JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - This case has come to us for decision on a reference made by a learned single Judge. The point for decision is as to whether the driver of a vehicle, who is himself not the owner, can be convicted of an offence punishable under section 123 read with section 42 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It appears that formerly there was some conflict of decisions on this point. In his referring order the learned Single Judge expressed the view that the driver of a vehicle as distinct from its owner could not be made liable for an offence under 123 section of the Act. In the referring order some decisions were adverted to such as the cases of Hari Gopal and another v. The State, 1956 ALJ 177 and Jagroop and another v. Rex, ILR 1960 All. 441. A contrary view was, however, expressed in some other decisions of this Court. In Uma Shanker Tewary and another v. Rex, AIR 1950 All. 234 Agarwala J. while referring to sections 42 and 123 of the Act came to the conclusion that the restrictions imposed by these provisions had the affect of prohibiting the use of a transport vehicle except in accordance with the conditions of a permit. Accordingly he affirmed the conviction of the driver who was found driving the vehicle which was unregistered in as much as its certificate of fitness had expired. A similar view was taken in a recent decision of this Court in Ram Sewak v. State, 1971 ALJ 105 in which Oak, C. J. ruled : "Upon reading sections 33 and 42 together, it appears that the Act has prohibited the use of a motor vehicle for hire without a valid permit for being used as such. This general prohibition against the use of a motor vehicle for hire without a permit is directed as much against the owner of the vehicle as against its driver or a stranger. Any one contravening the general prohibition of the Act is liable to be punished under section 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act." 2. Some other High Courts appear to have taken a contrary view. Any one contravening the general prohibition of the Act is liable to be punished under section 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act." 2. Some other High Courts appear to have taken a contrary view. The learned Single Judge was also of the opinion that the language of the statute, as incorporated in section 123, prima facie appeared to justify the view taken by the other High Courts. In this state of conflict of authorities the case was referred to a larger Bench and came to us for decision. The point is, however, concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court which does not seem to have been cited before the learned Single judge otherwise perhaps the reference would not have been necessary. 3. In the case of Bansraj v. State, AIR 1956 Alld. 27 (DB) the construction put on sections 42 and 123 of the Motor Vehicles Act was that they were in pari materia and the scope of section 123 could not transcend that of section 42. It was held that the intention of the Legislature while enacting section 123 could not be to punish any act which was not prohibited by section 42 itself. That dictum was approved by a full Bench of this Court in Sher Khan v. State, AIR 1958 Alld. 733. The law enunciated by the full Bench was : "Under sections 42(1) and 123(1) of the Act as they stood prior to the amendment, it is the owner of a transport vehicle alone when he acts in contravention of section 42(1) who can fall with- in the scope of section 123(1) of the Act. All persons who are not owners fall outside that scope." 4. The same view found favour with some other High Courts to whose decisions we need not refer. The case decided in A.I.R. 1956 Allahabad 27 which formed the bed rock of the later full Bench of this Court was expressly over-ruled by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Bansraj, AIR 1959 SC 79 . Their lordships of the Supreme Court analysed the provisions of section 42 and came to the conclusion that the emphasis in that provision was not only on the owner of the vehicle but on the user of the vehicle in violati in of the conditions of the permit. Their lordships of the Supreme Court analysed the provisions of section 42 and came to the conclusion that the emphasis in that provision was not only on the owner of the vehicle but on the user of the vehicle in violati in of the conditions of the permit. Examined from that point of view the scope of section 42 was wider than it might ostensibly appear. When the substantive act of plying a vehicle in a manner contrary to the conditions of a permit is itself prohibited, it makes no differences as to whether the vehicle was being driven by the owner himself or by such non-owner as the driver. The intention of the Legislature was to prohibit the principle act i.e. user of a vehicle in a particular manner and not merely its user at the hands of the owner himself. Kapur J. observed : "Thus construed section 42(I) contemplates not only prohibition against the user by the owner of the vehicle or his permitting its user in a manner contrary to the conditions of the permit but it also contemplates that the vehicle itself shall be used in the manner authorised by the permit. The prohibition therefore is not merely against the use by the owner but against the use contrary to the conditions of the permit of the vehicle itself." 5. The language employed by the Legislature in section 123 of the Act appears to be wholly repugnant to the contention put forward on behalf of the applicant. The aforesaid section which is a penalising section expressly casts the penalty on "whoever drives a motor vehicles or causes or allows a motor vehicle to be used in contravention of the provisions of section 22......". In the teeth of this language the argument is wholly untenable that the liability under that section is confined to the owner of the vehicle and cannot extend to a non-owner. As was pointed out by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Bansraj (supra) the use of the word "whoever" occurring in section 123 reveals beyond doubt the intention of the Legislature that no motor vehicle should be driven by any one contrary to the provisions of section 42(1) and if that was driven in contravention of this provision, the driver was liable to punishment. A cumulative reading of both these sections therefore leads to the irresistible conclusion that a motor vehicle cannot be driven by any one contrary to the conditions of the permit relating to the vehicle, whether the vehicle is driven by the owner himself or by someone other than the owner. In the circumstances the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant that the revisionists being mostly the drivers and not the owners of the vehicle are not liable to punishment for breach of section 42 of the Act must be repelled. 6. It was also submitted on behalf of the applicant that the driver of a motor vehicle could come within the mischief of section 123 for driving a vehicle without the required permit under section 42 only when on circumstances of the case knowledge could be attributed to him of the fact that the vehicle was not supported by a permit. There is no force in this contention. When the law en- joins on a driver that he shall not drive a motor vehicle without the permit required by section 42 it is his duty and responsibility to see that the vehicle which he handles is not without a permit. In case he choses to drive the vehicle without caring to observe the necessary requirements of law he incurs the liability under section 123 of the Act and his ignorance of the want of permit required under section 42 cannot be an adequate defence.