JUDGMENT K.B. Asthana, J. - The appellant, Munna Lal Agarwal, was appointed as a Lecturer in Agarwal Intermediate College, now known as Maharaja Agrasen Intermediate College. In 1951 the appellant was confirmed. This fact is not denied. According to the appellant he was teaching Economics and was carrying on his duties satisfactorily. Some-time in 1955 he received an order from the Manager of the College dispensing with his services on the ground that he had been convicted for embezzlement. However, on representations to the higher Educational authorities and on their intervention the appellant was restored to his post. The appellant then received a notice dated 31-3-1964 from the Manager of the College terminating his services on the ground that as the Commerce Department of the College had been disbanded or closed his services as Commerce teacher were no longer required. Apparently the Manager realised that the prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools had not taken; he wrote to the Inspector for approving the closure of the Commerce Department and for termination of the services of the appellant. By a communication dated 20-6-1964 the District Inspector of Schools accorded the necessary approval for closure of the Commerce Department and for termination of the services of the appellant. A notice dated 20-6-1964 signed by the Manager was then served on the appellant terminating his services as a lecturer of Commerce, with immediate effect. The appellant filed an appeal before the Regional Appellate Committee constituted under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act from the order of the District Inspector of Schools according approval of the closure of the Commerce Department of the College and for termination of his services. The Appellate Committee rejected the appeal. The appellant then presented a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution before this Court questioning the validity of the order or decision of the Appellate Committee. Inter-alia. it was alleged in the petition that the Manager had no jurisdiction or authority to seek approval of the District Inspector of Schools for closure of the Commerce classes and for termination of the services of the petitioner. It is not necessary for us for the purposes of this judgment to detail out other allegations in the petition in support of the grounds of attack on the validity of the action taken against the petitioner, as nothing will turn on them in this appeal. It is not necessary for us for the purposes of this judgment to detail out other allegations in the petition in support of the grounds of attack on the validity of the action taken against the petitioner, as nothing will turn on them in this appeal. In the counter-affidavit sworn by the Manager himself it was not denied that the approval for the closure of the Commerce classes and for termination of the petitioner's services was sought by the Manager from the District Inspector of Schools without reference to either the Managing Committee of the College or with the consent or approval of the President or the Vice President. A laconic averment was made in the counter-affidavit that there was no competent Managing Committee in existence. 2. The case of the petitioner as put forward at the hearing of the petition before the learned Single Judge was that under the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act and the regulations framed thereunder, it is the Managing Committee who is authorised by a resolution by two-third majority to terminate the services of a teacher and unless such a resolution were passed by the Managing Committee the approval of the District Inspector of Schools could not be sought.The learned Single Judge seems to have repelled this contention. From a perusal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge it appears that he thought that there was a disputed question of fact arising on the pleadings of the parties contained in the affidavits as to the actual existence of any valid Committee of Management of the College. The learned Judge held in the absence of a Committee of Management recognised by the Educational authorities under the administrative scheme envisaged by the Inter-mediate Education Act, no question arose of passing any resolution by the Committee of Management and the Manager was competent to ask for the approval of the District Inspector of Schools on his own initiative. Though the learned Judge has not expressed it so categorically as we have taken the liberty of expressing but that is what is the clearest implication of his findings. Though the learned Judge has not expressed it so categorically as we have taken the liberty of expressing but that is what is the clearest implication of his findings. The learned Single Judge then proceeded further and opined that even if there was a Committee of Management then the Regulation 28 relied upon by the petitioner at best fettered the jurisdiction of the Committee of Management, but it did not fetter the Manager in any manner from seeking the approval of the District Inspector of Schools. The learned Single Judge did not support his finding as to the power and jurisdiction of the Manager on any provisions of the Intermediate Education Act, the regulations framed thereunder or the Rules of the Society which was Managing the College. Before the Manager could succeed on an argument of this nature he should have established that under the law or the rules applicable he was vested with the power to terminate the service of a teacher. We find that from the rules which were placed before us framed by the Society running the college as regards the appointment and termination of the service of employees, the Manager's powers are confined only to the managerial staff. Thus there being lack of power in the Manager to terminate the service of a teacher, the only conclusion which can be drawn is that it is the Managing Committee of the College who was vested with the power for terminating the service of a teacher. 