JUDGMENT P.N. Bakshi, J. - This appeal under section 417 (3), Criminal Procedure Code is filed by Ram Krishna Singhal, representative of the Western India March Co., Ltd. Bareilly, against the judgment of Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Bareilly dated 14th August, 1970, acquitting respondent No. 2, the Match Marketing Company, North Car Street, Shivkashi, district Ramnad, Madras State 1 and its proprietor Deep Chand Doga, respondent No. 1. The appellant filed a complaint against respondents No. 1 and 2 and seven others for their prosecution for offences under section 78 and 79 of the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 read with Section 109, Indian Penal Code Padma Match Works situate in Madras State and V. Kandasamy Naicker its proprietor, who were opposite parties No. 1 and 2 in the complaint filed by Ram Krishna Singhal, pleaded guilty. Akhlaqul Hasan, Proprietor of Matches Biri Stores, Pull qazi, Bareilly opposite party No. 9 in the said complaint, also pleaded guilty. Bharat Match Stores, Matches Importers, Naya Bens, Delhi; Messers Manohar Lal, Manmohan Lal and Kitnti Lal opposite parties No. 5 to 8 in the complaint were discharged under Section 253, Criminal Procedure Code In the present appeal against acquittal we are not concerned with opposite parties No. 1, 2 and 5 to 9 of the complaint. This appeal is directed only against the acquittal of the two respondents, who were opposite parties No. 3 and 4 in the complaint filed by Ram Krishna Singhal. The complaint case briefly was that the respondents had manufactured matches with Chaukhat labels which were deceptively similar to Tekka matches and had sold them at Bareilly and other places. 2. The respondents aforesaid pleaded not guilty to the charges levelled against them. Their defence was that the court at Bareilly had no jurisdiction to try the case and that the Chaukhat labels of their match boxes were not deceptively similar to the Tekka labels of the match boxes manufactured by the Western India Match Company and as such they had not falsified any trade mark of the appellant. They denied having sold their goods at Bareilly. 3. They denied having sold their goods at Bareilly. 3. The prosecution in support of its case examined 9 witnesses, namely, Ram Krishna Singhal P.W. 1, Ram Gopal P.W. 2, Jumman Khan P.W. 3, Hem Chandra Jain P.W. 4, Chhotey Lal P.W. 5, K. L. Widge P.W. 6, P.P. Ayer P.W. 7, Shahid Ali P.W. 8 and B.L. Verma P.W. 9. 4. On a consideration of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Bareilly recorded a finding that there was a deceptive similarity between the label Chaukhal and the registered trade mark label Tekka, and that on a comparison of the two the impression on the mind of the ordinary purchaser of r the two match boxes would be that they are one and the same thing belonging to one and the same Company. On this finding the court below held that the respondents had falsified the trade mark of WIMCO. But the court below further held that as the falsification of trade mark WIMCO was done by the accused not in Bereilly but at the place of the manufacture of the match boxes and in particular of the labels Chaukhat, which admittedly was done at Madras, the court at Bareilly had no jurisdiction to try the accused for the offence under Section 78 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. In this view of the matter the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Bareilly acquitted the accused for the offence under Section 78 of the said Act including the charge of abatement. 5. With respect to the second charge under Section 79 of the Trade, and Merchandise Marks Act the court below has also acquitted the respondents on the following findings : "1. There is no evidence at all to the effect that the respondents sold match-boxes at Bareilly to their agent Akhlaqul Hasan. 2. There is no evidence also that Akhlaqul Hasan sold Chaukhat match-box at Bareilly with the aid or encouragement of the respondent Deep Chand Daga. 3. That the allegation of the accused Akhlaqul Hasan that Deep Chand Daga sold or exposed for sale Chaukhat match boxes to him at Bareilly cannot be made the basis of the conviction of the respondents. 4. That the complainant has not said in the complaint that the respondent Deep Chand Daga himself effected sale of the Chaukhat match- boxes at Bareilly. 5. 4. That the complainant has not said in the complaint that the respondent Deep Chand Daga himself effected sale of the Chaukhat match- boxes at Bareilly. 5. That it is highly improbable that Deep Chand Daga would himself come all the way from the south to sell a few match boxes to the petty dealers. 6. That the statement of the prosecution witnesses Ram Gopal, Jumman Khan and Chhotey that the accused Deep Chand Daga himself sold to them at Bareilly Chaukhat match-boxes is a subsequent development and cannot be relied upon. 7. That these prosecution witnesses do not know Deep Chand Daga by name. They did not see him since then, except in court and that Deep Chand Daga was not put up for identification to enable these prosecution witnesses to identify him. 8. That the complainant had no direct knowledge of the sale of Chaukhat match-boxes at Bareilly. He learnt it from others and as such his evidence is not legally admissible. 