JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - One of the questions raised in this group of cases was. that Section 2-A of the Central Indus-trial Disputes Act, 1947, was constitutionally ultra vires. Considering the importance of this question, a learned Single Judge referred these cases to a larger Bench for deciding this question. Learned counsel appearing rot the parties confined their arguments to the validity of Section 2-A. We shall hence deal with only that question. 2. Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, defined an industrial dispute. In C. P. Transport Service v. Raghunath, A.I.R. 1957 S. C. 104 it was observed that decided cases in India disclosed 3 different views as to the meaning of industrial , dispute' : (1) a dispute between an employer and a single workman is not an industrial dispute : (2) it can be an industrial dispute; and (3) it cannot per se be an industry dispute, but nifty become one if it is taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. The Supreme Court observed that the preponderance of judicial opinion is clearly in favour of the last of the three views. Notwithstanding that the language of Section 2(k) is wide enough to cover a dispute between an employer and a single employee the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act does appear to contemplate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion to settle only disputes which involve the rights of workmen as a class and that a dispute touching the individual w rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of adjudication under the Act, when the same had not been taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. This view was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, A.I.R. 1957 S. C. 532. The Court observed that this view is in consonance with the basic idea underlying modern industrial legislation. The interpretation given to the corresponding phrase "trade dispute", in English law and "Industrial dispute" in Australian law also accords with this view and in the absence of an express provision to the contrary or necessary intendment there is no reason to give a different pretation to the expression in the Indian statute. 3. In view of this state of judicial opinion, Parliament by the Amending Act No. 35 of 1965 dated 19th Nov. 3. In view of this state of judicial opinion, Parliament by the Amending Act No. 35 of 1965 dated 19th Nov. 1965 added Section 2-A to the Industrial Disputes Act. It, provided :- "2-A. Dismissal, etc. of an.individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute. Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute." Under this provision, individual disputes relating to termination of the services of an individual workman have been made an industrial dispute. 4. Mr. Khare appearing for the petitioners challenged the vires of Section 2-A on the following grounds : (1) The concept of industrial dispute has become well settled when the Government of India Act, 1935, was enacted. The power to legislate in respect of industrial disputes was confined to collective disputes. The Constitution of India conferred power on Parliament to legislate with regard to industrial disputes. Parliament hence was not competent to enlarge the concept of industrial disputes so as to include individual disputes in it. (2) In view of Entries 22, 23 and 24 of List III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution, Parliament could not make an individual dispute an industrial dispute without enacting substantive law therefor. (3) Since the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act covered the whole field of industrial disputes, Section 2-A of the Central Act was not operative in this State. (4) Section 2-A violated Art. 14 of the Constitution because it did not lay down any policy or standard to guide the discretion of the State Government in referring industrial disputes. 5. The relevant entries in the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Constitution in relation to industrial disputes are :- GOVT. OF INDIA ACT CONSTITUTION List III Entry 29 List III Entry 22 List III Entry 26 List III Entry 23 List III Entry 27 List III Entry 24 6. Entry 29 and Entry 22 both were "trade unions; industrial and labour disputes". Entry 26 was "Factories". Entry 27 was "Welfare of labour; conditions of labour; provident funds; employers' liability and workmen's compensation; health insurance, including invalidity pensions.; old age pensions," 7. Entry 29 and Entry 22 both were "trade unions; industrial and labour disputes". Entry 26 was "Factories". Entry 27 was "Welfare of labour; conditions of labour; provident funds; employers' liability and workmen's compensation; health insurance, including invalidity pensions.; old age pensions," 7. The submission was that since the Government of India Act, 1935, was enacted by the British Parliament, the power given by it to the India Legislature to make laws in respect of industrial and about disputes must be confined to what was in England considered to be the concept of industrial disputes. So far, there may not be any quarrel. The argument, however, proceeded that in England the corresponding term was "trade dispute" and the English Courts consistently held that trade disputes referred to collective disputes referred to collective disputes and did not include Industrial disputes, Similar was the position in Australia. 8. In the first place, if the British Parliament had intended to confer legislative power upon the Indian Legislature in respect of what was then known as "trade disputes", it would have used the phrase "trade disputes" in Entry 29 of List III rather than an unknown term in England namely "industrial and labour disputes". Assuming, however, that the term "industrial and labour disputes" was intended to refer to the corresponding English term "trade dispute", let us examine the concept of "trade dispute" as obtaining in England. 9. Trade disputes were not the subject-matter of the common law of England. 