A. N. SURTI, J. ( 1 ) ALL the aforesaid three matters were placed before the single Judge (D. P. Desai J.) for hearing and disposal. When these matters were heard by the single Judge of this Court (D. P. Desai J.) it was submitted on behalf of the petitioners-tenants that the appellate Court ought to have given the necessary permission to lead evidence to the petitioners-tenants as requested by them in their various applications to which we have made a reference hereinabove in course of this judgment. It was pointed out that after the disposal of the aforesaid two suits by the learned trial Judge there was a material change of circumstances having regard to the subsequent events which we have mentioned earlier and hence it was the duty and the obligation of the appellate Court to take into consideration the change of circumstances and the subsequent events. From this view point the provisions of sec. 13 (1) (g) and sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act were pointed out to the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid two matters. ( 2 ) BEFORE the learned Single Judge who heard the aforesaid matters reliance was placed on an unreported judgment of the Bombay High Court in Dudhwala Ambalal Lallubhai v. Gandhi Shamlal Keshavlal and another in Civil Revision Application No. 870 of 1954 delivered by Gajendragadker J. (as he then was ). It is not necessary for us to refer to all the facts mentioned in the said judgment. Suffice it to state that the suit was filed by opponents Gandhi Shamlal Keshavlal and others against the applicants tenants for getting the possession of the suit premises. That litigation went up to the High Court and while deciding the Civil Revision Application No. 870 of 1954 Gajendragadker (as he then was) observed as follows:cases of this kind where tenants are sought to be rejected must be tried bearing in mind fully the safeguards which are provided to the tenants by the Legislature. That litigation went up to the High Court and while deciding the Civil Revision Application No. 870 of 1954 Gajendragadker (as he then was) observed as follows:cases of this kind where tenants are sought to be rejected must be tried bearing in mind fully the safeguards which are provided to the tenants by the Legislature. Legislature requires that a Court trying a case for ejectment between landlord and tenant must even after the landlords need is proved ask itself whether by ejecting the tenant greater hardship would be caused to the tenant and it is ordinarily desirable that a specific issue on this point should be framed so that the parties attention would be invited to this aspect of the dispute and they would get as opportunity to lead evidence. Since that was not done in this case I do not think that the lower appellate Court was justified in proceeding to deal with this matter in the way he has done. That is an irregularity which needs to be corrected. It was also observed in the course of judgment as follows :"when the appeal was pending in the lower appellate Court the tenant moved the learned appellate Judge to take additional evidence in respect of his contention that subsequent to the decision of the trial Court the premises in which the landlords son was residing had been let out to another tenant. "it was further observed as follows :the learned appellate Judge taking a very technical view of the matter held that he did not see how he had any jurisdiction to admit such evidence. Now if a material fact had happened after the decision of the trial Court and during the pendency of the appeal I should have thought that the interests of justice required that the appellate Court should try to ascertain the nature of that material fact. In substance the reasoning adopted by the learned Judge was that the lower Court ought not to have taken a very technical view of the matter and should have taken into consideration the material facts which had happened after the decision of the suit and during the pendency of the appeal. In substance the reasoning adopted by the learned Judge was that the lower Court ought not to have taken a very technical view of the matter and should have taken into consideration the material facts which had happened after the decision of the suit and during the pendency of the appeal. As a result of the view which he took he directed the trial Court to take necessary evidence in regard to the subsequent events which took place after the dismissal of the suit and before the disposal of the appeal. ( 3 ) THE attention of the learned Single Judge (D. P. Desai J.) was also drawn to the two other judgments of the Bombay High Court. Firstly the learned Single Judge took into consideration the reasoning adopted by Bavdekar J. in Shantaram Keshav v. Prabhakar Balwant 57 Bombay Law Reporter 1116 In that case the landlord had succeeded in obtaining a decree for eviction on the ground of bona fide and reasonable requirement. The question of hardship was also answered in his favour because at the trial the landlord showed that certain accommodation was available to the tenant at the rent which he was paying. Both the Courts had found that in view of the availability of the alternative accommodation there would be greater hardship to the landlord. As the tenant did not accept the alternative accommodation a decree for eviction was passed by the trial Court. The tenant went in appeal and at the time when the matter was being heard before the appellate Court it was found that the accommodation which was shown to have been available at the time of the trial was no longer available. Thereupon some attempts were made to obtain further accommodation for the tenant. Nothing turned on that in that case because the appellate Court expressed the view that the availability of alternative accommodation which is required to be taken into consideration is the accommodation which was available at the time of passing the decree of the trial Court and that it did not make any difference if that accommodation ceased to be available later on. In this view the appellate Court did not go into the question whether at the time of its judgment the alternative accommodation was available to the tenant and dismissed the appeal. In this view the appellate Court did not go into the question whether at the time of its judgment the alternative accommodation was available to the tenant and dismissed the appeal. It was against that judgment of the Appellate Court that the tenant went in revision to the Bombay High Court. The question which was posed before the learned Judge was: What is the time at which the availability of the accommodation either to the landlord or tenant has got to be taken into consideration under sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act ? The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the word decree used in sec. 13 (2) of the Act must necessarily mean the decree of the trial Court and not that of the appellate Court. In his opinion the doctrine of merger made no difference. The learned Judge therefore came to the conclusion that the availability of the alternative accommodation to be seen for the purpose of sec. 13 (2) is the availability at the time when the trial Court is about to pass the decree for eviction In substance the reasoning of the learned Judge was that it was not the function of the appellate Court to take into consideration any change of circumstances or the subsequent events which had taken place after the dismissal of the suit by the trial Court. ( 4 ) THE attention of the learned Single Judge was also invited to another decision of the Bombay High Court in Vinayak Trimbak v. Tarachand 62 Bombay Law Reporter page 785. That was the judgment delivered by B. N. Gokhale J. sitting as a single Judge. In the said Judgment Gokhale J. approved the interpretation of the word decree by Bavdekar J. in Shantarams case (supra) and observed at page 768 as under :"in Shantaram Keshav v. Prabhakar Balwant Mr. Justice Bavdekar held that the word decree in sec. 13 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act means the decree for eviction which is passed by the trial court and. therefore the time at which the availability of the accommodation either to the landlord or tenant Which has to be taken into consideration under sec. 13 (2) of the Act is the time when the trial court is about to pass the decree for eviction. This principle must equally apply under sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. therefore the time at which the availability of the accommodation either to the landlord or tenant Which has to be taken into consideration under sec. 13 (2) of the Act is the time when the trial court is about to pass the decree for eviction. This principle must equally apply under sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. "the learned Single Judge in his referring judgment has also observed as follows :the aforesaid principle was applied by the learned Judge in a different context i. e. in the context of a Contention that the satisfaction of the Court as regards existence of reasonable and bona fide requirement must relate to not only the date of the notice terminating the tenancy but upto the hearing of the suit and passing of the decree. The learned Single Judge has also stated that the question about taking notice of subsequent events by the appellate Court did not arise before Gokhle J. The circumstance of which the Court is called upon to take notice as a subsequent event may in certain conceivable cases have also bearing upon the question of comparative hardship to be considered under sec. 13 (2) of the Act. Suffice it to state that Gokhle J. did approve the interpretation of the word decree as observed by Bavdekar J. in Shaptarams case (supra ). Under the aforesaid circumstances the learned Single Judge felt that the aforesaid matter should be referred to a Division Bench as in his opinion he felt that this was a matter of general public importance and the matter should be referred to a larger bench. He also took the view that there were two different opinions one which is expressed by Gajendragadkar J in Dudhwala Ambalal Lallubhai v. Gandhi Shamlal Keshavlal and others (supra) and the other expressed in Shantarams case (supra ). In this view of the matter the learned Single Judge has referred these three matters to a larger bench and accordingly these three matters are placed before us for disposal. ( 5 ) MR. S. B. Vakil learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners-tenants submitted that on a true reading of sec. 13 (1) (g) read with sec. In this view of the matter the learned Single Judge has referred these three matters to a larger bench and accordingly these three matters are placed before us for disposal. ( 5 ) MR. S. B. Vakil learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners-tenants submitted that on a true reading of sec. 13 (1) (g) read with sec. 13 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act it is the statutory obligation of the Appellate Court to take into consideration change of circumstances and all subsequent events in order to decide the question of hardship as mentioned in sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act. In order to persuade us to take that view Mr. Vakil placed before us the following view points for our consideration. (1) That the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord as contemplated under sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Rent Act in regard to the suit premises must not only exist on the date of the suit but also on the date on which the trial Court passes its decree and also when the appellate Court disposes of the appeal preferred before it under sec. 29 of the Rent Act. (2) That in order to achieve the statutory object as embodied in sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act and with a view to effectively discharge the duty imposed on the Court the appellate Court when it disposes of an appeal under sec. 29 (1) of the Rent Act must take into consideration all material and relevant facts as regards the subsequent change of circumstances after the passing of the decree by the trial Court. (3) That consequently the word decree appearing in sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act must necessarily be read as the decree passed by the appellate Court. (4) That the appeal under the Rent Act being the continuation of the suit the appellate Court must exercise its powers and discharge its duties under secs. 107 151 Order 7 Rule 7 Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with sec. 13 (1) (g) and sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act in order to balance the needs of the landlords and the tenants by permitting the tenants to lead evidence. 