JUDGMENT H.N. Kapoor, J. - This revision has been filed against the final order dated Dec. 7, 1972 passed by Shri S.C. Rastogi City Magistrate in proceedings under section 133 Cr.P.C. ordering demolition of house No. 44/403 Nai Sarak, Kanpur, which is a waqf property of which Maqbool Husain is the mutwalli. The applicant was one of the three tenants in this building. The other two tenants were also the parties to the proceedings but they were not impleaded in this revision nor has the State has been made a party which should have been done. The proceedings were initiated on the application of the opposite party on the ground that the building is a very old and in a dilapidated condition. A portion of the building had fallen down and the rest of it was likely to fall down endangering the public life. The learned Magistrate obtained a police report. He made an enquiry. He also inspected the site and then passed the impugned order. 2. One of the grounds taken in this revision is that no provisional order was passed. The Magistrate had passed the order dated September 4, 1971 on the basis of a report made by an Engineer produced by the opposite party and had been issued notice to all the parties concerned requiring them to demolish the building or to appear from him and show cause. There is thus no illegality in this regard. 3. It was next argued that the notice was wrongly issued to the applicant who was only a tenant and as such the notice could be for vacating the house and not for demolishing the same. The notice was issued to the owner as well as to the tenants who were the occupiers. The purpose was that they may not interfere with the demolition of the building by the owner. 4. It was next argued that the evidence adduced by the applicant has not been properly considered and that the findings given by the learned Magistrate are perverse. It was also argued that it has not been proved that the condition of the building was such that it would have fallen outside and was dangerous to the life of the persons of the neighbourhood or passers-by. It was further argued that the entire building could not have been ordered to be demolished. It was also argued that it has not been proved that the condition of the building was such that it would have fallen outside and was dangerous to the life of the persons of the neighbourhood or passers-by. It was further argued that the entire building could not have been ordered to be demolished. In this case the evidence of Murtaza Husain (P.W. 1) was recorded, who is a qualified and experienced Overseer. He had proved his inspection notes. It was found that the roof of the hall had collapsed in which the revisionist had installed a chakki, slippers had been worn out, walls had developed cracks and had tilted. One of the tenants Munshi Abdul Hamid, who has not been made a party in this revision had admitted that the wall of the house had collapsed and the remaining building had developed cracks and had tilted walls. It was also proved by the evidence that the building was an old one and was in a dangerous condition and could collapse at any time endangering the life and property of the dwellers and the public. It has also cone in evidence that there is a school adjacent to the said building. The safety of the children was also to be taken into consideration. 5. The revisionist had examined the Engineer Shri A.T. Patel (P.W. 1). His report also shows that the roof of the chakki had fallen down. He had, however, reported that the building was about fifty years old and required proper repairs and would not collapse if the repairs were properly carried out. When he was examined in court, he stated that the building could be 80 or 90 years old and that it was in its last stage. He also stated that if the upper storey falls down, the lower portion too would be affected. He could not state as to how long the building could last. He further stated that it was correct that it was dangerous to the life of the passers-by in case it falls down. The learned Magistrate himself had made an inspection and had prepared his inspection notes. He could not state as to how long the building could last. He further stated that it was correct that it was dangerous to the life of the passers-by in case it falls down. The learned Magistrate himself had made an inspection and had prepared his inspection notes. After considering the entire evidence on the record as well as his inspection notes, he arrived at the conclusion that the entire building was in such a condition that it was likely to fall and thereby causing injury to the persons living or carrying on business in the neighbourhood or to the passers-by. This finding cannot be considered to be perverse under the circumstances of this case. 6. It was also argued that in case the learned Magistrate had not passed an injunction order, the applicant would have got the repairs done himself and the fallen roof could have been repair- ed and that the building would not have been in such a dangerous condition. That order purported to have been passed under section 135 Cr.P.C. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to decide whether that order was properly passed or not. The learned Magistrate obviously wanted to make a thorough enquiry about the cracks etc. in the wall so that he could form his opinion. Moreover the roof had already fallen down before these proceedings were started or the injunction order had been issued. 7. Learned counsel for the. applicant then argued that recourse to proceedings under section 133 Cr.P.C. could not have been taken when civil remedy was open unless it was a case of urgency. In support of this contention, he has placed reliance on the case of Asharf Lal v. State, AIR 1965 All. p. 215 and Ghurahu Das v. Shakalraj Das, AIR 1926 All. p. 157. Those cases are distinguishable. The facts of those cases were that obstructions existed for the last several years and then proceedings under section 133 Criminal Procedure Code were suddenly started when a civil suit could have been filed. The present is not a case of obstruction but a case of demolition of a dilapidated building which was in a dangerous condition. It was, therefore, a case of urgency. 8. The present is not a case of obstruction but a case of demolition of a dilapidated building which was in a dangerous condition. It was, therefore, a case of urgency. 8. Lastly it was urged that after the enforcement of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, it was not possible to take action under section 133 Cr.P. C. in respect of a building which was in the occupation of tenants and those tenants could be evicted for that purpose under section 21 (1) (b) of the said Act as in that case special rights have been given to tenants. It was argued that to that limited extent, section 133 Criminal Procedure Code should be deemed to have been repealed. On the point of repeal certain authorities were cited: Northern India Caterers Private Limited v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC p. 1581; State of Orissa and another v. M.A.T. and Company, AIR 1964 SC p. 1284. In my opinion these authorities are irrelevant for the purpose of this case. When the provisions of the two Acts are similar, it is possible to advance such an argument. Here a civil remedy has been provided under the Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 while section 133 Criminal Procedure Code is meant for taking proceedings in urgent cases by the Magistrate. It is a different matter that the landlord has moved an application in the present ease. But the order can be passed only when the Magistrate himself is satisfied that it is likely to endanger the life of the public. Suppose there was a case in which the landlord did not choose to apply for ejectment of his tenants under section 21 of the aforesaid Act and allowed the building to fall down. Can it be said that the Magistrate was helpless in view of the aforesaid Act and could not pass an order under section 133 Criminal Procedure Code on the basis of his own information or police report ? I am, therefore, of the opinion that the two provisions are independent of each other and it cannot be said that section 133 Criminal Procedure Code has been repealed for the limited purpose for which relief could be given under section 21 of the aforesaid Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting. Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the two provisions are independent of each other and it cannot be said that section 133 Criminal Procedure Code has been repealed for the limited purpose for which relief could be given under section 21 of the aforesaid Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting. Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Reliance was placed on the case of Mst. Dhoopo v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 Raj. 238 in which it was held that when there was a definite provision in the Rajasthan Municipalities Act for realisation of the fine, simple imprisonment in lieu of fine under section 64 Indian Penal Code could not have been ordered. That authority too is irrelevant, in view of the above discussion. 9. In the result there is no force in this revision. It is accordingly dismissed. The stay order dated May 21, 1973 is vacated. The record of the case shall be sent back to the lower court immediately.