M. P. THAKKAR, J. ( 1 ) THE sole question agitated in this revisional application under sec. 29 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act is as to whether the petitioner-landlord is entitled to a decree for eviction under sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act against the respondent-tenant on account of his alleged failure to deposit the standard rent due on the date of the first hearing and on account of his alleged failure to continue to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent till the final decision of the suit. ( 2 ) ON May 2 1965 the petitioner-landlord demised to the respondent - tenant a shop bearing Gram Panchayat No. D-569 and D-517 situated in Lavar Wada Locality in Balasinor at a contractual rent of Rs. 30/per month. Within five months of the creation of the tenancy the petitioner-landlord began to refuse to accept the rent offered by the respondent-tenant. Money Orders were sent by the tenant on October 12 1965 November 4 1965 and December 12 1965 The landlord refused to accept these Money Orders (in paragraph 19 of his deposition the petitioner-landlord has admitted that he refused the Money Orders because he wanted the possession of the property himself and wanted to evict the tenant) By a notice dated February 26 1966 the plaintiff-landlord terminated the tenancy and instituted the suit (ultimately giving rise to the present petition for eviction - Eviction was sought on numerous grounds. It was claimed by the petitioner-landlord that he required the premises rented by him to the respondent only a couple of months back reasonably and bona fide for his personal use. He also claimed a decree for possession on the ground of non-payment of rent for a period exceeding six months (even though admittedly rent in arrears did not exceed a period of five months and even this much had fallen in arrears because the landlord refused to accept the rent ). The trial Court disbelieved the case as regards his requirement for personal use in a bona fide and reasonable manner and held that the landlord did not so require the premises. But the trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit for eviction on the ground that the tenant had not deposited the rent in arrears as required by sec. The trial Court disbelieved the case as regards his requirement for personal use in a bona fide and reasonable manner and held that the landlord did not so require the premises. But the trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit for eviction on the ground that the tenant had not deposited the rent in arrears as required by sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act on the first date of hearing i. e. on July 30 1966 on which day issues were framed by the trial Court. According to the learned trial Judge the sum due was Rs. 300 for a period of 10 months from September 1 1965 till July 30 1966 It was overlooked by the learned trial Judge that the rent for the month of July 1966 would fall due on the first day of August 1966 apart from the fact that July consisted of 31 days and the month itself would come to a close on 31st July 1966 The learned Judge was of the view that the rent for a fraction of the month of July became due on July 30 1966 i. e. on the day on which the issues were framed. In this view of the matter the learned trial Judge decreed the plaintiffs suit for eviction. The tenant approached the District Court at Nadiad by way of Civil Appeal No. 283 of 1967 and questioned the legality and validity of the decree for eviction passed by the learned trial Judge. The learned Judge who heard the appeal came to the conclusion that rent for the month of July 1966 would become due 2 days later on August 1 1966 and that it could not be said to be due on July 30 1966 which was the first date of hearing. In this view of the matter he set aside the decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the suit for eviction. It may be mentioned for the sake of record that it was inter alia argued before the learned Judge hearing the appeal that the tenant was not entitled to protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act inasmuch as in the submission of the landlord the tenant had failed to regularly deposit the rent till the final decision of the suit. 12 (3) (b) of the Act inasmuch as in the submission of the landlord the tenant had failed to regularly deposit the rent till the final decision of the suit. No such contention was raised in the trial Court but the argument was advanced for the first time in the lower appellate Court. The learned appellate Judge negatived this contention as well relying on Harnamsing Lalsing v. Gangaram Itchharam 9 G. L. R. 323. Thereupon the landlord preferred the present revision contending that the decision rendered by the learned Appellate Judge was not in accordance with law. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has urged the following submissions in support of this petition : (1) That the lower appellate Court was in error in holding that rent for the fraction of the month of July 1966 was not due till August 1 1966 (2) That even if the amount then due was deposited on the first date of hearing on July 30 1966 the tenant was not entitled to the protection of sec. 13 (1) (b) inasmuch as according to the petitioner the tenant had failed to deposit regularly the rent due subsequent to the date of the first hearing till the date of the disposal of the suit. ( 4 ) WITH regard to the first submission namely that the rent for the month of July 1966 was due and payable by the tenant to the landlord on July 30 1966 i. e. 2 days before 1st August 1966 I am unable to detect any merit therein. Even the month of July had not expired on the first date of hearing namely on July 30 1966 It would have expired on the next day. How can it be contended that the rent for the month of July or any part of it became payable on July 30 1966 ? It was a tenancy in which rent was payable monthly. The right to claim the rent would arise only upon the completion of the month. The rent payable being compensation for the occupation of the premises for the month of July it would not become payable till the expiry of the last day of the month. Rs. It was a tenancy in which rent was payable monthly. The right to claim the rent would arise only upon the completion of the month. The rent payable being compensation for the occupation of the premises for the month of July it would not become payable till the expiry of the last day of the month. Rs. 30/was the rent for the occupation of the whole month of July 1966 On July 30 1966 the tenant did not have the benefit of occupying