JUDGMENT-This is an application to revise an order passed by the learned District Judge, Parbhani, reversing the order of Mr. S.Y. Gambhir. Civil Judge (1. D.), Sailu, dated August 30, 1969, refusing to grant extension of time under a decree for specific performance on the ground that the Court had no power to do so. It is not necessary for the purpose of this application to state the facts prior to the decree. Suffice it to say that, on March 30, 1968, a conditional decree for specific performance was passed in favour of the present respondent which was m the following terms: "Defendant shall execute a sale deed in respect of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall deposit in court the costs for the execution and the registration of, the sale deed within one month from this date. In case the plaintiff fails to deposit the costs as aforesaid the suit shall stand dismissed. On his depositing the costs in Court. Defendant shall execute the sale deed and get it registered. In case of failure of the defendant so to do plaintiff should be entitled to get the sale deed executed and registered in execution of the decree though court….. It is an admitted position that the plaintiff (present respondent) failed to make the deposit in respect of the costs of execution and registration of the sale-deed within the time fixed by the said decree, and on September 6, 1968 he filed an application praying for condonation of the delay in depositing the said costs within the time fixed by the decree, on the ground that after the date of the decree he had been ill and there was no other person available to him to make the deposit on his behalf. It may be mentioned that, on the same day, the plaintiff also filed an execution application requesting the Court to direct the defendant to execute the necessary sale-deed in terms of the decree. Both the applications were opposed by the defendant (present petitioner) who contended that, in view of non· compliance with the terms of the decree, the suit automatically stood dismissed at the end of one month from the date of that decree and the Court had no jurisdiction to condone the delay, or to extend time, as applied for. Both the applications were opposed by the defendant (present petitioner) who contended that, in view of non· compliance with the terms of the decree, the suit automatically stood dismissed at the end of one month from the date of that decree and the Court had no jurisdiction to condone the delay, or to extend time, as applied for. The learned trial Judge upheld that contention of the defendant and rejected the application for extension of time. As a necessary corollary, he also dismissed the execution application. On appeal to the District Court, the learned District Judge, relying on the decision of a single Judge of this Court in the case of Babulal Vithoba v. Jagannath1 held that in view of the provisions of section 28 (1) of the Specific Relief Act. 1963, the decree was not a final decree and the Court had jurisdiction to grant extension of time. He therefore, remitted the proceedings back to the trial Court for the disposal of that application on merits. It is against that order that the original defendant has approached this Court in revision. 2. Under section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, at the time of passing a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale of immovable property, the Court has undoubtedly the power to direct payment by the purchaser of the price or other sum by a fixed date. The said section, however, proceeds to lay down that, in such a case, if the purchaser fails to pay the amount within the time fixed by the decree for specific performance the vendor could apply in the same suit to have the contract rescinded and on such application, the Court may order rescission of that contract and proceed to give consequential direction for the restoration of any benefit received thereunder. 3. In the case of Babulal Vithoba v. Jagannath, cited by me earlier, which was relied upon by the lower appellate Court, the facts were, no doubt identical with the facts of the present case. Relying upon the language of section 28 (1) my brother Bhole held (p. 837) that the terms of the said section itself clearly contemplate that the Court had the power to grant extension of time. He also referred to certain other decisions in which the same view had been taken. Relying upon the language of section 28 (1) my brother Bhole held (p. 837) that the terms of the said section itself clearly contemplate that the Court had the power to grant extension of time. He also referred to certain other decisions in which the same view had been taken. I agree with the view taken by my brother Bhole in the said case that in a conditional decree for specific performance of the nature contemplated by section 28 (1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Court would have the power to grant extension of the time for the payment fixed under that decree. In my opinion, however, the decree in the· present case is not a decree under section 28 (1) of the Specific Relief Act. 1963, in so far as it is a self-operative final decree which provides in ex-press terms that if the payment is not made within the time fixed, the suit is to stand dismissed. In the case of such a decree, it is impossible to apply the provisions of section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which, for instance, provide for a subsequent application for the rescission of the contract itself, and for certain consequential orders. It is true that in Babulal Vithobas case which was decided by my brother Bhole also, the decree was in the same form as in the present case but, I am afraid, there can be no question of my being bound by authority in the matter of the proper construction of the decree before me. In any event, if I am to be bound by authority in such a matter, there is an unreported decision of a Division Bench of this Court by which I would be bound in which also the decree was in precisely the same form as in the present case, in so far all it provided that the plaintiffs in the said case were to deposit in the trial Court within one month of the receipt of the papers of the appeal a certain sum, and further provided that in case the plaintiffs failed to make that deposit within the time prescribed the said suit was to stand dismissed with costs. A Division Bench of this Court consisting of S. T. Desai and D. Har J)., held in Sahadu Talhu Patil v. Nayamukh Bherulal Marwadi2 that the failure on the part of the plaintiffs to carry out the terms of the decree had automatically resulted in the disposal of the suit and the Court had become functus officio and had no power to grant an extension of the time fixed by the decree. It is true that in a subsequent case the Supreme Court has in the case of Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Dos3 taken the view that section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the Court to deal with events that might arise subsequent to an order, for the purpose of enlarging time for payment even though it had been peremptorily fixed, but in that connection the Supreme Court observed as follows (p. 883) : “……Such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed." It is, therefore, quite clear that whilst laying down, in effect, that section 148 must be liberally construed, the Supreme Court has excluded from its ambit conditional decrees like the one in the present case. The unreported decision of S. T. Desai and Datar JJ., referred to by me above, is perfectly in consonance with the view taken by the Supreme Court in Mahanth Ram Doss case just cited by me and is, therefore, still good law. In that view of the matter, this Revision Application succeeds and the Rule must be made absolute with costs. The order passed by the learned District Judge is set aside and that of the Civil Judge restored and the application for extension of time made by the plaintiff (exh. 4) stands rejected and dismissed. Rule made absolute.