JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - The important question of law mooted in this appeal is whether as a result of the enforcement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and land reforms act 1950 (U.P. Act 1 of 1951) in the district of Naini Tal where the property in dispute is situate a decree of pre-emption obtained by the plaintiff has become inexecutable. 2. Suit No. 143 of 1961 was filed by Vidya Sagar plaintiff-respondent for pre-empting the sale made on March 17, 1961 by a registered sale-deed by the defendants Nos. 5 and 6 in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 4. It was alleged that a custom of pre-emption obtained in the village and the plaintiff-respondent being a co-sharer in Khata Khewat No. 1 was entitled to pre-empt the same, inasmuch as the sale was in respect of a share in that Khata. The plaint allegations were denied by the defendants. The suit was decreed by the trial court on August 28, 1963. The decree with some modification was affirmed by the first appellate court. The decree was upheld by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 501 of 1965 connected with Second Appeal No. 1246 of 1965 on April 27, 1970. The decree-holder had already deposited the purchase money in court on August 20, 1969, i.e. even prior to the date of vesting, which was July 1, 1970 in the present case. Thereafter the respondent moved an application for execution against which the appellants filed objections under Section 47, C.P.C. on the ground that in view of Section 336 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (Act 1 of 1951)) the respondent could not enforce the aforesaid decree. The objections were dismissed by the learned Munsif as well as the II Civil Judge of Kumaon and hence the defendant-appellants have filed this execution second appeal. 3. It may be noticed at the very outset that the pre-emption decree passed in the suit in favour of the plaintiff had become final on April 27, 1970, i.e., prior to June 30, 1970/July 1, 1970, the date with effect from which the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was applied to the area in which the property is situate. 4. Section 336 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act reads as follows: - "336. 4. Section 336 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act reads as follows: - "336. No right of pre-emption in the area to which this Act applies- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custom, usage or agreement the right of pre-emption shall not exist in respect of any sale of an immovable property in the area to which the Act applies whether made voluntarily or under order of court. (2) All suits for pre-emption pending in respect of any such property in any court whether of the first instance or appeal or revision shall stand dismissed, but award of the costs incurred in any such suit shall be in the discretion of the court." If the suit had been filed after July 1, 1970 or even earlier and an appeal, therefrom was pending on the aforesaid date, there is no doubt that the suit would have stood dismissed in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 336. The whole complication in the present case has arisen on account of the fact that following close on the heels of the decree of pre-emption came the enforcement of Section 336 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in the region where the property in suit was situate. The appellants filed objections under Section 47, C.P.C. inter alia, on the following grounds: - "No. 2. That, because of the application of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act to the area where the land in dispute is situate, the decree for pre-emption has become not only non-existent but has also become in executable under Section 336 of the aforesaid Act. No. 6. That in the alternative the judgment-debtors cannot be ejected from the land in dispute as they have acquired independent rights over the land in dispute otherwise also on the ground of having become Adhivasis of the land in dispute and also because of the other operative provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act prohibiting ejectment of the occupants from the land in dispute." 5. Sri Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel for the appellants, strenuously urged that the decree passed in the preemption suit had become in executable and hence the objections filed by the judgment-debtors were erroneously dismissed by the courts below and since the property of which the respondent was the erstwhile Zamindar no longer vested in him and instead vested in the State the decree had become incapable of execution. The contention of the respondent, on the other hand, was that a perfectly valid decree for pre-emption had been passed in the plaintiff's favour prior to the application of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act to the land in suit; it must, therefore, be executed and the fact that the plaintiff had lost his title was wholly irrelevant, that unless it was established that the appellants had themselves acquired fresh legal rights they could not defeat the decree in execution. It was further contended that the courts below had not recorded any finding that the plaintiff bad acquired Adhivasi rights and hence the case must be remanded for investigation into that question, that the lower court acted illegally in refusing to decide the appellants' objections on merits and dismissing them on the preliminary ground that Section 336 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was applicable to the facts of the case it was submitted that the executing court had no jurisdiction to entertain the objection that the plaintiff's right had come to an end or that the defendants had acquired a new status after the pre-emption decree had become final. 