the premises for the whole month of July for the month would have expired on the next day i. e. July 31. He was bound to pay the compensation for use and occupation till July 31 after he had the benefit of occupying the premises till July 31 and not earlier inasmuch as the rent was payable monthly. It was not payable in advance. Under the circumstances it is a poor argument to contend that the rent due on July 30 1966 included the rent for the month of July which was yet to expire on the next day. The lower Court was perfectly justified in holding that the rent for the month of July had not become due on July 30 1966 There is no substance in the point urged by counsel. ( 5 ) IT was in the alternative argued that on July 30 1966 the tenant ought to have calculated the rent for the fraction of the month and ought to have deposited the said amount on July 30 1966 Sec. 12 (3) (b) requires the tenant to deposit on the first date of hearing the rent hen due and on July 30 1966 rent for a fraction of the month of July had not become due because rent was payable monthly and not from day-to-day. The argument of the counsel for the petitioner was that even if the month was not completed and the rent for the entire month was not due the tenant was liable to deposit rent for such number of days of the current month as had expired. As the rent was payable monthly it would fall due on the completion of the month and not from day-today. There is therefore no substance in this contention of counsel. Accordingly the first submission must fail. . . . . . . . . . . . . As the rent was payable monthly it would fall due on the completion of the month and not from day-today. There is therefore no substance in this contention of counsel. Accordingly the first submission must fail. . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 6 ) BESIDES having regard to the undisputed position that the petitioner landlord had refused all the three Money Orders sent by the tenant prior to the termination of the tenancy and having regard to the fact that it is in terms admitted by the landlord in paragraph 19 of his deposition (see Ex. 1) that he was not prepared to accept the sum remitted by the tenant as he wanted possession of the premises for his own requirement it is not at all open to him to claim a decree on the ground of non-payment of rent on the hypothesis that the tenant was not ready and willing to pay the rent. A decree for ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent under sec. 12 cannot be passed in a case where the landlord is not prepared to accept the rent. The prayer for ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent postulates that the landlord is ready and willing to accept the rent but the tenant is not ready and willing to pay the rent. When however the landlord himself is not prepared to accept the rent the question regarding the readiness or the willingness of the tenant becomes irrelevant. Surely the tenant cannot be expected to thrust the rent into the hands of the unwilling landlord or to use force to make the landlord accept the rent? When the landlord is not entitled to a decree for ejectment in view of his unwillingness to accept the rent the Court cannot pass a decree against the tenant on the ground that during the course of the pendency of the suit there was a shortage in the amount deposited by him or some irregularity in making the deposit unless the Court calls upon him to deposit a particular amount and the tenant willfully and deliberately fails or refuses to do within the specified time subject to extension of the deadline for deposit from time to time if so warranted by the attendant circumstances. There is yet another dimension of the matter. There is yet another dimension of the matter. The requirement as regards tendering such rent in Court regularly embodied in sec. 12 (2) (b) is not mandatory. It is merely directory. The emphasis is on tendering the amount of future rent in Court: not on tendering the same at the stroke of a particular hour with computer-like precision or punctuality. What is of the essence is the pragmatic test of actual payment or tendering; not payment or tendering with clock-like precision. Surely the legislature did not intend to invest the Court with the role of a school teacher who inculcates lessons of rigid punctuality to his students. So also the Legislature could not have intended to confer disciplinary or penal jurisdiction on the Courts to punish an unfortunate tenant who either on account of error in computation or lack of adequate funds at the zero hour is unable to deposit the arrears to the last pie. The legislature could not have so intended because the manifest perspective of the legislature is to shield the tenant from exploitation by the landlord and to redeem him from the plight arising out of paucity of living accommodation which the welfare State is obliged to provide. Sec. 12 (3) (b) it must be realized has not been designed by way of a trap to ensure a tenant who may commit a mistake in calculation or may not be able to deposit the amount that may become due during the course of the appeal on the stroke of the zero hour The Legislature has not enacted the provision to introduce the doctrine of pay punctually or perish or to terrorize the tenant who may (like any one else) find himself in financial embarrassment at the crucial moment. The provision is enacted to reasonably protect the landlord not to capitalize on the economic distress of the tenant. When these weighty considerations are introduced in the equation there remains no escape from the conclusion that the requirement regarding regularity embodied in section 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act (in connection with payment or tendering in Court Or the rent) is merely directory and not mandatory. When these weighty considerations are introduced in the equation there remains no escape from the conclusion that the requirement regarding regularity embodied in section 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act (in connection with payment or tendering in Court Or the rent) is merely directory and not mandatory. Of course if the Court determines the amount due and calls upon the tenant to deposit the amount and the tenant deliberately and willfully refuses to do so even after reasonable time is granted to him the matter might stand on a different looting. Under the circumstances the view taken by the learned Judge of the lower Appellant Court must be confirmed. ( 7 ) THERE is no substance in the revision. It fails and is rejected. Rule is discharged. There will be no order regarding costs. Application dismissed. .