LAXMAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA — 1973 DIGILAW 52 (KAR)

( 1 ) THE petitioners in all these petitions are all teachers working in various schools run by the Gqvt. of Karnataka,. Their services stood allotted to the State of Karnataka under the provisions qf the Stages Re-organisation act. In the States in which they were working before the re-organisation of States, the age of superannuation had been fixed at 55 years. In the case of teachers who were working in the former State off Mysore and who were also allotted to the State of Karnataka, the; age of superannuation was sb yeas. Similarly teachers who were wording in the schools belonging to certain Local school Boards and Municipalities who became Govt servants on the said schools being taken over by the Govt also were liable to be retired at 58 years of age. The Gqvernor of Karnataka increased the age of superannuation of teachers who had been allotted to the State of karntaka from all integrating areas, other than ex-Mysore area and of those who had joined service after 1-11-1956 to 58 years by amending R. 95 of the Karnataka Civil Service Rules by introducing Clause (d) which after amendment read as follows :" Rule 95. (a) Subject to the provisions relating to protection of conditions of service prescribed by the Govt. of India in respect of persons allotted or deemed to be allotted to serve in connection with the affairs of the State of Mysore under S. 115 of the State Reorganisation act 1956 the date of compulsory retirement of a Govt. servant is the date on which he attains the age of 55 years. He may be retained in service after the date of compulsory retirement with the sanction of Govt and if the Govt. servant concerned is physically fit on public grqunds which must be recorded in writing but he must not be refined after the age of 60 years except in very special circumstances. Note. 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nqte. 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Note. 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) Deleted. (c) Heads of Departments are authorised to retire all non- gazetted Govt. servants under them when they attain the age of 55. . . . . . . Nqte. 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Note. 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) Deleted. (c) Heads of Departments are authorised to retire all non- gazetted Govt. servants under them when they attain the age of 55. (d) (i) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule the date of compulsory retirement of a Teacher of Primary | Secondary School shall be the date on which he attains the age of 58 years. (ii) In respect of a teacher in service on 10th July 1970 belonging to the departments of Collegiate and Technical Education the date of compulsory retirement shall be the date on which he attains the age of 58 years. Exception : A teacher to whom the provisions of this clause are applicable may be granted superannuation pension if he opts to retire under Rule 284 after attaining the age of 55 years. " ( 2 ) THE said amendment was introduced with effect from 5-4-1966. But by the Karnataka Civil Services (Twenty Second Amendment) Rules 1973 which is hereinafter referred to as the impugned amendment Cl. (d) of rule 95 was deleted. The impugned amendment came into force on. 17-11- 1973. The result was that the age of superannuation was again reduced to 55 years. The impugned amendment reads as follows :" In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constn. of India the Governor of Karnataka hereby makes the following rules further to amend the Karnataka Civil Services Rules namely- 1. Title and commencement : - (1) These rules may be called the Karnataka civil Services (Twenty-second Amendment) Rules 1973. (2) They shall come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette. 2. Amendment of Rule 95 : In Rule 95 of the Karnataka Civil services Rules (hereinafter referred to as the sajd rules) Clauses (d) ; (e) and (f) shall be omitted. 3. Application of the rules in certain cases : (1) Every Goyt. (2) They shall come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette. 2. Amendment of Rule 95 : In Rule 95 of the Karnataka Civil services Rules (hereinafter referred to as the sajd rules) Clauses (d) ; (e) and (f) shall be omitted. 3. Application of the rules in certain cases : (1) Every Goyt. servant governed by the said Clauses (d) or (e) or (f) of Rule 95 of the said rules before the commencement of these rules- (i) who has continued in service after attaining the age of 55 years shall retire on the dates on which he attains the age of 58 years or on 1st January 1974 whichever is earlier; (ii) who attains the age of 55 years after the commencement of these rules but before 1st January 1974 shall retire on 1st January 1974; (iii) who attains the age of 55 years after 1st January 1974 shall retire on the date on which he attains the age of 55 years. (2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the said rules the entire earned leave not exceeding 120 days to the credit on the date of retirement of a Govt. servant referred to in sub- rule (1) who would retire within a period of six months from the date of commencement of these rules shall be deemed to have been refused to him in public interest under Rule 110 of the said rules and he shall be permitted to avail it with effect from the date of his retirement: provided that in the case of an allottee governed by the rules applicable to him in his parent State the period of such leave (whether earned or privilege or furlough on average pay) shall be permissible under such rules. Provided fusther that nothing in this sub-rule shall apply to a govt. servant who on the date of commencement of these rules is on leave preparatory to retirement. This Notification cancels the amendments issued in Notification no. FD 150 SRS 73 dt. the 10th Octr. 1973 (not published in the official Gazette)". ( 3 ) AFTER the promulgation of the impugned amendment the State Govt. issued an Official Memorandum dt. 23-11-1973 stating that the impugned amendment did not affect the persons whose age of superannuation was 58 years in the State from which they were allotted under the States Reorganisation act. the 10th Octr. 1973 (not published in the official Gazette)". ( 3 ) AFTER the promulgation of the impugned amendment the State Govt. issued an Official Memorandum dt. 23-11-1973 stating that the impugned amendment did not affect the persons whose age of superannuation was 58 years in the State from which they were allotted under the States Reorganisation act. It also took action pursuant to the impugned amendment and issued orders cf retirement to those teachers who were affected by the impugned amendment. Aggrieved by the orders of retirement served on them and by the impugned amendment the petitioners have filed these petitions questioning the constitutionality of the impugned amendment. . The writ petitions are resisted by the State Govt. It is urged on behalf of the State Govt. that the impugned amendment was promulgated after the State Govt. had taken a decision to retire all. teachers at 55 years of age and that action was also taken to write to the Central Govt. seeking its approval under the proviso to S. 115 (7) of the States Reorganisation Act for fixing the age of retirement of teachers from ex-Mysore area at 55 years. The allegation that the impugned amendment was unconstitutional is denied by the respondents. The following contentions were urged on behalf of the petitioners In support of these writ petitions :1. The impugned amendment "was void as it violated Art. 14 of the constitution; 2. The impugned amendment was void as it contravened Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution; 3. The act of the Governor in promulgating the impugned amendment amounted to a fraud on the Constitution; 4. The impugned amendment was an unreasonable one; and 5. The impugned amendment was not applicable to certain teachers who had acted to their prejudice on the representation made by the State government. ( 4 ) BEFORE dealing with the various questions raised by the petitioners in these petitions it is necessary to consider the nature and character of the power conferred on the Governor Under the proviso to Art. 309 of the constitution in order to appreciate the arguments urged on boh the sides. ( 4 ) BEFORE dealing with the various questions raised by the petitioners in these petitions it is necessary to consider the nature and character of the power