State of Madras represented by the Secretary to Government R. D. & L. A. Dept, v. Deivasigamani Pillai
1973-09-11
NATARAJAN, VEERASWAMI
body1973
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- VEERASWAMI 1. These appeals are from the orders of Palaniswami and Ramaprasada Rao, JJ., By a notification under S. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, certain piece of land were sought to be acquired for a public purpose, to wit, for the construction of a mutton and vegetable market. One of the survey numbers sought to be acquired, which both the appeals cover, is R.S. No. 238-1A-1A-1-A-1. The description in the notification is as follows: “Natham poromboke, R.S. Nos. 288-A-1-A-1.A/present enjoyers and interested persons (1) Balakrishna Pillai son of Audi Pillai, (2) Dhanawmal, aged 10. (3) Rajeswari aged 7, (4) Sivaprakasam aged 2 (Nos. 2 to 4 minors by guardian father No. 11),—O-13 aeres (a thatched tea hotel and one wall). Objections were filed by the respondent that the land was not natham poromboke, but belonged to them. But these objections were overruled. There was a declaration under S. 6 on 20th August 1967, which was published. Thereafter, en 28th May 1968, an erratum to the declaration was published to the effect that what was sought to be acquired on the survey number was not the land itself but the thatched tea hotel and also well. It is this notification that was quashed by Palaniswami, J. He found: “On the fasts proved by the petitioner and found by the Acquisition Officer, it follows that the petitioner and hit predecessors-in-title have been in possession of the land, upon which the present superstructure stands, for over the prescriptive period. The petitioner is thus entitled to both the land and the superstructure. What is sought to be acquired Is only a part of his interest, which is not contemplated under the Act. In this view, the entire acquisition proceedings including the notification under S. 4 have to be struck down as being incompetent.” In the appeals filed by the Government it is rightly contended that the learned Judge went, outside the purview of the petitioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution to decide a question of title as to land. From the excerpt from the judgment, it is obvious that the learned Judge did go into the question of title and gave a declaration that the land belonged to the respondent. This is entirely outside the purview of the petition.
From the excerpt from the judgment, it is obvious that the learned Judge did go into the question of title and gave a declaration that the land belonged to the respondent. This is entirely outside the purview of the petition. The question of title will have to be decided in the light of evidence, especially the question of possession, which could not be satisfactorily decided only on the basis of affidavits in support of the petition asserting or denying title. It is no doubt true that the government sought to decide the objections end overrule the same after S. 4(1) notification and before the declaration under S. 6. We are not called upon to say whether this was proper or not. But the erratum was only to the declaration. That would be wrong. What was sought to be acquired must normally find a place in the notification under S. 4(1) and it not having been made clear in the notification that what was sought to be acquired was only the superstructure on the view that the land was natham poromboke, the notification itself was bad and the mere erratum to the declaration will not cure this defect. On that ground we agree with the learned Judge that both the notification under S. 4(1) and the declaration under S. 6 will have to be quashed. But the appeals are well founded in as much as the learned Judge went out-side the purview of the writ petitions and gave a declaration as to the ownership of the land. That is set aside. To that limited extent the appeals are allowed. No costs.