6. It is a truism that the executing court cannot go behind the decree. There are, however, some well recognised exceptions to this rule such as when the decree is a nullity when the court which passed the decree had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, that the decree has become incapable of execution by reason of subsequent events, for instance, the decree for demolition may become infructuous when the property has ceased to exist. It was not seriously contended on behalf of the appellant that the decree in the present case was a nullity. Sri Shanti Bhushan's main argument was that it had become in executable. I think this contention is valid and must be upheld. It was not seriously contended on behalf of the appellant that the decree in the present case was a nullity. Sri Shanti Bhushan's main argument was that it had become in executable. I think this contention is valid and must be upheld. In order to admit an application under Section 47, C.P.C. the decree should not only be subsisting but also be one capable of being executed. The executing court can go into the question of executability and consider whether by any subsequent development the decree had ceased to be executable. 7. Sri Shanti Bhushan argued that pre-emption was nothing but a preferential right of purchase and a successful plaintiff in such a suit really seeks to enforce the right of sale of the property in his favour by the vendee. In other words, it involves a re-conveyance or the property to the plaintiff pre-emptor. It is more or less akin to a decree for specific performance where a sale-deed has to be executed in the plaintiff's favour by the defendant. This argument is fallacious and must be rejected. Order XX, Rule 14, C.P.C. shows that unlike a decree for specific performance no sale-deed is required to be executed in the plaintiff's favour by the vendee. In a pre-emption suit tho plaintiff becomes the owner of the property from the date of deposit of the purchase money. A pre-emption decree is not an order to the judgment-debtor to resell the property to the decree-holder. By such decree the title is held decided, it does not require a resale. It is just a right of substitution of title which is declared by the deposit of the purchase money and it accrues from the date the purchase money is paid in court. The problem was posted long ago in Indian jurisprudence as to whether the right of pre-emption was a right merely of re-purchase or it was an incident annexed to the lands belonging respectively to the vendor and the pre-emptor. A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Sheikh Kudratullah v. Mahani Mohan, 4 Beng. L.R. 134 (F.B.). held that pre-emption was nothing more than a mere right of re-purchase, not from the vendor but from the vendee. The same question came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Gobind Dayal v. Inayatullah, 7 I.L.R. Alld. 775. L.R. 134 (F.B.). held that pre-emption was nothing more than a mere right of re-purchase, not from the vendor but from the vendee. The same question came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Gobind Dayal v. Inayatullah, 7 I.L.R. Alld. 775. and the point for decision was as to whether a Muhammadan pre-emptor could enforce his right against a Hindu vendee from a Muhammadan vendor. The learned Judges took a view contrary to that taken by the majority of the Calcutta Full Bench and answered the question in the affirmative. It was held that the right of pre-emption was not one of re-purchase from the vendee. It was a right inherent in the property and hence could be followed in the hands of the purchaser whoever he might be. Mr. Justice Mahmood in his classic judgment ransacked the original authorities on Muhammadan law and came to the conclusion that the right of pre-emption shared strongly the characteristics of a right of easement, the dominant tenement and the servient tenement of the law of easement being analogous to what the learned Judge described respectively as the pre-emptive tenement and pre-emptiontional tenement. In other words, the right of pre-emption was adjuged as a sort of legal servitude running with the land. The right exists, as the learned Judge said, in the owner of the pre-emtive tenement for the time being which entitles him to have an offer of sale made to him, whenever the owner of the pre-emptional property desires to sell it. But the right could not be a right of re-purchase either from the vendor or the vendee involving a new contract of sale. To quote Justice Mahmood:- "It is simply a right of substitution entitling the pre-emptor by reason of a legal incident to which the sale itself was subject, to stand in the shoes of the vendee in respect of all the rights and obligations arising from the sale under which he has