conferred on the Governor Under the proviso to Art. 309 of the constitution in order to appreciate the arguments urged on boh the sides. The main part of Art. 309 confers the power on the State Legislature to make laws subject to the provisions of the Constitution to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State. Under the proviso to art. 309 until the State Legislature passes the law the Governor is authorised to make rules regarding the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to pubic service or posts in connection with the affairs of the State. In view of the various decisions of the High Courts in India and of the Privy Council rendered in the context of S. 96b of the Govt. of india Act 1915 as amended by the Govt. of India Act 1919 and S. 240 of the Govt. of India Act 1935 at the commencement of the Constitution doubts were entertained as to the enforceability of the laws made by the slate Legislature or the rules made by the Governor regarding the conditions of service of persons appointed to tbp public services of the State. ( 5 ) IN State of UP. v. Babauram Upadhyaya, AIR. 1961 SC. 751. . the Supreme Court held that the rules made by an authority under Art. 309 would be efficacious within the permissible limits. In State of Mysore v. Bellary, AIR. 1965 SC. 868. the Supreme Court observed at page 870 as follows :" In view of the decisions of this Court of which it is sufficient to refer to the State of UP v Baburam Upadhyaya ( (1961) 2 SCR 679 - air 1961 SC 751 ) that if there was a breach of a statutory rule framed under Art. 309 or which was continued under Art. 313 in relation to conditions of service the aggrieved Govt. servant could have recourse to the Court for redress. " ( 6 ) IN B. S. Vadera v. Union of India, AIR. 1969 SC. 118. servant could have recourse to the Court for redress. " ( 6 ) IN B. S. Vadera v. Union of India, AIR. 1969 SC. 118. the Supreme Court reiterated its earlier views referred to above and proceeded to hold that the rules made by the Governor could be retrospective in effect also. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows : it is also significant to note that the proviso to Art. 309 clearly lays down that ' any rule sq made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act'. The clear and unambiguqus expressions, used in the Constitution must be given their full and unrestricted meaning unless hedged-in by any limitations. The rules which have to be ' subject to the provisions of the Constitution' shall have effect ' subject to the provisions of any Act'. That is if the appropriate legislature has passed an Act under Art. 309 the rules framed under the Proviso will have effect subjcet to that Act; but in the absence of any Act of the appropriate Legislature on the matter in our opinion the rules made by the President or by such person as he may direct are to have full effect both prospectively and retrospectively. Apart from the limitations pointed out above there is none other imposed by the proviso to Art. 309 regarding the ambit of the operation of such rules. In other words the rules unless they can be impeached on grounds such as breach of Part III or any other Constitutional provision must be enforced if made by the Rppropriate authority. ( 7 ) IN the case before us the Indian Railway Establishment Code has been issued by the President in the exercise of his powers under the proviso to Art. 309. Under Rule 157 the President has directed the railway Board to make rules of general application to non-gazetted railway servants under their control. The rules which are embodied in the Schemes framed by the Board under Annexures 4 and 7 are within the powers conferred under Rule 157; and in the absence of any Act having been passed by the ' appropriate' Legislature on the said matter the rules framed by the Railway Board will have full effect and, if so indicated retrospectively also. Such indication about retrospective effect as has already been pointed out by us is clearly there in the impugned provisions. ( 8 ) THE rules framed under the proviso to Art. 309 are embodied in an authoritative for. They are general in their application and are not made to suit the case of any particular individual. They are made in anticipation of future events. They can have retrospective effect. An earlier rule made under the proviso to Art. 309 can be repealed by a subsequent rule. In other words it has the capacity to abrogate an earlier rule. The persons in respect of whom the rules are made are bound by them and their consent is not necessary to alter the conditions of their service. The rules are enforceable in Courts and they have the same sanction which an Act passed by a Legislature possesses provided they satisfy the conditions subject to which they can be made. It is therefore seen that the rules framed under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constn. constitute a part of the public law of the land as indicated in para 6 of the decisiqn of the Supreme Court in Roshanlal Tandon v. Union of India, AIR. 1967 SC. 1889. The characteristics of a rule framed under the proviso to Art. 309 which are set out above are in essence the characteristics of a law made by the Legislature. Hence it has to be held that the said rules are legislative in character and not administrative even though they may be made by the Governor under the advice of his council of Ministers. It follows that while construing or interpreting then and while examining their validity the Court has to proceed on the basis that they are in the nature of laws passed by Legislatures and enjoy the same immunities which the Acts passed by the Legslature have provided they satisfy all the constitutional limitations imposed on their promulgation. The first contention urged on behlaf of the petitioners is that the impugned amendment was violative of Art. 14 of the Constn. on the foliowing grounds : (i) That it made a discrimination between the teachers who were allotetees from the former Mysore State on the one hand and other allottees and persons who were recruited after 1-11-1956 by the State of Karnataka. on the foliowing grounds : (i) That it made a discrimination between the teachers who were allotetees from the former Mysore State on the one hand and other allottees and persons who were recruited after 1-11-1956 by the State of Karnataka. on the other; (ii) That ft made a discrimination between the teachers who were allottees from all the integrating areas other than ex-Mvsore area and the teachers who were ex-Local Board or Municipal employees; (ii) That it was arbitrary; (iv) That it had been framed to favour unemployed persons in the state; (v) That the petitioners were not paid three months' salary and allowanees in of notice which was paid to persons who were compulsorily retired under Note I to Rule 285 of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules. I shall deal with the above grounds in the order in which they are urged. ( 9 ) THE first ground of attack is that it made a discrimination between the teachers who were allotted under S. 115 of the States Reorganisation act from the ex-Mvsore area on the one hand and the allottees from other integrating units and persons recruited after 1-11-1956. The age of retirement of teachers who were allottees from the ex-Mysore area was 58 years under Art. 294 of the Mvsore Services Regulations as it stood prior to 1-11-1956 i e. the appointed day under the States Reorganisation Act and the age of retirement of teachers from other integrating areas was 55 years. As mentioned earlier the State Govt increased the age of retirement of all teachers to 58 years Later on the State Govt decided to reduce the age of retirement of all teachers to 55 years But whereas it was possible for the State Govt. to implement the said decision in the case of the other allottees and persons recruited after 1-11-1956 forthwith in regard to the teachers who came from the ex-Mysore area it rould not do so without the previous approval of the Central Govt. as required by the proviso to s. 115 (7) of the States Reorganisation Act It is however stated in the statement of objections filed on behalf of the State Govt that it had written to the Central Govt to accord its approval to alter the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers also to 55 years. as required by the proviso to s. 115 (7) of the States Reorganisation Act It is however stated in the statement of objections filed on behalf of the State Govt that it had written to the Central Govt to