107 151 Order 7 Rule 7 Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with sec. 13 (1) (g) and sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act in order to balance the needs of the landlords and the tenants by permitting the tenants to lead evidence. (5) That in the instant case the learned Assistant Judge erred in not investigating subsequent change of circumstances after passing of the decrees by the trial Court and hence the matters must be remanded. He further submitted that the appellate Courts failure to record the evidence as requested by the petitioners-tenants would result into a gross miscarriage of justice and would defeat the statutory object as embodied in sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act. ( 6 ) IN so far as the Civil Application No. 1286 of 1972 filed by the opponent-landlady is concerned Mr. Vakils submission in substance was that on a true reading of sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act this Court will have no jurisdiction either to investigate or to record evidence or to take into consideration any new facts or subsequent change of circumstances (except the admitted facts: i. e. the death of a party after the filing of the revision application in this Court) into consideration after the passing of the decree by the Appellate Court and hence Civil Application No. 1286 of 1962 filed by the opponent should be rejected. ( 7 ) IN order to substantiate the submission advanced by Mr. Vakil Mr. Vakil first of all drew our attention to the relevant provisions of the Rent Act. Mr. Vakil drew our attention to sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Rent Act which provides as follows :13 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act (but subject to the provisions of sec. 15) a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied. (g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held (or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust ). Mr. Vakil also invited our attention to sec. 13 (2) of the Act. Mr. Vakil also invited our attention to sec. 13 (2) of the Act. Sec. 13 (2) provides as follows :13 (2) No decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground specified in clause (g) of sub-sec. (1) if the Court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant greater hardship would he caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. Where the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such party only. Mr. Vakil also drew our attention to the provisions of sec. 29 (1) of the Rent Act. Suffice it to mention that sec. 29 (1) of the Rent Act confers a right of an appeal from a decree or other made by the courts of competent jurisdiction as mentioned in sec. 28 of the Rent Act. Mr. Vakil also drew our attention to sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act. Sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act provides as follows :29 (2) No further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under sub-sec. (1) hut the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that any such decision in appeal was according to law call for the case in which such decision was taken and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit. Mr. Vakil also invited our attention to sec. 31 of the Rent Act which deals with the procedure of the Court. Sec. 31 of the Rent Act provides as follows :31 The courts specified in secs. 28 and 29 shall follow the prescribed procedure in trying and hearing suits proceedings applications and appeals and in executing orders made by them. Mr. Vakil emphasised the fact that on a true reading of sec. 13 (1) (g) read with sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act it is the statutory obligation of the Court to be satisfied before it passes a decree for eviction in regard to the question of hardship as mentioned in sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act. He further submitted that the appeal which is filed under sec. 13 (1) (g) read with sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act it is the statutory obligation of the Court to be satisfied before it passes a decree for eviction in regard to the question of hardship as mentioned in sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act. He further submitted that the appeal which is filed under sec. 29 of the Rent Act is a continuation of the suit and hence it will be the duty and the statutory obligation of the appellate Court to take into consideration all the circumstances of the case and particularly the change in the circumstances and the subsequent events which might have taken place after the dismissal of the suit by the trial Court in order to decide the question of hardship as contemplated under sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act. Mr. Vakil submitted that for discharging the duty as contemplated under sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act the satisfaction of the Court concerned is a very vital aspect and it is impossible for the appellate Court to satisfy itself unless the appellate Court takes into consideration the change in the circumstances or the subsequent events which might have taken place after the disposal of the suit by the trial Court and which ave brought to the notice of the appellate Court. Placing reliance on sec. 31 of the Rent Act Mr. Vakil submitted that the procedure for the disposal of appeals must be followed as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Vakil therefore drew our attention to sec. 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sec. 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the powers of the appellate Court. Sec. 107 provides as under :107 (1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed an Appellate Court shall have power. (a) to determine a case finally; (b) to remand a case; (c) frame issues and refer them for trial; (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. (2) Subject as aforesaid the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. Mr. (2) Subject as aforesaid the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. Mr. Vakil submitted that the Appellate Court will have the same powers and the same duties as are conferred on the Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. Mr. Vakil submitted that if it is open to the trial Court to take into consideration all the circumatances or any event which had taken place prior to the disposal of the suit in the trial Court it would be equally the appellate Court also to take into consideration the change in circumstances or the subsequent event which had taken place after the disposal of the suit by the trial Court and before the appeal is finally disposed of by the appellate Court. ( 8 ) MR. Vakil also invited our attention to sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. Sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code provides as follows :151 Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise after the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Mr. Vakil submitted that in order to balance the social needs between landlords and tenants and in order to achieve the statutory object as mentioned in secs. 13 (1) (g) and 13 (2) of the Rent Act the appellate Court is also having inherent powers to record evidence in regard to the change of circumstances or the subsequent events which might have taken place after the disposal of the suit and before the disposal of the appeal. In substance Mr. Vakil submitted that there is no prohibition in the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits the appellate Court from recording evidence in regard to the change of circumstances or the subsequent events which might have taken place after the disposal of the suit and before the disposal of the appeal. Mr. Vakil also invited our attention to Order 7 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Vakil also invited our attention to Order 7 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code. Order 7 Rule 7 provides as under :7 Every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for. And the same rule shall apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement. Mr. Vakil also invited our attention to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 (i) (b) of the Civil Procedure Code. Order 41 Rule 27 (i) (b) of the Civil Procedure Code provides as follows :the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause the Appellates Court may allow such evidence or document or be produced or witness to be examined. "mr. Vakil submitted that in order to give effect to the statutory provision in Order 41 Rule 27 (i) (b) and more particularly to give effect to the use of the words for any substantial cause appearing in 0. 41 r. 27 (i) (b) the Appellate Court must record evidence in regard to the change of the circumstances or the subsequent events which might have taken place after the disposal of the suit and before the disposal of the appeal. ( 9 ) A large number of authorities were cited at the Bar to satisfy us that the Appellate Court must necessarily record evidence in regard to the change of circumstances or the subsequent events in order to consider the question of hardship as contemplated under sec 13 (2) of the Rent Act. ( 10 ) MR. Vakil firstly invited our attention to the judgment in Dudhwala Ambalal Lallubhai v. Gandhi Shamlal Keshavlal and others (Supra ). Mr. Vakil submitted that Justice Gajendragadkar (as he then was) while disposing of the Civil Revision Application No. 870 of 1954 did direct the trial Court to take into consideration the subsequent events which took place after the disposal of the suit by the trial Court. We may incidentally mention that in the Case before Mr. Mr. Vakil submitted that Justice Gajendragadkar (as he then was) while disposing of the Civil Revision Application No. 870 of 1954 did direct the trial Court to take into consideration the subsequent events which took place after the disposal of the suit by the trial Court. We may incidentally mention that in the Case before Mr. Gajendragadkar (as he then was) the suit was filed for getting the possession of the suit it premises from the applicant-tenent After the disposal of the suit was pointed out by the tenant to the Appellate Court to take additional evidence in respect of the contention that subsequent to the decision of the trial Court the premises in which the landlords son was residing had been let out to another tenant In that case the High Court was also informed that when the appeal was pending the whole of the property was sold to a stranger. In that case before the High Court it was also brought to the notice that after the disposal of the appeal the landlord himself had died. Suffice it to mention that Mr. Vakil placed reliance on this judgment to show that the High Court did direct the trial Court to take into consideration the aforesaid three subsequent events which took place after the disposal of the suit by the trial Court. He also drew our attention to the pertinent observation made by Gajendragadkar in that case. He drew our attention that His Lordship has observed that the Appellate Judge had taken very technical view of the whole matter and that the Appellate Judge did not see as to how he had jurisdiction to admit such evidence. Placing reliance on this judgment Mr. Vakil submitted that the Appellate (Court ought to have recorded the evidence as requested by the petitioners-tenants in the various applications submitted to the Appellate Court. ( 11 ) MR. Vakil also drew our attention to an unreported