9. On the above findings the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Bareilly held that he had no jurisdiction to try the respondents for the charge under Section 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. He has accordingly acquitted the respondents of the charges levelled against them. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at great length and have also perused the evidence on record. Learned counsel for the parties have not seriously challenged the finding of the court below with regard to the offence under Section 78 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act read with section 109, Indian Penal Code, with respect to which the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) Bareilly has recorded a finding that the falsification of the trade mark of WIMCO was done by the accused not in Bareilly but at the place of manufacture of the match box and in particular of the labels Chaukhat which admittedly had been done in south. G, eat stress, however, is laid by the learned counsel for the appellant with respect to the charge under Section 79 of the Trade and,Merchandise Marks Act. G, eat stress, however, is laid by the learned counsel for the appellant with respect to the charge under Section 79 of the Trade and,Merchandise Marks Act. His sub- mission is that the evidence on the record establishes the charge under this section and as such in view of the provisions of Section 182, Criminal Procedure Code the respondents could be tried at Bareilly for the offences committed on both the counts, i.e. under Section 78 as well as Section 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. In any event, his submission further is that the order of Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Bareilly acquitting the respondents is not sustainable in law. In order to constitute an offence under Section 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 it is necessary that the accused person "sells or exposes for sale............any goods or things to which any false trade mark or false trade description is applied." 6. The material question, therefore, is whether the respondents have sold or exposed for sale the Chaukhat match boxes at Bareilly, for that alone would give jurisdiction to court at Bareilly to try the case. From a perusal of the complaint, which has been filed by the appellant Ram Krishna Singhal, it is clear that the allegations made therein are that the respondent No. 1 is the proprietor of the firm Marketing Company respondent No. 2. Respondent No. I is said to be marketing the impugned match-boxes through accused No. 6, 7 and 8 at Delhi and through accused No. 9 Akhlaqul Hasan, who is the proprietor of Match Biri Stores, at Bareilly. It has been specifically stated in paragraph No. 5 of the complaint that accused No. 9 Akhlaqul Hasan is committing the offence by actually exposing for sale the impugned goods at Bareilly, which is an offence punishable under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. It is noteworthy that there is no allegation in this complaint to the effect that the respondent No. 1 Deep Chand Daga had actually sold the impugned match boxes to I Akhlaqul Hasan (accused No. 9) at Bareilly. It is true that in his statement before the sessions Court, Ram Krishna Singhal P.W. 1 has stated that when he went to the market at Bareilly he saw that Jumman Khan and others were selling match boxes bearing the label Chaukhat. It is true that in his statement before the sessions Court, Ram Krishna Singhal P.W. 1 has stated that when he went to the market at Bareilly he saw that Jumman Khan and others were selling match boxes bearing the label Chaukhat. On enquiry from these petty dealers he was informed by them that in the year 1964 one Deep Chand Daga had approached them and that they had purchased the impugned matches from him. The information received by Ram Krishna Singhal from the so-called petty dealers is not admissible in evidence. However, the prosecution has produced Ram Gopal P.W. 2, Jumman Khan P. IV. 3, Chhotey Lal P.W. 5 and Shahid All P.W. 8, who are all petty shop-keepers at Bareilly in support of this case, which has been developed in the statement of Ram Krishna Singhal. No doubt these witnesses have deposed that respondent No. 1 had sold these impugned matches to them at Bareilly, I am, however, not inclined to place any reliance on the statement of these prosecution witnesses for a number of reasons, which I shall detail hereafter. 7. There is no specific allellation in the complaint that respondent No.1 actually sold these matches to Ram Gopal P.W. 2, Jumman Khan P.W. 3, Chhotey Lal P.W. 4 and Shahid All P.W. 5 at Bareilly. This is not a case in which a complaint had been hurriedly filed and therefore, the allegations suffer from the infirmity of vagueness. This complaint is, in my opinion, well thought out. It details all the facts upon which the prosecution is sought to be based. It was open to the complainant to take up this specific case of sale by respondent No.1 to the petty shopkeepers at Bareilly, if it was desired to prosecute the respondents on these allegations. The statements that have been given by the prosecution witnesses are clearly an after thought and an embellishment in the prosecution case. I have carefully perused these statements. In my opinion, they are not reliable and they do not inspire confidence. 8. It also seems highly improbable that the respondent No.1, who is the proprietor of Match Marketing Company at Madras would come personally to Bareilly to sell a few match boxes to these petty dealers. I have carefully perused these statements. In my opinion, they are not reliable and they do not inspire confidence. 8. It also seems highly improbable that the respondent No.1, who is the proprietor of Match Marketing Company at Madras would come personally to Bareilly to sell a few match boxes to these petty dealers. In the normal course of business one would expect the agents and sales-men of the Company to do this work of advancing the sales of their concern. They would normally be sent out to various places to establish contacts and to effect sales. I am, therefore, in agreement with the finding recorded by the court below that the probability of respondent No. 1 coming all the way from south to sell a few match boxes is highly remote and cannot be accepted. 9. Further Akhlaqul Hasan Accused No, 9, who is alleged to be actually exposing the impugned match boxes for sale at Bareilly has, as stated by counsel compromised the case with the complainant. His statement as a co-accused that respondent No. 1 sold the match boxes to him at Bareilly, in my opinion, cannot form a sale basis for recording a finding thereon in favour of the prosecution and for convicting the respondents of this appeal. 10. For all these reasons I am satisfied that on the merits the prosecution has failed to prove that the respondents sold or exposed for sale the impugned match boxes at Bareilly, as such 1 am of the view that the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) Bareilly had no jurisdiction to try the case against the respondents. 11. In view of the findings recorded by me above the question which still remains to be considered is; Whether the impugned order of the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) Bareilly acquitting the respondents of the charges levelled against them is sustain- able in law. In this connection reference may be made to a case reported in Mohammad Safi v. State of West Bengal, 1966 SC 69. Paragraph 8 of the aforesaid decision runs thus : "............From what we have said above, it will be clear that the fact that all the witnesses for prosecution as well as for the defence had been examined before Mr. Ganguly and the further fact that the appellant was also examined under Section 342 cannot in law be deemed to be a trial at all. Ganguly and the further fact that the appellant was also examined under Section 342 cannot in law be deemed to be a trial at all. It would be only repetition to say that for the proceedings to amount to a trial they must be held before a court which is in fact competent to hold them and which is not of opinion that it has no jurisdiction to hold them. A fortiori it would also follow that the ultimate order made by it by whatever name it is characterised cannot in law operate as an acquittal. In the privy Council case it was interpreted by Sir John Beaumont who delivered the opinion of the Board of to be an order of discharge. It is unnecessary for us to say whether such an order amounts to an order of discharge in the absence of any expressed provision governing the matter in the Code or it does not amount to an order of discharge. It is sufficient to say that it does not amount to an order of acquittal as contemplated by Section 403 (1) and since the proceedings before the Special judge ended with that order it would be enough to look upon it merely as an order putting a stop to the proceedings." 12. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court, I am of the opinion that the impugned order passed by the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) Bareilly will not in law amount to an order of acquittal, but it is merely an order putting a stop to the proceedings initiated against the respondents for offences under Sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. 13. In the result, therefore, this appeal is dismissed with the modification that the order of acquittal recorded by the Court below shall be deemed to be an order putting a stop to the proceedings initiated against the respondents for the commission of offences under Sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act.