10. The British Parliament enacted the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, which was followed by the Trades Disputes Act, 1906, and the Industrial Courts Act, 1919. All these enactments defined the term "trade dispute" in identical language with a minor change in punctuation These enactments were followed by the Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order, 1940, which was made under regulation 58-AA of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, and, the Industrial Disputes Order, 1951. 11. The definition of the term "trade dispute" as occurring in the 1940 Order and the 1951 Order came up for consideration in Rex v. National Arbitration Tribunal, (1951) 2 All. E. R. 828. In that case a dispute between a town clerk and the Municipal Corporation was referred to the National Arbitration Tribunal under the 1940 Order. The reference was proceeded with by the `Industrial Disputes Tribunal which superseded the earlier Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Order, 1951. E. R. 828. In that case a dispute between a town clerk and the Municipal Corporation was referred to the National Arbitration Tribunal under the 1940 Order. The reference was proceeded with by the `Industrial Disputes Tribunal which superseded the earlier Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Order, 1951. The Municipal Corporation took the matter to the King's Bench Division for an order prohibiting the Tribunal from proceeding with the case on the ground that the referred dispute was between a single workman and the employer and it was outside the purview of the trade disputes referred to in the Order of 1940 and of 1951 and so the Tribunal had no jurisdiction. Construing the provisions of the 1940 Order, Lord Goddard, C. J. speaking for the Court held that the definition of the term "trade dispute" therein read with Section 1(l) of the Interpretation Act of 1889 (which provided that unless the contrary intention appears, words in the singular shall include the plural and words in the plural shall include the singular) established that an individual dispute was included in it. He observed :- "It cannot, we think, be contended - that the wording of the order of 1940 indicates any intention to exclude the application of the words of Section 1(1) of the Interpretation Act set out above. We therefore conclude that a dispute between one employer and one work-man was within the order of 1940 and in this' respect some reliance was placed on the opinion of Lord Atkinson in Conway v. Wade, 1909 A. C. 506 where he said (1909 A. C. 517) : 'In order that a dispute may be a trade dispute at all, a workman must be a party to it on each side, or a workman on one side and an employer on the other.' His Lordship was there considering a matter arising under the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, in which the definition of trade dispute is in the same words as in the order although the punctuation is different. In fact, in the Industrial Courts Act, 1919, the definition of trade dispute is in the same words as in the Act of 1906, and in that the punctuation is the same as in the order we are now considering. 12. In fact, in the Industrial Courts Act, 1919, the definition of trade dispute is in the same words as in the Act of 1906, and in that the punctuation is the same as in the order we are now considering. 12. In our opinion this question whether the reference were validly made under the order of 1940 is not to be determined by any nice question as to the presence or absence of a comma but we think that the application of the Interpretation Act, 1889, concludes the matter. In our opinion, therefore, there was power, when the references were made, to refer the dispute, which was a dispute between an employer and a workman, to the tribunal and the tribunal had authority to deal with it. The Order of 1940 was, however, revoked on August 1, 1951 by the Industrial Disputes Order, 1951. Construing the various provisions of the 1951 Order the learned Chief Justice came to the conclusion that an individual dispute was not a trade dispute within meaning of the 1951 Order. It was observed that the whole tenor of the Order of 1951, and the fact that throughout the Order the word "employer" in the singular is used in conjunction with the word "workers" in the plural, indicates an intention that these words should be interpreted literally and in consequence that Section 1(1) of the Interpretation Act, 1889 should not apply. 13. This decision brings out the position that the term "trade dispute" did not have any uniform or well settled concept in England. Its meaning and connotation depended upon its definition in the statutory enactments considered in the light of the scheme of the particular statute read as a whole. It is equally evident that at least the Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order, 1940, which remained in operation for more than 10 years, included individual dispute to be a trade dispute under it. 14. Section 51 of the Australian Constitution gave Legislative power in Sub-section xxxv, with respect to "Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State." The term "industrial disputes" was considered by the High Court of Australia in the context of the entry to be confined to collective disputes. 14. Section 51 of the Australian Constitution gave Legislative power in Sub-section xxxv, with respect to "Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State." The term "industrial disputes" was considered by the High Court of Australia in the context of the entry to be confined to collective disputes. Is the Jambunna Coal Mine, No Liability v. Victorian Coal Miners' Associations, C. J. R. 309 Isaacs, J. observed (p. 375) :-? "The dispute in the industry generally, which is an industrial dispute in the large economic sense must be carefully distinguished from an individual dispute between a specific single employer and one of his employees. The latter may be an industrial dispute too but in a narrower sense, and not in the broad national sense which the Constitution intended." The term "industrial dispute" was construed in its broad sense in Australia in the context of the constitutional provisions there. The constitutional provisions in our country are entirely different. The Government of India Act, 1935, or the Constitution of India was not based on the Australian Constitution. The Australian decisions, therefore, cannot be utilised to establish that the term "industrial dispute" had acquired a well settled meaning by 1935 when the Government of India Act was enacted. 