accord its approval to alter the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers also to 55 years. Ehiring the pendency of these petitions the Governor having obtained the annroval of the Central govt. has reduced the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers also to 55 years by the Mysore Services (Amendment) Regulations 1974 dated 30-1-1974. In view of the above amendment made in the case of ex-Mysore teachers also the contention does not survive at all. Still I shall consider the contentions urged by the petitioners on the footing that no action had been taken in the case of ex-Mysore teachers since elaborate arguments have been addressed at the Bar on the above question. As mentioned earlier the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers prior to Reorganisation of States was 58 years and it could not be altered to their ' prejudice without the previous approval of the Central Govt as required by the proviso to S. 115 (7) of the States Reorganisation Act. The arguments of the petitioners is that when once all the teachers from all the integrating units were treated as one class and the age of retirment of all of them was fixed at 58 years the State Government could not thereafter reduce it to 55 years only in the case of those in respect of whom the State govt. could take action without the previous approval of the Central govt. Reliance was placed on the decisions in the Railway Board v. Pitchamuni, AIR. 1972 9c. 508. ( 10 ) STATE of Mysore v. Krishnamurthy, AIR. 1973 SC. 1146. and State of Jand K v. Triloknath Khosa, AIR. 1974 SC. 1. in support of the proposition that when once all the teachers cqming from all the different areas ware treated similarly regarding the age of retirement pay and other conditions of service it was not open to the State Govt. to make discrimination between then regarding the age of retirement only at a subsequent stage. The argument no doubt appears to be attractive on the face of it but in the peculiar circumstances of the case it is liable to be rejected. to make discrimination between then regarding the age of retirement only at a subsequent stage. The argument no doubt appears to be attractive on the face of it but in the peculiar circumstances of the case it is liable to be rejected. ( 11 ) THE three decisions of the Supreme Court relied on by the petitioners are all cases in which the power of the concerned Govt was unrestricted and if the said Govt. wished to deal with all the officials concerned equally there was no legal obstacle in the way. But in the instant case even though the State Govt. wished to treat all the teachers uniformly in the matter of fixation of age of retirement it could not reduce the age of retirement of the teachers from ex-Mysore area without the previous approval of the central Govt. If the argument of the petitioners is accepted then in the event of the Central Govt. refusing to accord its approval in the case of teachers from ex-Mysore it has to be held that the State Govt. once having increased the age of retirement of all teachers to 58 years lost its constitutional power to reduce the age of retirement of all other teachers over whom it had undoubted power until the last of the ex-Mysore teachers retired from the service of the State. It is difficult to accept the above proposition. Teachers coming from ex-Myscre area should be treated as forming a separate class from all others for the purpose of application of art. 14 of the Constn. They would not lose the right which they had acquired under the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act notwithstanding the fact that other teachers had been treated equally in the matter of age of superannuation after the reorganisation of States. It should be remembered that the inequality between the teachers from ex-Mysore area and others is the result of the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act which is passed by the Parliament. It is well settled that as a result of action of different Governments or of different Legislatures there is inequality amongst persons or things who are otherwise equal, it cannot be said that there has been violation of Art. 14 of the Constn. In State of MP. v. G. C. Mandawar, AIR 1954 SC. 493 . It is well settled that as a result of action of different Governments or of different Legislatures there is inequality amongst persons or things who are otherwise equal, it cannot be said that there has been violation of Art. 14 of the Constn. In State of MP. v. G. C. Mandawar, AIR 1954 SC. 493 . the Supreme Court rejecting the contention that the rate of dearness allowance payable to Central Govt. servants and the State govt. servants working within the same State could not be different observed as follows : "the power of the Court to declare a law void under Art. 13 has to be exercised with reference to the specific legislation which is impugned. It is conceivable that when the same legislature enacts two different laws but in substance they form one legislation it might be open to the Court to disregard the form and treat them as one law and strike it down if in their conjunction they result in discrimination. But such a course is not open where as here the two laws sought to be read in conjunction are by different Governments and by different legislatures. Art. 14 does not authorise the striking down of a law or one State on the ground that in contrast with a law of another State on the same subject its provisions are discriminatory. Nor does it contemplate a law of the Centre or of the State dealing with similar subjects being held to be unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the provisions of the two enactments. The sources of authority for the two statutes being different Art. 14 can have no application. The result therefore is that the scale of dearness allowance recommended by the Commission and sanctioned by the Cetral Govt. can furnish no ground for holding that the scale of dearness allowance recommended by the Committee and adopted by the appellant is repugnant to Art. 14 it may no doubt sound hard that Govt. servants doing work of a similar kind and working it may be even in the same place should receive different allowances; but the rights of the parties have to be decided on legal considerations and it is impossible to hold that the Resoluton in question is bad under Article 14. servants doing work of a similar kind and working it may be even in the same place should receive different allowances; but the rights of the parties have to be decided on legal considerations and it is impossible to hold that the Resoluton in question is bad under Article 14. " ( 12 ) THE above view is reiterated by the Supreme Court in Lachmandas v. State of Punjab, AIR. 1963 SC 222. and Nazeeria Motor Service v. State of AP. , AIR. 1970 3c. 1864. . In the last case i. e. in the case of Nazeena Motor Service (9) the Supreme Court also upheld the exemption given by the Andhra Pradesh Govt. to the motor operators in the Telengana area from payment of tax under the andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) amendment and Validation Act on the ground that no such tax was being levied in that area prior to reorganisation of States even though the Act in question was the State Act and there were no two different laws parsed by different legislatures. ( 13 ) HENCE even if the Central Govt had not accorded its approval and the age of retirement of ex-Mysore teachers had not been reduced the impugned amendment would not have violated Art. 14 of the Constn. Similarly it cannot be said that there has been any discrimination between the petitioners and the teachers who were formerly. employees of local School Boards or Municipalities. The former employees of Local school Boards and Municipalities became Govt. Servants on the schools in which they were working being taken over by the State Govt. under various argeements. One of the clauses in those agreements was that the conditions of service of those employees would not be altered to their prejudice. It is stated that the age of retirement of those teachers was 58 years. After the impugned amendment was issued the State Govt. thinking that it applied to those teachers also issued orders directing the retirement of those teachers at 55 years. Many of them who felt aggrieved by such orders also filed writ petitions before this Court. One of the contentions urged by them was that the Government had not altered the age of retirement of those teachers in view of the language of the impugned