judgment in Panchal Ramanlal Babardas and ors. v. Soni Mahendraprasad Somchand delivered by Miabhoy J. (as he then was) in Civil Revision Application No. 416 of 1960 decided on 13-2-1969. We need not set out in detail the facts of this case as the same are not necessary for the disposal of the present civil revision application. v. Soni Mahendraprasad Somchand delivered by Miabhoy J. (as he then was) in Civil Revision Application No. 416 of 1960 decided on 13-2-1969. We need not set out in detail the facts of this case as the same are not necessary for the disposal of the present civil revision application. Suffice it to state that while disposing of the aforesaid Civil Revision Application No. 416 of 1960 Miabhoy J. (as he then was) took the view that the appeal is a continuation of the proceedings and that the decree passed by the trial Court was in a fluid state. He also took the view that in a suit for eviction on the ground for personal requirement the material point is whether the requirement does or does not subsist at the time when the Court passes the decree. Further observed that just as it was the duty of the trial Court to consider whether the requirement subsisted or not at the date of the passing of the decree it is equally the duty of the appellate Court to consider the same question when it passes the appellate decree. Having regard to this principle he felt no doubt whatsoever for arriving at the conclusion that the same result must follow on the cessation of the requirement during the pendency of an appeal as follows when the requirement ceases during the pendency of the suit. In substance the reasoning adopted by Miabhoy J. was that the Appellate Court must take into consideration the change in the circumstances or the subsequent events before the appeal is disposed of. ( 12 ) MR. Vakil also invited our attention to an unreported judgment in Second Appeal No 395 of 1964 decided on 22nd September 1973 by V. R. Shah J. While deciding the aforesaid Civil Revision Application V. R. Shah J. observed as follows :having considered the opposing view points I am of the opinion that the plea made by Mr. Shah should be accepted. There is no doubt that when a landlord filed a suit for possession on the ground of his need for personal occupation falling within the ambit of sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rate Control Act. Shah should be accepted. There is no doubt that when a landlord filed a suit for possession on the ground of his need for personal occupation falling within the ambit of sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rate Control Act. 1947 it is necessary for the landlord to prove not only that he had this necessity in existence at the date when he filed the suit but that such necessity continued right upto the making of the decree. The learned Judge in this judgment has followed the judgment given by Miabhoy J. (as he then was) in Civil Revision Application No. 416 of 1960 In the Second Appeal No. 395 of 1964 the landlady had died during the pendency of the second appeal and therefore the Court took the view that there was no need of personal occupation. Suffice it to state the disposal of this present revision applications that the aforesaid subsequent event which took place was taken into consideration. We may mention that after the death of the land-lady no need of personal occupation then survived for the legal representatives. In this view of the matter the learned Judge held that the legal representatives of the landlady had no right to get possession of the suit premises. Mr. Vakils submission was that the Court did take into consideration the subsequent events had taken place after the disposal of the suit by the trial Court. ( 13 ) MR. Vakil also invited our attention to the Bombay Rent Act by Dalal 4 Edition at pages 451 and 623 At page 451 it is stated by the learned Author as follows :where an ejectment suit was decreed on the ground of the landlords reasonable and bona fide requirement and the tenant appealed the material change of circumstances (viz. landlord obtaining a consent decree for possession against another tenant was not taken into account by the appeal Court but the High Court in revision directed the appeal Court to take that fact into consideration and the matter was remanded for taking further evidence. In this behalf the judgment delivered by Naik J. on 21st June 1960 in Michael DSouza v. Rehemtullah Suleman and Ors. In this behalf the judgment delivered by Naik J. on 21st June 1960 in Michael DSouza v. Rehemtullah Suleman and Ors. in Civil Revision Application No 380 of 1960 was not produced before the Court with the result we could not place any reliance for want of necessary certified copy of the judgment. Mr. Vakil also drew our attention at page 623 of the Bombay Rent Act of Dalal 4th Edition. The relevant passage is as follows:the reason for the aforesaid rule appears to be that the original relief claimed has by reason of the subsequent change of circumstances either become inappropriate or that it has become necessary to base the decision on the altered circumstances in order to shorten the litigation or to do completed justice between the parties. In this behalf Mr. Vakil drew our attention to the cases which are noted at page 623 and particularly the case decided by Shah J. on 13th August 1936 in Ratilal Meghji v. Haji Mahomed Haji Dawood. In Civil Revision Application No. 1971 of 1954 we are not having with us the certified copy of the judgment and hence we could not place any reliance on the same. Mr. Vakil has also drew our attention to a case which has been noted at the foot of page 623. That case is Radharani v. State of West Bengal 67 Calcutta Weekly Notes P. 318. But Mr. Vakil could not read that case before us. ( 14 ) WE may usefully refer to a reported decision in Lachmeshwar v. Keshwar Lal A. I R. 1941 Federal Court 5 Our purpose is served if we refer to the relevant head note (b) of the said decision. Head Note (b) provides as under :the hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of India is in the nature of re-hearing and therefore in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appellate Court is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against. Consequent the appellate Court is competent to take into account legislative changes since the decision in appeal was given and its powers are not confined only to see whether the lower Courts decision was correct according to the law as it stood at the time when its decision was given. Placing reliance on this judgment Mr. Consequent the appellate Court is competent to take into account legislative changes since the decision in appeal was given and its powers are not confined only to see whether the lower Courts decision was correct according to the law as it stood at the time when its decision was given. Placing reliance on this judgment Mr. Vakil submitted that it is the duty of the appellate Court to take into account even the facts and the events which have come into existence after the decree appealed from against. ( 15 ) IN Surinder Kumar v. Gian Chand A. I. R. 1957 Supreme Court 875 Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in para 6 of the judgment has observed as follows :as to the power of this Court there is no specific provision for the admission of additional evidence but R. 5 of 0. 45 of the Supreme Court Rules recognises the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent an abuse of process of the Court. Their Lordships have further observed as follows :the powers of this Court in regard to the admission of additional evidence are in no way less than that of the Privy Council. Moreover in deciding the appeal we have to take the circumstances as they are at the time when the appeal is being decided and a judgment in rem having been passed in favour of the appellants it is necessary to take that additional fact into consideration. In this case the relevant facts are that the plaintiffs brought a suit on a mortgage claiming to be heirs and representatives of the original mortgagee who had under a registered will bequeathed to them the rights in the mortgage. The suit was dismissed by the High Court holding that the plaintiffs had no locus standi to maintain the suit as the will was not properly attested. The plaintiffs thereafter applied for probate and obtained it in their favour. In appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court the plaintiffs-appellants applied for admission of additional evidence praying that the probate of the Will be placed on record. In the light of these facts the Supreme Court did admit the relevant evidence and took the probate on the record of the case. In appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court the plaintiffs-appellants applied for admission of additional evidence praying that the probate of the Will be placed on record. In the light of these facts the Supreme Court did admit the relevant evidence and took the probate on the record of the case. ( 16 ) IN Kotturuswami v. Veeravva A. I. R. 1959 Supreme Court 577 the Supreme Court in paragraph 4 has observed as follows : It is well settled that an appellate Court is entitled to take into consideration any change in the law. ( 17 ) IN Mohanlal v. Tribhovan A. I. R. 1963 Supreme Court 358 in paragraph 7 it has been observed as follows :it would thus appear that when the matter was still pending in the Court of Appeal the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court being dated September 27 1954 the notification cancelling the previous notification was issued. The suit had therefore to be decided on the basis that there was no notification in existence under sec. 88 (1) (d) which could take the disputed lands out of the operation of the Act. This matter was brought to the notice of the learned Assistant Judge who took the view that though on the merger of Baroda with Bombay in 1949 the defendants had the protection of the Act that protection had been taken away by the first notification which was cancelled by the second. That Court was of the opinion that though the appellate Court was entitled to take notice of the subsequent events. the suit had to be determined as on the state of facts in existence on the date of the suit and not as they existed during the pendency of the appeal. In that view of the matter the learned Appellate Court held that the tenants-defendants could not take advantage of the provisions of the Act and could not resist the suit for possession. In our opinion that was a mistaken view of the legal position. When the judgment of the lower Appellate Court was rendered the position in fact and law was that there was no notification under cl. (d) of sec. 88 (1) in operation so as to make the land in question immune from the benefits conferred by the Tenancy Law. In our opinion that was a mistaken view of the legal position. When the judgment of the lower Appellate Court was rendered the position in fact and law was that there was no notification under cl. (d) of sec. 88 (1) in operation so as to make the land in question immune from the benefits conferred by the Tenancy Law. In other words the tenants could claim the protection afforded by the law against eviction on the ground that the terms of the lease had expired. But it was argued on behalf of the appellants that the subsequent notification cancelling the first one could not take away the rights which had accrued to them as a result of the first notification. In our opinion this argument is without any force. If the landlords had obtained an effective decree and had succeeded in ejecting the tenants as a result of that decree which may have become final between the parties that decree may not have been reopened and the execution taken thereunder may not have been recalled. nut it was during the pendency of the suit at the appellate stage that the second notification was issued cancelling the first. Hence the Court was bound to apply the law as it found on the date of its judgment. Hence there is no question of taking away any vested rights in the landlords. It does not appear that the second notification cancelling the first notification had been brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge who heard and decided the second appeal in the High Court. At any rate there is no reference to the second notification. Be that as it may in our opinion the learned Judge came to the light conclusion in holding that the tenants Could not be ejected though for wrong reasons. The appeals are accordingly dismissed but there would be no order as to costs in this Court in view of the fact that the respondents had not brought the second notification concelling the first to the pointed attention of the High Court ( 18 ) MR. The appeals are accordingly dismissed but there would be no order as to costs in this Court in view of the fact that the respondents had not brought the second notification concelling the first to the pointed attention of the High Court ( 18 ) MR. Vakil also invited our attention to the decision in Nair Service Society v K. C. Alexander A. I. R. 1968 Supreme Court 1165 The Supreme Court has observed in para 29 as under :now it is a fixed principle of law that a suit must be tried on the original cause of action and this principle governs not only the trial of suits but also appeals. Indeed the appeal being a continuation of the suit new pleas are not considered. If circumstances change they can form the subject of some other proceedings but need not ordinarily be considered in the appeal. To this proposition there are a few exceptions. Sometimes it happens that the original relief claimed becomes inappropriate or the law changes affecting the rights of the parties. In such cases courts may allow an amendment pleading the changed circumstances. Sometimes also the changed circumstances shorten litigation and then to avoid circuity of action the courts allow an amendment. ( 19 ) IN J. C. Chatterjee v. S. K. Tandon A. I. R. 1972 Supreme Court 2526 the Supreme Court in para 9 of its judgment has observed as follows :it is now settled that after the termination of the contractual tenancy the statutory tenant has only a personal right to continue in possession till evicted in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court then proceeds to observe:a person remaining in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly though in law not accurately called a statutory tenant. Such a person is not a tenant at all; he has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the Statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases if any and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. Such a person is not a tenant at all; he has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the Statute in that he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases if any and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal: it is not capable of being transferred or assigned and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. These observations were made with reference to the provisions of Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act 1947 but it equally applies to the provisions of the Act with which we are concerned. The protection is withdrawn either because there is a change in the statute or because the person who is to be personally protected is no longer living the question arises as to what is the position of the legal representatives of the deceased statutory tenant qua the landlord in a proceeding of the nature with which we are concerned. ( 20 ) PLACING reliance on this judgment Mr. Vakil submitted that in the case before the Supreme Court the statutory tenant had died during the pendency of the appeal and the Supreme Court did take into consideration the subsequent event viz. the death of the statutory tenant and granted the necessary relief to the landlord. Our attention was also invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1310 of 1966 delivered on 9th September 1969 (State of Madhya Pradesh v D. N. Dutta ). Mr. Vakil drew our attention to the following passage iron; the aforesaid judgment :counsel for the State however contended that in a suit for injunction a money decree could not be passed. As we have already observed the plaint could have been amended and rights and obligations of the parties adjusted in the light of the subsequent developments which took place since the institution of the suit. If the High Court has without insisting upon the procedural requirements passed a decree for money to do justice between the parties we will not be justified in interfering with that order. If the High Court has without insisting upon the procedural requirements passed a decree for money to do justice between the parties we will not be justified in interfering with that order. The other argument of counsel for the State that by paragraph 20 of the plaint Dutta had reserved liberty to file a separate suit for refund of the sale proceeds of timber disposed of by the State and on that account the decree could not be given in this suit is without substance. obviously the liberty claimed did not relate to any sale of timber after the institution of the suit. We do not think that this request in the plaint praying for leave of the Court to file a separate suit for refund of the sale proceeds of the timber so disposed of the State prior to the suit operates as a bar against the jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief after adjusting the rights and obligations of the parties in the light of the developments subsequent to the institution of the suit. . ( 21 ) MR. Vakil submitted that the Supreme Court has accepted in principle that the Court must take into consideration the subsequent development Which might take place after the institution of the suit. Our attention was also invited to King v. Taylor Queens Bench Division Volume I p. 150 (All England Report p. 373 1954 In that case the landlord of the premises at Mitcham within the protection of the Rent Acts sought an order for possession on the ground that the premises were required for occupation as a residence for himself and his wife. It was the case of the landlord that he and his wife were old and in poor health and they desired to return to Mitcham from Sheresbury where the Were living in order that they might be near to a daughter who would be able to visit them frequently and to assist them in case of illness. The county court judge dismissed the application holding that greater hardship would be caused to the tenant by granting the application than by refusing it because the tenant had not found other accommodation. According to the evidence the tenant had made only very slight efforts to find other accommodation. The landlord being aggrieved by the judgment given by a county court judge had appealed. According to the evidence the tenant had made only very slight efforts to find other accommodation. The landlord being aggrieved by the judgment given by a county court judge had appealed. After the judgment of the county court and the hearing of the appeal the landlords wife had died. Considering the question of hardship the Appellate Court took the view that save in most exceptional circumstances the question of comparative hardship was one for the county court judge. Having regard to the proviso to paragraph (h) of Schedule I to the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act 1933 the question whether other accommodation was available was a relevant circumstance in considering the balance of hardship. There being some evidence of hardship the decision of the county court judge could not be the subject of appeal. It was observed that:having regard to the imperative language of sec. 3 of the Act of 1933 and the proviso to paragraph (b) it seems to me that if in such a case as this it is shown to the Court that the circumstances have changed materially (and I mean by materially in a way which is material in the consideration and enforcement of the provisions of the Act) since the date of the hearing before the county court it does not by any means follow that this court is entitled to ignore that change of circumstances. The proper course is for the Court which is asked to make an order for possession to take into consideration all the circumstances which are then before it. In the converse case where the county court has made an order for possession. then no doubt the function of this court on an appeal is prima facie at any rate to consider whether the order was rightly made having regard to the facts and circumstances which were before the county courtwe may set out here the relevant proviso to paragraph (h) of Schedule I to the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act 1933 The relevant proviso is as follows :that an order or judgment shall not be made or given on any ground specified in paragraph (h ). . . . . . . . . if the court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant greater hardship would be caused by granting the order or judgment than by refusing to grant it. We may mention that the language of the proviso which we have set out hereinabove is practically the same as provided in sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act. Mr. Vakil submitted that this reported cast in King v. Taylor (supra) also lays down the principle that the appeal court should take into consideration the change of the circumstances or the subsequent events which might take place after the disposal of the suit of the trial Court. ( 22 ) IN Govind v. Jairam A. I. R. 1963 Madras 456 at page 460 Their Lordships of the Madras High Court have observed as follows :it is well sealed principle that a Court has got an inherent power to take note of subsequent events and to mould the reliefs to the parties in accordance therewith and for that purpose permit amendments to the petition before it. ( 23 ) IN Subramaniam v Sundaram A. I. R. 1963 Madras 217 at page 220 in paragraph 11 it is observed by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court as follows :we shall first dispose of the contention relating to the propriety of the adjudicating Court taking note of events subsequent to the filing of the insolvency petition Broadly and generally stated the rule is that the rights of parties have to be determined and pronounced upon as on the date of the commencement of the lis before the Court. This is not however a stubborn or inflexible rule and it has to give way in instance where unless the subsequent events are considered and taken into account grave injustice would result or the decision of the Court would become a mockery. ( 24 ) IN Gnanasambandan v. Radhakrishna Pillai 1972. The Madras Law Journal Reports p. 478 at page 481 the Court has observed as follows :i am of the view that considering the principles laid down in the above decisions the main question that has to be decided is the bona fide intention of the landlord to have the additional accommodation asked for. The Madras Law Journal Reports p. 478 at page 481 the Court has observed as follows :i am of the view that considering the principles laid down in the above decisions the main question that has to be decided is the bona fide intention of the landlord to have the additional accommodation asked for. As far as the facts and circumstances stand as now the Authorities below never had the opportunity to consider the subsequent events. Admittedly both the sons of the landlord have married and there is a grandchild to the landlord. Once it is conceded that the demand is bona fide it is for the landlord to choose the portions for his additional accommodation and it is not for the tenants to dictate or direct the landlord to take such and such portions for additional accommodation. In Satish Chandra v. State of West Bengal A. I. R. 1960 Calcutta 278 in para 27 it is observed as follows :ordinarily the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stand at the date of its institution. But where it is shown that the original relief claimed has by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate or that it is necessary to have the decision of the court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties it is incumbent upon a court to take notice of events which have happened since the institution of the suit and to mould its decree according to the circumstances as they stand at the time the decree is made. ( 25 ) IN Bhola Ram v Peari Devi A. I. R. 1962 Patna 168 at page 177 it is observed as follows:a suit is to be tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed at the date of its commencement. ( 25 ) IN Bhola Ram v Peari Devi A. I. R. 1962 Patna 168 at page 177 it is observed as follows:a suit is to be tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed at the date of its commencement. An exception to this rule namely that a court may take notice of events which have happened since the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties on the basis of the altered conditions is applied in cases where it is shown that the original relief claimed has reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate or that it is necessary to base the decision of the Court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties ( 26 ) IN Amritlal v. Kantilal A. I. R 1931 Bombay 280 at page 282 it is observed as follows :a Court of appeal can vary a decree under appeal not for error but also on ground which have come into existence since it was passed ordinarily the decree in suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stand at the date of its institution but where it is shown that the original relief claimed has by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate or that it is necessary to have to decision of the Court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties it is incumbent upon a Court of justice to take notice of events which have happened since the institution of the suit and to mould its decree according to the circumstances as they stand at the time the decree is made. ( 27 ) IN Ram Gobind Singh v. Ramranbijai Singh A. I. R. 1958 Patna 379 at page 282 it is observed as follows :if however it is brought to the notice of the appellate Court that there have been some subsequent events or legislations on the matter in controversy between the parties then the appellate Court will take judicial notice of the subsequent events and the change in the law to quiten or shorten litigation between the parties a to do complete justice between them. ( 28 ) IN Daniraiji Vrajlalji v. V. M. Chandraprabha A. I. R. 1971 Gujarat 188 at page 202 it is observed as follows :we find that the learned trial Judge was correct when he applied the ratio of the decision given by the High Court of Bombay in the case of Laxmibai Wamanrao v. Wamanrao Govindrao reported in A. I. R. 1953 Bom. 342 to the fact of the present case. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court have held in that case that ordinarily the rule is that a Court should give its decision on the facts and circumstances as they existed at the date of the institution of the suit or at the date of any subsequent amendment of the pleadings and should not take notice of events which have happened after such date. After accepting this ordinary rule they have further observed that inspite of this rule the Courts have power in proper cases to take notice of events subsequent to the suit in order to shorten litigation avoid unnecessary expenditure and do complete justice between the parties. If facts of this case are taken into account it will be found that even before the defendant filed his written statement the plaintiff made an unequivocal declaration as to the revocation of the adoption of the defendant. The plaintiff also took care to give notice of this revocation to the defendants guardian and his brother. The defendant has filed his written statement with reference to this allegation of revocation and the whole suit has proceeded on the basis that by virtue of this document of written declaration the plaintiff has revoked the adoption. Under the circumstances the evidence recorded in this case also shows that both the parties have offered evidence and have focussed their attention on the question whether revocation has in fact taken place and whether such a revocation can legally be made by the plaintiff. Under these circumstances it would not help the ends of justice to be too technical about the matter. We therefore find that it is not possible to non-suit the plaintiff on the ground. Incidentally Mr. Vakil also drew our attention to a reported decision in Commissioner of Income-Tax v. M/s. Mcmillan and Co. A. I. R. 1958 Supreme Court P. 207. Mr. We therefore find that it is not possible to non-suit the plaintiff on the ground. Incidentally Mr. Vakil also drew our attention to a reported decision in Commissioner of Income-Tax v. M/s. Mcmillan and Co. A. I. R. 1958 Supreme Court P. 207. Mr. Vakil drew our attention only to the following portion in the head-note appearing in the said judgment. In the third case also the appellate authority can interfere and set aside the opinion or determination of the Income-tax officer and in doing so the appellate authority must form his opinion if the method of accounting is proper and acceptable. ( 29 ) IN view of the aforesaid decisions pointed out by Mr. Vakil before us Mr. Vakil submitted that the ratio applied and accepted by Bavdekar J. in Shantarams case (supra) is not proper nor just. Accordingly he also submitted that the reasoning and the ultimate conclusion and the acceptance of the aforesaid ratio by Gokhale J in Vinayak Trimbaks case (Supra) is also not proper and if accepted would result into a gross miscarriage of justice. He submitted on the strength of the aforesaid decisions and even on a plain reading of the provisions contained in sec. 13 (1) (g) read with sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act it is the duty of the appellate Court to take into account all the subsequent events and the change in circumstances which might take place after the disposal of the suit by the trial Court and before the disposal of the appeal in order to do complete justice between the parties. He further submitted that in order to achieve the aforesaid statutory object as embodied in sec 13 (2) of the Rent Act it was the duty and the obligation of the Appellate Court to give the necessary permission to the petitioners-tenants to lead the evidence on various points as prayed by them in various applications given to the learned Assistant Judge before the disposal of the appeals of the opponent-landlady. ( 30 ) IN regard to Civil Application No. 1286 of 1972 Mr. Vakils submission was that on a true reading of sec. ( 30 ) IN regard to Civil Application No. 1286 of 1972 Mr. Vakils submission was that on a true reading of sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act this Court will have no jurisdiction either to investigate any new facts or to record any evidence in that behalf or to take into consideration any new facts or change of circumstances or subsequent event after the passing of the decree by the Appellate Court except the consideration of admitted facts: e. g. the death of a party after the filing of the revision application in this Court. In the light of this submission Mr. Vakil requested us to reject the application filed by the opponent-landlady. ( 31 ) SEC. 29 (2) in terms provides that where no further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under sub-sec. (1) but the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that the decree or order made was according to law call for the case in which such decree or order was made and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit. Mr. Vakil in this behalf invited our attention to the passage from the Bombay Rent Act by Dalal 4th Edition at page 627 which is in the following terms:the expression may call for the case has become a term of art to connote the revisional or the superintending nature of the power conferred on the authority as contradistinguished from the appellate power. We have carefully examined the statutory language employed by the Legislature in sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act. ( 32 ) IN S. S. Khanna v. F. J. Dillon A. I. R. 1964 Supreme Court 497 at page 500 it has been stated that the necessity arising out of peculiar circumstances to invest the High Courts with the power to rectify errors committed by subordinate Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction and to consequent investitute of the power are indicative of the extent of that power. The power to correct error being one of superintendence. The power to correct error being one of superintendence. Hence we are satisfied that this Court will have no jurisdiction to record evidence in regard to new facts or to investigate new facts in relation to change of circumstances or subsequent events which might take place after the disposal of the appeal and before the disposal of the revision application except the consideration of admitted facts: e. g. the death of a party after the filing of the revision application in this Court. In this view of the matter we see lot of force in Mr. Vakils submission when he has tried to persuade us to take the view that when this Court exercises its powers under sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act will not record any evidence for investigation of new facts or will not take into account any change of circumstances or subsequent events which might take place after the disposal of the appeal by the appellate Court. (except the admitted facts e. g the death of a party or such other like events.) ( 33 ) MR. Vakil also invited our attention to a decision in Habib Nasir Khanji v. State XI Gujarat Law Reporter p. 307. It is observed in para 27 of this judgment as follows :in this case the State Government as held by us was exercising revisional jurisdiction under sec. 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. Therefore it had no jurisdiction to receive any additional evidence in the matter. Within the meaning of the Bombay Land Revenue Code it should have confined itself to the record and proceed ings of the case when it examined the legality or the propriety of the decision of Collector or of the Prant Officer or examined the regularity of the proceedings either before the Collector or before the Prant Officer. Even otherwise sec. 211 lays down a very sound principle by excluding the power of the revisional authority to take additional evidence. Even otherwise sec. 211 lays down a very sound principle by excluding the power of the revisional authority to take additional evidence. The revisional authority which examines the legality or propriety of a decision or order of a subordinate officer or regularity of any proceeding before him cannot take additional evidence and uphold the legality and propriety of a decision or order the regularity of any proceedings nor can it came to a conclusion otherwise on the basis of such additional evidence because the State Government is the final authority under the Bombay Land Revenue Code and there is no appellate or any other check under this Code against its findings which may be based upon such additional evidence and which shall therefore to be a certain extent original and final in character. If such powers are conferred upon the final authority under this Code and are exercised by it they have the potentiality of opening floodgates of mischief capable of disturbing the settled property rights of the citizens Placing reliance on the aforesaid decision Mr. Vakil submitted that this Court can call for the record while exercising powers under sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act for the purpose of satisfying itself whether the order passed was according to law or not. In the submission of Mr. Vakil it is open to this Court to rectify errors committed by subordinate Court in the exercise of their jurisdiction under sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act. From this view point Mr. Vakil submitted that this Court can have no jurisdiction to examine any new facts or to investigate into new circumstances after the disposal of the appeal and during the pendency of the Civil Revision Application. ( 34 ) IN view of the submission Mr. Vakil requested that both the civil revision applications which have been filed by the petitioners-tenants should be accepted by this Court and we should direct the Appellate Court to give to the petitioners-tenants the necessary permission to lead evidence as requested by them in various applications which they had filed before the learned Assistant Judge In regard to Civil Application No. 1268 of 1970 Mr. Vakil submitted that the Court should reject the Civil Application filed by the opponent-landlady as she had requested this Court to take into consideration a subsequent event which had taken place after the disposal of the appeals by the learned Assistant Judge Baroda. ( 35 ) THE learned advocate appearing on behalf of the opponent-landlady resisted the proposition of law canvassed by Mr. Vakil before us. It was submitted that when the Appellate Court disposes of an appeal filed under sec. 29 (1) of the Rent Act for the Appellate Court to take into consideration any facts on which there is a controversy between the parties. It was fairly conceded that it was open for the Appellate Court to take into consideration any subsequent changes in the legislation which might have been passed after the disposal of the suit and during the pendency of the appeal and also to take into consideration any admitted facts between the litigating parties. From this point our attention was invited to the decisions which were cited by Mr. Vakil. Referring to the decision in Lachmeshwar v. Keshwerlal A. I. R. 1941 Federal Court 5 it was submitted that in that case there was subsequent change in the legislation after the disposal of the suit by the trial Court. It was urged that no new facts or no new events had come into existence after the disposal of the suit by the trial Court. From this view point it was submitted on behalf of the opponent-landlady that it is not correct to say that it is open to the Appellate Court to take into consideration or to take into account any facts or events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against. From this view point we have carefully examined the aforesaid decision. In clearest and categorical terms in the aforesaid decision it is observed by the Federal Court as follows at page 13 :the Court of appeal is entitled to take into account even Facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against. The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the opponent-landlady has also made similar submission in regard to the reported decision in Mohanlal v. Tribhovan A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 358. The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the opponent-landlady has also made similar submission in regard to the reported decision in Mohanlal v. Tribhovan A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 358. In regard to this decision it was pointed out to us that after the dismissal of the suit the authority concerned had issued a second notification. It was submitted that the said notification was issued during the appeal and that the Supreme Court was of the view that it was the duty of the Appellate Court to take into consideration the subsequent notification which was issued by the authorities concerned. On these premises it was submitted that no new facts had come into existence after the suit. In substance the submission was that the issuance of the subsequent notification was something in the nature of legislation and therefore the view of the Supreme Court was open for the Appellate Court to take into consideration the subsequent notification after the disposal of the suit and during the appeal. In any view of the matter the learned advocate for the opponent submitted that this case also does not lay down a proposition that it was open to the Appellate Court to take into consideration any new facts or any change of the circumstances or any subsequent events. From this view point we have examined this decision and it is not possible for us to agree with the submissions made by the learned Advocate for the opponentlandlady. In paragraph 7 of this very judgment Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed in so many terms as follows :the appellate Court was entitled to take notice of the subsequent events the suit had to be determined as on the state of facts in existence on the date of the suit and not as they existed during the pendency of the appeal. In that view of the matter the learned Appellate Court held that the tenants-defendants could not take advantage of the provisions of the Act and could not resist the suit for possession. In our opinion that was a mistaken view of the legal position. When the judgment of the lower Appellate Court was rendered the position in fact and law was that there was no notification under cl. (d) of sec. In our opinion that was a mistaken view of the legal position. When the judgment of the lower Appellate Court was rendered the position in fact and law was that there was no notification under cl. (d) of sec. 88 (1) in operation so as to make the land in question immune from the benefits conferred by the Tenancy law. In other words the tenants could claim the protection afforded by the law against eviction on the ground that the term of the lease had expired But it was argued on behalf of the appellants that the subsequent notification cancelling the first one could not take away the rights which had accrued to them as a result of the first notification. In our opinion this argument is without any force If the landlords had obtained an effective decree and had succeeded in ejecting the tenants as a result of that decree which may have become final between the parties that decree may not have been reopened and the execution taken thereunder may not have been recalled. But it was during the pendency of the suit at the appellate stage that the second notification was issued cancelling the first. Hence the Court was bound to apply the law as it found on the date of its judgment. We have carefully examined this decision of the Supreme Court and it is not possible for us to agree with the submission made by the learned advocate on behalf of the opponent-landlady. ( 36 ) THE learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opponentlandlady also drew our attention to the various decisions cited by Mr. Vakil where even after the disposal of the suit and during the pendency of the appeal certain new facts had come into existence. In some of the cases referred hereinabove in course of this judgment we have pointed out that after the disposal of the suit and during the pendency of the appeal sometimes a litigant had secured a probate and the necessary direction was given by the Supreme Court that the probate should be taken on the record of the case. We may also incidentally mention that in some of the cases which were cited before us the tenant had died during the pendency of the appeal. We may also incidentally mention that in some of the cases which were cited before us the tenant had died during the pendency of the appeal. Surely that would be something in he nature of a new fact or a subsequent event which had taken place after the disposal of the suit and during the pendency of the appeal. We have referred to number of decisions wherein the Courts have accepted as a principle of law that the Appellate Court should take into consideration new facts or subsequent events or any change in the circumstances after the disposal of the suit and before the disposal of the appeal. Shortly stated the death of a litigant the production of the probate and revocation of the adaptation are surely circumstances which had nothing to do with any legislation nor can it be said that there was no controversy between the litigating parties over the said facts. The Courts have consistently taken the view that in order to shorten the litigation or to do the complete justice between the parties it is imperative to take into account the change in the circumstances or the subsequent events. We have carefully considered the submission of the learned advocate in this behalf and it is not possible for us to accept the submission of the learned advocate. ( 37 ) IT was also alleged on behalf of the opponent that the appellate Court can only exercise its powers to record additional evidence having regard to the provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure only. It was submitted that as there is an express provision in the Civil Procedure Code in regard to the recording of additional evidence it is not open to the Appellate Court to record evidence in regard to new events or the change in the circumstances which might have taken place after the disposal of the suit by the trial Court. We pointedly requested the learned advocate for the opponent-landlady to point out to us any express provision in the Civil Procedure Code which contemplates the necessary prohibition put on the powers of the appellate Court to record evidence in regard to the new events or the subsequent change in the circumstances after the disposal of the suit by the trial Court. Inspite of our pointed request in this behalf the learned advocate for the oppoent-landlady could not point out to us any provision from the Civil Procedure Code putting a prohibition limitation or restriction on the powers of the Appellate Court to record evidence for the aforesaid purpose. In that view of the matter it is not possible for us to accept the submission of the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the opponent-landlady in this behalf. ( 38 ) IN this behalf it is not possible for us to agree with the submission of the learned Advocate for the opponent that the provisions of sec. 107 of the Civil Procedure Code in any way control or limit the inherent powers of the Court as mentioned in sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. Nor is it possible for us to take the view that in view of the express provisions in Order 41 Rule 27 Civil Procedure Code the inherent powers to record evidence are curtailed in any manner as submitted by the learned advocate for the opponent. In this behalf it is pertinent to note that even Order 41 Rule 27 (1) (b) provides:the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The use of the words for any other substantial cause are very significant and important and surely the said words can be effectively pressed into service by the Appellate Court for the purpose of recording evidence in order to do complete justice between the parties and to effectively discharge the statutory obligation imposed on the Appellate Court having regard to the provisions contained in sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act. 13 (2) of the Rent Act. ( 39 ) WE may usefully refer to the provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides as follows :the Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection; provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under sec. 35a in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order. On reading the aforesaid provision contained in the Civil Procedure Code we are further convinced that the Appellate Court has got power to pass or make any older as the case may require. It is needless to repeat that in the instant cases in order to do complete justice between the parties as contemplated under sec. 13 (2) of the Rent Act the Appellate Court must take into account new facts or the subsequent events or the change in the circumstances and for the purpose of achieving that object the Appellate Court must give the necessary permission to the litigating parties to lead necessary evidence in that behalf. ( 40 ) THE learned advocate appearing on behalf of the opponent-landlady also drew our attention to a reported case in Appalasuri v. Kannamma Nayurala A. I. R. 1926 Madras 6 The learned advocate brought to our notice head note (b) from the said judgment which provides as follows:events that happened even after the filing of the suit including those that add to the title of the plaintiff may be taken notice of so that a cause of action that arose after the filing of the suit can be included by the amendment of a plaint. But the discretion ought not to be exercised when there is a change of jurisdiction where there is a great delay in making the application and may not be exercised if a fresh enquiry on other facts is necessary. But the discretion ought not to be exercised when there is a change of jurisdiction where there is a great delay in making the application and may not be exercised if a fresh enquiry on other facts is necessary. But when these features do not exist the amendment sought as a general rule to be allowed to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. In all such cases the only question of consequence is one of Court-fees a matter with which the parties are not concerned and the opposite party is not deprived of any defence which is open to him. Placing reliance on the aforesaid head note it was urged that it was not open for the Appellate Court to take into consideration any new facts involving in fresh inquiry. Our attention was also drawn to a judgment reported in Mahendra v. Sushila A. I. R. 1965 Supreme Court p. 364. The learned advocate pointedly drew our attention to head note G which provides as follows :appellate Courts power under sec. 107 of the Civil Procedure Code to remand a case or to frame issues and refer them for trial or to take additional evidence or require such evidence to be taken is regulated by the provisions of Order 41 Rules 23 to 25 and 27. Rule 25 circumscribes the powers of the Appellate Court to frame an issue and refer the same for trial to the Court below if need be by taking additional evidence and permits it to adopt this course only if (a) the trial Court had omitted to frame an issue (b) try an issue or (c) to determine any question of fact which appears to the Appellate Court essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits. There is no scope for exercise of power under Rule 25 where the trial Court already had raised the necessary issues which the appellate Court purported to remand for finding. In such a case in view of the express provisions of this rule the High Court cannot have recourse to inherent powers because it is well settled that inherent powers can he vailed of ex debito justitias only in the absence of express provisions in the Code. We have carefully considered the observations made by the Supreme Court in this behalf. We have carefully considered the observations made by the Supreme Court in this behalf. Having regard to the facts and the circumstances of the matters before us this decision does not assist us in arriving at a just decision in the case. . ( 41 ) THE learned Advocate for the opponent land-lady also invited our attention to a reported decision in M/s. Laxmi and Co. v. Dr. Anand R. Deshpande (1973) I Supreme Court Cases 37 In para 27 of the said judgment it is observed as follows :it is true that the Court can take notice of subsequent events. These cases are where the Court finds that because of altered circumstances like devaluation of interest it is necessary to shorten litigation. Where the original relief has become imappropriate by subsequent events the Court can take notice of such changes. If the Court finds that the judgment of the Court cannot be carried into effect because of change of circumstances the Court takes notice of the same. If the Court finds that the matter is no longer in controversy the court also takes notice of such event. If the property which is the subject-matter of suit is no longer available the court will take notice of such event. The court takes notice of subsequent events to shorten litigation to preserve rights of both the parties and to subsequent the ends of justice. Judged by these principles it is manifest that in the present case suits are pending. On the one hand the appellant has challenged the decree obtained by Ashar and others as also the warrant of execution. On the other hand the suit instituted by Ashar and others against inter alia the appellant in 1965 for possession is pending. This Court cannot say with exactitude that any final decision has been reached on the respective and rival rights and claims of the appellant and the respondent. It is therefore. neither desirable nor practicable to take notice of any fact on the rival versions of the parties as to subsequent events. The learned advocate wanted to take the advantage of the observations contained in this paragraph to persuade us to take the view that in the instant cases this Court should not direct the Appellate Court to take into account the subsequent events Or the altered circumstances. The learned advocate wanted to take the advantage of the observations contained in this paragraph to persuade us to take the view that in the instant cases this Court should not direct the Appellate Court to take into account the subsequent events Or the altered circumstances. It is not possible for us to agree with the submission which is made by the learned advocate. On the contrary the observations contained in this para are sufficiently clear and in categorical terms Their Lordships have laid down that it is open to the Court to take notice of subsequent events. In so many terms the Supreme Court has observed that The Court should preserve rights of both the parties to subsequent the ends of justice. In this view of the matter it is not possible for us to agree with the submissions made by the learned advocate in regard to this decision. ( 42 ) THE learned advocate for the opponent-landlady also invited our attention to the decision in Lilaram v. Meghraj A. I. R. 1972 Gujarat 56 The learned advocate pointedly drew our attention to para 12 of this judgment. It provides as follows :in my opinion therefore a subsequent legislation affecting the rights of the parties in the litigation can be taken into account has no other subsequent events in the shape of new facts can be considered at an appellate or revisional stage. An appellate or revisional Court must confine itself to the circumstances of the case on record when the judgment under appeal or revision was delivered. To do otherwise is to place a premium on the protraction of litigation to use the words of Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjee of Calcutta High Court. In other words to do otherwise would mean that to use the language of that great and eminent judge again the rights of the parties would depend not upon the merits of the controversy between them but upon the length of time over which the litigation might be protracted and upon accidental circumstances whether a subordinate Court has or has not taken an erroneous view of the rights and obligations of the parties. In other words a suit must be tried and decided on its original cause of action as stated in the plaint or in the amended plaint at all stages of that litigation. In other words a suit must be tried and decided on its original cause of action as stated in the plaint or in the amended plaint at all stages of that litigation. With respect it is not possible for us to be in entire agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge in the aforesaid judgment. We have pointed out a large number of decisions particularly the decisions of the Supreme Court and the decisions of the other various High Courts who have consistently taken the view that it is open to the appellate Court to take into account new facts it they have come into existence after the disposal of the suit and during the pendency of the appeal either with a view to shorten the litigation or to do complete justice between the parties. What weighed with all the Courts was that the ends of justice must be effectively served. In the matters before us there is one additional ground which should substantially weigh with us. Matters arising under the Rent Act while considering the question of hardship the Court must satisfy itself on the question of requirement of the premises on the evidence led before the Court. The Court must necessarily take into consideration as discussed by in course of this judgment all the relevant circumstances and more particularly the altered circumstances and the subsequent events to do complete justice between the parties. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge in the aforesaid judgment that it is not open to the Court at the revisional stage to take into account any new facts which would require investigation in view of the statutory language of sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge in the aforesaid judgment that it is not open to the Court at the revisional stage to take into account any new facts which would require investigation in view of the statutory language of sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act. Except the admitted facts e. g. the death of a party or such other like events ( 43 ) OUR attention was also invited to the judgment of this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 261 of 1969 decided on March 21 1972 by D. A Desai J. It was pointed out to us that during the pendency of that revision application the tenant-petitioner had filed an affidavit on February 21 1972 in which he had stated that one Kantilal Jethalal who was the tenant of one room on the first floor and was also possessing one room on the second floor as a tenant of the house had vacated the premises and that the landlord had obtained possession of two rooms and that aspect may be taken into consideration while disposing of that revision application. On the same day one Jayantibhai Sanabhai the respondents son filed an affidavit stating therein that the petitioner-tenant bas vacated the room and had gone to reside at Highway Park Society Ramnagar Ambavadi Bunglow No. 24 Sabarmati since June 1970 and that aspect should be taken into consideration. A further affidavit was filed by Jayantilal on 28th February 1972 in reply to the affidavit filed by tenant-petitioner on 21-2-1972. The learned Judge while disposing of the aforesaid civil revision has stated in his judgment as follows :mr. Patel put strong reliance on the judgment of my learned brother S H. Sheth J. in Civil Revision Application No 508 of 1968 along with Civil Application No. 1567 of 1971 decided on 1st September 1971 In that case tenant-petitioner gave a civil application for permission to lead additional evidence in respect of three subsequent events namely: (1) plaintiff has died since passing of the appellate decree (2) Tulsidas one of the plaintiffs sons has got a bungalow in his possession in Nayana Society in the City of Baroda; and (3) plaintiffs another son G. M. Kelwani has got another similar bungalow in Nayana Society in the City of Baroda. My learned brother rejected this civil application observing that these are subsequent events which cannot be taken into consideration when the matter is before the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The application was rejected with the observation that the suit must be tried and decided on its original cause of action as stated in the plaint or in the amended plaint at all stages of that litigation. It is further observed in this judgment as follows :taking the ratio of S. H Sheths aforementioned judgment it comes to this that it would not be open to the Court to take any subsequent events into consideration while disposing of a civil revision application under sec 29 of the Bombay Rent Act. I will accept the ratio as binding on this Court with this little suggestion that there is important judgment of the Supreme Court bearing on this very point which in fact appears not to have been brought to the notice of my learned brother. In Maharaj Jagat Bahadur Singh v Badri Prasad Sheth (1962) Supp. 3 S. C. R. 952 the question that was in terms raised was whether the Rent Controller can take into consideration the events that occurred after filing of the application for eviction. The Controller declined to take these events into consideration but in appeal the District Judge did take such events into consideration and moulded the decree accordingly. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the learned District Judge wrongly took into consideration facts which had come into existence after the filing of the application under sec. 13 (1) of the Act. Negativing this contention it was observed that having regard to the scheme and purpose of the legislation it was open to the learned District Judge to take into consideration such facts as existed at the time when the order for eviction was to come into effect. In fact ordinarily speaking subsequent events especially in a litigation under the Bombay Rent Act will have to be examined because the decree Will have to be moulded according to the facts as are in existence on the date of the decree. We have carefully perused the reported decision in Maharaj Jajat Bahadur Singh v. Badri Prasad Sheth (1962) Supp. In fact ordinarily speaking subsequent events especially in a litigation under the Bombay Rent Act will have to be examined because the decree Will have to be moulded according to the facts as are in existence on the date of the decree. We have carefully perused the reported decision in Maharaj Jajat Bahadur Singh v. Badri Prasad Sheth (1962) Supp. 3 S. C. R. 952 a case on which reliance was placed by my brother D. A. Desai J. while disposing of Civil Revision Application No. 261 of 1969 on 21st March 1972 At page 959 of the Supreme Courts Judgment the relevant paragraph read as under : The learned Attorney General has argued that the learned District Judge wrongly took into consideration facts which had come into existence after the filing of the application under sec. 13 of the Act. Here again we think that having regard the scheme and purpose of the legislation it was open to the learned District Judge to take into consideration such facts as existed at the time when the order for vacation was to come into effect. Sec. 13 (3) (b) says that the Controller shall if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller. In the present case the Controller made the order in July 1957 and directed the building to be vacated by September 25 1957 But long before that date namely on June 8 1957 the Executive Engineer Central P. W. D. had inspected the building and found that the pillar had been repaired satisfactorily. The Controller did not accept the testimony of the Executive Engineer and the learned District Judge pointed out that the testimony of the Executive Engineer had been rejected by the Controller on very insufficient grounds. It was open to the learned District Judge to take into consideration the testimony of the Executive Engineer and having regard to that testimony the learned District Judge rightly came to the conclusion that cl. (iii) of sec. 13 (3) (a) of the Act was not attracted to the case. It was open to the learned District Judge to take into consideration the testimony of the Executive Engineer and having regard to that testimony the learned District Judge rightly came to the conclusion that cl. (iii) of sec. 13 (3) (a) of the Act was not attracted to the case. We have carefully considered the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Maharaj Jagat Bahadur Sings case (supra) and have noticed that the Supreme Court did not deal with the question of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In the case before the Supreme Court the Controller did not take into consideration the testimony of the Executive Engineer. When the matter came before the District Judge the District Judge thought it expedient and desirable to take into consideration the testimony of the Engineer to do complete justice between the parties. An argument was advanced that the District Judge was in error in taking into consideration the testimony of the Executive Engineer This submission was not accepted by the Supreme Court. Reading the entire judgment in Maharajs case (supra) we could not find any observation of the Supreme Court dealing with the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court as regards its powers for investigation of new facts which had been brought to the notice of the High Courtin this view of the matter with respect it is not possible to agree with the view taken by D. A. Desai J. when he disposed of Civil Revision Application No. 261 of 1961 on 21st March 1970 Once again we should like to emphasise the fact that when the High Court exercises its revisional powers under sec. 29 (2) it mast be fully conscious of the fact that revisional powers of the High Court can only be exercised to correct or rectify the errors of law committed by the lower Courts. 55 Our attention was also drawn to the judgment given by M. U. Shah J. in Civil Revision Applications Nos. 1271 and 1272 of 1967 decided on 6th September 1972 While disposing of the aforesaid two civil revision applications it has been observed as follows : As regards the question of greater hardship so far as it concerns tenant Mahendraprasad of the first floor he has as appears from the affidavit filed in Civil Application No. 1412 of 1971 obtained possession of a bungalow. In would therefore consider the case of tenant Mahendraprasad on a different footing. In my opinion the circumstances and conditions obtaining at the time of the passing of the decree have to be considered. Such is the view which has been taken by D A. Desai J. in Civil Revision Application No. 261 of 1969 decided on March 21 1972 wherein the learned judge has considered the decision of S. H. Sheth J. and having regard to the view taken by the Supreme Court in Maharaj Jagat Bahadur Singh v. Badri Prasad Sheth (1962) Supp. 3 S. C R. 952 he has observed that the circumstances and conditions obtaining at the date of the decree ought to have been taken into account and the decree must be moulded accordingly. I am in agreement with the reasoning adopted by the learned Judge which proceeds on the view taken by the Supreme Court in Maharaj Jagat Bahadur Singh v. Badri Prasad Sheth. The view taken by Mr. S H. Sheth J. will therefore not prevail over the decision of the Supreme Court. In am inclined to accept the facts stated in the Civil Application No. 1442 of 1972 and to hold that the tenant Mahendraprasad petitioner of Civil Revision Applica tion No. 5272 of 1967 has obtained possession of a newly constructed building which is in the name of his wife. The learned Judge while disposing of the aforesaid two Civil revision applications. placed reliance on the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in Maharaj Jagat Bahadur Singh (supra) and the decision given by D. A. Desai J. in Civil Revision Application NO. 261 of 1969 decided on 21st March 1972 For the reasons which we have mentioned above With respect it is not possible for as to agree with the view taken by D. A. Desai J. in Civil Revision Application No. 261 of 1969. 56 We may usefully also refer to a reported decision in Thakkar Anandji v. Dharamshi Kalabhai A. I. R. 1972 Gujarat 70 XIII G. L. R. 819. In para 6 of the said judgment the learned Judge who had delivered the judgment has referred to the Certain observations made by Divan J. in Second Appeal No. 756 of 1960 with Civil Applns. Nos. In para 6 of the said judgment the learned Judge who had delivered the judgment has referred to the Certain observations made by Divan J. in Second Appeal No. 756 of 1960 with Civil Applns. Nos. 184-A of 1960 1258 and 1259 of 1964 dated 24th February 1965 (State of Bombay v. Vora Ibrahim Akbarali) Divan J. while disposing of the aforesaid matter has observed as follows:i respectfully agree with the observations of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court. In the instant ease also the additional evidence which the plaintiff-respondent in this second appeal wants to lead before this court has come into existence after disposal of the first appeal by the learned District Judge Baroda and during the pendency of the present second appeal. However in the light of this additional evidence the original plaintiff wants me to decide a question of fact. The only ground of attacking the judgment or decree of the lower appellate Court can be one of the grounds set out in sec. 100 Civil P. C. and the only manner of supporting that judgment and decree can be that none of the defects set out in sec. 100 of the Civil P. C. is attracted so far as the present case is concerned. In view of this judgment of the Calcutta High Court. I have come to the conclusion that this civil application for leading additional evidence cannot be allowed. It was further observed :it was in the alternative urged before me on behalf of the petitioner in this civil application that if there is no power under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 and sec. 100 of the Civil P. C. the High Court should exercise the inherent powers under sec. 151 of the Civil P. C. and allow such additional evidence to be led. Now this argument is not tenable because it is well settled law that where there is a specific provision made by the Legislature On any particular point the provisions of sec. 151 Civil P. C. cannot be invoked and if the Legislature in terms laid down in secs. 100 to 103 of the Civil Procedure Code that the High Court can entertain second appeal only on points of law as mentioned in those sections and that the final court for the purposes of facts is the first appellate Court. 151 Civil P. C. cannot be invoked and if the Legislature in terms laid down in secs. 100 to 103 of the Civil Procedure Code that the High Court can entertain second appeal only on points of law as mentioned in those sections and that the final court for the purposes of facts is the first appellate Court. It is clear that the provisions of sec. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code and the inherent powers of the High Court cannot help the original plaintiff in leading additional evidence at the stage of second appeal. I must come to my conclusions on poits of law on the facts as found by the first appellate Court and it is not open to admit additional evidence and the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot apply so far as this second appeal is concerned. In the instant cases before us we have taken into consideration the provisions contained in sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act and as stated earlier it is only open to this Court to correct or rectify the errors of law committed by the Lower Court. In that view of the matter it is not possible to take the view that this Court can investigate into new facts when it disposes of a revision application under sec. 29 (2) of the Act. ( 44 ) WE have referred almost all these authorities which have been cited at the bar. The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the opponent has submitted that he does not press the civil application which has been filed by him in this Court. He has requested this Court to give him the necessary liberty to make the necessary application to the appellate Court if we remand the matters. ( 45 ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussion we have come at the conclusion that the Appellate Court erred in not giving the necessary permission to the petitioners to lead evidence as requested by him in their various applications. ( 45 ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussion we have come at the conclusion that the Appellate Court erred in not giving the necessary permission to the petitioners to lead evidence as requested by him in their various applications. ( 46 ) THE result is that the impugned common judgment and the decrees passed by the lower appellate Court are set aside and we direct that these matters be remanded before the lower Appellate Court with a direction that Learned Appellate Judge should give the necessary permission to the petitioners-tenants to lead evidence as requested by them in their various applications or to give them full opprotunrity to lead evidence in regard to any altered circumstances or change in the circumstances or in regard to subsequent events which might have taken place. We also give the necessary liberty to opponent-landlady to make the necessary application for bringing to the notice of the appellate Court the altered circumstance which she has stated in Civil Application No. 1286 of 1973 before us. Accordingly the matters are remanded. The Appellate Court should take into account the evidence which may be led before it and should dispose of the appeals of the opponent-landlady according to law. Having regard to the facts and the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. .