15. The Supreme Court decisions in,the cases of C. P. Transport Services Limited and the Newspapers Limited shown that the term "industrial dispute" as occurring in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was construed to exclude individual disputes because of the scheme of the Act. It was not even whispered that the Legislature was in-competent to legislate with regard to individual disputes under the Entry. 16. In our opinion, the legislative history relating to industrial and labour disputes shows that the term "industrial dispute" included individual disputes also in its narrower sense in England, Australia as well as this country. Conferment of legislative power with respect of industrial disputes included the power to legislate on individual disputes. Section 2-A was within the legislative competence of Parliament. 17. In the next place Mr. Khare urged that legislation with regard to individual disputes for the first time could be operative and efficacious only if Parliament had along with Section 2-A enacted substantive law in relation to individual disputes. The Industrial Disputes Act contained various substantive provisions with regard to reference and resolution of industrial disputes. 17. In the next place Mr. Khare urged that legislation with regard to individual disputes for the first time could be operative and efficacious only if Parliament had along with Section 2-A enacted substantive law in relation to individual disputes. The Industrial Disputes Act contained various substantive provisions with regard to reference and resolution of industrial disputes. There was no necessity for Parliament to enact the same provisions all over again, for making an individual dispute of the kind mentioned in Section 2-A, an industrial dispute. Various provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act all became applicable to individual disputes. We see no infirmity in Section 2-A on this ground. 18. The next submission was that since the field of industrial dispute was fully covered by the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, Section 2-A of the Central Act could not operate in this. State. Section 12 of the U. P. Act provides: "Unless any order made under this Act makes express provision to the contrary, nothing in this Act shall affect the power of the State Government to refer any industrial dispute or matters connected therewith under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or to deal with any report or settlement in accordance with the provisions of that Act." Thus, the U. P. Act expressly confers rower upon the State Government to make references under the Central Act. With regard to such references Section 2-A of the Central Act would clearly be applicable.' In the present group of cases references have been made under the Central Act. 19. The subject-matter of industrial dispute being in the Concurrent List, the proviso to Art. 254 (2) of the Constitution is attracted. Under it, nothing in Art. 254 (2) could prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law made by the Legislature of the State. The U. P. State Legislature had enacted the Industrial Disputes Act in 1947. Parliament could thereafter make any law with respect to the same subject-matter namely industrial disputes. Con-sequently, Section 2-A having been added in 1965, was saved by the proviso aforesaid; and would operate even in this State. 20. The U. P. State Legislature had enacted the Industrial Disputes Act in 1947. Parliament could thereafter make any law with respect to the same subject-matter namely industrial disputes. Con-sequently, Section 2-A having been added in 1965, was saved by the proviso aforesaid; and would operate even in this State. 20. The last submission of tin learned counsel was that Section 2-A was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution because it did not lay down any policy or standard for guiding the State Government for choosing individual cases for reference. Section 2-A does not deal with the power of the Government to refer a particular case to adjudication. Upon the ground urged by learned counsel the sections of the Act conferring power upon the State Government to refer individual cases for adjudication maybe hit by Art. 14, but that was not the argument before us. On the ground urged by learned counsel, See. 2-A could not possibly be held to be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. 21. In P. Janardhana v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 Mys. 171 Toshniwal Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Courts, 1960 (19) I. F. and L. R. 352, F. B. and T. V. S. Iyengar & Sons v. State, A.I.R. 1970 Mad. 82 the validity of Section 2-A was upheld. In Jute and Jute Goods Buffer Stock Association v. Second Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, 1972 (24) F. L. R. 22 a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court held that Section 2-A was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. But this decision was overruled by a Division Befich of that Court in The State of West Bengal v. Jute & Jute Goods Buffer Stock Association and others, Appeal No. 308 of 1971 decided on May 1973. The appeal Bench held that neither Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, nor Sec.10 of the said Act offends Art. 14 of the Constitution. We are in respectful agreement with this view. 22. We answer the reference by saying that Section 2-A is intra wires the powers of Parliament and is valid. 23. Let the papers be returned to the learned Single Judge with this opinion and answer.