JUDGMENT K.B. Srivastava, J. - This reference under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure raises an interesting question of law which does not appear to be covered by any authority of this Court. 2. The facts giving rise to this reference, may now be stated, in brief. There is a strip of land, 71 feet x32 feet, which is enclosed by iron pipes and a major portion of which is covered by corrugated asbestos sheets and which is situate within the premises of the Charbagh Station of the North Eastern Railway at Lucknow. This land is always given on a contract by the Railway administration to contractors for use as a cycle and scooter stand, on such terms and conditions, including payment of premium and rent, as may be settled between the Railway administration and the contractor, after acceptance of tender. One Sardar Satpal Singh was given the contract of the stand for the period December 1, 1967 to November 30, 1969, though the agreement was reduced into writing on March 20, 1968. Before expiry of the period of the contract, the Railway administration invited tenders on November 26, 1969 for the settlement of a new contract which was to be effective from December 1, 1969. The tender of one Gorakh Nath Upadhya was accepted on January 29, 1970 for a period of three years at a monthly payment of Rs. 2,001/- . The contract was to come into force with effect from March 1, 1970 and in the meantime the previous contract of Sardar Satpal Singh had been extended upto February 28, 1970. A notice dated February 25, 1970 was accordingly issued to Satpal Singh to vacate the stand by February 28. Satpal Singh, however, instituted a suit for perpetual injunction in the Court of Munsif South, Lucknow for restraining the Railway Administration from preventing him from running and maintaining the cycle stand. The Munsif granted an interim injunction which was, however, vacated on April 20, 1972. Satpal Singh filed an appeal on April 22, 1977 against the order vacating the interim injunction. He also succeeded in obtaining another interim injunction from the appellate court on April 22, 1972. His appeal was dismissed on September 21, 1972. The Munsif granted an interim injunction which was, however, vacated on April 20, 1972. Satpal Singh filed an appeal on April 22, 1977 against the order vacating the interim injunction. He also succeeded in obtaining another interim injunction from the appellate court on April 22, 1972. His appeal was dismissed on September 21, 1972. He then instituted a writ petition in this Court on September 23, 1972 which was admitted and an interim order was also passed restraining the Railway Administration from evicting him on the condition that he deposited Rs. 60,000/- within a month and continued to deposit a sum of Rs. 2,000/- every month thereafter. The Railway Administration filed an application on October 5, 1972 for the vacation of this interim order. This matter came up before this Court on October 23, 1972 and on that date the learned counsel for Satpal Singh made a statement that he did not press the stay application which was accordingly dismissed on that date and the earlier stay order was vacated. The Station Superintendent, Charbagh then put the cycle stand under lock and key. This lock was, however, found broken next day on October 24, 1972. On that very date, that is to say, on October 24, Ram Bilas, Pandey instituted a writ petition in this court "alleging that after the vacation of the. stand by the previous contractor Satpal Singh, he had entered into lawful possession with the consent and permission of the Railway Administration on the clear and express assurance that a formal agreement would be executed in due course. This writ petition was admitted and the eviction of Ram Bilas Pandey was stayed. However, the stay order specifically mentioned that no fetters were placed upon the power a the Prescribed Authority in issuing a notice and passing a final order of eviction under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupant) Act, 1971. The interim order was subsequently vacated by this Court on November 10, 1972. The Railway Administration then presented an application under Section 138, Indian Railways Act before the Special Railway Magistrate, Lucknow on November 10, 1972 for the eviction of Ram Bilas Pandey and the Special Railway Magistrate passed an order on the same date directing the Station Officer, G.R.P., Lucknow to evict Ram Bilas Pandey and deliver possession to the Railway Administration. The Railway Administration then presented an application under Section 138, Indian Railways Act before the Special Railway Magistrate, Lucknow on November 10, 1972 for the eviction of Ram Bilas Pandey and the Special Railway Magistrate passed an order on the same date directing the Station Officer, G.R.P., Lucknow to evict Ram Bilas Pandey and deliver possession to the Railway Administration. Ram Bilas Pandey instituted a revision (Criminal Revision 177 of 1972) before the Sessions Judge against this order on November 13, 1972 and eviction was stayed during the pendency of the revision. He asserted that he was in lawful possession with consent and permission of the Railway