Judgment: This is an appeal by the State against the acquittal of the respondent, the sole accused in C.C. No. 5494 of 1970 on the file of the IV City Magistrate, Hyderabad, who was tried for an offence punishable under section 34 (a) of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for transporting 531½ litres of liquor in 16 motor car tubes (M.Os. 1 to 16) in the car bearing No. APX 325, without a licence on 13th September, 1970 at about 1-30 a.m. at Toli Chowki cross roads near Golconda. 2. The prosecution case is that the Sub-Inspector of Police, Golconda Police Station P.W. 2) on information that illicit liquor was being transported from Nakramguda to Hyderabad City by car he along with three police constables and two panch witnesses, including P.W. 1, waited at Toli Chowki cross roads. At about 1-30 a.m. one motor car came from Nakramguda side and was going towards Hyderabad City. They stopped the car. Besides the driver two persons were in the car. The two persons in the car jumped and escaped. The respondent was the driver. They found in the car 16 motor tubes containing liquor. When they questioned the respondent whether he has any licence or any permit for transporting liquor he replied in the negative. Then P. W. 2 conducted a panchanama, Ex. P-1 and seized the car and the liquor tubes. Then P.W. 2 took the respondent and the seized property to Golconda police station. After registering the case he released the respondent on bail. On 14th September, 1970, he sent the car and M.Os. 1 to 16 tubes and the concerned documents to the Excise Department through one head constable and three police constables along with the panch witnesses who produced the car and M.Os. 1 to 16 and the documents before P. W. 3, Sub-Inspector of Excise, Hyderabad South, at 8 p.m. P.W. 3, took the car and M.Os. 1 to 16 and the case papers into his custody. In their presence P. W. 3 removed the chits on M.Os. 1 to 16 with the signature of P.W. 1 and measured the liquor and drew a panchanama, Ex. P-2. P. W. 3, also tested the strength of the liquor in each tube with the thermometer and hydrometer and noted their readings and strenght of liquor in the panchanama. In their presence P. W. 3 removed the chits on M.Os. 1 to 16 with the signature of P.W. 1 and measured the liquor and drew a panchanama, Ex. P-2. P. W. 3, also tested the strength of the liquor in each tube with the thermometer and hydrometer and noted their readings and strenght of liquor in the panchanama. In the presence of the mediators he took about 600 ml. from each tube into separate bottles and sealed them and pasted chits signed by the panch witnesses on them and sent the sealed bottles to the Chemical Examiner for analysis. Ex. P-4 is the report of the Chemical Examiner in which it is reported that the samples contain alcohol and they are liquor. 3. P.Ws. 1 to 3 spoke to the facts of the prosecution case as mentioned above. 4. The plea taken by the respondent in his statement under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, is that he has nothing to do with M.Os. 1 to 16 motor tubes containing liquor or the car in which they were said to have been found. He does not know how to drive. He was not driving the car, APX 325 as alleged. When he was going by walk he found the car parked there. Then two police constables came and forcibly took him away in the car. By way of defence one witness was examined as D.W. 1. His evidence is that on one night he was standing near the beer shop at Toli Chowki, as it was raining. The respondent came there from Ramachandrapuram side and stood near him. Then two or four police constables came and enquired them about their professions. Then the police constables took away the respondent. The learned Magistrate rightly disbelieved the defence story. It is not the defence case that any of these prosecution witnesses who spoke against the respondent were inimically disposed towards him and in order to harm him he was falsely implicated in the case. So far as the evidence of D.W. 1 is concerned, it was not put to any of the prosecution witnesses that D.W. 1 was present there. 5. The learned Magistrate while accepting the case of the prosecution that the respondent was transporting M.Os. So far as the evidence of D.W. 1 is concerned, it was not put to any of the prosecution witnesses that D.W. 1 was present there. 5. The learned Magistrate while accepting the case of the prosecution that the respondent was transporting M.Os. 1 to 16 motor tubes with their contents in the car, APX 325 on that night as alleged, however, acquitted the respondent on two grounds, viz., (1) that there was an illegality in the search and seizure as P. W. 2 did not record reasons before making the search as provided under section 55 of the Act; and (2) the office copy of the letter under which the samples taken from M.Os 1 to 16 were sent to the Chemical Examiner was not produced to connect the samples with the report. It is provided under section 55 of the Act that whenever any of the officers mentioned therein has reason to believe that an offence under section 34, section 35, section 36 or section 37 has been or is likely to be committed and that a search warrant cannot be obtained without affording the offender an opportunity of escape or of concealing evidence of the offence, he may, after recording the grounds in that behalf, enter and search any place