JUDGMENT S. Malik, J. - This is a plaintiff's appeal against the judgment dated 15-5-1971 of the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Banda, allowing the defendant-respondent's appeal and dismissing the plaintiff's suit for-ejectment, arrears of rent and damages. 2. The relevant facts, as recorded by the court below, are that the property in suit is an "accommodation" within the meaning of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (Act No. III of 1947) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The defendant-respondent was the tenant of the same and the plaintiff-appellant was his landlady. The plaintiff obtained the necessary permission under section 3 of the Act from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer who had been duly authorised by the District Magistrate to grant such permissions, and filed the suit on the basis of the permission obtained. The defendant-respondent went up in revision to the Commissioner against the order granting the permission and the permission was cancelled by the Commissioner. Thereafter the plaintiff-appellant west up to the State Government under section 7-F of the Act and the State Government set aside the order of the Commissioner and confirmed the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction officer. Against the order of the State Government under section 7-F of the Act the respondent filed a Writ Petition (Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 3229 of 1964) in this court which was dismissed on 23-10-1964. Thereafter the respondent filed a Special Appeal No. 982 of which was also dismissed on the 25th of January, 1966. 3. The questions raised in this Court in this Second Appeal are whether the decision of the High Court in the writ petition regarding the validity of the permission granted by the State Government under section 7-F of the Act would act as res judicata between the parties in this case and secondly whether in view of the provisions of section 3(4) and 16 of the Act, the Civil Court can enter into the question as to whether the permission granted by the State Government under section 7-F of the Act is not a valid permission because the State Government did not give reasons in support of the order granting the permission. 4. 4. As regards the first question, there can be no two opinion that the question in issue or in other words the question as to whether the permission granted by the State Government under Section 7-F was a valid permission, involved in this case, was also directly in issue in the writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court and that the writ petition was between the same parties who were parties to the suit giving rise to this appeal. Therefore, apparently the decision of the High Court in the writ petition culminating in the dismissal of the Special Appeal should act as res judicata between the parties on the question of validity of the permission granted by the State Government under Section 7-F of the Act. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the decision of High Court in the writ petition or the Special Appeal will not act as res-judicial in this particular case as since the writ petition and the Special Appeal were decided by the High Court there has been a change in the law as regards the question involved. It was pointed out that originally the view taken by this Court was that an order passed by the State Government under Section 7-F of the Act was an administrative order and, therefore, it was not necessary for the State Government to give reasons in support of such an order or in other words the order passed by the State Government under Section 7-F need not be a speaking order. This view undoubtedly has since been reversed not only by this Court but also by the Supreme Court and the settled view is that the State Government acts in a quasi judicial capacity when it passes an order under Section 7-F and, therefore, it must give reasons in support of such an order specially if it reverses the order passed by the Commissioner or in other words disagree with the Commissioner and does not accept the reasons given by the Commissioner for granting a permission or for not granting a permission. Vide Ram Murti Saran v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 Allahabad 54 (F.B.) 5. Vide Ram Murti Saran v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 Allahabad 54 (F.B.) 5. It was pointed out, from the decision of this Court dismissing the writ petition, that it was dismissed with the observation that Section 7-F does not expressly require the State Government to record its reasons for granting or for not granting a permission under Section 7-F of the Act, while the Special Appeal was dismissed summarily with the observation that proceedings under Section 7-F of the Act are administrative in nature and not quasi judicial. It was urged on behalf of the respondent that as the law or the interpretation of the provisions of Section 7-F of the Act by this Court, while deciding the writ petition inter parties and the Special Appeal arising out of it, has undergone a change, as already pointed out, the decision in the writ petition or the special Appeal will not act as res judicata in this case and in support of this view a number of rulings were cited which need not be mentioned, because, to my mind, the contention put forward is misconceived. 6. If the contention put forward on behalf of the respondent is accepted, it would mean that a decision by a court of law inter parties on any question or issue will have no finality even though the requirement of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied if that decision is based on a wrong interpretation of the law after the law has been differently interpreted subsequently. If, of course, it is shown that the prior decision was not by a court of competent jurisdiction and in the previous decision the law was wrongly interpreted on the question of jurisdiction of that court, the matter would be different and it could be argued that as the decision was not given by a court having jurisdiction it would not be a decision of a competent court and therefore, a nullity. 