administration on a specific assurance that a formal agreement would be executed in due course. The Railway Administration, however, controverted this fact and alleged that no such consent or permission or assurance was given and that Ram Pandey was a rank trespasser. The revision came up for decision before the Third Temporary a Civil and Sessions Judge who made this reference on January 19, 1973 recommending the quashing of the order passed by the Special Railway Magistrate on the following grounds, namely, (1) that Ram Bilas Pandey was not a Railway servant and, therefore, Section 138 had no application the Special Railway Magistrate had no jurisdiction to act under it, because the mandatory notice mentioned in the section had not been issued to Ram Bilas Pandey was not even that of a Railway contractor and that his real status was that of a rank trespasser and, therefore the facts attracted the application of the public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and not of the Indian Railways Act. 3. At the time of the hearing of this reference, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the Railway Administration that the impugned order passed by the Special Railway Magistrate was a purely administrative or executive order and not an order passed in "any proceeding before any inferior criminal Court" and, therefore, no revision lay under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to the court of Session and consequently the Sessions Judge had no power to make a reference to this Court under Section 438 and this Court is equally not competent to pass any order in exercise of its revisional power under Section 439 of the Code. This argument of his has several facts, and I now proceed to deal with them. 4. The first contention is that Section 138. Indian Railway Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) provides the procedure for summary delivery to Railway Administration of property detained by a Railway servant and does not, whether expressly or by necessary implication, create an offence which could end in a trial before a Magistrate, and which could he made the subject of an appeal or revision before a superior Court, in the manner provided by the Code of, Criminal Procedure. I have no doubt in my mind that Section 138 of the Act noes not create an offence. A few sections and Chapter IX of the Act relate to penalties and offences. Sic. 47(1) confers power to make rules and Sub-sec. (2) of that section makes a breach of such rules an offence. Section 71-H, creates the act of employment of a Railway servant in contravention of the provisions contained in Chapter VI-A and the Rules made there under, also an offence. An offence is also created under Section 82-C (3) in case of an application for compensation containing - a statement which. is false. We then come to Chapter IX. This Chapter is `headed "Penalties and Offences". It is divided into three parts, that is to say "Forfeitures by Railway Companies" "Offences by Railway Servants" and "Other Offences". The category "Forfeitures by Railway Companies", comprises ten Secs. 87. to 96. A perusal of these ten sections will immediately reveal that they provide for penalties and not offences. The next following two sections namely, Section 97 and 98 further furnish unmistakable proof of the fact that Secs. 87 to 96 do not create offences but civil wrongs and the remedy provided by Section 97 by way of penalty for that civil wrong, is the institution at a suit to recover the sums incurred as penalties. Section 98 gives an alternative or supplementary remedy, in addition to the remedy by way, of suit. The category "Offences by Railway Servants" include seven sections namely, Secs. 99 to 105. These undoubtedly create offences and provide for punishments for those offences. Then follows the category "other offences". These other offences are specified in Secs.106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 120A, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 and 130. 99 to 105. These undoubtedly create offences and provide for punishments for those offences. Then follows the category "other offences". These other offences are specified in Secs.106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 120A, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 and 130. Section 113-A does not create an offence but confers a power on Railway servant. Section 113-B is a section of a preventive nature enabling a Court to demand security from habitual offenders of Railway offences. See. 131 and 132 provide for arrest; Section 133 deals with jurisdiction of Magistrates; and Section 134 with place of trial. Besides the offences aforesaid, there is no other section or Chapter in the Act which creates any offence. Section 138 does not tall under Chapter IX hut under Chapter X. This chapter deals with supplemental provisions. Section 135 provides for taxation of Railways by local authorities Section 136 for restriction on execution against Railway property; Section 137 states that Railway servants shall be public servants. Section 138 provides the procedure for summary delivery to Railway Administration of property detained by Railway