Order.-Petitioner No. 1 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 98 of 1973 is the Revenue Minister of Mysore, and Petitioner No. 2 is the Deputy Commissioner of Mercara, and Petitioner No. 3 is the Superintendent of Police, Coorg. Petitioner No. 1 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 104 of 1973 is the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Coorg, and Petitioner No. 2 is the Sub-Inspector of Police, Ponnampet. In these revision petitions the petitioners have challenged the order passed by the Principal Munsiff — and First Class Magistrate, Virajpet issuing summons against them for answering charges under section 447 and section 427 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. 2. Respondent No. 1 in these petitions filed a complaint against petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 98 of 1973 alleging that on 25th October, 1972, the petitioners along with the other accused, trespassed into his land S. No. 68/30 and 73/6 at Kaikeri Village and committed mischief by destroying the fence and coffee plants put up by him. Respondent No. 1 also filed a second complaint, dated 5th November, 1972 against petitioners 1 and 2 and other accused in Criminal Revision Petition No. 104 of 1973 alleging that they trespassed into his land and removed the fence and destroyed the coffee plants which he had again put up. After recording the sworn statement of the complainant in both the cases, the learned Magistrate called for a report from the Deputy Inspector-General of Police in both the cases. After the receipt of the report the learned Magistrate held that there were sufficient grounds to proceed against the petitioners and issued summons to them. These orders of issuing summons against the petitioners have been challenged by them in these revision petitions. As the same point, whether the sanction of the Government is necessary before instituting the proceedings against the petitioners is raised in both the petitions, they are heard together and one common order is passed. 3. The learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has contended that there is no dispute that the petitioners are public servants. There is also no dispute that section 197 is applicable to a Minister and counsel for respondent has conceded this. Before initiating proceedings against them, as they have acted in the discharge of their official duty, sanction of the Government is necessary. There is also no dispute that section 197 is applicable to a Minister and counsel for respondent has conceded this. Before initiating proceedings against them, as they have acted in the discharge of their official duty, sanction of the Government is necessary. He argues that the petitioners are entitled to the protection which section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and section 170 of the Mysore Police Act, 1963 and section 196 of the Mysore Land Revenue Act of 1964 gives them, and these provisions bar the institution of proceedings against the petitioners. It is argued that the report of the D.I.G. called for by the Court under section 202, Criminal Procedure Code, clearly shows that the public road called Vokkaligara Gudde road passes through the complainant’s land. This road has been used by the members of the public for over a decade. This road is also shown in the village map of 1930. It is clear from the report of the D.I.G. that the village Panchayat has been spending money on this road. The residents of that locality had no access to their homes except through this road. The members of the public had complained about the blocking of the public road by the complainant, to the officials. When the first petitioner, the Revenue Minister visited that place, the members of the public complained to him about the blocking of this public road. The Minister thereafter went to the scene with petitioners-2 and 3 and some others and after the Deputy Commissioner had held a local inquiry at the spot, he issued directions for the removal of the obstruction on the public road. As a Minister is a public servant, and when any grievance of an obstruction to a public is brought to his notice, it is his duty to act. Attention is invited to section 3 of the Mysore Land Revenue Act which will be hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’, wherein it is stated that the State Government shall be the Chief Controlling authority in all the matters connected with the land, and land revenue administration under this Act. Petitioner No. 1 being the Revenue Minister has to act on behalf of the State. As petitioners were public servants, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties, sanction of the Government is necessary before proceedings could be initiated against them. Petitioner No. 1 being the Revenue Minister has to act on behalf of the State. As petitioners were public servants, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties, sanction of the Government is necessary before proceedings could be initiated against them. It is argued, that the view taken by the learned Magistrate that whether the petitioners were acting or purporting to act as public servants has to be decided later on at the time of the evidence, is erroneous. The question whether sanction is necessary or not has to be decided first. The absence of sanction is a bar to the jurisdiction of the Court and unless this point is decided, the Court cannot proceed with the case against the petitioners. Strong reliance is placed by the learned Adovcate General on Ramayya v. State of Bombay1; Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu2; Matajoe. Dobey v. H.C. Bhari3; B.P. Srivastava v. N.P. Mishra4; Siddiah V. State of Mysore5in support of his contentions. 4. Sri B.V. Deshpande, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 the complainant has argued whether the sanction of the Government is necessary or not depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is contended that the various decisions relied on by the learned Advocate-General have no application to the facts of this case. The learned Magistrate has held that the allegations made by the complainant were prima facie true and it is argued that the Magistrate was right in issuing summons to the petitioners. Reliance Is placed on Nirmaljit Singh Horn v. State of West Bengal.6It is also argued that the Magistrate has not decided whether the sanction of the Government is necessary or not for initiating proceedings against the petitioners, and has held that it is a matter to be decided later, after the evidence has been recorded. As the Magistrate has not expressed any opinion on this matter, it is urged that this Court should not decide the point as it has not had the benefit of the opinion of the learned Magistrate on the subject. It is also contended that the Deputy Commissioner has no authority to take a decision at the spot and abate the nuisance, as alleged on behalf of the petitioners. It is also contended that the Deputy Commissioner has no authority to take a decision at the spot and abate the nuisance, as alleged on behalf of the petitioners. Under the various provisions of the Land Revenue Act, before he acts he has got to hold an enquiry as laid down, by the Act. Attention is drawn to section 33 which refers to how a formal enquiry should be conducted under the Act. Section 34 of the Act sets out how a summary enquiry should be held. It is contended that before any such enquiry is held, a notice of such enquiry should be given and evidence should be recorded and thereafter an order should be passed. These are Judicial proceedings which give a right of appeal. As the rights of the parties are affected, no oral decision can be given by the Deputy Commissioner at the spot. The petitioners have acted illegally and in a high-handed manner. It is a blatant excess of duty which takes away the protection given by section 197, Criminal Procedure Code Reliance is placed on Namdeo Kashinath Aher v. H.G. Vartak1. It is argued that the order of the learned Magistrate is right and it is for the petitioners to make out that they acted in the discharge of their duties as public servants. 5. Sri M. Rama Bhat, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the second Respondent in Cr.R.P. No. 98 of 1973, who was the 4th accused in the trial Court, has contended that the 2nd Respondent is the President of the Taluk Board and is also entitled to protection under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code as he is a public servant. It is argued that the second respondent also went to the place in his official capacity and as such he is also entitled to the same protection as the petitioners in this case. The learned Counsel has relied on Timmaiah v. T. Narasappa2in support of his contention that the sanction of the Government is necessary before Respondent 2 could be prosecuted. Reliance is placed on section 225 of the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act, 1959, which states that the members of the panchayat and Taluk Boards are public servants. 6. The learned Counsel has relied on Timmaiah v. T. Narasappa2in support of his contention that the sanction of the Government is necessary before Respondent 2 could be prosecuted. Reliance is placed on section 225 of the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act, 1959, which states that the members of the panchayat and Taluk Boards are public servants. 6. Sub-section (1) of section 197, Criminal Procedure Code reads as follows: " When any person who is a Judge within the meaning of section 19 of the Indian Penal Code, or when any Magistrate or when any public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of a State Government or the Central Government, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction- (a) .................... (b) in the case of a person employed in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government." 7. Section 170 (1) of the Mysore Police Act of 1963 states that in any case of alleged offence by the Police Officer, by any act done by him under colour or in excess of any such duty or authority as aforesaid, or wherein it shall appear to the Court that the offence or wrong if committed or done was of the character aforesaid, no prosecution or suit shall be entertained except with the previous sanction of the Government. 8. Sub-clause (a) of section 196 of the Mysore Land Revenue Act, 1964 reads as follows: "Protection of action taken in good faith.-No suit, prosecution or other proceeding shall lie against any officer of the State Government for anything in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act, or the rules thereunder ". Sub-clause (b) is not relevant for our purpose. 9. I will now examine the principles laid down by the various decisions in construing section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. In Ramayya v. State of Bombay3 at para 18 of the judgment Their Lordships have observed as follows: "Now it is obvious that if section 197, Criminal Procedure Code is construed too narrowly it can never be applied, for of couse it is no part of an official’s duty to commit an offence and never can be. In Ramayya v. State of Bombay3 at para 18 of the judgment Their Lordships have observed as follows: "Now it is obvious that if section 197, Criminal Procedure Code is construed too narrowly it can never be applied, for of couse it is no part of an official’s duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The section has content and its language must be given meaning. What it says is- ‘When any public servant ...... is accused of any ‘offence’ alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty.‘ We have therefore first to concentrate on the word ‘offence’. Now an offence seldom consists of a single act. It is usually composed of several elements and, as a rule, a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be established. In the present case, the elements alleged against accused-2 are, first, that there was an ‘entrustment’ and/or ‘dominion’ second, that the entrustment and/or dominion was ‘in his capacity as a public servant’ third, that there was a ‘disposal’; and fourth, that the disposal was ‘dishonest’. Now it is evident that the entrustment and/or dominion here were in an official capacity, and it is equally evident that there could in this case be no disposal, lawful or otherwise, save by an act done or purporting to be done in an official capacity. Therefore, the act complained of, namely the disposal, could not have been done in any other way. If it was innocent, it was an official act; if dishonest, it was the dishonest doing of an official act, but in either event the act was official because accused 2 could not dispose of the goods save by the doing of an official act, namely officially permitting their disposal; and that he did. He actually permitted their release and purported to do it in an official capacity, and apart from the fact that he did not pretend to act privately, there was no other way in which he could have done it. Therefore, whatever the intention or motive behind the act may have been, the physical part of it remained unaltered. He actually permitted their release and purported to do it in an official capacity, and apart from the fact that he did not pretend to act privately, there was no other way in which he could have done it. Therefore, whatever the intention or motive behind the act may have been, the physical part of it remained unaltered. So, if it was official in the one case it was equally official in the other, and the only difference would lie in the intention with which it was done; in the one event, it would be done in the discharge of an official duty and in the other, in the purported discharge of it." It is clear from the observations made by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court that even if the act of the official was dishonest, if it was an act clone or purporting to be done in his official capacity sanction of the Government would be necessary, irrespective of the motive behind the act. Their Lordships also pointed out that section 197, Criminal Procedure Code should not be construed too narrowly, and if it is done so, it can never be applied, for it is no part of official’s duty to commit the offence and never can be. Their Lordships also pointed out that what the Court should examine is not the official duty but the alleged offence committed. 10. In Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu1at para. 8 of the judgment, Their Lordships observed as follows: "The result of the authorities may thus be summed up: It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under section 197 (1), Criminal Procedure Code nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary; and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that world really be a matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the prosecution." 11. In Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari2Their Lordships have pointed out that the Court has to find out whether the act complained of is committed by the accused while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. The offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do or must be related in the manner with the discharge of his official duty. No question of sanction arises under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code unless the act complained of is an offence. The only point for determination is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and. the official duty. Their Lordships have also pointed out that in certain cases it may not be possible to decide on the complaint whether the sanction under section 197 is necessary or not. The complaint may not disclose the act or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty, but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial enquiry, or in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. 12. In B.P. Srivastava v. N.P. Mishra,1Their Lordships have again re-iterated that section 197 is neither to be too narrowly construed nor too widely. They have emphasised that it is not the ‘ duty ‘ which requires examination so much as the ‘act’ because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty and the act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. 13. In Siddiah v. State of Mysore2, a Bench of this Court had to decide whether a Superintendent of State Home for Women and Girls was entitled to the protection under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. The prosecution case was that one of the girl inmates of a rescue home was troublesome and the superintendent (A-1) directed the girl to be locked in a room. As the girl started making noise, her hands were tied to the window bars by accused 3 and 4. Later A-1 came and caned the girl. The prosecution case was that one of the girl inmates of a rescue home was troublesome and the superintendent (A-1) directed the girl to be locked in a room. As the girl started making noise, her hands were tied to the window bars by accused 3 and 4. Later A-1 came and caned the girl. As the girl was making a lot of noise, A-1 directed her to be gagged and accused 2 and 5 gagged the girl at 11 a.m. At 1 p.m. the girl was found to be in a limp condition and it was found that the gagging caused suffocation which resulted in the girl’s death. When accused 1 along with others was prosecuted for having committed various offences, the contention was raised on behalf of accused 1, that without the sanction of the Government under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code no proceedings can be initiated against her. This Court held that the prosecution of accused 1 was vitiated for lack of sanction under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code as the acts directed by her were connected with her official duty and her claim to have acted in her official capacity was not a pretence. This Court pointed out that the applicability of section 197, Criminal Procedure Code is not limited to acts which are strictly within the scope of the authority of the accused. An act done in excess of authority is not taken out of the purview of the section on the ground of the knowledge of the accused of the limits of his official authority. If an act is done in such a way or in such circumstances that it conveys the impression that in substance it has been done to carry forth or carry forward the discharge of official duty or by its be nor it indicates that the doer of that act professes or claims to do it in the discharge of official duty, the act would be one done in the discharge of official duty. At page 663 their Lordships have observed as follows: "..........it should be remembered that one of the principles stated by the Federal Court in Dr. Hari Ram Singh v. Emperor3is that the expression ‘ act purporting to have been done in the discharge of official duty’ does not necessarily import the idea of good faith in doing that act. At page 663 their Lordships have observed as follows: "..........it should be remembered that one of the principles stated by the Federal Court in Dr. Hari Ram Singh v. Emperor3is that the expression ‘ act purporting to have been done in the discharge of official duty’ does not necessarily import the idea of good faith in doing that act. Indeed, if the application of section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code is to be limited only to acts which are or can clearly be shown to be strictly within the scope of authority of an accused as an officer and any departure therefrom or any act done in excess thereof should be taken out of the purview of the expression ‘purporting to have been done in the discharge of official duty’ on the ground of the knowledge of the accused of the limits of his official authority (which knowledge can almost always be imputed to him because every person exercising power is required to inform himself of the nature and limits thereof), there would hardly be any scope for the operation of section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code in regard to acts which are not strictly within the limits of official duties. Such does not appear to be the effect of or policy underlying the said section. It will be noticed that that section proceeds upon the footing that an offence has been committed. If a general defence under section 79 could be made out, then the said act would not be an offence. If therefore an investigation into the question whether section 197 of Criminal Procedure Code applies should be more or less equated to an investigation whether the circumstances would bring the case within the ambit of section 79 of the Penal Code, it would virtually mean that the protection under section 197 Criminal Procedure Code is limited to cases where there is either no offence at all committed or the accused officer has a complete defence." It is clear from this ruling of the Bench of this Court that even though the act done is in excess of the authority, still the person is entitled to protection if he has been purporting to act in his official capacity. This Court has, also pointed out that the official duty need not have been done in good faith and the question of protection arises only where the allegation is that the accused has committed an offence in the discharge of his official duty. 14. Bearing in mind the principles laid down by the various decisions referred to above I will examine the facts of the instant case to find out whether the petitioners are entitled to the protection under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. The important point to be considered is whether the petitioners were acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties. The report of the D.I.G. submitted under section 202, Criminal Procedure Code to the Court indicates that the Gonikoppal-Virajpet main road runs from east to west and from this road, a road popularly called Vokkaligara Gudde road passes through the lands of the complainant. The report of the D.I.G. also shows that this road has been shown in the village map of 1930. The learned Magistrate has observed that the copy of the road Map produced does not clearly indicate that there was a road passing through the lands of the complainant. It is no doubt true that from the copy produced before the Court this is not clear, but the D.I.G. has recorded the statement of the surveyor, which clearly indicates that there was such road passing through the land of the complainant. Number of witnesses examined during the course of the investigation by the D.I.G. have also stated that there was such a public road passing through the land of the complainant. The report of the D.I.G. indicates that the village panchayat has been spending Large sums of money for maintenance of the road. Several persons who were examined in the course of the investigation have spoken to the existence of the road for a long time. It is also clear from the report based on the statement of the witnesses that this road is only right of way to the residents of that locality and if this public road is blocked, people living in that area will have no access to their houses. Further the complainant had put up a fence and some coffee plants blocking the way only a few days before the occurrence. The public had complained about the obstruction of the public road to the officials. Further the complainant had put up a fence and some coffee plants blocking the way only a few days before the occurrence. The public had complained about the obstruction of the public road to the officials. The report also states that when the first petitioner, Minister for Revenue, visited that place, members of the public complained to him that the public road had been blocked by the complainant. As pointed out by the learned Advocate-General under section 3 of the Land Revenue Act the State Government is the chief controlling authority in all matters connected with land and land revenue administration. Petitioner No. 1 being the Revenue Minister, when such a complaint of blocking of the public road was made to him, he went to the spot with the Deputy Commissioner and other officers. The report also indicates that the Deputy Commissioner at the spot made a local enquiry and thereafter he directed the removal of the obstruction under the statutory power vested in him. There is no material before the Court to show that either petitioner No. 1 or the other petitioners had any ill-will against the complainant. Under subclause (3) of section 94 of the Revenue Act it is open to the Deputy Commissioner summarily to evict a person unauthorisedly occupying such a public road. Even assuming the contention of Sri Deshpande is correct that the Deputy Commissioner had no power to take a decision at the spot and even assuming that he acted in excess of his power, as pointed by the decisions referred to above, if he was acting or purporting to act in exercise of his powers in his official capacity, protection of section, 197 is available to him. There is no force in the contention of Sri Dishpande that there is a blatant use of excess of power. As has been pointed out in Ramayya v. State of Bombay1if section 197, Ciminal Procedure Code is construed too narrowly it can never be applied, for of course it is no part of an official’s duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty which the Courts have to examine so much as the act because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. 15. But it is not the duty which the Courts have to examine so much as the act because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. 15. In Siddiah v. State of Mysore2, Their Lordships have pointed out that the applicability of section 197, Criminal Procedure Code is not limited to acts which are strictly within the scope of the authority of the accused and an act done in excess of the authority is not taken out of the purview of the section. In the said decision it has also been pointed out that the act purporting to have been done in the discharge of official duty as laid down by the Federal Court in Dr. Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor3, does not necessarily import the idea of good faith in doing that act. From what has been stated above, from the report of the D.I.G. it is clear that the public road had been blocked by the complainant and that was the only right of way available to their houses by the residents of that locality, and when a public complaint was made to them of such obstruction, petitioners went to the spot and purported to have acted under sub-clause (3) of section 94 of the Revenue Act. It is clear from what has been stated above, that the petitioners have acted or purported to have acted in the discharge of their official duty and as such they are entitled to the protection under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. Even though petitioner No. 2 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 104 of 1973 may not be entitled to protection under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code as he is not an officer liable to be removed by the State Government, he is entitled to the protection under section 170 of the Mysore Police Act. 16. Taking next the contention of Sri Bhat, urged on behalf of respondent 2, proviso to sub-clause (3) of section 114 of the Mysore Village Panchayat and Local Boards Act, 1959 shows that respondent 2 is not a person who can be removed only by the Government. If a resolution expressing want of confidence in him is passed as contemplated by sub-clause (3), -even though no Government order of removal is made, the President or Vice-President shall vacate the office. If a resolution expressing want of confidence in him is passed as contemplated by sub-clause (3), -even though no Government order of removal is made, the President or Vice-President shall vacate the office. It may also be pointed out that he has not filed any revision petition challenging the order of issue of summons against him. There is also no clear evidence in the case whether he was present at the spot in his official capacity. As there is no clear-evidence, this is a matter which can be decided by the Court after recording of evidence and it is open to respondent 2 to urge his point before the trial Court. 17. The learned Magistrate in para. 5 of his order has observed as follows: “.......... The question whether the Deputy Commissioner was performing his duties and exercising his powers vested on him and was competent to make an oral order directing removal of fence cannot be considered at this stage............” The learned Magistrate after making this observation, relied on Nirmaljit Singh v. State of W. B.4As already pointed out this view of the learned Magistrate is clearly erroneous. Whether the Deputy Commissioner was acting or purporting to act in the exercise of his powers in the discharge of his duties is the point which the Court was called upon to decide. If the Court can come to the conclusion that he was doing so, undoubtedly the sanction of the Government is necessary. It may also be pointed out that the decision in Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of W.B.1relied on by the learned Magistrate, has no application to the facts of the instant case. No question of sanction under section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, arose in the said decision. The point that was considered in the said decision was whether there was sufficient ground to proceed against the accused and order issue of summons. If the Court came to the conclusion that the sanction was necessary, the question of holding that there was sufficient ground to proceed would not arise. There is force in the contention by the learned Advocate-General that the learned Magistrate should have decided whether the sanction of the Government was necessary before proceedings could be instituted against the petitioners. If he came to the conclusion sanction was not necessary, the Magistrate was entitled to proceed with the case. There is force in the contention by the learned Advocate-General that the learned Magistrate should have decided whether the sanction of the Government was necessary before proceedings could be instituted against the petitioners. If he came to the conclusion sanction was not necessary, the Magistrate was entitled to proceed with the case. It is no doubt true that in proper cases, where the complaint does not disclose whether the act of the accused has been done in the discharge of his official duty, it is open to the accused on production of proper material before the Court, even in the course of enquiry, to raise the contention that the sanction of the Government is necessary. In the instant case, as already pointed out, there was ample material before the Court in the report submitted by the D.I.G. under section 202, Criminal Procedure Code, accompanied by various statements recorded by him, that the petitioners were acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties. 18. The decision in N.K. After v. H.G. Vartak2, relied on by Sri Deshpande is of no assistance to him. In the said case the Court held that when the Minister used the abusive word such as “goonda”, and he was not acting or purporting to act in the discharge of the official duty. It was no part of the official duty of the Minister to call anybody “goonda”.‘In paragraph 13 of the very same decision, the Court has pointed out that section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be so narrowly construed as to defeat the very object of the Legislature and the section seems to have been enacted with a view to afford protection to public servants against vexatious and frivolous prosecutions at the hands of those who may come to bear grudge in the course of the discharge of their official duties. Normally what is done in good faith in execution of official duties is never an offence in view of the exception engrafted in section 79, Indian Penal Code. The Court has pointed out that however, in practical life even honest officers may commit mistakes while discharging their official duties. Normally what is done in good faith in execution of official duties is never an offence in view of the exception engrafted in section 79, Indian Penal Code. The Court has pointed out that however, in practical life even honest officers may commit mistakes while discharging their official duties. This section seems to have been primarily and essentially enacted to protect such public servants and that protection is also extended to the acts of public servants where they may purport to act in the discharge of their duty even though departure from the normal course of official duties was deliberate. The Court has pointed out that even where the public servants assume the colour of office to serve their own ends, such acts also get protected automatically and these do not cease to have been done in purported discharge of the duties. 19. There is also no force in the contention of Sri Deshpande that as the Magistrate has not decided the point, the Court should remand the matter back to the Magistrate to decide whether the sanction is necessary or not. As pointed out by the learned Advocate-General, the question of sanction goes to the very root of the jurisdiction of the Court. The learned Magistrate, though this point has been specifically raised before him, has not decided it and has proceeded with the hearing of the case. The very point raised by the petitioners in this revision petition is that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case against them. As it is a natter pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to try the petitioners, I see no point in this Court again remitting the same back to the Magistrate for decision. Even if the Magistrate decides the point, the party against whom the decision is given, is sure to come to this Court in revision. I am therefore of the opinion that this Court should decide the said point and not remit the matter back to the Magistrate. 20. For the reasons mentioned above I have come to the conclusion that the petitioners were acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their duties as public servants and as such the sanction of the Government is necessary before prosecuting them. 21. 20. For the reasons mentioned above I have come to the conclusion that the petitioners were acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their duties as public servants and as such the sanction of the Government is necessary before prosecuting them. 21. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab1, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have pointed out that the inherent power of High Court in quashing the proceedings under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code should be exercised by the Court where it is manifest that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings against the accused. In such a case, the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings on that ground alone. I am therefore of opinion that this is a fit case where proceedings initiated against the petitioners should be quashed by this Court. 22. In the result, for the reasons mentioned above, I allow the Revision Petition No. 98 of 1973 and quash the proceedings taken against the petitioners in P.C. No. 34 of 1972 on the file of the Munsiff First Class Magistrate, Virajpet. I also allow Criminal Revision Petition No. 104 of 1973 and quash the proceedings against the petitioners in P.C. No. 35 of 1972 on the file of the Munsiff-First Class Magistrate, Virajpet.