amendment and further that the State Govt. Many of them who felt aggrieved by such orders also filed writ petitions before this Court. One of the contentions urged by them was that the Government had not altered the age of retirement of those teachers in view of the language of the impugned amendment and further that the State Govt. had no power to alter their age of retirement to their prejudice. During the pendency of these petitions the Governor in exercise of his powers under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constn. promulgated the Karnataka State Civil Services (Age of Compulsory Retire merit) Rules 1974 on 24-2-1974 fixing the age of retirement of those teachers also at 55 years and that beyond 1-4-1974 no teacher of that category would be entitled to continue in service if he had completed 55 years notwithstanding the agreement entered with their former employers. ( 14 ) IT should be mentioned here that this contention had not been taken in the petitions when they were first presented. This contention was taken as an additional ground after the petitions filed by the petitioners who were formely employees of Local School Boards and Municipalities were heard for some time. But this contention also fails because of the Rules framed on 24-2-1974 reducing their age of retirement also to 55 years. It has to be observed as in the case of ex-Mysqre teachers even if no action had been taken the impugned amendment would not be contravening art. 14 of the Constn. as the teachers who were employees of Local School boards and Municipalities belong to a separate class and until a Rule is framed which would apply to them specifically they continue to retain their distinction. The petitioners have not placed any material to show that these teachers were being governed by the Karnataka Civil Services rules immediately from the date on which they became Govt. servants. Dealing with a similar contention that there was discrimination between two categories of teachers namely teachers who were all along Govt. employees and teachers who were formerly serving in the Local Bodies and who became Govt. teachers with effect from Octr. 1 1957 in Ram Lal wadhava v. State of Haryana, AIR. 1972 SC. 1982. the Supreme Court observed that until the two categories were fused into one and were brought under one common set of Rules it was open to the State Govt. teachers with effect from Octr. 1 1957 in Ram Lal wadhava v. State of Haryana, AIR. 1972 SC. 1982. the Supreme Court observed that until the two categories were fused into one and were brought under one common set of Rules it was open to the State Govt. to treat the two categories separately. It further held that it was not incumbent on the Government to frame Rules uniformly applicable to both the categories of teachers firstly because a rule framing authority need not legislate for all the categories and could select the category in respect of which it wished to legislate. ( 15 ) I do not therefore consider that there is any substance in the above contention also. The next ground of attack based on Art. 14 was that the impugned amendment was arbitrary. It was argued that the Govt. having once decided to increase the age of superannuation to 58 years it had no power to reduce it to 55 years without any fresh material before it which called for the reduction. Having regard to the nature of the power exercised by the governor under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constn. which is legislative in character I do not think there is any substance in this contention. Even otherwise it has to be observed that fixation of the age of superannuation at 55 years cannot be considered as unreasonable having regard to the age of superannuation of officials working in the other Depts. of the State. It was next argued that the impugned amendment was bad as it had been made to favour new entrants to Govt. service. I do not agree that the new entrants who had no jobs when the amendment was issued and the petitioners who retire after a sufficiently long tenure of service with all the available terminal benefits can be treated as a single class between whom there could be no discrimination. There is no merit in this contention also. One of the contentions which requires to be noticed at this stage is that under the impugned amendment some were made to retire at 55 years said some at ages higher than 55 years on 1-1-1974. This contention again has to be rejected in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in para 7 in Bishun Narain Misra v. State of UP, AIR. 1965 SC. 1567 1570. This contention again has to be rejected in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in para 7 in Bishun Narain Misra v. State of UP, AIR. 1965 SC. 1567 1570. Further it has to be borne in mind that in a transitional stage when a rule has to be framed in regard to different categories of persons who constitute a large number there would always be some room for complaint that either during a short while or in some minor respects there would be discrimination between one group and another. But the point that has to prevail in deciding the case is whether the Govt. has deliberately and consciously tried to favour one group as against the other. If ultimately it is found that the Govt. has attempted to treat all persons equally then even if there is an error which is immediately rectified the charge of violation of Article 14 may not prevail. The petitioners and the officials who are retired under Note 1 to Rule 280 in the interest of public sesvice do not belong to the same class and hence the petitioners cannot claim the benefit of three months' salary and alowances which are paid to them on retirement. ( 16 ) I therefore hold that the impugned amendment is not violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was next urged on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned amendment and the action taken by the respondents directing the retirement of the pentioners on the completion of 55 years of age contravened art. 311 (2) of the Constn. of India and hence were liable to be declared as void. The learned Counsel for the petitioners strongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Cpurt in Motiram Deka v. General Manager ne. Rly. , AIR. 1964 SC. 600. and argued that the Govt. had no competence to make a rule which would result in premature retirement of the officials and to act on its basis. The facts of that case were as follows. The petitioners in those petitions were employees of the NERly. Under the Railway Fundamental rules a permanent servant who substantively held a permanent post had title to hold the said post until he reached the age of superannuation or until he was compulsorily retired. The facts of that case were as follows. The petitioners in those petitions were employees of the NERly. Under the Railway Fundamental rules a permanent servant who substantively held a permanent post had title to hold the said post until he reached the age of superannuation or until he was compulsorily retired. Rules 148 (3) and 149 (3) empowered the railway administration to terminate services of the employees even before they attained the age of superannuation by giving notices of specified periods to the employees. The validity of the said Rules came up for consideration before the Sup. Court. The Sup. Court held tnat the termination of services of a permanent servant otherwise than on the ground of superannuation or compulsory retirement would perse amount to his removal within the meaning of Art. 311 of the Constn. and was therefore void unless the requirements of Art. 311 (2) were followed . It further held that there was no doubt that on a fair construction Rules148 (3) and 149 (3) authorised the Railway administration to terminate the services of all the permanent servants to whom the Rules applied merely on giving notice for the specified period or on payment of salary in lieu thereof and that clearly amounted to the removal of the servants in question. That being so the impugned Rules which did not require compliance with the procedure prescribed under Art. 311 (2) were liable to be struck down. ( 17 ) IN Gurudev Singh Sindhu v. State of Punjab, AIR. 1964 SC. 1585. the Supreme Court was concerned with the validity of a Rule providing for compulsory retirement of an official after ten years of service. In that case the Supreme court was of opinion that there were two exceptions to the safeguard provided to a Govt. servant under Art. 311 (2) of the Constn. and they