servants. Section 139 deals with proof of entries in records and. documents Secs. 140 and 141 with service of notices Section 142 with presumption where notice is served by post Section 143 with provisions in respect, of Rules Section 145 with representations of Managers, and Agents of Railways in Court Section 146 with the power to extend-tile Act to certain tramways Section 147 with power to exempt a certain Railway from the Act Section 147-A with the power to amend the Second `Schedule and Section 148 with matters supplemental to the definitions of "Railway" and "Railway Servants". It is evident that a Magistrate acting under Section 138 has no power to convict, or acquit, or impose a fine or a forfeiture or to require the person proceeded against to furnish bond, with or without sureties. These are the main results of a trial. I, therefore, agree with the contention of the learned counsel that Section 138 does not deal with an offence at all and consequently, it cannot and will not entail a prosecution or a trial: 5. His next contention is that a proceeding before a Magistrate under Section 138 of the Act cannot partake the character of "any proceedings", within the meaning of these words, as occurring in Sub-sec. His next contention is that a proceeding before a Magistrate under Section 138 of the Act cannot partake the character of "any proceedings", within the meaning of these words, as occurring in Sub-sec. (1) of Section 435 ,of the Code, because the words "any proceeding", as occurring in that sub-section, did not must mean "judicial proceedings", as defined by clause (m) of Section 4 of the Code, Clause (m) says that "judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. It is obvious that this clause does not attempt to give an exhaustive definition but is content with declaring that in addition to what are plainly and obviously "judicial proceedings", that term further includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. A judicial proceeding is one of which the object is to determine a jural relation between a citizen and a citizen or a citizen and the State and that necessarily postulates the recording of evidence, and the legal empowerment, to record the evidence, I think that there is great substance and force in this contention. The words used in Sub-sec. (1) of Section 435 of the Code are "any proceeding" before any inferior criminal court. That being so, Section 435 does not contemplate proceedings of all kinds but only such proceedings which take place before a court and that limits the character of the proceeding which, otherwise may be all embracing and comprehensive. I have no doubt, therefore, in my mind that the revisional power is in relation to the record of a judicial proceeding before an inferior criminal court. It is not necessary that such proceeding must be in relation to an offence, or must have concern with a trial it is sufficient if it is a judicial proceeding before an inferior criminal court. There are many provisions in the Code itself which are not concerned, or not necessarily concerned, with the commission or the prevention of an offence, for instance Secs. 133, 144 and 488. Therefore, the words "any proceeding" cannot be given such a restrictive significance as relating only to the trial of an offence. There are many provisions in the Code itself which are not concerned, or not necessarily concerned, with the commission or the prevention of an offence, for instance Secs. 133, 144 and 488. Therefore, the words "any proceeding" cannot be given such a restrictive significance as relating only to the trial of an offence. It was held In Re Horniman that "proceedings" is a very wide term, and would include any judicial proceeding taken before any inferior criminal court even though it may not relate to any specific offence. 6. The next contention of the learned counsel for the Railway Administration is two-fold, namely, (1) a Magistrate under Section 138 of the Act is not an "inferior criminal court" within the meaning of Sub-sec. (I) of Section 435 and (2) a proceeding under Section 138 is not a judicial proceeding and unless "a proceeding" fulfils both these condition that is to say, unless both these conditions co-exist simultaneously, no revision would be competent. 7. I will now cite a few cases relied upon by the learned counsel in support of his contention that in certain contingencies, a Magistrate does and may function as an administrative or executive officer and not as a court. In Fateh Bahadur Sing v. Ramdeo, AIR 1950 Alld. 540. one Fateh Bahadur Singh was selected by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate as the Headman (Mukhlyat under Section 45 (3) of the Code but his selection was set aside by the Additional District Magistrate who selected Ramdeo in his place, Fateh Bahadur Singh came up in revision in this Counsel but the revision was dismiss by Misra, J., on the ground that an order of a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or of the Additional District Magistrate passed under Section 45 (3) constituted an executive order of an officer specially designated to carry out the provisions of Section 45 (3) and not a judicial order of an