the basis of the complaint regarding the same subject matter. Therefore, in my opinion, there is no merit in point No. (1), as urged by Mr. Misra. 6. Now I turn to consider point No. (2). In my view, there is no merit in this point either, as it is well established that a transferee Court can issue processes. In fact, in the present case, the transferee Court has issued process against the petitioner. Hence this point also fails. 7. Now I turn to consider point No. (3). Learned counsel has referred to ORDER :dated the 10th July 1969, in ORDER :to show that the transfer was made by the Sessions Judge. Learned counsel submitted that the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to have transferred the case. He derives jurisdiction only under the provisions contained in Clause (IC) of Section 528 of the Code, which reads :- "Any Sessions Judge, on an application made to him in this behalf, may, if he is of opinion that it is expedient for the ends of justice, ORDER :that any particular case be "transferred from one Criminal Court to another Criminal Court in the same" Sessions Division." This provision has been introduced by Amending Act XXVI of 1955. On the basis of the above provision, learned counsel submitted that the Sessions Judge could have transferred the case only if an application was made to him. Since in this case no application was made, the Sessions Judge could not have passed the ORDER :of transfer on administrative ground. Learned counsel submitted that the Sessions Judge has no power to transfer a case by exercising his administrative power. In my opinion, this submission of the learned counsel is not acceptable. A reference may be made to the case of (3) Udhomal Karmumal V. Manjribai Udhomal and others (A.I.R. 1933 Sind 205), where a Division Bench of that court was considering Section 528 (2) of the Code before the amendment It was observed :- . "ORDER :s of transfer are frequently made for reasons of administrative convenience and it is not the intention of the Legislature to make an application from either of the parties a necessary preliminary." I Thus, in my opinion, the intention of the Legislature by introducing the amendment was not to take away the administrative power of the Sessions Judge to transfer cases on administrative grounds. Even assuming that the transfer was irregular, but that by itself would 110t vitiate the proceeding as no prejudice has been caused t6 the petitioner by the said transfer. Reference may be made to the case of (4) Employees State Insurance Corporation V. M.d. Ismail and others (A.I.R. 1960 Madras 64), where a Full Bench of the Madras High Court was considering the provisions contained under Sections 526 (1) (e) (i), 530 and 531 of the Code It wilt be useful to quote some of the observations of their Lordships at page 70 in paragraph 23 :- "In fact, the object of these sections is that criminals should not be allowed to escape by reason of technical irregularities. The policy of the Code as shown by Section 531 is to uphold in most cases ORDER :s passed by a Criminal Court which was jacking in local jurisdiction or which has committed illegalities or irregularities unless failure of justice has been occasioned or is likely to be occasioned through such want of jurisdiction or such illegalities or irregularities." 8. In the result, the application is dismissed and the ORDER :passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate taking cognizance as well as the subsequent proceedings in the case are affirmed. In the result, the application is dismissed and the ORDER :passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate taking cognizance as well as the subsequent proceedings in the case are affirmed. Let the records of the court below be sent down without delay. Application dismissed