derived his title. It is in effect, as if in a sale-deed the vendee's name was rubbed out and the pre-emptor's name was substituted in its place." The decision in Dashrathila 1 v. Bai Dhondu Bai, A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 262 agreed substantially with the view taken by Justice Mahmood and held the right of pre-emption to be an incident of property. It is in effect, as if in a sale-deed the vendee's name was rubbed out and the pre-emptor's name was substituted in its place." The decision in Dashrathila 1 v. Bai Dhondu Bai, A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 262 agreed substantially with the view taken by Justice Mahmood and held the right of pre-emption to be an incident of property. Sri Shanti Bhushan was at pains to impress upon me that the view of Justice Mahmood in Gobind Dayal's case had not been endorsed by the Supreme Court in Audh Behari v. Gajadhar, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 417. I am unable to agree with his interpretation of the Supreme Court decision. It is true that in paragraph 16 of the Reports Mukherjea, J. did not seem to approve entirely the analogy between a right of pre-emption and a right of easement which was elaborated by Mahmood, J. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Justice Mahmood's analysis of the nature of the right of pre-emption was fully endorsed by the Supreme Court. Mukherjea, J. observed: "In our opinion it would not be correct to say that the right of preemption under Muhammadan law is a personal right on the part of the' pre-emptor to get a re-transfer of the property from the vendee who has already become owner of the same. We prefer to accept the meaning of the word 'Taji bo' used in the Hedaya in the sense in which Mr. Justice Mahmood construes it to mean and it was really a mis-translation of that word by Hamilton that accounted to a great extent for the view taken by the Calcutta High Court." The further observations made in the case make the position still more explicit: "It is true that the right becomes enforceable only when there is a sale but the right exists antecedently to the sale, the foundation of the right being the avoidance of the inconveniences and disturbances which would arise from the introduction of a stranger into the land. We agree with Mr. We agree with Mr. Justice Mahmood that the sale is a condition precedent not to the existence of the right but to its enforcibility." Sri Shanti Bhushan relied on the following passage occurring in the same judgment: "The correct legal position seems to be that the law of pre-emption imposes a limitation or disability upon the ownership of a property to the extent that it restricts the owner's unfettered right of sale and compels him to sell the property to his co-sharer or neighbour as the case may be." The learned counsel argued that according to the Supreme Court the law of pre-emption compelled the owner of the property to sell it to the co-sharer or neighbour, etc. and hence resale was a necessary concomitant of a decree of pre-emption. The above passage does not warrant any such inference. His Lordship of the Supreme Court was merely analysing the basic characteristic of a right of pre-emption and not examining the legal effect of a decree of pre-emption or the procedure which was to follow the passing of such a decree. The conclusion was stated by Justice Mukherjea in these words: "The crux of the whole thing is that the benefit as well as the burden of the right of pre-emption run with the land and can be enforced by or against the owner of the land for the time being although the right of the pre-emptor does not amount to an interest in the land itself. It may be stated here that if the right of preemption had been only a personal right enforceable against the vendee and there was no infirmity in the title of the owner restricting his right of sale in a certain manner, a bona fide purchaser without notice would certainly obtain an absolute title to the property, unhampered by any right of the pre-emptor and in such circumstances there could be no justification for enforcing the right of pre-emption against the purchaser on grounds of justice, equity and good conscience on which grounds alone the right could be enforced at the present day. In our opinion the law of pre-emption creates a right which attaches to the property and on that footing only it can be enforced against the purchaser." 8. In our opinion the law of pre-emption creates a right which attaches to the property and on that footing only it can be enforced against the purchaser." 8. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the Supreme Court in the case of Audh Behari has fully endorced the view of Mahmood, J. The contention of the appellant that the pre-emption is a command to the judgment-debtor to re-sell the property is untenable. It is virtually' a right of substitution. To borrow the language of Justice Mahmood, "It is in effect, as if in a sale-deed the vendee's name was rubbed out and the pre-emptor's name was substituted in its place." It is, therefore, not correct to argue that the plaintiff vendor having lost his rights as intermediary and the same rights having now vested in the State, was dis entitled from claiming a re-sale of the property in his favour and for that reason the decree had become unenforceable. 