inferior criminal court and the revisional powers could not be invoked in as much as the proceedings were not of a criminal nature but of an executive nature., The ratio of the case is that though the order was passed by a Magistrate, it was passed by him as persona designate and not as an inferior criminal Court. In State v. Beni Bahadur Singh, 1957 Cal. In State v. Beni Bahadur Singh, 1957 Cal. L. J., 268 the decision is that a Magistrate appointed by the State Government as the authority to hear and decide claims arising out of deductions from wages, or delay in payment of wages, under Section 15, payment of wages, Act, is not an inferior criminal or civil court, and no revision is competent, whether under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Mitthan v. Municipal Board, A.I.R. 1956 Alld. 351 it was held that a Magistrate passing an order under Section 247(1) of the U. P. Municipalities Act does not do so as an inferior criminal Court within the meaning of Section 435 of the Code. To the same offert is the decision in Madho Das.v. Rex, A.I.R. 1949 Alld. 738. In Darrnah Committee v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1962 Bom. 533, it was held that proceedings initiated before a Magistrate under Section 234 of the Ajmer Merwara Municipalities Regulation are no more than recovery proceedings and partake of the character' of a ministerial inquiry rather than judicial inquiry and the Magistrate who entertains the application is not an,inferior criminal Court. Pandurana Shidrao 8 Indian Cases 747 it was held that an order passed by a District Magistrate under Section 44, Bombay District Police Act, 1890 was a mere executive police order, and could not, therefore, be interfered with by the High Court in its criminal revisional jurisdiction. In Ujamshi Govindji Sanghadia A.I.R. 1946 Bom. 533, an order by a District Magistrate exercising the powers under Rule 81(2) of the Defence of India Rules requiring a person to let a part of his premises to the person specified, was held not to be a judicial order or an order made by a Court and was not, therefore, revisable by the High Court. On the other hand, the learned counsel for Ram Bilas argued that a Magistrate is appointed by the State Government under Section 12 of the Code and the classes of Criminal Courts which are recognised by the Code are mentioned under Section 6 and, therefore, a Magistrate must for all purposes be deemed to be a Court as lie is one of the Magistrate mentioned in Section 6 which describes the different kinds of Courts constituted under the Code. He placed reliance on some case law also. He placed reliance on some case law also. The decision In Re Horniman was that even though a person holding a ticket of a lower class but found travelling in a higher class, without necessary permission and in contravention of Section 68 of the Act, does not commit an offence, the proceedings before a Magistrate under Section 113 of the Act are judicial proceedings and the order passed by him, is revisable under Section 435 r. of the Code. In Narain v. Rex, A.I.R. 1950 Alld. 441 also, it was held that Section 113 of the Act does not create an offence but the revision was accepted because the conviction had been recorded under Section 112 of the Act which conviction was bad. In Secretary of State v. Govind Ram, A.I.R. 1930 Sind 162. the decision was in line with the decision in Horniman's case that Section 113 of the Act did not create an offence but it disagreed with the second decision that in spite of it, a revision lay, and held that an order of a Magistrate under Section 113 is an administrative or ministerial order and the proceedings are not criminal proceedings in a criminal Court within the scope of the Criminal Procedure Code. In Pallonji v. State, A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 421 and in Governor General in Council v. Roopchand Shivacharan, A.I.R. 1949 Nagpur 330 the view taken was that Section 113 of the Act creates an offence and, therefore, is subject to revisional jurisdiction. I am of the view that Section 113 of the Act does create an offence, after this section was amended in 1945 as the Magistrate was empowered to impose imprisonment in default. However, since that matter does not fall for decision in this case, my word is not final, and the only thing I wish to emphasise is that the decision in Horniman's case is no longer good law and reliance upon that decision is. misplaced. He then placed reliance' on In Re Dinbai". In that case an application was made to a Magistrate under Section 161 (2) of the Bombay District Municipal' lites Act for the recovery of the expenses in Court by a Notified Area Committee. misplaced. He then placed reliance' on In Re Dinbai". In that case an application was made to a Magistrate under Section 161 (2) of the Bombay District Municipal' lites Act for the recovery of the expenses in Court by a Notified Area Committee. That case is easily distinguishable because the decision was that Section -162 (2) relates to prosecutions to be instituted before a Magistrate and it will be unquestionable that the power which a Magistrate exercises in respect of such a prosecution is a