7. The most that can be said keeping in view the facts narrated is that the reasons given by this Court in deciding the writ petition and the special appeal arising out of it inter parties were not correct in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court and also by this Court in subsequent cases in which the law has been differently interpreted. But due to that it could not be said that the law has undergone a change. The law has always been the same though it may be that in the earlier cases including the writ petition and the special Appeal in question the view taken by this Court was erroneous. Even if it be assumed that the decision in the writ petition and in the Special Appeal was erroneous that cannot prevent the operation of the rule of res judicata as regards the question of validity of the permission granted by the State Government under Section 7-F of the Act. It settled law that even a wrong decision inter parties by a court competent to decide the suit or issue which had become final in respect of a question which was directly in issue in the earlier case would act as res judicata in a subsequent case between the same parties. Therefore, the lower appellate court clearly erred in holding that the decision in the writ petition and the Special Appeal, holding the permission granted by the State Government under Section 7-F to be a valid permission, would not act as res judicata, because the reasons given by this Court in disposing of the writ petition and the Special Appeal were erroneous in accordance with subsequent decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court in other cases. 8. The lower appellate court erred in holding that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to go behind a permission granted by the State Government under Section 7-F of the Act and decide whether the permission given by the State Government was just. It is true, as has been held by the Supreme Court and observed by the lower appellate court that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the permission granted by the State Government is not a valid permission and the same was given in violation of the principles of natural justice but it does not mean that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to sit over judgment and decide for itself whether keeping in view the facts of the case or the allegations made by the parties the permission should have been given by the State Government. if the Civil Court finds that the State Government in granting the permission did not give an opportunity to the opposite party to present its case before it, it would be an invalid permission as in that case it could be said that the principles of natural justice were violated in as much as both the parties were not given an opportunity of being heard either personally or present their respective cases for and against granting the permission in writing. Once it appears that an opportunity was given to both the parties to place before the State Government their respective cases in favour of and against granting the permission and the State Government passed the order under Section 7-F of the Act after considering the same, in view of the provisions of Section 3(4) and 16 of the Act, the Civil Court will have no right to enter into the question as to whether the reasons given by the Stag Government for granting the permission were just and even if no reasons were given, whether keeping in view the allegations made by the parties the permission should have been given by the State Government or not. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court is much wider and is not fettered by the provisions of Section 3(4) and 16 of the Act. Therefore, in a writ petition it could be urged that the permission given under Section 7-F of the Act is not a valid permission because the State Government did not give reasons for the same, but such a plea could not be taken before a Civil Court in view of the provisions of section 3(4) and 16 of the Act, unless it is shown that the principles of natural justice were violated in the manner indicated above. The Supreme Court in the case in Rainji Das v. Trilok Chand, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 2361 p. 3 and 4. has pointed out ; "it is true that the finality of the order declared by Section 3(4) and Section 16 will not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 22o of the Constitution to issue an appropriate with it quashing the order. But subject to interference by the High Court, the decision must be deemed final and is not liable to be challenged in any collateral proceeding. 9. But subject to interference by the High Court, the decision must be deemed final and is not liable to be challenged in any collateral proceeding. 9. In our view, the High Court was in error in holding that the decision of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was, in the suits filed by the appellant, open to the objection that the Officer did not consider the "needs of the tenant." The Rent Control and Eviction Officer had jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter. Even if we assume that he committed an error in the exercise of his jurisdiction, the error could be corrected only in a proceeding under Section 7-F of the Act approaching the State Government and by way of a writ petition to the High Court but the order made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and confirmed by the Additional Commissioner could not be challenged in the suit." 10. No other question was raised. 11. Under the circumstances, I allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower appellate court and confirm the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. Keeping in view the facts and the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.