JUDGMENT : G.L.OZA, J. ( 1. ) This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution has been filed by the petitioner against the order dated the 20th February 1970 passed by the Board of Revenue rejecting a revision petition filed by the petitioner. ( 2. ) It is alleged that one Chainsingh, the guardian of minor non-applicants Nos. 1 and 2 who are both sisters, gave on 20th March 1951 a notice under section 319 of the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior, to the petitioner for ejectment from the suit lands on the ground that the lands were required for personal cultivation as the non-applicants Nos. 1 and 2 had no other land in their possession. Admittedly the agricultural lands are in village Salampur, Tehsil and district Shajapur, and formed part of Zamindari village in the erstwhile Gwalior State The petitioner contested the notice and, therefore, a suit under section 349 of the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior, was filed. This suit, after remand from the Additional Commissioner, Bhopal, for further enquiry was decreed by the Tehsil Court on 27th July 1966. This order of the Tehsil Court was confirmed on appeal by the Sub-Divisional Officer. On second appeal, the Additional Commissioner, Bhopal, again remanded the case for further enquiry to the Tehsil. This remand was made with a direction to enquire whether the non-applicants had any interest in the lands situated in village Khokari, Tehsil Udaipura of the erstwhile Bhopal State, which has been mutated in the name of Chainsingh. It was also directed that an enquiry should be made into the question whether the petitioner acquired the rights of an occupancy tenant on account of his possession over the suit lands on 2nd October 1959 when the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, came into force. After further enquiry, the Tehsil again decreed the suit of the plaintiff-non-applicants and that order was upheld in appeal. Ultimately the petitioner went up in revision before the Board of Revenue. The Board dismissed the revision petition by the impugned order. ( 3. ) It was contended by Shri A. M. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the petitioner was in possession of the land as a sub-tenant, and on the date of vesting he became a sub-tenant of a Pakka tenant and consequently the proceedings for the petitioners eviction under the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior could not proceed against him. ( 3. ) It was contended by Shri A. M. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the petitioner was in possession of the land as a sub-tenant, and on the date of vesting he became a sub-tenant of a Pakka tenant and consequently the proceedings for the petitioners eviction under the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior could not proceed against him. Learned counsel also contended that on 2nd October 1959, when the M. P. Land Revenue Code came into force, the petitioner being in possession as a sub-tenant acquired the rights of an occupancy tenant and, therefore, he could not be evicted. ( 4. ) It was contended on behalf of the non-applicants Nos. I and 2 that notice under section 319 of the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior, was given long before the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, came into force. Admittedly at that time the parties were governed by Qanoon Mal, Gwalior and the suit for possession under section 319 of the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior, was filed against the petitioner. According to the learned counsel for the non- applicants Nos. 1 and 2, by coming into force of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act the position was not altered as even when the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, came into force, the provisions of section 319, Qanoon Mal, Gwalior, were not repealed, and therefore, the proceedings against the petitioner were continued under the provisions of section 319 of Qanoon Mal, Gwalior. Learned counsel also contended that after the notice of termination of the lease the petitioner could only be treated as a trespasser and there was no protection Act to protect the sub-tenants in Zamindari lands as the provisions of the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior, were applicable to these areas. According to the learned counsel in these circumstances even by coming into force of the M. P. Land Revenue Code no rights of an occupancy tenant were conferred on the petitioner. ( 5. ) As regards the question whether the suit under section 319 of the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior was maintainable against the petitioner on the ground that the conditions required under section 318 have been or have not been fulfilled, it is a question of fact about which even the Board of Revenue did not interfere with the finding arrived at by the appellate Courts. That conclusion, therefore, cannot be challenged before us also in this petition. That conclusion, therefore, cannot be challenged before us also in this petition. ( 6. ) Section 3 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, provided as under- "3. Repeal and Saving-Subject to the provisions of section 2 of this Act, all Acts and Laws described in Schedule No. 1 to the extent mentioned therein and all other Acts, Laws, Rules, Standing Orders and Circulars relating to matters connected with Ryotwari villages and Revenue Administration in force in any of the convening States shall stand repealed; Provided that such Rules, Standing Orders and Circulars as are not inconsistent with or contrary to any provision of this Act shall remain in force in the area of the United State, in which they are in force at the time this Act comes into force until they are superseded or repealed by any rules made under this Act." The M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act came into force on 15th August 1950. Section 3 provided that laws to the extent mentioned in Schedule-1 shall stand repealed. In Schedule-1, item 5, Qanoon Mal, Gwalior, has been stated but section 319 of the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior, has not been mentioned as repealed. It cannot, therefore, be doubted, and is not in dispute, that the provisions contained in sections 318 and 319 of the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior, continued to be in force even after the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act came into force. The notice under section 319 of the Qanoon Mal was given on 29th March 1951 and thereafter proceedings for evidence under that section were launched. It is also clear that these provisions of the Qanoon Mal have not been repealed. The legal rights to the Zamindari lands continued to remain as they were even after the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act came into force. The M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act came into force on 25th June 1951, and the date of vesting was 2nd October 1951 when the rights of Zamindars vested to the State as provided for in section 4 of that Act. Section 38 of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act provided the procedure for conferral of Pakka Tenancy rights as tenants and sub-tenants. Section 38 of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act provided the procedure for conferral of Pakka Tenancy rights as tenants and sub-tenants. Subsection (5) of this section provided if a sub-tenant or a tenant fails to deposit the amount mentioned therein within the prescribed time, he would cease to have any rights in the land and would be deemed to be a trespasser. It was also provided in section 30 that if a tenant or a sub-tenant of a tenant who is protected under section 74 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, then he will have no right to become a pakka