judicial power and any order made by him would be the order of an inferior Criminal Court liable to revision by a superior Court. In Editor, Tribune v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1942 Lahore 171 the order challenged was under Section 144 of the Code and it is well settled that such orders. are revisable. In Rathulal Krishna Chanchi Reddy A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 129 the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the proceedings before a Magistrate under Section 87, Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, are judicial proceedings and the Magistrate acts as a Court and, therefore, his order upon is State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushailiya, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 416 which over-ruled the decision in that case of our High Court reported in A. I.R. 1963, Allahabad, 71. The question was whether a Magistrate acting under Section 20, Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, acts as a persona designate a or as a Magistrate and their Lordships held that the proceedings under Section 20 are judicial proceedings and the Magistrate functions as a Court and, therefore, an order passed by him is revisable. 8. Both sides have thus taken shelter upon case law to show either that a Magistrate functions as a persona designate or as an executive or administrative officer and not as a Court or that he functions as a Court and not as a persona designate or executive officer or administrative officer. It seems to me, however, fairly obvious that a Magistrate may not always or necessary act on a Court. Cases have been cited above to show that a particular act of, or order made a by, Magistrate, is not that of a Court. Likewise, cases have been cited to establish the contrary proposition. It seems to me, however, fairly obvious that a Magistrate may not always or necessary act on a Court. Cases have been cited above to show that a particular act of, or order made a by, Magistrate, is not that of a Court. Likewise, cases have been cited to establish the contrary proposition. He may function and pass purely an executive order or police order and cannot be a Court; or he may pass a judicial order and may be a Court. No help can be derived one way of the other from the mass of case law cited before me. The emphasis laid by the code is on the nature of the proceedings and the capacity in which a Magistrate holds those proceedings, that is to say, whether the proceedings are judicial or executive or administrative or police and whether he acts as an executive or administrative officer or as a persona designate or as a Court. 9. This leads me to find out as to what are the essential attributes of a Court. In Bharat Bank v. Employees of Bharat Bank, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 188 their Lordships said that there can be no doubt that to be a Court, the person or persons who constitute it must be entrusted with judicial functions, that is, of deciding litigated questions according to law. Their Lordships cited R. v. London Country Council, (1931) 2 K. B. 215 Saville, L.J. gave the following meaning to the word "Court" or "judicial authority" :- "It is not necessary that it should be a court in the sense that this Court is a Court; it is enough if it is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition; and it is not necessary to be strictly a Court; if it is a tribunal which has to decide rightly after hearing evidence and opposition." In Virendra Kumar v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 153 their Lordships, after a review of case law, English and Indian, observed thus: "It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be on heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court." Their Lordships further emphasised that (1) there should be a `lis, (2) there should be machinery provided for summoning of witnesses or of compelling production of documents, (3) the right to adduce evidence, and (4) the obligation to decide judicially on the basis of that evidence and to pronounce a definitive judgement. It is in this light that we have to ascertain whether a Magistrate under Section 138 of the Act is or not a Court. That section reads thus. "If a railway servant is discharged or suspended from his office, or dies, absconds or absents himself, and he or his wife or widow, or any of his family or representatives, refuses or neglects, after notice in writing for that purpose, to deliver up to the railway administration, or to a person appointed by the railway administration in this behalf any station dwelling house, office or other building with its appurtenance, or any books, papers or other matter, belonging to the railway administration and in the possession or custody of such railway servant at the occurrence of any such event as aforesaid, any Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class may, on application made by on behalf of the railway administration, order, any police officer, with proper assistance, to enter upon the building and remove any person found therein and take possession thereof, or to take possession of the book, papers or other matters, and to deliver the same to the railway administration or a person appointed by the railway administration in that behalf." 