JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - Smt. Premda respondent No. 4 filed a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for a declaration that she was co-Bhumidhar and co-Sirdar of the land in dispute along with defendants 1 to 6 on the ground that she was the sister of one of the co-tenure-holders Namsway. The judgment of the trial court indicates that only the petitioner contested the suit on the ground that respondent No. 4 was not the sister of Namsway and that he was the sole Bhumidhar and Sirdar of the land in dispute. The trial court came to the conclusion that the respondent No. 4 was the sister of Namsway and accordingly decreed the suit against all the defendants. 2. The defendants other than the petitioner submitted to the decree of the trial court. The petitioner alone filed an appeal. The Additional Commissioner did not set aside the finding of the trial court that the respondent No. 4 was the sister of Namsway but still he dismissed the suit on the ground that the compromise decree passed in an earlier suit being suit No. 1/31 of 1967, filed by the respondent No. 4 against one of the defendants Gandharva Singh operated as res judicata. On second appeal the Board of Revenue set aside the lower appellate court and restored that of the trial court. Aggrieved the petitioner has come to this court under Article 226 of the Constitution with a prayer to quash the order of the Board of Revenue. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the decree in suit No. 1131 of 1967 referred to above did operate as res judicata and the Board of Revenue committed a manifest error of law in taking a contrary view. I am however, unable to agree with the submission made by the learned counsel. From the facts narrated in the orders of the trial court and the Additional Commissioner it is apparent that suit No. 1/31 of 1967 had been filed by the respondent No. 4 against Gandharva Singh, Gaon Sabha and the State Government only. The petitioner was not a party to that suit. From the narration of the facts in the orders aforesaid it further appears that in the aforesaid suit the compromise was only to Gandharva Singh to be the heir of Namsway. The petitioner was not a party to that suit. From the narration of the facts in the orders aforesaid it further appears that in the aforesaid suit the compromise was only to Gandharva Singh to be the heir of Namsway. The compromise did not go further to state that she was not the sister of Namsway. It is settled that decree passed on compromise does not operate as res judicata and operates only as an estoppel. In Suhba Rao v. Jagannatha Rao, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 591 it was held that a compromise is not a decision by the Court. It is the acceptance by the court of something to which the parties had agreed. A compromise decree merely sets the seal of the court on the agreement of the parties. The court doer not decide anything. Nor can it be said that a decision of the court was implicit in it. Only a decision by the court can be res judicata, whether statutory under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or constructive as a matter of public policy on which the entire doctrine rests. Such a decree cannot strictly be regarded as decision on a matter which was heard and finally decided and cannot operate as res judicata. Such a decree might create an estoppel by conduct between the parties, but such an estoppel must be specifically pleaded. 4. As already pointed out above the petitioner was not a party to the earlier suit which was compromised. So far as Gandharva Singh is concerned he submitted the decree even of the trial court and has not challenged to the order of the Board of Revenue also. The petitioner cannot plead any estoppel as against respondent No. 4 on account of the compromised decree in suit No. 1131 of 1967. The Board of Revenue accordingly did not commit an error in taking the view which it did. In the result the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.