were retirement on attaining the age of superannuation reasonably fixed or compulsory retirement under the rules which prescribed a reasonably long period of qualifying service. But where while a rule was framed prescribing the proper age of superannuation and another rule was added giving the State power to retire a public servant compulsorily at the end of ten years of his service then the latter rule which authorised retirement at the end of ten years should be held as being inconsistent with Art. 311 (2) of the Constn. of India. of India. It however observed that if the power to retire compulsorily in which the minimum qualifying service was prescribed as high as twenty-five years or at the age of 50 years of the public servant it might not be void. Both the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above are distinguishable from the present case. In the cases before the Supreme Court govt. had reserved the right to -terminate the service of an official long before the age of superannuation was attained and the periods at the end of which that power could be exercised were unreasonably short. In the instant case what has been done is merely the fixation of age of superannuation at 55 years which cannot at all be considered to be unreasonably low from any standard. The present case therefore comes within one of the exceptions recognised by the Supreme Court in Motiram Deka's case (12 ). Further it is seen that in the subsequent decisions of the Supreme court where it was directly concerned with the rules by which age of retirement was reduced from 58 years to 55 years the Supreme court has distinguished the cases relied upon bv the petitioners and has held that such rules did not contravene Article 31] (2 ). In Bishun Narain Misra's case (11) the Supreme Court distinguished motiram Deka's case (12) in the following words" That case in our opinion has no application to the facts of the present case for that case did not deal with any rule relating to the age of retirement. Further it was made clear in that very case that a rule as to superannuation (retirement) or as to compulsory retirement shortly before the age of superannuation resulting in the termination of service of a public servant did not amount to removal. In the present case what has happened is that the Govt. first raised the age of retirement from 55 to 58 years in the year 1957 and the appellant got the advantage of that inasmuch as he remained in service after Deer. 11 1960 on which date he would have otherwise retired on completing the age of 55 years. Thereafter in 1961 the Govt. seems to have changed its mind as to the age of superannuation and reduced it back again to 55 years. Even so the rule dealt with the age. 11 1960 on which date he would have otherwise retired on completing the age of 55 years. Thereafter in 1961 the Govt. seems to have changed its mind as to the age of superannuation and reduced it back again to 55 years. Even so the rule dealt with the age. of superannuation and the termination of service on reaching the age of superannuation was held by the majority in Moti Ham Deka's case ( AIR 1964 SC 600 ) as out of the application of Art. 311. We have not been shown any provision which takes away the power of Govt. to increase or reduce the age of superannuation and therefore as the rule in question only dealt with the age of superannuation and the appellant had to retire because of the reduction in the age of superannuation it cannot be said that the termination of his service which thus came about was removal within the meaning of Art. 311. The alteration in the circumstances of this case at least cannot be regarded as unreasonable. The argument that the termination of service resulting from change in the age of superannuation amounts to removal within the meaning of Art. 311 and therefore the necessary procedure for removal should have been followed is negatived by the very case on which the appellant relies. We therefore hold that Art 311 has no application to the termination of service of the appellant in the present case. "in State of Assam v. Premdha Baruagh, AIR. 1970 SC. 1314. and in Batahari Jena v. State of Orissa, AIR. 1971 SC. 1516. in which the facts were almost similar the Supreme court followed its view expressed in Bishun Naran Misra's case (11) and distinguished Motiram Deka's case (12 ). ( 18 ) IN view of the foregoing I hold that the impugned amendment does not contravene Art. 311 (2) of the Constn. of India. The next contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the promulgation of the impugned amendment amounts to fraud on the Constn. ( 18 ) IN view of the foregoing I hold that the impugned amendment does not contravene Art. 311 (2) of the Constn. of India. The next contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the promulgation of the impugned amendment amounts to fraud on the Constn. It was urged that the object of reducing the age of superannuation from 58 years to 55 years was according to certain statements said to have been made on behalf of the State Government was to provide employment opportunities to younger sections of society who were unemployed after getting rid of persons above the age of 55 years from the service of the State. It was also argued that the State Govt. had tried to achieve a result indirectly which it could not do directly as any attempt to remove the petitioners directly from the service before they attained the age of 58 years would have exposed the State Govt. to the charge of deliberate contravention of Art. 311 (2) of the Constn. of India Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners on the decision of the Supreme court in M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR. 1963 SC. 649. In that case the question of validity of a Government order passed by the State of Mysore making provision for reservation of seats in the educational institutions for Schedule castes Scheduled Tribes and other backward classes under Art 15 (4) of the Constn. came up for consideration By the said order the State Govt. had fixed 50 per cent of the quota for reservation for other Backward classes (out of which 28 per cent had been reserved for Backward Classes and 22 per cent had been reserved for more Backward Classes), 15 per cent had been fixed as the quota reserved for Scheduled Castes and 3 per cent for the scheduled Tribes The result was only 32 per cent was available to the merit pool which was against the larger interests of society. The petitioners in that case contended that the said order was irrational and the reservation made by it was a ' fraud on the Constitution '. The petitioners in that case contended that the said order was irrational and the reservation made by it was a ' fraud on the Constitution '. This argument was upheld by the Supreme Court in the following words :" The petitioners contend that having regard to the infirmities in the impugned prder action of the State in issuing the said order amounts to a fraud on the Constitutional power conferred on the State by Art. 15 (4 ). This argument is well-founded and must be upheld. When it is said about an executive action that it is a fraud on the Constitution it does not necessarily mean that the action is actuated by mala fides. An executive action which is patently and plainly outside the limits of the constitutional authority conferred on the State in that behalf is struck down as being ultra vires the State's authority. If on the other hand the executive action does not patently nr overtly transgress the authority conferred on it by the Constn. but the transgression is covert or latent the said action is struck down as being a fraud on the relevant constitutional power. It is in this connection that Courts often consider the substance of the matter and not its form and in ascertaining the substance of the matter the appearance or the cloak or the veil of the executive action is carefully scrutinized and if it appears that notwithstanding the appearance the cloak or the veil of the executive action in substance and in truth the constitutional power has been transgressed the impugned action is struck down as a fraud on the Conatn. We have already noticed that the impugned order in the present case has categorised the Backward Classes on the sole basis of caste which in our opinion is not permitted bv Art. 15 (4): and we have also held that the reservation of 68% made bv the impugned order is plainly inconsistent with the concept of the special provision authorised by Art. 15 (4 ). Therefore it