10. An analysis of the section will give the following break-up: (1) It will come into play in a case where a Railway servant is discharged or suspended from his office, or dies, absconds or absents himself, (2) if the fact in No. (1) is existent, the section will apply if he or his wife or widow, or any of his family or representatives, refuses or neglects to deliver it to the Railway administration, or to a person appointed by the Railway administration in this behalf, any station dwelling-house, office or other building with its appurtenances, or any books, papers or other matters belonging to the Railway administration and in the possession or custody of such Railway servant at the occurrence of any such event as aforesaid, (3), if (1) and (2) both exist, the section will come into play after notice in writing for delivery has been issued. (4) If all the facts in Nos. (1), (2) and (3) exist and the property is not delivered, the Railway Administration to any Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the Ist Class, (5) If such an application is made, the Magistrate may order any police officer, with proper assistance, to enter upon the building and remove any person found therein and take possession thereon, or to take possession of the books, papers or other matters, and to deliver the same to the Railway Administration or a person appointed by the Railway Administration in that behalf. 11. A perusal of the section makes it quite obvious that the Magistrate comes into the picture after Nos. (1), (2) and (3) are already in existence and he assumes jurisdiction on the event mentioned in No. 4 taking place. He is thus concerned only with No. (5). This goes to show that he acts as a persona designate or as executive officer and not as a Court. I say so because of several reasons. Firstly, there is no list before the Magistrate. Secondly, there is no provision for recording of evidence or even for summoning the person who is going to be dispossessed or for affording him an opportunity to take part in the proceedings. The Act contemplates the exercise of powers by a Magistrate in a few section only. Under Section 15, he has to award compensation for felled trees. Under Section 33, he has certain duties to perform in the event of Railway accidents. The Act contemplates the exercise of powers by a Magistrate in a few section only. Under Section 15, he has to award compensation for felled trees. Under Section 33, he has certain duties to perform in the event of Railway accidents. Under Secs. 131 and 132, arrested persons have to be produced before him. Section 133 confers power to try certain cases. These powers will certainly relate, to the trial or offences which have been discussed earlier. Under Section 138, he has to receive certain papers when an application, is made before him, and he may either decline to act upon those papers; and if he decides to act, he hits to pass an order for vacation taking the facts to be correct. The person aggrieved has no remedy except by way of a suit in a competent civil court of by approach to this Court for exercise of its prerogative power under Art. 226 or 227 or under both. The learned counsel for Ram Bilas Pandey, however, argued that there is a direct decision of the Supreme Court in N. A. Chainami v. Union of India, 1970 (2) S.C.C., 321 to show that a revision lies against the decision of a Magistrate under Section 138 of the Act. This point was never mooted before their Lordships and was not decided, even by way of obiter which might have been binding in this Court. The point was never argued before their Lordships whether an order passed by a Magistrate under Sec. 138 is an order by an inferior criminal Court. Besides, the appeal before the Supreme Court was by special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution which empowers the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or tribunal in the, territory of India. Special leave can be granted against order passed by any authority or tribunal, which may or may not be a Court. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Rail way Administration placed reliance upon B. N. Prasad v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, 197 P.L.J.R. 71 wherein it was held that a Magistrate acting under Section 138 does not act as an inferior criminal Court and, therefore, no revision lies. I have come to the same conclusion. 12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Rail way Administration placed reliance upon B. N. Prasad v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, 197 P.L.J.R. 71 wherein it was held that a Magistrate acting under Section 138 does not act as an inferior criminal Court and, therefore, no revision lies. I have come to the same conclusion. 12. This reference arising it does as a result of the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge, is incompetent as the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain or decide the revision. This Court also has no revisional powers. The reference is, accordingly, rejected.