tenant. It is not the case of the petitioner that after the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act came, into force he tried to get within the prescribed time rights of a pakka tenant conferred on him. In fact, no such rights were conferred on the petitioner. Consequently he continued to be a sub-tenant whose lease was terminated under section 349 of the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior. It is also clear that the sub-lease of the petitioner was terminated before 2nd October, 1951, that is before the date of vesting. Consequently on 2nd October 1951 the petitioner was not even a sub tenant and this conclusion arrived at by the Board of Revenue is justified in view of the laws in force then. ( 7. ) It is thus clear that the proceedings under section 319 of the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior, were rightly instituted against the petitioner and there was nothing on the basis of which it could be said that those proceedings could not be mentioned. It is also clear that conditions under section 319 under which eviction could be ordered existed, and on that ground also the proceedings under section 319 were justified. ( 8. ) Section 41 of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act provided that from the date of vesting the tenants of a Zamindar shall be deemed to be a Government-tenant, and the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act would be applicable to that land. Section 41 reads thus- "41. ( 8. ) Section 41 of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act provided that from the date of vesting the tenants of a Zamindar shall be deemed to be a Government-tenant, and the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act would be applicable to that land. Section 41 reads thus- "41. When the proprietary rights in any village, Mubal, land, chak or block are vested in the State under section 3 of this Act, every Sakttul Milkiyat, Pacca Mourusi, mamuli mourusi cair, mourusi tenant of such village, mubal, land, chak or block who, who is possession of any holding, shall, from the date of vesting, be deemed to be a tenant of the Government and the proprietor shall also likewise, in respect of the holding of his khudkasht or Sir, be deemed to be the tenant of the Government from the date of vesting and all provisions of Part II of the Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, shall, subject to other provisions of this Act, apply to such village, Mubal, land, chak or block and similar provisions of Qanoon Mal, Gwalior State, Samvat 1985, and of other laws shall cease to apply, Provided that all cases pending before any Revenue Court at the time of commencement of this Act shall be decided according to the provisions of Acts and laws heretofore in force." The proviso to this section clearly provided that cases pending before the Revenue Courts on the date of vesting shall be decided in accordance with law which was in force when the proceedings were initiated. In this view of the matter, therefore, it is clear that the proceedings before the Tehsildar under section 319, Qanoon Ma), which were commenced on 2nd May 1951, were to proceed in accordance with the provisions in force on the date of the institution of the suit, that is, in accordance with the provisions of the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior. A perusal of this section also indicates that Part II of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act was brought into force in the Zamindari area from the date of vesting, and only the provisions similar to the provisions contained in Part-II of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act were repealed. A perusal of this section also indicates that Part II of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act was brought into force in the Zamindari area from the date of vesting, and only the provisions similar to the provisions contained in Part-II of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act were repealed. Consequently as sections 318 and 319 of the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior, cannot be said to be provisions which were similar to any other provision in Part-II of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, those provisions cannot be said to have been repealed under section 41 of the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act. ( 9. ) It is, therefore, clear that till the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, came into force, even if the petitioner continued to be in possession of the land, he so continued in no other capacity than that in which he was. The M. P. Land Revenue Code came into force on 2nd October 1959. Section 262 (1) of the Code provides as under- "262 (1). Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Code, all cases pending before the State Government or any Revenue Court in any region immediately before the coming into force of this Code, whether in appeal, revision, review or otherwise shall be decided in accordance with the provisions of the appropriate law, which would have been applicable to them had this Code not been passed," It is clear from this provision that suits or proceedings which were pending on the date this Code came into force were to continue as if this Code had not come into force, that is, to be continued in accordance with the law which was in force at the time of the filing of these proceedings. In this view of the matter, therefore, even on the coming into force of the Code it did not have any effect on the proceedings pending against the petitioner under section 319 of the Qanoon Mal, Gwalior. Even if the contention of the applicant is accepted that the provisions contained in section 185 of the Code will be applicable to the present proceedings, it cannot be doubted that the petitioner would fall in category (d) of clause (ii) of section 185 (1). Even if the contention of the applicant is accepted that the provisions contained in section 185 of the Code will be applicable to the present proceedings, it cannot be doubted that the petitioner would fall in category (d) of clause (ii) of section 185 (1). Sub-section (4) of section 185 provides as under- "Nothing in this section shall effect the rights of a sub-tenant or tenant of a subtenant belonging to any of the categories specified in items (c) and (d) of clause (ii) of sub-section (1) to acquire the rights of a pakka tenant in accordance with the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951 (28 of 1951) or of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 (13 of 1951), as the case may be." This clearly indicates that this section shall not affect the rights as acquired under the M. B Zamindari Abolition Act. As stated earlier, the lease of the petitioner having been terminated long before the M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act came into force, the rights of the petitioner as a sub-tenant of a tenant came to an end. It is also clear that the proceedings instituted under section 319 of the Qanoon Mal were all through saved and, therefore, they continue against the petitioner. They having come to a conclusion against the petitioner, it cannot be said that those proceedings were in any manner bad in law. Consequently we see no error in the conclusions arrived at by the Board of Revenue. ( 10. ) Apart from that, as stated earlier this is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, There is no error apparent on the face of the record In fact, the conclusions arrived at by the Board of Revenue are in accordance with law. ( 11. ) Consequently we see no substance in this petition. It is, therefore, dismissed. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 shall be entitled to the costs of this petition Counsels [fee 200/- (Two hundred)], if certified. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.