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Allahabad High Court · body

1973 DIGILAW 491 (ALL)

Debi Prasad v. State

1973-11-08

H.N.KAPOOR

body1973
ORDER H.N. Kapoor, J. - Devi Prasad Applicant has been convicted u/s 332 IPC and was sentenced to 18 months' RI under that section. In appeal the sentence was reduced to three months' RI. 2. The prosecution case is that -the Applicant denied to pay some Canal dues. On 13-10-70 SDD canals, Dehradun had directed Ved Prakash, Patrol to collect dues from him and divert the flow of water if he failed to make payment. That order is Ex. Ka-2. On 20-1-70 at about 5 P. M. Ved Prakash (PW 3) went to the Applicant and asked him to pay the am aunt. When he did not pay he closed the low of water of the canal into the flour-mill of the Applicant. The Applicant started beating him with an iron rod, as a result of which Ved Prakash received injuries. Ved Prakash then lodged the FIR Ex. Ka-3. His injuries were examined by Doctor S.N. Dutta, Medical Officer on 21-1-70 at 12-30 P.M. The doctor found the following injuries on his person: 1. Abrasion 1"X 1/2" on the left side head, 3" above the left ear. 2. Contusion 4" X 1" on the outer part of left knee. 3. Contusion 1-1/2" X 1/2" on the outer aspect of left leg. 4. Abraded contusion 1" X 1/4" on the medial aspect of left knee. 5. Abrasion 1" X 1/2" on medial aspect of right knee. 6. Contusion 1" X 1/4" on medial aspect of right knee. 3. SI, K.N. Joshi made the investigation of the case. He prepared the site-plan Ex. Ka-4. After completing the investigation of the case he submitted the charge-sheet against the Applicant who was duly tried. 4. The Applicant denied the prosecution allegations. The lower courts, however, found the Applicant guilty. 5. Learned Counsel for the Applicant Sri M.A. Ansari has mainly argued that the offence u/s 331 IPC has not been proved because there is no provision authorising the SDO to get the dues realised from the Patrol and to order the diversion of water on the failure to do so. He has relied on Section 45 of the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act which provide is that Canal dues could be realised as arrears of land revenue. He has also referred to manual of orders of Govt. of U.P., Revenue Deptt. Vol. He has relied on Section 45 of the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act which provide is that Canal dues could be realised as arrears of land revenue. He has also referred to manual of orders of Govt. of U.P., Revenue Deptt. Vol. I, paras 259 onwards prescribing the mode of realisation of oanal dues as arrears of land revenue. His contention is that when a particular mode is prescribed for realising the canal dues it is not possible to realise the same in any other manner. In support of this contention he has placed reliance on the case of AIR 1936 253 (Privy Council) (2) which was subsequently followed in several decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. One such decision is State of UP v. Singhara Singh 1964 AWR 97 SC. 6. Learned Asstt. Govt. Advocate has argued that the provisions u/s 45 are meant for realisation of arrears when the same could not be realised by the Canal Department itself and that there is no bar to the realising of the dues by the Canal Deptt. and ordering the stoppage of water on failure to pay the dues. He has referred to Section 32 which authorises DCO to stop water. He has also argued that the Applicant must have been bound by the terms of the contract also to pay the water dues and on failure to do the same, supply of water could be stopped. Learned A.G.A. was given several opportunities to produce the contract if any before the Court or to place the relevant rules of the Irrigation Deptt. before this Court by which the SDO might have been authorised to stop the water through the Patrol in case the dues had not been paid. Unfortunately, he could not produce the contract on the rule before this Court. He has stated that he wrote letters to the Distt. Canal Officer Dehradun but he has not cared to send the relevant papers. He stated that the Canal Officer only sent a telegram on 10-10-73 to the effect that the order by SDO was only for closure of Canal supply to water mill under conditions of auction but he did not send the auction deed, subsequently, even though adjournment was allowed for the same. 7. He stated that the Canal Officer only sent a telegram on 10-10-73 to the effect that the order by SDO was only for closure of Canal supply to water mill under conditions of auction but he did not send the auction deed, subsequently, even though adjournment was allowed for the same. 7. Under these circumstances it is to be assumed that there was no such power under the rules or under the terms of the contract to close the water supply. Section 32 of the Act is irrelevant for this purpose; there is no provision for stopping the water supply on the failure to pay water dues. 8. Learned A.G.A. has next argued that even if the SDO had committed any irregularity in issuing the order for diversion of the water Ved Prakash, Patrol acted under the colour of his Office in good faith. In support bf this contention he has placed reliance in the case Khuda Bux and Others Vs. State, AIR 1951 All 637 . In that case ultimately it was held that there was no illegality in the warrant but Desai, J. as he then was made the following observations: If he acted in good faith colore offici, there could be no right of private defence against his act; see Section 99 IPC. So long as his act of arresting could not be said to be absolutely without jurisdiction, it was one which at the worst could be said to be not strictly justifiable by law. Those who attacked him and his party could not escape the consequences by relying upon the right of private defence. The only effect of the illegality of warrant would be that the SI could not be said to have been acting in the discharge of his duty within the meaning of Section 332 and the apprehension of Noor Jahan could not be said to be lawful and consequently that no offence u/s 332 or 225B, IPC would have been committed. But, all other offences such as those Under Sections 323, 147, 379 and 342 IPC could certainly have been committed. 9. I am most respectfully in agreement with these observations of the learned Judge, even though, they may be considered to be obiter under the circumstance; of that case. These observations are fully applicable to the facts of the present case. 10. 9. I am most respectfully in agreement with these observations of the learned Judge, even though, they may be considered to be obiter under the circumstance; of that case. These observations are fully applicable to the facts of the present case. 10. Learned Counsel for the Applicant in this connection has relied on the case of Emperor v. Brikhbhan Singh AIR 1915 All. 430 which is a Division Bench authority. It was held in that case that no offence u/s 332 IPC was made out when a search was illegal. 11. I have thus arrived at the conclusion that on the basis of the material on the record and under the provisions of the Act it cannot be said that the order issued by the SDO for diverting the water was strictly according to law and as such no offence u/s 332 was committed by the Applicant when Ved Prakash wanted to stop the flow of water on the basis of such an order. At the same time offence u/s 323 IPC has certainly been proved as the Applicant could not claim any right of self-defence. I am informed that the Applicant has already undergone the sentence for little over two weeks. 12. In the result, the revision is partly allowed to this extent that conviction of the Applicant is altered into I one u/s 328 IPC from Section 332 IPC and the Applicant is sentenced to imprisonment already undergone and a fine of Rs. 100/- under that section. In default of payment of the fine he shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. He is allowed one month's time from the date of the receipt of the record to deposit the fine the Applicant is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged after the payment of the fine. Revision partly allowed.