9. Another point submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants must also be rejected on the same ground. It was argued that the mode of executing the decree was to make a re-sale in favour of the decree-holder and since the area of the land involved exceeded 12 acres the decree could not be executed. The sale-deed was assiled on the ground that it purported to transfer plots of land with an area of 22 acres of land which exceeded the maximum limit of 12 acres permissible under U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It thus violated Section 454 of the said Act. This argument has no force. Firstly, such transfer is not void. The consequences of such transfer are provided by Section 163 of the Act which shows that if the restriction is contravened the transferee shall be liable to ejectment on the suit of the Gaon Sabha and the land shall thereby become vacant land. The transferor and the transferee both would lose their rights on land, but this would not affect the rights of a third person in the land, nor the right of the transferor to realise the price of the land from the transferee it is unpaid. Moreover, in the view that I have taken about the nature of the right of pre-emption no fresh sale is involved in a pre-emption decree. Moreover, in the view that I have taken about the nature of the right of pre-emption no fresh sale is involved in a pre-emption decree. It is a sort of legal servitude running with the land, a right of substitution, not repurchase. For that reason therefore, decree cannot be said to have become incapable of execution. 10. There is, however, a more formidable reason for which the decree passed in the respondent's favour must be held to have become really incapable of execution. The contention of the appellants is that Order XX, Rule 14(1) (b) enjoins that the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff whose title thereto shall be deemed to have accrued from the date of the payment in court of the purchase money by the plaintiff. It was contended that since the property itself had ceased to exist, there was no question of delivery of possession to the decree-holder. The inevitable consequence of the enforcement of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was that all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries in every estate had ceased and vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances vide Section 6 the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The vendor had sold his Zamindari rights, i.e. proprietary rights but now the proprietary rights had ceased to exist and were substituted by fresh tenancy rights created by the new Act. Section 20 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act brought into existence a new class of tenure-holders namely, Adhivasis and Adhivasi rights were distinct from the proprietary rights which formerly existed. In other words, the property which had been the subject-matter of sale no longer existed and what replaced it was a bundle of new rights. I have looked into the record of Second Appeal No. 501 of 1965 arising out of suit No. 143 of 1961 and the finding recorded by the High Court in the second appeal was that in reality what was conveyed by the vendors, was some share in Khata Khewat No. 1 It is true that in the sale-deed it was mentioned that under the mutual arrangement as between the co-sharers the, vendors were in possession over a definite area having a certain, measurement. That, however, did not mean that actually that very land was the subject-matter of sale. That, however, did not mean that actually that very land was the subject-matter of sale. The sale actually being of a share in the Khewat, the right of preemption which had been held by both the courts below to be obtaining in the village, was not defeated. It is thus manifest that the subject-matter of the sale was proprietary rights which had since ceased to exist and for that reason the decree must be held to have become incapable of execution. Even though certain plots of land may physically continue to exist yet that would not be identical with the property transferred by the sale-deed. The term property is not co-terminus with the custody of a physical object but may mean mere rights relating to such 'object. The property thus includes any proprietary interest including a temporary or precarious interest such as that of mortgagee or lessee. See Suryapal v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 1066. In State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 92, it was observed by Patanjali Sastri, C.J. that 'property' in Article 31 of the Constitution 'must be understood both in a corporeal sense as having reference to all those specific things that are susceptible of private appropriation and enjoyment as well as in its juridical or legal sense of a bundle of rights which the owner can exercise under the municipal law with respect to the user and enjoyment of those things to the exclusion of all others'. Thus, the modern concept of property is a bundle of rights, even intangible rights. According to Salmond all property is either corporeal or incorporeal. He observes, Salmond On Jurisprudence (Twelfth Edition) by P.J. Fitzerald page 413. "Corporeal Property is the right of ownership in material things; incorporeal property is any other proprietary right in rem. Incorporeal property is itself of two kinds namely (1) jura in re aliena of encumbrances, whether over material or immaterial things (for example, leases, mortgages, and servitudes) and (2) jura in re propria over immaterial things (for example, patents, copyrights and trade marks)." 