follows that the impugned order is a fraud on the constitutional power conferred on the State by Article 15 (4)". ( 19 ) THE doctrine of 'fraud on the Constitution ' was first explained by the supreme Court in Gajapathi Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR. 1953 SC. 375. Therefore it follows that the impugned order is a fraud on the constitutional power conferred on the State by Article 15 (4)". ( 19 ) THE doctrine of 'fraud on the Constitution ' was first explained by the supreme Court in Gajapathi Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR. 1953 SC. 375. In that case the validity of an enactment made by the State Legislature came up for consideration. One of the contentions urged was that the impugned enactment was a piece of 'colourable legislation' and it amounted to a fraud on the Constn. It was also urged that the legislation in question had not been passed with any bona fide intention. The Supreme Court observed that ultimately the validity of a piece of legislation depended upon the competence of the Legislature' to pass it and if the Legislature was competent to pass it it could not be said that the legislation amounted to a piece of clourable legislation' or a fraud on the Constn. It was also held that the motives or intentions of the Legislature were irrelevant in determining the constitutionality of the law passed bv it provided it did not thereby contravene any of the provisions of the Constn. The relevant part of the above decision of the Supreme Court is extracted below :" We have been referred to a number of decisions on this point where the doctrine of colourable legislation came up for discussion before Courts of Law; and stress is laid primarily upon the pronouncement of the majority of this Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Kampshwar Singh ( AIR 1952 SC 252 ) which held two provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act namely Ss. 4 (b) and 23 (f) to be unconstitutional on the ground among others that these provisions constituted a fraud on the Constn. The fact that the provisions in the amended Agricultural Income Tax Act were embodied in a separate statute and not expressly made a part of the Abolition Act itself should not it is argued make any difference in principle. As the question is of some importance and is likely to be debated in similar cases in future it would be necessary to examine the precise scope and meaning of what is known ordinarily as the doctrine of 'colourable legislation'. As the question is of some importance and is likely to be debated in similar cases in future it would be necessary to examine the precise scope and meaning of what is known ordinarily as the doctrine of 'colourable legislation'. ( 20 ) IT may be made clear at the outset that the docrtine of colourable legislation does not involve any question of 'bona fides' or 'mala fides' on the part of the legislature The whole doctrine resolves itself into the question of competency of a particular legislature'to enact a particular law. If the legisature is competent to pass a particular law the motives which impelled it to act are really irrelevant. On the other hand if the legislature lacks competency the question of motives does not arise at all. Whether a statute is constitutional or not is thus always a question Off power: vide Cooley's Constitutional limitations Vol. 1 Page 379. A distinction however exists between a legislature which is legally omnipotent like the British Parliament and the laws promulgated by which could not be challenged on. the ground of incompetency and a legislature which enjoys only a limited or a qualified jurisdiction. ( 21 ) IF the Constn. of a State distributes the legislative powers amongst different bodies which have to act within their respective spheres marked out by specific legislative entries or if there are limitations on the legislative authority in the shape of fundamental rights questions do arise as to whether the legislature in a particular case has or has not in respect to the subject-matter of the statute or in the method of enacting it transgressed the limits of its constitutional powers Such transgression may be patent manifest or direct but it may also be disguised covert and indirect and it is to this latter class of cases that the expression 'colourable legislation' has been applied in certain judicial pronouncements. The idea conveyed by the expression is that although apparently a legislature in passing a statute purported to act within the limits of its powers vet in substance and in reality it transgressed these powers the transgression being veiled by what appears on proper examination to be a mere pretence or disguise. ( 22 ) THE Supreme Court in reaching the above conclusion drew support from attorney General for Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers, 1924 AC. 328. ( 22 ) THE Supreme Court in reaching the above conclusion drew support from attorney General for Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers, 1924 AC. 328. in which it was held :" Where the law making authority is of a limited or qualified character it may be necessary to examine with some strictness the substance of the legislation for the purpose of determining what is that the legislature is really doing. "for the purpose of this investigation the Court can take into consideration its object purpose or design. As observed by the Privy Council in Attorney general for Alberta v. Attorney General for Canada (AIR 1939 AC 117) it is not open to a law making body with limited powers " under the guise or the pretence or in the form of an exercise of its own powers to carry out an object which is beyond its powers and a trespass on the exclusive powers of the other. ( 23 ) SUMMARISING the leading general propositions on the interpretation of the British North America Act which provides for distribution of legislative powers between the Dominion Parliament and the provincial Legislatures in Canada the learned author Lefroy in his 'short Treatise on canadian Constitutional Law' observed : '" If it is once determined by competent judicial authority that the dominion Parliament or a Provincial Legislature has passed any Act upon any subject within its area of power its jurisdiction as to the terms of such legisation is absolute as that of the Imperial Parliament would if legislating over a like subject and courts of law have no right whatever to enquire whether such jurisdiction has been exercised wisely or not; or to pronounce the Act invalid because it may affect injuriously private rights or destroy vested rights or be otherwise unjust or contrary to sound principles of legislation. " ( 24 ) DEALING specifically with the topic of colourable legislation the learned author observes :" E. Colourable Legislation : The Parliament of Canada cannot under colour of general legislation deal with what are provincial matters only and conversely provincial legislatures cannot under the mere pretence of legislating upon one of the matters enumerated in S. 92 really legislate upon a matter assigned to the juridiction of the parliament of Canada. And if the Dominion Parliament or the provincial legislatures have no power to legislate directly upon a givensubject matter neither may they do so indirectly. " ( 25 ) ALMOST to the same effect is the observation of the Privy Council in moran v. Dy. Commr. of Taxation for New South Wales, 1940 AC. 838. in which ss. 96 and 51 (ii) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 came for consideration. The Privy Council pointed out that :" Cases may be imagined in which a purported exercise of the power to grant financial assistance under S. 96 would be merely colourable. Under the guise and pretence of assisting a State with money the real substance and purpose of the Act might simply be to effect discrimination in regard to taxation. Such an Act might well be 'ultra vires' the Commonwealth Parliament. "a close study of the cases referred to above shows that ultimately the decision on the question whether an act of the executive or of the legislature is hit by the doctrine of 'fraud on the Constitution' or 'colourable legislation' depends upon the question whether the concerned authority whose act is called in question has acted within the four corners of its delegated authority or whether it has tried to clutch at a jurisdiction not vested in it by attempting to circumvent the constitutional provisions. It is also clear that in so far as law making bodies are concerned the motive with which they have