3. The other limb of the argument that unless there was an Administrative Scheme approved by the Education Department, Regulation 28 would not apply, does not impress us. We think under the Scheme of Section 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act, the management of the college contemplated is a Managing Committee of the College constituted under its rules so long a Scheme of Administration had not been framed. We even do not doubt the existence of a Managing Committee of the College as in the counter-affidavit sworn by the Manager there is no categorical assertion that no committee of Management was in existence or working. What he has said is that there was no competent Committee of Management. We even do not doubt the existence of a Managing Committee of the College as in the counter-affidavit sworn by the Manager there is no categorical assertion that no committee of Management was in existence or working. What he has said is that there was no competent Committee of Management. There is an averment in the affidavit of the petitioner that in a previous litigation the Manager who has sworn the counter-affidavit did not question the existence and the validity of a Committee of Management in the College. Assuming for a moment that there was a Committee of Management in existence but its constitution for any reasons was defective, the fact remains that it was the Committee of Management which was managing the affairs of the college. The Manager of the college, we do not think, could claim a status or capacity independent of the Committee of Management of the College. Under the rules of the Society we find that the Manager had to take from time to time instructions from the Committee of Management in the day to day affairs of the college and has to act in accordance with such instructions. The attempt of the learned counsel for the Manager before us to establish some kind of supremacy in the Manager independent of the Committee of Management, the President or the Vice-President of the Society, failed. No doubt remains in our mind that the Manager on his own without reference to the Committee of Management, the only body under the rules, who was empowered by two-third majority to express its will, could not ask for the approval of the District Inspector of Schools either for the abolition of the commerce classes or for the termination of the service of the petitioner. The learned Single Judge was in error in holding that the Manager could make a reference and the District Inspector of Schools could accord the approval. 4. May be, the learned Single Judge not being assured of the position, at one place in his judgment observed that the Appellate Committee's jurisdiction was confined only to the Act of approval accorded by the District Inspector of Schools and since it dismissed the appeal without reference to any provisions of the Act or the Regulations or the Rules, the error was not apparent in the impugned order of the Appellate Committee and no writ could be issued. Again here with respect we say this amounted to begging the question. We consider that it was within the scope and jurisdiction of the Appellate Committee to go into all matters relating to the proposal of Management of the College for closing the Commerce Department and for terminating the services of the petitioner. It was well within the scope of the District Inspector of Schools to have refused to accord approval on the finding that the appropriate authority of the College has not sought for the approval and it was the own doing of the Manager alone. On that ground the District Inspector of Schools should have refused to accord approval. If the District Inspector of Schools failed to appreciate this position, it was equally the duty of the Appellate Committee on having been invited by the petitioner in appeal to adjudicate upon it to consider the question. We do not agree with the learned Single Judge when he observed that it did not strictly fell within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Committee to take into consideration such questions. We think that that was the very matter and very soul,of the appeal of the petitioner before the Appellate Committee and the Appellate Committee in rejecting the appeal would be deemed to have decided that question against the petitioner. The error becomes apparent in the decision of the Appellate Committee for the approval was accorded by the District Inspector of Schools only on an invitation by the Manager alone and not on a resolution passed by two-third majority of the Committee of Management which was the requirement of the law. We are not in agreement with the learned Single Judge when he held that the decision of the appellate Committee rejecting the petitioner's appeal was not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge seems to have thought that the petitioner would have had his remedy by way of a civil suit and after making observations on any controversies arising did not finally opine upon them and left it to be decided in a civil suit. Of what use a civil suit would be to the petitioner if the finding of the learned Single Judge that the decision of the Appellate Committee was correct, stands ? Of what use a civil suit would be to the petitioner if the finding of the learned Single Judge that the decision of the Appellate Committee was correct, stands ? Since we have found on un controverted facts that the approval accorded by the District Inspector of Schools was without jurisdiction as there was no proper reference before him, we think we should afford relief to the petitioner in exercise of our jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution instead of sending him to the civil court to seek an alternative remedy. 5. Accordingly we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge, allow the writ petition and quash the impugned order of the Appellate Committee dated 4-12-1964 and the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 20-6-1964 and the notice dated 26-6-1964. We further direct that the Manager or the other authorities of the College or the educational authorities shall treat the petitioner as in service as a lecturer in the college. The appellant shall be entitled to h' costs throughout.