11. The physical corpus of a property may continue to exist yet if old rights which attach to it do not survive, it is not possible to hold that the same property exists. The core of a property is the nature of rights which attach to it. The physical corpus of a property may continue to exist yet if old rights which attach to it do not survive, it is not possible to hold that the same property exists. The core of a property is the nature of rights which attach to it. A charge in the complexion of rights imparts a new character to it and it becomes a property different from the one which formerly existed, The passing of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act has brought about a more or has similar phenomenon. Even though physical certain land may continue to exist but by virtue of this enactment that land has become the nucleus of new and different rights and hence it is no longer the same old property. To borrow the language of Shakespheare from 'The Tempest', 'it is as it were that the old property'. 'Suffers a sea-change' and is transformed 'into something rich and strange'. This concept of property was elucidated by the Supreme Court in Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1970. It was held that the original proprietary rights could not be followed if they vested in the State vide Section 6 in the hands of the judgment-debtors as they had become Bhumidhari rights and constituted a different 'property'. The contention that Bhumidhari rights arising under Section 18 of the Act were liable to be sold as they represented the proprietary rights which were mortgaged was repelled. The law on the point was thus stated by Wanchoo, J.: (Para 7 of the Reports): "The legislature was therefore creating a new right under Section 18 and the old proprietary right in Sir and Khudkasht land and any intermediary's grove land had already vested under Section 6 in the State. Therefore, it cannot be said that Section 18 is an exception to the consequences provided in Section 6 and therefore Sir and Khudkasht land and grove land continue to be the property of the judgment-debtor in this case in the same manner as they were the property at the time of the mortgage and would therefore be available in execution of the decree as the proprietary rights mortgaged. We are of opinion that the proprietary rights in Sir and Khudkasht land and grove land have vested in the State and what is conferred on the intermediary by Section 18 is a new right altogether which he never had and which could not therefore have been mortgaged in 1914." 12. In Shivashanker v. Baikunth, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 971 it was held that the extinction of old rights and the creation of different rights in the owners of property may be ostensibly simultaneous, yet in law the process resulted in emergence of new rights of property. Even though an intermediary may continue to hold certain classes of land which were formerly in his possession, yet since that land is now clothed with new kind of rights the intermediary cannot be said to retain the quondam property. It was pointed out by Hegdge, J. (Para. 10 of the Reports): - "Reading Sections 3, 4 and 6 together, it follows that all Estates notified under Section 3 vest in the State free of all encumbrances. The quondam proprietors and tenure-holders of those Estates lose all interests in those Estates. As proprietors they reain no interest in respect of them whatsoever. But in respect of the lands enumerated in Section 6 the State settled on them the rights of Raiyats. Though in fact the vesting of the Estates and the deemed settlement of Raiyat's rights in respect of certain classes of lands included in the Estates took place simultaneously, in law the two must be treated as different transactions; first there was a vesting of the Estates in the State absolutely, and free of all encumbrances. Then followed the deemed settlement by the State of Raiyat's rights on the quondam proprietors. Therefore, in law it would not be correct to say that what vested in the State are only those interests not coming within Section 6." The same View was again expressed in Budhan Singh v. Babi Bux, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1880. Thus, there can be no doubt that the property in the hands of the judgment-debtors at the time of the execution was different from the property which formed the subject-matter of the pre-emption decree. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Himmatrao v. Jaikisandas, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1974. But that case is clearly distinguishable. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Himmatrao v. Jaikisandas, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1974. But that case is clearly distinguishable. It arose out of a suit for partition and it was held that a right to enforce a claim to partition was not affected by the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950. All that the case decided was that the Act provided for payment of compensation to ex-proprietors for the acquisition of the proprietary interest. In these circumstances it was held that a co-sharer could despite the acquisition of his proprietary rights under the Act obtain a declaration from a civil court as to the fact and extent of his share in the preexisting proprietary rights of that village so that he could lay claim to a proportionate amount of compensation. The other case on which the learned counsel for the respondent relied was Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 997. The facts of that case were also different. There a suit had been filed for a declaration of title and the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act (28 of 1951) was passed during the pendency of the suit. It was held that the plaintiff did not lose his rights to receive compensation if he was proved to have been the owner of the suit property on the date of the commencement of the Act, even, though the suit property had come to vest in the State. In the aforesaid cases the only mode of enforcing the erstwhile rights of the plaintiff which the Supreme Court approved was to lay claim to compensation. Another single Judge decision of this Court on which reliance was placed was Ganga Singh v. Santosh Kumar, A.I.R. 1963 Alld. 201. It related to a suit for specific performance and not a suit for pre-emption. 14. Applying the above principles which may be deducted from the various decisions of the Supreme Court to which I have adverted,I cannot resist the conclusion that the pre-emption decree passed in the instant case became incapable of execution. It is true that the pre-emptor's title to the property accrues from the date of payment of the purchase money into court, yet his rights do not mature until the decree is executed and he obtains possession. It is true that the pre-emptor's title to the property accrues from the date of payment of the purchase money into court, yet his rights do not mature until the decree is executed and he obtains possession. Merely securing a decree is not enough otherwise it would be futile for a decree-holder to follow up his decree by taking out execution. The decree must be executed within the period of limitation and then alone the rights of a decree-holder fully mature. Order XX, Rule 14, C.P.C. requires that on payment of the purchase money into court the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff. In other words, delivery of possession of some sort is essential to effectuate the pre-emptor's decree. If this were not so, the present appellants would not have felt the necessity of executing their decree and the controversy in the instant case would not have arisen. The decree-holder was admittedly not in possession and possession was sought by means of the execution. It was also stated at the bar that the judgment-debtors had not withdrawn the purchase money deposited in court and the respondent did not controvert the statement. In such circumstances it was incumbent on the plaintiff to put the pre-emption decree into execution and ask for being formally placed in possession of the property. A sale-deed may not be required to be executed but some kind of mechanism for delivery of possession has to be gone through. In other words, something has to be done after obtaining the decree and then the title would mature otherwise the decree may get barred by limitation. Obviously a decree holder can ask for possession in respect of that property alone which formed the subject-matter of the decree. A decree does not attach really to a corpus but to the rights surrounding that corpus and if new rights are created the relief for possession in respect of such property becomes infructuous. Obviously a decree holder can ask for possession in respect of that property alone which formed the subject-matter of the decree. A decree does not attach really to a corpus but to the rights surrounding that corpus and if new rights are created the relief for possession in respect of such property becomes infructuous. In Rana Sheo Ambar Singh's case (8) it was clearly pointed out that the mortgagee could not follow the proprietary rights after they vested in the State and the only way in which the mortgagee could recover his money advanced on the security of the property which vested in the State by virtue of the notification under Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was to follow the procedure under Section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act, i.e., follow the compensation money. Thus, in my opinion if a mortgagee could not proceed against the new property, a pre-emptor likewise cannot follow the new property in the hands of the judgment-debtor as it is not the same 'property' which was the basis of the pre-emption decree. 15. In short, the judgment-debtors do not retain the 'property' which was the subject-matter of the sale and the proprietary rights to which the preemption decree related. The pre-emption decree obtained by the respondent is no longer executable. 16. The above appeal is, therefore, allowed and the objections of the appellants under Section 47, C.P.C. are upheld. In view of the facts of the case, however, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.