Order.- The question requiring determination in this revision petition relates to the scope, ambit and true interpretation of clause 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Coarse Grains Procurement (Levy) Order, 1973, hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as ‘the Procurement Levy Order’. For a proper appreciation of the question arising for decision in this revision petition, it is necessary to set out the material facts which are undisputed. 2. The petitioner is a wholesale food grains dealer in Osman Gunj, Hyderabad, having a valid licence under the Andhra Pradesh Food Grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964. The District Supply Officer, Hyderabad, and the Assistant Commissioner of Civil Supplies, Hyderabad, checked the shop of the petitioner on 22nd March, 1973. They reported that the dealer had purchased 85 bags of Jawar from another dealer in Thandur, transported and sold 21 bags out of the same after the Procurement Levy Order came into force on 31st January, 1973 in contravention of clauses 3 and 4 of the said Order. The enforcement officer seized the stock of 64 bags of Jawar available in the shop. On receipt of the report from the enforcement officer, the dealer was given a show cause notice by the District Revenue Officer on 12th March, 1973. After the receipt of the explanation of the dealer and after hearing him in person, the District Revenue Officer ordered confiscation of the seized stocks for violation of clauses 3 and 4 of the Procurement Levy Order under section 6 (A) of the Essential Commodities Act The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Principal Sessions Judge, Hyderabad. It Was contended before the learned Judge that the order of the District Revenue Officer was unsustainable inasmuch as the provisions of clauses 3 and 4 of the Procurement Levy Order were not attracted to the facts of this case. The submission was that the petitioner having purchased the Jawar from another dealer in Thandur and not a producer the provisions of clauses 3 and 4 which are only applicable in cases of purchase from the producer cannot be invoked. The learned Judge held that clause 3 would apply only to purchases from producers and that the petitioner therefore did not contravene clause 3. But as regards clause 4 he observed as follows: "But clause 4 is independent of clause 3. The learned Judge held that clause 3 would apply only to purchases from producers and that the petitioner therefore did not contravene clause 3. But as regards clause 4 he observed as follows: "But clause 4 is independent of clause 3. A plain reading of clause 4 undoubtedly proves that it is not dependent upon the purchase from producers at all as mentioned in clause 3. On the other hand it deals with all cases of purchase whether it be from business man or from the producer. Clause 4 imposes a restriction on the dealer to sell or otherwise dispose of the balance of stocks unless he produces a receipt in token of having delivered the levy to the persons authorised. It is therefore clear that the dealer is required to surrender levy first and after such surrender of levy alone he is entitled to sell or dispose of the balance quantity. For invoking clause 4 of the said order the purchase by a dealer need not be restricted to the producers alone. It applies to all classes of purchases of coarse grains by dealers be it from the producers or from business people. Thus it is clear that clause 4 comes into play even if the dealer purchases coarse grains from business man and sells them without surrendering the required quantity towards levy from out of the total quantity which he purchased". 3. Having so concluded the learned Judge held that the petitioner had contravened clause 4 of the Procurement Levy Order although he had not contravened clause 3. Consequently he confirmed the order of confiscation. Aggrieved against the said decision, the petitioner has now preferred this revision petition. 4. Before I proceed to peer into the scope and ambit of clause 4 of the Procurement Levy Order, it would be appropriate to observe the purpose and object of the Procurement Levy Order. A look at the Order as a whole would make it plain that the purpose and object of the Procurement Levy Order is to procure a certain percentage of coarse grain purchased from a producer by a dealer, at a notified price. The notable feature is that Levy, as in the case of any other Levy Orders like the Rice Procurement Levy Order, or Sugar Levy Order, is imposed at the first purchase from the producer himself. The notable feature is that Levy, as in the case of any other Levy Orders like the Rice Procurement Levy Order, or Sugar Levy Order, is imposed at the first purchase from the producer himself. Glauses 3 and 4 of the Procurement Levy Order which are relevant may now be profitably be read: "3. Declaration of and Levy on coarse grains:- (1) Every dealer who purchases coarse grains from a producer shall sell to the agent or an officer duly authorised by Government in this behalf at the notified price and at such percentage of the total quantity purchased as is specified in column (3) of Schedule III. (2) The Government, the District Collector or any Officer authorised by him in this behalf, may by, notification, call for a declaration of stocks of coarse grains from all the dealers whenever considered necessary to do so. 4.Restriction on sale and movement of coarse grains:- No dealer who purchases coarse grains shall sell, move or otherwise dispose of the balance of levy free stocks, unless he produces a receipt in token of having delivered the levy to the persons authorised and except in accordance with the direction of the Collector or the Government. 5. A close and careful reading of clauses 3 and 4 would make it radiantly clear that clause 3 imposes an obligation on every dealer who purchases coarse grains from a producer to sell such percentage of the total quantity purchased as is specified in column (3) of Schedule III to the agent or an officer duly authorised by the Government in this behalf, at the notified price. Column (3) of Schedule III shows that the percentage of total quantity of coarse grains (Jonna or Jawar) required to be sold to the Government is 25 per cert. Clause 4 enacts an injunction on the dealer who purchased coarse grains, from the sale of the balance of levy free stocks unless he produces a receipt in token of having delivered the levy. The contention of the learned Public Prosecutor is that clause 4 is independent of clause 3 and under clause 4 every dealer is liable to levy irrespective of the purchase whether it be from another dealer who had already paid levy or producer. The words "balance of levy free stock" in clause 4 are significant and could only mean stocks left after the levy under clause 3. The words "balance of levy free stock" in clause 4 are significant and could only mean stocks left after the levy under clause 3. These words provide, in my opinion, the crucial clue to the question and enables One to elude the construction sought to be placed by the prosecution. As far as possible every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as to ascertain the ambit and scope of a clause in a statute. The Court must look at the whole statute; at what precedes and what succeeds and not merely at the clause itself. Says Lord Greene, M.R. in Re Bidie (deceased)1: "The method of construing statute that I prefer is to read the statute as a whole and ask oneself the question: in this state, in this context, relating to this subject matter, what is the true meaning of the word." 6. To the same effect is the rule stated by Sinha, C.J. in State of West Bengal v. Union of India1. The learned Chief Justice observed: "The Court must ascertain the intention of the Legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clause to be construed, but to the entire statute: it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law, and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs." 7. In my opinion to hold that clause 4 should be construed independently of clause 3 and that every dealer whether he purchased from a producer or another dealer is liable to pay levy irrespective of the purchase, would be contrary to the well recognised rules of construction of statutes. Further the Order is one which imposes a burden on the subject. It is a recognised rule that in such cases, even if there is ambiguity, the construction which is in favour of the subject should be adopted. I have therefore, no hesitation in holding that clause 4 of the Procurement Levy Order should be construed with reference to clause 3 and clauses 3 and 4 are not attracted to cases where the dealer has not purchased coarse grain from the producer. It is undisputed in this case that the dealer has not purchased from a producer but has purchased from another dealer. Therefore, clause 4 of the Procurement Levy Order cannot be invoked in the instant case. It is undisputed in this case that the dealer has not purchased from a producer but has purchased from another dealer. Therefore, clause 4 of the Procurement Levy Order cannot be invoked in the instant case. It, therefore, follows that the order of confiscation is illegal and cannot be sustained. The order of confiscation is therefore set aside and the revision petition is allowed.