JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - This is petition under Article 226 of the Constitution directed against an order of the Prescribed Authority, Allahabad dated 9th February, 1973, evicting the petitioner Mewalal from the accommodation in dispute under section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "1972" Act). 2. One Shrimati Narain Pyari was the owner of House No. 16 New Bairahna, Allahabad. A portion of that building has been in the tenancy of Mewalal, the petitioner. Shrimati Narain Pyari made an application for the grant of permission under section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 for permission to file a suit for petitioner's ejectment. During the pendency of those proceedings Shrimati Narain Pyari sold the entire house to Nandlal, respondent No. 3, sometime in 1970. Thereafter Nandlal became the landlord of the premises in question. In December, 1970 Nandlal made an application under section 3 of U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 1947 Act). The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by a detailed order dated 30th August, 1971 granted the necessary permission to respondent No. 3. Petitioner challenged that order before the Commissioner as well as before the State Government under section 7-F of the Act but both the authorities dismissed the petitioner's claim and upheld the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in favour of the respondent No. 3. The order of the State Government under section 7-F of the 1947 Act was passed on 20th September, 1972. The petitioner did not challenge that order before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the same was allowed to become final. 3. In the meantime the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 was enforced on 15th July, 1972. Nandlal, respondent No. 3, did not file any suit for the petitioner's eviction instead he filed an application under section 43(2) (rr) of the 1972 Act for evicting the petitioner. After hearing both the parties the Prescribed Authority Allahabad by his order dated 9th February, 1973, directed the petitioner's eviction. The petitioner, thereupon filed the present writ petition challenging the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 9th February, 1973. 4. Dr. After hearing both the parties the Prescribed Authority Allahabad by his order dated 9th February, 1973, directed the petitioner's eviction. The petitioner, thereupon filed the present writ petition challenging the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 9th February, 1973. 4. Dr. Gyan Prakash, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order evicting the petitioner from the premises in question as the permission granted under section 7 of 1947, Act was not covered by any of the grounds laid down in section 21 of the 1972 Act. Section 43(2) (rr) of the 1972 Act lays down that where a permission obtained under section 3 of 1947 Act on any of the grounds specified in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 21 had become final, either before or after the commencement of 1972 Act, and no suit for eviction of the tenant had been instituted, it was open to the land-lord to apply to the Prescribed Authority for the eviction of the tenant under section 21 of the 1972 Act. The section further lays down that if such an application is made the Prescribed Authority need not satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground for the eviction of the tenant because the order granting permission, which had become final, shall be conclusive. The Prescribed Authority is required to execute the orders which had become final. It is empowered to pass orders for eviction on the basis of the permission already granted provided the permission is granted on any of the grounds mentioned in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 21 of 1972 Act. If the ground on which the permission was granted under section 3 of 1947 Act is not covered by any of the grounds enumerated in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 21 of 1972 Act, the Prescribed Authority will have no jurisdiction to pass any orders for the ejectment of the tenant in pursuance of the permission which may have been granted in favour of the landlord under section 3 of 1947 Act. It is thus clear that before an order of eviction is passed against a tenant, the Prescribed Authority must satisfy itself that the grounds on which permission had been granted under section 3 of 1947 Act was covered by any one of the grounds enumerated in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 21 of 1972 Act. 5. In the instant case permission was granted to the landlord on the ground that he required the premises in question for opening a show room and establishing a Gaddi which was necessary for his business of flour and Dal Mills. Learned counsel, urged that since the accommodation in question had been let out to the petitioner for residential proposes, application for release of the accommodation was not maintainable in view of the third proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of 1972 Act. It is true that the third proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 lays down that no application under clause (a) shall be entertained in case any residential building is needed for occupation for business purposes. Clause (a) provides that on an application of the landlord the Prescribed Authority may order eviction of a tenant from a building under tenancy if he is satisfied that the building is bonafide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any members of his family either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling. Third proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21, however, lays down that no application under clause (a) shall be maintainable in a case where the landlord requires a residential accommodation for purposes of carrying on business. In that case the Prescribed Authority will have no jurisdiction to pass any order of eviction against the tenant. 6. In his objection to the landlord's application under section 3 of 1947 Act, the petitioner had asserted that his son was carrying on business in the premises in question and he had acquired goodwill in the vicinity and if he was evicted from the shop he would be deprived of his only source of livelihood. Thus on the petitioner's own assertion it is clear at the premises in question was used by his son for business purposes. On admitted facts of the instant case petitioner had been carrying on business the premises in question. Thus on the petitioner's own assertion it is clear at the premises in question was used by his son for business purposes. On admitted facts of the instant case petitioner had been carrying on business the premises in question. The landlord also required the premises in ques fou for opening a show room and establishing a Gaddi for purposes of running his business of flour and Dal Mills. It is thus clear that the premises in question was not a residential building, therefore, the prohibition contained under the third proviso to Sub-section (t) of Section 21 of 1972 Act is not applicable. The Prescribed Authority had jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 43 (2) (rr) of 1972 Act and to pass order for petitioner's eviction. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that the premises in question was exempt from the operation of 1972 Act, and, the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order of eviction against the petitioner. Reliance was placed on Section 2 (1) (d) of 1972 Act to support this contention. Section 2 enumerates buildings which are exempt from the operation of the Act. Clauses (d) to Sub-section (1) of Section 2 lays down that nothing in the Act shall apply to any building used or intended to be used for any other industrial purposes (i.e. for the purposes of manufacture, preservation or processing of any goods), or as a cinema or theatre, where the plant and apparatus installed for such purposes in the building is leased out along with the building. Proviso to Section 2 (1) (d) lays down that nothing in this clause shall apply in relation to any shop or other building, situated within the precincts of the cinema or theatre, the tenancy in respect of which may have been created separately from the tenancy in respect of the cinema or theatre. Therefore, exemption under clause (d) is contemplated for a building which is used or intended to be used for industrial purpose. The proviso to the clause indicates that no exemption is permissible the buildings which may be used as a shop or for other business purposes. The purpose for which the land-lord required the premises in question was for business purpose and not for industrial purpose. The proviso to the clause indicates that no exemption is permissible the buildings which may be used as a shop or for other business purposes. The purpose for which the land-lord required the premises in question was for business purpose and not for industrial purpose. As already observed the petitioner has been carrying on shop in the premises in question and the landlord also wants to carry on business by opening a show room and establishing a Gaddi in the accommodation. Opening of a show room in the premises does not mean use of that premises for industrial purposes. In this view of the matter the premises in question was not exempt from the operation of 1972 Act and the Proscribed Authority acted within its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order. 8. There is no other reason to reject the petitioner's contention. Section 2 (a) of 1947 Act made similar provisions as those contained in he Section 2 (1) (d) of 1972 Act. Under Section 2(a) of 1947 Act an accommodation which was used as a factory or for an industrial purpose, was exempt from the operation of 1947 Act, as the definition of accommodation did not include any accommodation used as factory or for industrial purpose. In his application filed under Section 3 of 1947 Act, the landlord specially mentioned that he wanted the accommodation in question for purposes of opening a show room and establishing Gaddi but the petitioner did not raise any objection that the accommodation in question was exempt from the operation and the provisions of 1947 Act. The contention that the premises in question was intended to be used for industrial purposes was raised for the first time before the Prescribed Authority. Since the petitioner failed to raise this question before the appropriate authorities under 1947 Act, he was not entitled to raise this question before the Prescribed Authority during the execution proceedings. 9. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the premises which had been let out to the petitioner by the landlord consisted of two rooms. The State Government granted permission for the petitioner's eviction only from one room, with the result the State Government splitted the petitioner's tenancy which was not permissible under the law. This question has been raised by the petitioner before the appropriate authorities in proceedings under Section, 3 of 1947 Act. The State Government granted permission for the petitioner's eviction only from one room, with the result the State Government splitted the petitioner's tenancy which was not permissible under the law. This question has been raised by the petitioner before the appropriate authorities in proceedings under Section, 3 of 1947 Act. A perusal of the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer would show that the petitioner himself made a grievance before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that although two rooms had been let out to him by the landlord but one of the said rooms had been occupied by the landlord prior to the filing of the application under Section 3 of 947 Act. He further stated that the land-holder had taken one room for his temporary use and had promised to return back the possession to the petitioner but subsequently the landlord resiled and refused to deliver the possession to the petitioner. Thus, it is clear that on the petitioner's own assertion he was in occupation of only one room and, therefore, the land-lord had made application for his eviction only from that room. If the petitioner was in possession of only one room there was no question of filing any application for his ejectment from two rooms. In these circumstances, there was no case of splitting up of tenancy by the State Government. Moreover, Section 43 (2) (rr) lays down that once the Prescribed Authority is satisfied that the permission was granted on one of the grounds as contained in Sub-section (i) and (2) of Section 21 of 1972 Act, it need not satisfy itself again about the existence of those grounds instead it has to execute the order of eviction against the tenant. If the petitioner was aggrieved by the order of the State Government, which according to him, splitted his tenancy, he was at liberty to challenge that order before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Admittedly, the petitioner did not take any such step and allowed the order of the State Government to become final. The petitioner is, therefore, not entitled to raise that question in the present proceedings. 10. There is yet another aspect which needs consideration. Admittedly the petitioner has constructed a three storied building in Mohalla Kydganj in the city of Allahabad. His entire family is residing in that house. The petitioner is, therefore, not entitled to raise that question in the present proceedings. 10. There is yet another aspect which needs consideration. Admittedly the petitioner has constructed a three storied building in Mohalla Kydganj in the city of Allahabad. His entire family is residing in that house. In addition to the residential accommodation he has constructed several shops also which have been let out to tenants and in some of the shops his sons are carrying on business. The petitioner has thus sufficient alternative accommodation to carry on his business and to establish his sons. He is, therefore, not entitled to retain the premises in question. In these circumstances the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 11. In the result the petition fails and is according dismissed with costs.