without a search warrant. Admittedly the search of the car, APX 325 was made by P.W. 2 without a search warrant and without also recording reasons for making the search without obtaining search warrant. Purporting to follow the Supreme Court decision in State of Rajasthan v. Rehman1, the learned Magistrate found the search made by P. W. 2 in the circumstances mentioned as illegal. In the Supreme Court decision referred to above the facts are: When the Deputy Superintendent, Central Excise accompanied by his staff went to the house of one Rehman with a view to search his house to find out whether he had stored 1 tobacco there and they declared their intention to do so, the respondent and another in that case, it was alleged, obstructed the making of the search and in the process the Deputy Superintendent fell down and received some injuries. The respondent and the other man were prosecuted. The respondent and the other man were prosecuted. It was found that the search had not been conducted in accordance with section 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as the Deputy Superintendent, without recording the reasons as he should under that provision, attempted to make the search. It is under those circumstances it was held that the respondent in obstructing the Deputy Superintendent from making the search, did not commit any offence. 6. But the question is whether the failure on the part of P.W. 2 to record reasons for making the search of the car without a warrant vitiates the trial of the respondent and the evidence relating to the search becomes inadmissible in evidence. In the subsequent Supreme Court decision Bai Radha v. State of Gujarat2, a similar question came to be considered with regard to a search made in connection with an offence under Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act. It is provided under section 15 of that Act that “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, whenever the Special Police Officer has reasonable grounds for believing that an offence punishable under the Act has been or is being committed in respect of a woman or girl living in any premises, and that search of the premises with warrant cannot be made without undue delay, such officer may, after recording the grounds of his belief, enter and. search such premises without a warrant.” 7. In that case one of the defences raised was that the Special Police Officer who conducted the search without a warrant did not record the grounds for making the search. In that connection the Supreme Court held that non-compliance with the provision by not recording the grounds for conducting the search without a warrant is only an irregularity and not an illegality. The trial is not vitiated unless it is shown that prejudice is caused by non-compliance. The Supreme Court said that there is hardly any parallel between an officer conducting a search who has no authority under the law to make search and an officer who has the authority to make search, but does it only without strictly following the procedure. The trial is not vitiated unless it is shown that prejudice is caused by non-compliance. The Supreme Court said that there is hardly any parallel between an officer conducting a search who has no authority under the law to make search and an officer who has the authority to make search, but does it only without strictly following the procedure. With regard to the Supreme Court case in State of Rajasthan v. Rehman1, their Lordships held that the facts are different there and that in that case a different question was involved, viz., whether any offence was committed in obstructing the public servant from making the search without following the necessary procedure. That decision cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that in a case if search is made without following the procedure the trial would be vitiated and the evidence relating to the search would become inadmissible in evidence. 8. In the decision Radha Kishan v. State of Uttar Pradesh2, it was held by the Supreme Court that it may be that where the provisions of sections 103 and 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code, are contravened the search can be resisted by the person whose premises are sought to be searched. It may also be that because of the illegality of the search, the Court may be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding the seizure. But beyond those two consequences no further consequence ensues and the seizure of the articles is not vitiated. 9. The decision Kochan Velayudhan v. State of Kerala3, is a full Bench case. Therein it was held that althouth the failure to comply with the provisions regulating searches may cast doubts upon the bona fides of the officers conducting the search, there is nothing in law which makes the evidence relating to an irregular search inadmissible and once it is found that the evidence of the recovery of articles in the search is reliable a conviction based on such evidence is not invalid on the ground of irregularity in search. 10. 10. Therefore it is clear that merely on the ground that P.W. 2 failed to record the grounds as provided under section 55 of the Act, when he conducted the search of the motor car as provided thereunder, it is not possible to say that the search itself is illegal and the evidence relating to it becomes inadmissible and no conviction can be based on the evidence of of such a search. 