enacted an Act or a rule having the force of law would be irrelevant in determining the constitutionality of the Act or rule having the force of law. ( 26 ) IN para 71 of the decision in State of Bihar v Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1952 SC. 252 278. Mahajan J: as he then was stated in unequivocal language that the constitutionslity of a statute passed by a competent legislature cannot be challenged on the ground that the law made is not reasonable or just. Agreeing with him B. K. Mukherjea J: as he then was in para 84 at page 280 observed that in deciding the competency of the legislature under an Entry they were not concerned with the justice or propriety of the principles upon which a particular provision of a statute was based. Agreeing with him B. K. Mukherjea J: as he then was in para 84 at page 280 observed that in deciding the competency of the legislature under an Entry they were not concerned with the justice or propriety of the principles upon which a particular provision of a statute was based. The above view of the Supreme Court is in accord with the opinion expressed in Cooley on constitutional Limitations under the caption ' Inquiry into Legislative motives' as follows :" From what examination has been given to this subject it appears that whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a question of power; that is whether the legislature in the particular case, in respect to the subject matter of the Act the manner in which its object is to be accomplished and the mode of enacting it has kept within the constitutional limits and observed the constitutional conditions. In any case. in which this question is answered in the affirmative the Courts are not at liberty to inquire into the proper exercise of the power. They must assume that legislative discretion has been properly exercised. If evidence was required it must be supposed that it was before the legislature when the Act was passed and if any special finding was required to warrant the passage of the particular Act it would seem that the passage of the particular Act itself might be held equivalent to such finding. And although it has some times been urged atthe bar that the Courts ought to inquire into the motives of the legislature where fraud and corruption were alleged and annul the action if the allegation were established the argument has in no case been acceded to by the judiciary and they have never allowed the inquiry to be entered upon. The reasons are the same here as those which preclude an inquiry into the motives of the Governor in the exercise of a discretion vested in him exclusively. He is responsible for his acts in such a case not to the Courts but to the people . " ( 27 ) I have earlier held that a Rule made by the Governor in exercise of the power conferred on him under the proviso to Art 309 of the Constn. is a law and the act Of making such a Rule is a legislative act. " ( 27 ) I have earlier held that a Rule made by the Governor in exercise of the power conferred on him under the proviso to Art 309 of the Constn. is a law and the act Of making such a Rule is a legislative act. Hence the principles which govern the interpretation and validity of a law made by a legislature apply with equal force to a Rule made under the proviso to article 309 also. Now can it be said that the impugned amendment reducing the age of retirement is outside the power of the Governor? It is not disputed that the age of retirement of an official in the service of the State is a condition of service and hence it squarely falls within Art. 309 read with Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh Sch. of the Constn. of India. On the above topic there is no other authority except the State Legislature which has competience to make a rule having the force of law. The Governor has not usurped the powef of any other body while promulgating the impugned amendment to the Rule fixing the age of superannuation. It is therefore clear that the impugned amendment does not amount to a piece of colourable legislation or an act of fraud on the Constn. as contended on behalf of the petitioners. Let me assume for purposes of argument that the object of promulgating the impugned amendment was to provide greater employment opportunities to the younger sections of society. Can it for that reason be charactensed as an arbitrary act not having any reasonable relation to the purpose for which Art. 309 of the Constn. was enacted? The preamble of the constitution the provisions contained in Arts. 15 (4) 16 (4) and 19 (6) the directive Principles of State policy contained in Part IV of the Constn. and the special provisions relating to certain classes contained in Part XVI of the Constn. clearly establish that the philosophy of the Constn. is that there should be a welfare State functioning throughout the territories of india One of the primary responsibilities of the Central and State Govts. as envisaged in Arts. 39 and 41 of the Constn. and the special provisions relating to certain classes contained in Part XVI of the Constn. clearly establish that the philosophy of the Constn. is that there should be a welfare State functioning throughout the territories of india One of the primary responsibilities of the Central and State Govts. as envisaged in Arts. 39 and 41 of the Constn. is that the State should endeavour to create and provide employment opportunities to all individuals to enable them to lead their life atleast with the minimum comforts which human beings should have. It is needless to observe that the problem ot unemployment has become almost an insurmountable one during the present period pf our history and it is eluding every body in the major part of the world. The Govt. being the biggest employer of men and women in its services factories and farms has a special responsibility in relieving the people who are suffering from poverty and unemployment more particularly in India where the problem is very acute what with the fast growing population slow and stunted growth of agricultural and industrial production unprecedented inflation and consequent depreciation in the value of money. In the above situation it behoves every Govt. Central and state to find out solutions without seriously jeopardising the interest of general public. Viewed from this angle if the State Govt. has as contended by the petitioners reduce the age of superannuation from 58 to 55 years to provide more employment opportunities to younger men it cannot be said that it has transgressed its constitutional power as the age of superannuation now fixed at 55 years cannot at all be considered as so unreasonably low that the officials would not be able to get sufficient terminal benefis such as gratuity and pension for their living after retirement. ( 28 ) IT was however argued by Sri Rama Jois, relying upon the decision in british Paints (India) Ltd. v. Its Workers, AIR. 1966 SC. 732. that the determination of the age of superannuation had to be done haying regard to the standard of health of the workers the increase in their longevity and the degree of their efficiency and on that basis the age of superannuation should have been at 60 years. According to the petitioners there was no case for reducing it to 55 years particularly whon only very recently the State Govt. According to the petitioners there was no case for reducing it to 55 years particularly whon only very recently the State Govt. had increased it to 58 years. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners is one rendered in an appeal against an award of an industrial Tribunal and hence it is not applicable to the cape where the employer has the constitutional power to modify the conditions of service of the employee unilaterally without being subjected to any limitation outside the Constn. itself. In the case of Govt. Servants the Supreme Court itself has observed that the fixation of age of superannuation after 25 years' of qualifying services or at 50 years of age may not be unreasonable (vide para 12 in Gurudev Singh's case (13) ). Further the Supreme Court has not also disapproved of the action of the State Govt. in lowering the age of superannuation for the purpose of providing employment opportunities to younger men. In State of Assam v. Premadhar, Ray. J; as he then was observed at para 18 as follows :" In the present case after 21st March 1p63 memorandum was superseded and abrogated by 2nd April 1968 memorandum the respondent could not draw any sustenance from 21st March 1968 memorandum. 