11. The question for consideration is whether on the basis of the evidence adduced in the case can it be found that the tubes M.Os. 1 to 16 seized from the respondent contained liquor. So far as this question is concerned, we have the evidence of P.W. 3 and the report of the Chemical Examiner. The report of the Chemical Examiner no doubt shows that the samples relating to it contain alcohol and they are liquor. The only point for consideration is whether the report of the Chemical Examiner relates to the samples taken from M.Os. 1 to 16. According to the evidence of P.W. 3 he took samples from M.Os. 1 to 16 in the presence of the mediators and after sealing them he sent the samples to the Chemical Examiner and Ex. P-4 is the report of the Chemical Examiner relating to those samples. Ex. P-4 also mentions the samples having been sent in 16 sealed bottles. On the basis of the evidence of P.W. 3, I do not see any reason why Ex. P-4 report of the Chemical Examiner cannot be connected with the samples taken from M.Os. 1 to 16 motor tubes. The only ground on which the learned Magistrate thought that the connection between the two is not established is that the office copy of the covering letter under which P.W. 3 sent the sample bottles to the Chemical Examiner has not been produced. I do not think that it is only the office copy of the covering letter that can establish the connection between the samples and the report. When P. W. 3 has categorically stated that Ex. P-4 is the report of the Chemical Examiner which he received with regard to the samples taken from M.Os, 1 to 16 and when there is no cross-examination on that point, there is no reason why it should be doubted that Exhibit P-4 may not relate to the samples taken from M.Os. P-4 is the report of the Chemical Examiner which he received with regard to the samples taken from M.Os, 1 to 16 and when there is no cross-examination on that point, there is no reason why it should be doubted that Exhibit P-4 may not relate to the samples taken from M.Os. 1 to 16. Even apart from the report of the Chemical Examiner, it is in the evidence of P.W. 3 that he found the contents in the tubes M.Os. 1 to 16 to be liquor. He stated that he could found it to be liquor from its colour, odour, piercing smell and the strength which is tested. According to him he tested the strength of the liquor in each tube with a thermometer and a hydrometer and noted their readings and the strength of the liquor in the panchanama. P.W. 3 being an Excise Sub-Inspector can be trusted with having some knowledge about liquors. Therefore, when he has stated so in his evidence as mentioned above there is no reason, even on the basis of the evidence of P.W. 3 why it cannot be found that what was contained in M.Os. 1 to 16 was only liquor. There is a recent decision of Chinnappa Reddy, J., in Rokholamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh1. Therein His Lordship held that the question whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that an article seized in a particular case is liquor or not must naturally depend on the facts of each case and the evidence adduced. The Excise Act does not prescribe any particular mode of proof like in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Drugs Act wherein certain procedure is prescribed with regard to modes of proof and insist on the prosecuting agency obtaining the opinion of an expert. It cannot therefore be insisted that there must be chemical analysis before a Court can hold that an article is liquor. The failure of the prosecution to adduce expert evidence may perhaps be taken into consideration by the Court in arriving at a conclusion whether an article is liquor or not. But from the mere absence of expert evidence it cannot be concluded that the prosecution has failed to prove that the article is liquor. The evidence of an expert is only to help the Court to arrive at a conclusion. 12. But from the mere absence of expert evidence it cannot be concluded that the prosecution has failed to prove that the article is liquor. The evidence of an expert is only to help the Court to arrive at a conclusion. 12. With great respect to the learned Judge, I am in entire agreement with his views as expressed above. 13. There is no doubt that the motor tubes, M.Os. 1 to 16 seized by P.W. 2 contain liquor. There is also no doubt that it is only the respondent who was driving the car, APX 325 transporting the liquor contained in M.Os. 1 to 16. There is absolutely no reason not to believe the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 that while the respondent was driving the car, APX 325, P.W. 2 stopped it and when the car was searched M.Os. 1 to 16 were found in it. Nothing has been suggested to these witnesses as to why they think of falsely implicating the respondent if he was not really driving the car at that time as pleaded by him. 14. Having regard to all these circumstances I find the respondent guilty. Accordingly the appeal is allowed and the respondent is convicted under section 34 (a) of the Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years, the minimum punishment provided thereunder. With regard to the car, APX 325 in which the liquor was being transported, the Magistrate is directed to follow the procedure prescribed under section 45 of the Act for the purpose of confiscation.