2nd April 1968 memorandum reduced the age of superannuation and withdrew the benefits which had been conferred by 21st March 1963 memorandum. This was again done in the interest of the Govt. servaults to prevent unemployment as a result of increase of age of superannuation. "i am of the view that the decision in the case; of British Paints (India) ltd (21) does not exhaustively lay down the factors which should govern a decision regarding the fixation of the age of superannuation. No decision is cited before me stating that economic factors such as the presence of a large number of unemployed should not be taken into account while fixing the age of superannuation. One should bear in mind that a person who retires after 55 years of age would not be without any means for his livelihood after his retirement. He would have all Of some of the terminal benefits such as gratuity pension provident fund insurance amount etc. But an unemployed person who is just at the threshold of Jife has almost nothing to eat and nothing to wear. He would have all Of some of the terminal benefits such as gratuity pension provident fund insurance amount etc. But an unemployed person who is just at the threshold of Jife has almost nothing to eat and nothing to wear. Can any reasonable person say that as between the two the person who has enjoyed the privileges of Govt. service till his 55th year should be preferred? We should recognise that means of livelihood are becoming scarcer and scarcer as each day passes and there exists the imperative necessity to balance the needs of one section of society with another section with least possible inconvenience. I recall to my mind in this context what Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru observed years ago. I quote:" The service of India means the service of the milions who suffer. It means the ending of poverty and ignornace and disease and inequality of opportunity. The ambition of the greatest man of our generation has been to wipe every tear from every eye. That may be beyond us but as long as there are tears and suffering so long our work will not be over. " ( 29 ) I therefore hold that the Governor has not committed an act amounting to a 'fraud on the Constitution' even granting that the impugned amendment has been passed with a view to providing greater employment opportunities to the younger section of society. The impugned amendment has also not been based on any irrelevant consideration. The next submission is that the impugned amendment was an unreasonable one as it did not give sufficient notice to the parties who were affected by it. Reliance was placed on the observations made in Halsbury's laws of England on the topic of Law of Master and Servant and it was contended that a servant was entitled to a reasonable notice of termination of service. It has to be stated that the rules made under the proviso to Art. 309 the mselves being law are not governed by the common law governing the relationship of master and servant. As observed by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh at page 71 the constitutionality of a law cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not reasonable or just provided it satisfies the Constn. otherwise. As observed by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh at page 71 the constitutionality of a law cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not reasonable or just provided it satisfies the Constn. otherwise. Further the impugned amendment was published in the Karnataka Gazette on 17-11-1973 and it came into effect virtually on 1-1-1974 as all persons who had completed 55 years of age by 1-1-1974 had to retire on that date. Hence all of them had more than a month's notice Others who attained the age of 35 years after 1-1-1974 have to retire on completion of age of 55 years. The impugned amendment also provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the rules the entire earned leave not exceeding 120 days to the credit on the date of retirement of the Govt. servant who would retire within a period of six months from the date of commencement of the impugned amendment shall be deemed to have been refused to him in public interest under Rule 110 of the Karnataka Civil Service Rules and he shall be permitted to avail it with effect from the date of retirement. Hence it cannot also be said that the impugned amendment is not a reasonable one. ( 30 ) THE last contention urged on behalf of some of the petitioners is based on the following facts. When their cases were about to be considered for prqmotion to a higher cadre they were given the option either to get promoted to the higher administrative cadre and retire at the age of 55 years or to continue in the teaching cadre so that they could retire at the age of 58 years. Thinking that they would be allowed to continue in service till 58 years they expressed their desire to continue in the teaching cadre only and informed the State Govt. that they need not be promoted to the higher cadre. On the basis of these facts it is urged that the State Govt. was bound by the rule of promissory estoppel and hence could not retire such teachers at the age of 55 years notwithstanding the fact that the age of superannuation has been reduced to 55 years from 58 years. The petitiopers relied upon the decisions in Union of India v. Anglo Afghan agencies, AIR 1968 SC. 718 . and Century Spinning and Mfg. The petitiopers relied upon the decisions in Union of India v. Anglo Afghan agencies, AIR 1968 SC. 718 . and Century Spinning and Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Mun. Council, AIR. 1971 SC. 1021. in support of the above contention. It is seen that both the above cases are distinguishable from the present case. In the first case the question for consideration was whether the Govt. was immune from the doctrine of estoppel when a private individual has altered his position to his prejudice relying upon the representation as to its future conduct made by the Govt In the second case the question was whether a public body like a municipality is exempt from the said rule of estrppel in similar circumstances. But we are not concerned in this case with any administrative action as in the first case and with any action of a local authority like a municipal council. If the Govt. had asked some of the teachers to elect whether they would choose to be promoted or not it did so on the basis of the law as it stood then. The Govt. did not tell the concerned teachers that the age of superannuation would not of altered by a subsequent amendment. No Govt. can bind a law making authority by its representation. ( 31 ) IT is a basic principle of constitutional law that no contract or grant can curtail the legislative power granted oy the Constn. Dealing with a similar question the Federal Court observed in Thakur Jagannath baksh Singh v. United Provinces, AIR. 1943 FC 29. as follows :" If once it be found that the subject matter of a Crown grant is within the competence of a provincial legislature nothing can prevent that legislature from legislating abcut it unless the Constn. Act itself expressly prohibits legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally. " ( 32 ) THE above view of the Federal Court was approved by the Privy council in Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. UP, 73 IA. 123. and followed by the supreme Court in Mahataj Umeg Singh v. State of Bombay, AIR. 1955 SC. 540. Hence even granting that there had been a representation on the part of the State govt. both the State Gcvt. and the officials concerned are bound by the impugned amendment which is the result of a legislative action. 123. and followed by the supreme Court in Mahataj Umeg Singh v. State of Bombay, AIR. 1955 SC. 540. Hence even granting that there had been a representation on the part of the State govt. both the State Gcvt. and the officials concerned are bound by the impugned amendment which is the result of a legislative action. Further as a general rule the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied against the State in its Governmental public or sovereign capacity. But an exception however arises where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice (see Ramanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC. 2641 . The petitioners have not made out the case of any fraud or manifest injustice in this case. This contention also therefore fails. No other contention is urged. These writ petitions therefore fail and are dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .